On Apr 25, 10:22*am, "Dutch" > wrote:
> "Rupert" > wrote
>
> > Jon Wetlesen claims that those marginal humans who permanently lack
> > the ability to be a moral agent "may" still have the capability. What
> > I would like is for you to explain what this claim means.
>
> In order for a being to have the ability to act as a moral agent it must
> first possess the capability for the ability to develop and manifest. A one
> day old infant possesses this capability. It is in its dna, in his brain,
> his being.

Well, maybe you can elaborate, are you suggesting that there are well-
defined criteria for whether the capability is present?

On 4/25/2012 12:34 AM, Rupert wrote:
> On Apr 23, 10:41 pm, George > wrote:
>> On 4/23/2012 1:21 PM, Rupert wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> On Apr 23, 8:22 pm, George > wrote:
>>>> On 4/23/2012 10:26 AM, Rupert wrote:
>>
>>>>> On Apr 23, 5:11 pm, George > wrote:
>>>>>> On 4/23/2012 1:07 AM, Rupert wrote:
>>
>>>>>>> On Apr 22, 6:26 pm, George > wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 4/22/2012 1:34 AM, Rupert wrote:
>>
>>>>>>>>> On Apr 22, 6:38 am, George > wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 4/21/2012 12:48 PM, Rupert wrote:
>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 21, 9:25 pm, George > wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/21/2012 10:39 AM, Dutch wrote:
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> > wrote
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 21, 9:41 am, > wrote:
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Let's not get too far off topic. We're not talking about animal
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> welfare, the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> subject is "speciesism" and "equal consideration". I give greater
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> consideration to a gorilla than a pig, and more to a pig than to a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sponge.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Unfortunately you don't seem willing to specify in detail what kind of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> moral consideration you give to a pig, so I suppose I'm never going to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> learn all that much about what your views are.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> I'm willing to discuss the treatment of pigs, its just not on point at
>>>>>>>>>>>>> the moment. My view on the current discussion is that "equal
>>>>>>>>>>>>> consideration" (or 'non-speciesism') is at the very least a misnomer, a
>>>>>>>>>>>>> misguided notion.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Good job on not letting Woopert steer the conversation off topic. It's
>>>>>>>>>>>> one of his regular tactics.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Dutch is claiming that otherspeciesare due less moral consideration.
>>>>>>>>>>> I am trying to getting him to make this concrete by expounding his
>>>>>>>>>>> views with regard to a specific example. It's not going off topic.
>>
>>>>>>>>>> Trying to get him to explain in detail the *degree* of consideration he
>>>>>>>>>> gives pigs, when the issue is the binary one of giving equal
>>>>>>>>>> consideration or not giving equal consideration to animals, is going off
>>>>>>>>>> topic.
>>
>>>>>>>>> No, it's not
>>
>>>>>>>> It is. The particular weight he gives to pigs' interests has nothing to
>>>>>>>> do with the principle ofspecies-specific consideration.
>>
>>>>>>>> You're engaging in your usual invalid debate tactics.
>>
>>>>>>> Why is asking someone a question to get them to clarify their views an
>>>>>>> "invalid debate tactic"?
>>
>>>>>> It's a time-wasting evasion that is *not* asking him to clarify his
>>>>>> views. His contention is that a different level of consideration for
>>>>>> animals on aspeciesbyspeciesbasis is morally permissible. How much
>>>>>> consideration he gives to members of a particularspeciesis irrelevant
>>>>>> to the topic.
>>
>>>>> It is asking him to clarify his views. And it is relevant because he
>>>>> has not refuted the AMC.
>>
>>>> The AMC was never really anargument, and what little bit ofargumentis
>>>> in it is refuted by the ASN, which no "ara" has ever properly understood
>>>> and so has never refuted.
>>
>>> I directed you towards a critical discussion of the ASN. You have not
>>> provided a satisfactory response.
>>
>> I did. You and all the other "ar" extremists don't get ASN.
>>
>
> What you said is "They don't get it". This is not a satisfactory
> response.

It's a fact.


>>>> Rights and moral consideration of interests are evolutionary
>>>> developments of humans, and they evolved because they are successful at
>>>> helping to regulate human interactions.
>>
>>> In what sense?
>>
>> You continue to exhibit problems with basic English language.
>>
>
> It's not a problem with the English language.

It appears it is.

"Rupert" > wrote in message
...
> On Apr 25, 9:43 am, "Dutch" > wrote:
>> "Rupert" > wrote in message
>>
>> ...
>>
>> > On Apr 24, 7:09 am, "Dutch" > wrote:
>> >> "Rupert" > wrote
>>
>> >> > On Apr 23, 8:09 pm, "Dutch" > wrote:
>> >> >> > It is asking him to clarify his views. And it is relevant because
>> >> >> > he
>> >> >> > has not refuted the AMC.
>>
>> >> >> I have.
>>
>> >> > What's the refutation?
>>
>> >> moralstat99
>>
>> > How would you define "capabilities"?
>>
>> From moralstat99
>> -----------------------------------------------
>> A rebuttal of the argument from marginal cases
>> It may well be that Warren's proposal at this point is more adequate in
>> relation to common sense than the positions of Regan or Singer.
>> Nevertheless, it appears that all three of them have based their
>> arguments on the assumption that the concepts of a moral person and a
>> moral agent are synonymous or equivalent. This assumption can be
>> contested, and if it is rejected, it seems that their arguments will not
>> work.
>> An alternative to their assumption has been developed by Jens Saugstad
>> in his doctoral thesis on The Moral Ontology of Human Fetuses; A
>> Metaphysical Investigation of Personhood (1994). On Saugstad's
>> interpretation, Kant's concept of a moral person is generic in relation
>> to that of a moral agent. This implies that the class of moral agents is
>> a subclass of moral persons; some moral persons are moral agents, others
>> are not.
>> On the conceptual level Saugstad gets this result by distinguishing two
>> kinds of capacities: capabilities and abilities. In order to be a moral
>> agent, a person must be able to take a moral responsibility for his or
>> her actions, and to be answerable for them. This requires not only the
>> capabilities of free will, reason and a linguistic competence; but also
>> the operative ability of realising these capabilities in practice.
>> However, a subject may have the capabilities of moral agency without
>> having the operative abilities. In that case the subject is a moral
>> person without being a moral agent, since moral personhood is grounded
>> on the actual capability and not on the potential ability.
>> Two consequences follow from this solution. In the first place, it
>> extends moral status to sentient marginal humans. The sufficient and
>> necessary condition for this extension is the presence of the capability
>> of moral agency. If this is present, it is not necessary that the
>> operative ability is also present. On this ground equal inherent value
>> and equal basic rights can be ascribed to both marginal and normal human
>> beings.
>> Admittedly, the assumption about the presence of this capability is not
>> equally verifiable in all cases. In some cases it is verifiable, such as
>> in normal youths, children, neonates, and foetuses in the later stages
>> of pregnancy. They do not have the actual ability of being moral agents,
>> but they have it potentially and it will be actualised in due time.
>> Still they may be assumed to have the capability as an actual internal
>> property, and this is the ground for considering them to be persons. It
>> may be asked whether this argument justifies the assumption about equal
>> moral status value. Would it not be possible to introduce grading on the
>> basis of how far the potentiality for moral agency has developed? This
>> view has been propounded in discussions about abortion. On the basis of
>> the present argument, however, it must be rejected, since moral status
>> value is assumed to be grounded on capabilities of agency, which are
>> actual, and not on potential abilities.
>> In other cases there are humans who have been moral agents, but have
>> lost the required abilities. This pertains to many cases of the severely
>> brain damaged and the severely senile. If we assume that they have
>> retained their capabilities of being moral agents, we still have a
>> sufficient reason for ascribing equal inherent value to them. Against
>> this it may be objected that they may have lost not only their ability
>> of being moral agents, but also their capability. There is room for much
>> empirical doubt about these borderline cases, and for that reason there
>> is also room for giving them the benefit of doubt. Admittedly, this is a
>> somewhat ad hoc assumption. Even if it is not a good scientific
>> explanation, however, it may be a good moral reason.
>> This kind of argument can also be applied to the most difficult cases of
>> marginal humans who have never had the ability of being moral agents and
>> will never get it, such as the severely mentally retarded.
>> Theoretically, it is not inconceivable that the capability is still
>> there, and that this can be used as a ground for ascribing an equal
>> moral status value to them. If this justification is not accepted,
>> however, it does not necessarily follow that they have no moral status
>> value at all. They may have a gradual moral status value, depending on
>> the argument which we shall discuss below. As for those who are borne
>> without a brain, they do seem to be excluded.
>> According to the present argument, inherent value is ascribed equally to
>> all moral persons. Hence this position is universalistic and
>> egalitarian. If this way of understanding the relation between moral
>> persons and moral agents works, there will be no need to distinguish
>> Agent's Rights and Human Rights the way Warren does. They will be
>> grounded in the same internal property of moral persons, and there will
>> be no need for a supplementary justification based on an external
>> relation such as membership in a human society.
>> The second consequence which follows from this position is that there
>> will be a relevant difference between human and non-human beings, which
>> can justify a differential treatment with regard to the ascription of
>> moral status. Humans have a property which other animals lack, notably
>> the capability of being moral agents, and if this property is accepted
>> to be a necessary condition for the ascription of moral status, then its
>> absence in other animals will be a sufficient condition for denying
>> moral status to them. In this way Kant's anthropocentrism is vindicated,
>> albeit with the proviso mentioned earlier that this rests on the
>> contingent fact that only humans are moral persons. Theoretically, there
>> might be other moral persons also, but there seem to be none, excepting
>> perhaps some of our closest relatives among the primates.
>> ----------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Yes, I just re-read that passage this morning.
>
> The difficulty is that no definition of the central term "capability"
> is given.

A capability is an inherent ability in any state, potential, latent, active,
or disabled.

An eagle has (or "eagles have") the capability of flight before ever
leaving the egg, but the ability doesn't develop until later.

> Let us suppose that we have a human who has always been very seriously
> mentally impaired ever since he was born, and has never had cognitive
> abilities greater than that of a dog. Wetlesen claims that there is
> some possibility that he might still have the capability to be a moral
> agent, and therefore we have moral reason to extend the benefit of the
> doubt and treat the individual as though he does in fact have that
> capability. I assume that there is meant to be an objective fact of
> the matter about whether the capability is in fact present. Suppose
> that I were a scientist trying to resolve this question. How would I
> go about trying to resolve it?

I don't know that there is a way to prove it, perhaps someday with advances
in biology they will discover exactly where each ability originates in the
brain, they already know most of them. But he is suggesting that it is
reasonable to assume that it exists and that its the ability to develop or
manifest the capability in an ability that has been lost. The person
probably has all the right types of brain cells, they just don't work or
connect properly. He would not have a dog brain. Anyway these marginal cases
don't prove anything, because we normally have a list of subjective reasons
to view and treat those humans differently, just as we have subjective
reasons to treat individual animals in special ways, such as pets or
"special" species.

We can't make the assumption that advanced cognitive capacities exist with
any other species because no member of those species has ever manifested
those abilities. We give consideration to animals based on an educated guess
as to their capacities. Until a flea or a dog or a pig exhibits advanced
cognitive abilities we can safely assume that those capacities do not exist
in those species. As soon as *one* does, then we would be compelled in my
opinion to assume that every member of that species possesses those
capabilities, just as we do with humans. Therefore we are giving them equal
consideration.

"Rupert" > wrote in message
...
> On Apr 25, 9:45 am, "Dutch" > wrote:
>> "Rupert" > wrote in message
>>
>> ...
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> > On Apr 24, 7:18 am, "Dutch" > wrote:
>> >> "Rupert" > wrote
>>
>> >> > On Apr 23, 9:14 pm, "Dutch" > wrote:
>> >> >> The first thing to consider is that the moment you use the broad
>> >> >> term
>> >> >> "animals" the argument against "speciesism" immediately falls apart
>> >> >> because
>> >> >> no argument for equal consideration of animals can *possibly*
>> >> >> include
>> >> >> all
>> >> >> animal life (e.g there is animal life in your hair, in the carpet,
>> >> >> etc...)
>> >> >> so the assumption must be made that it refers to certain animals
>> >> >> only,
>> >> >> and
>> >> >> as soon as you do that you are engaging in "speciesism". And if the
>> >> >> ARA
>> >> >> says, no I am not selecting by species, I am selecting by the
>> >> >> attributes
>> >> >> of
>> >> >> certain species, such as sentience or intelligence, the response,
>> >> >> that
>> >> >> is
>> >> >> exactly what we are doing too.
>>
>> >> > But you refuse to spell out the details of your views, such as for
>> >> > example what it entails about how pigs should be treated.
>>
>> >> The details are beside the point, bigger and better pens, no tail
>> >> docking,
>> >> more light, soothing music, whatever is shown to make them content,
>> >> etc.
>> >> The
>> >> point is that I believe that they deserve a lot more consideration
>> >> than
>> >> fleas, and so do you, therefore both of us are "speciesist". I just
>> >> don't
>> >> have the same set of speciesist attitudes about the same species that
>> >> you
>> >> do. It would be folly to not use the information that an animal's
>> >> species
>> >> conveys to inform our ways of relating to them.
>>
>> > As far as the comparison with fleas go, fleas have a completely
>> > different set of interests, so you haven't really shown that I'm
>> > failing to follow the principle of equal consideration of interests.
>> > That is not what I mean by speciesism.
>>
>> Don't fleas have an interest in survival?
>>
>
> Well, they may or may not, I'm not sure whether they are capable of
> conscious experience. If they do have an interest in survival, then
> that is one thing that they have in common with pigs, but it still
> remains true that the set of interests a flea has is very different in
> many important ways to the set of interests that a pig has. So even if
> you were extending equal consideration to similar interests, you still
> might end up treating a flea very differently to the way you would
> treat a pig.

I'm not talking about conscious experience or suggesting they are aware that
they have an interest in survival, but that they behave as if they have it.
I doubt if pigs are aware that they have an interest in survival either,
like the flea and every other animal other than humans they simply are wired
to pursue that interest. If you are saying that consideration should be
based on the degree to which animals have conscious experience then I would
say that humans are far ahead of every other animal.

On Apr 25, 8:17*pm, "Dutch" > wrote:
> "Rupert" > wrote in message
>
> ...
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Apr 25, 9:43 am, "Dutch" > wrote:
> >> "Rupert" > wrote in message
>
> ....
>
> >> > On Apr 24, 7:09 am, "Dutch" > wrote:
> >> >> "Rupert" > wrote
>
> >> >> > On Apr 23, 8:09 pm, "Dutch" > wrote:
> >> >> >> > It is asking him to clarify his views. And it is relevant because
> >> >> >> > he
> >> >> >> > has not refuted the AMC.
>
> >> >> >> I have.
>
> >> >> > What's the refutation?
>
> >> >> moralstat99
>
> >> > How would you define "capabilities"?
>
> >> From moralstat99
> >> -----------------------------------------------
> >> A rebuttal of the argument from marginal cases
> >> It may well be that Warren's proposal at this point is more adequate in
> >> relation to common sense than the positions of Regan or Singer.
> >> Nevertheless, it appears that all three of them have based their
> >> arguments on the assumption that the concepts of a moral person and a
> >> moral agent are synonymous or equivalent. This assumption can be
> >> contested, and if it is rejected, it seems that their arguments will not
> >> work.
> >> An alternative to their assumption has been developed by Jens Saugstad
> >> in his doctoral thesis on The Moral Ontology of Human Fetuses; A
> >> Metaphysical Investigation of Personhood (1994). On Saugstad's
> >> interpretation, Kant's concept of a moral person is generic in relation
> >> to that of a moral agent. This implies that the class of moral agents is
> >> a subclass of moral persons; some moral persons are moral agents, others
> >> are not.
> >> On the conceptual level Saugstad gets this result by distinguishing two
> >> kinds of capacities: capabilities and abilities. In order to be a moral
> >> agent, a person must be able to take a moral responsibility for his or
> >> her actions, and to be answerable for them. This requires not only the
> >> capabilities of free will, reason and a linguistic competence; but also
> >> the operative ability of realising these capabilities in practice.
> >> However, a subject may have the capabilities of moral agency without
> >> having the operative abilities. In that case the subject is a moral
> >> person without being a moral agent, since moral personhood is grounded
> >> on the actual capability and not on the potential ability.
> >> Two consequences follow from this solution. In the first place, it
> >> extends moral status to sentient marginal humans. The sufficient and
> >> necessary condition for this extension is the presence of the capability
> >> of moral agency. If this is present, it is not necessary that the
> >> operative ability is also present. On this ground equal inherent value
> >> and equal basic rights can be ascribed to both marginal and normal human
> >> beings.
> >> Admittedly, the assumption about the presence of this capability is not
> >> equally verifiable in all cases. In some cases it is verifiable, such as
> >> in normal youths, children, neonates, and foetuses in the later stages
> >> of pregnancy. They do not have the actual ability of being moral agents,
> >> but they have it potentially and it will be actualised in due time.
> >> Still they may be assumed to have the capability as an actual internal
> >> property, and this is the ground for considering them to be persons. It
> >> may be asked whether this argument justifies the assumption about equal
> >> moral status value. Would it not be possible to introduce grading on the
> >> basis of how far the potentiality for moral agency has developed? This
> >> view has been propounded in discussions about abortion. On the basis of
> >> the present argument, however, it must be rejected, since moral status
> >> value is assumed to be grounded on capabilities of agency, which are
> >> actual, and not on potential abilities.
> >> In other cases there are humans who have been moral agents, but have
> >> lost the required abilities. This pertains to many cases of the severely
> >> brain damaged and the severely senile. If we assume that they have
> >> retained their capabilities of being moral agents, we still have a
> >> sufficient reason for ascribing equal inherent value to them. Against
> >> this it may be objected that they may have lost not only their ability
> >> of being moral agents, but also their capability. There is room for much
> >> empirical doubt about these borderline cases, and for that reason there
> >> is also room for giving them the benefit of doubt. Admittedly, this is a
> >> somewhat ad hoc assumption. Even if it is not a good scientific
> >> explanation, however, it may be a good moral reason.
> >> This kind of argument can also be applied to the most difficult cases of
> >> marginal humans who have never had the ability of being moral agents and
> >> will never get it, such as the severely mentally retarded.
> >> Theoretically, it is not inconceivable that the capability is still
> >> there, and that this can be used as a ground for ascribing an equal
> >> moral status value to them. If this justification is not accepted,
> >> however, it does not necessarily follow that they have no moral status
> >> value at all. They may have a gradual moral status value, depending on
> >> the argument which we shall discuss below. As for those who are borne
> >> without a brain, they do seem to be excluded.
> >> According to the present argument, inherent value is ascribed equally to
> >> all moral persons. Hence this position is universalistic and
> >> egalitarian. If this way of understanding the relation between moral
> >> persons and moral agents works, there will be no need to distinguish
> >> Agent's Rights and Human Rights the way Warren does. They will be
> >> grounded in the same internal property of moral persons, and there will
> >> be no need for a supplementary justification based on an external
> >> relation such as membership in a human society.
> >> The second consequence which follows from this position is that there
> >> will be a relevant difference between human and non-human beings, which
> >> can justify a differential treatment with regard to the ascription of
> >> moral status. Humans have a property which other animals lack, notably
> >> the capability of being moral agents, and if this property is accepted
> >> to be a necessary condition for the ascription of moral status, then its
> >> absence in other animals will be a sufficient condition for denying
> >> moral status to them. In this way Kant's anthropocentrism is vindicated,
> >> albeit with the proviso mentioned earlier that this rests on the
> >> contingent fact that only humans are moral persons. Theoretically, there
> >> might be other moral persons also, but there seem to be none, excepting
> >> perhaps some of our closest relatives among the primates.
> >> ----------------------------------------------------------------
>
> > Yes, I just re-read that passage this morning.
>
> > The difficulty is that no definition of the central term "capability"
> > is given.
>
> A capability is an inherent ability in any state, potential, latent, active,
> or disabled.
>
> An eagle has *(or "eagles have") the capability of flight before ever
> leaving the egg, but the ability doesn't develop until later.
>
> > Let us suppose that we have a human who has always been very seriously
> > mentally impaired ever since he was born, and has never had cognitive
> > abilities greater than that of a dog. Wetlesen claims that there is
> > some possibility that he might still have the capability to be a moral
> > agent, and therefore we have moral reason to extend the benefit of the
> > doubt and treat the individual as though he does in fact have that
> > capability. I assume that there is meant to be an objective fact of
> > the matter about whether the capability is in fact present. Suppose
> > that I were a scientist trying to resolve this question. How would I
> > go about trying to resolve it?
>
> I don't know that there is a way to prove it, perhaps someday with advances
> in biology they will discover exactly where each ability originates in the
> brain, they already know most of them. But he is suggesting that it is
> reasonable to assume that it exists and that its the ability to develop or
> manifest the capability in an ability that has been lost. The person
> probably has all the right types of brain cells, they just don't work or
> connect properly. He would not have a dog brain. Anyway these marginal cases
> don't prove anything, because we normally have a list of subjective reasons
> to view and treat those humans differently, just as we have subjective
> reasons to treat individual animals in special ways, such as pets or
> "special" species.
>
> We can't make the assumption that advanced cognitive capacities exist with
> any other species because no member of those species has ever manifested
> those abilities. We give consideration to animals based on an educated guess
> as to their capacities. Until a flea or a dog or a pig exhibits advanced
> cognitive abilities we can safely assume that those capacities do not exist
> in those species. As soon as *one* does, then we would be compelled in my
> opinion to assume that every member of that species possesses those
> capabilities, just as we do with humans. Therefore we are giving them equal
> consideration.

I am extremely skeptical that "capabilities" is a meaningful concept.

On Apr 25, 8:24*pm, "Dutch" > wrote:
> "Rupert" > wrote in message
>
> ...
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Apr 25, 9:45 am, "Dutch" > wrote:
> >> "Rupert" > wrote in message
>
> ....
>
> >> > On Apr 24, 7:18 am, "Dutch" > wrote:
> >> >> "Rupert" > wrote
>
> >> >> > On Apr 23, 9:14 pm, "Dutch" > wrote:
> >> >> >> The first thing to consider is that the moment you use the broad
> >> >> >> term
> >> >> >> "animals" the argument against "speciesism" immediately falls apart
> >> >> >> because
> >> >> >> no argument for equal consideration of animals can *possibly*
> >> >> >> include
> >> >> >> all
> >> >> >> animal life (e.g there is animal life in your hair, in the carpet,
> >> >> >> etc...)
> >> >> >> so the assumption must be made that it refers to certain animals
> >> >> >> only,
> >> >> >> and
> >> >> >> as soon as you do that you are engaging in "speciesism". And if the
> >> >> >> ARA
> >> >> >> says, no I am not selecting by species, I am selecting by the
> >> >> >> attributes
> >> >> >> of
> >> >> >> certain species, such as sentience or intelligence, the response,
> >> >> >> that
> >> >> >> is
> >> >> >> exactly what we are doing too.
>
> >> >> > But you refuse to spell out the details of your views, such as for
> >> >> > example what it entails about how pigs should be treated.
>
> >> >> The details are beside the point, bigger and better pens, no tail
> >> >> docking,
> >> >> more light, soothing music, whatever is shown to make them content,
> >> >> etc.
> >> >> The
> >> >> point is that I believe that they deserve a lot more consideration
> >> >> than
> >> >> fleas, and so do you, therefore both of us are "speciesist". I just
> >> >> don't
> >> >> have the same set of speciesist attitudes about the same species that
> >> >> you
> >> >> do. It would be folly to not use the information that an animal's
> >> >> species
> >> >> conveys to inform our ways of relating to them.
>
> >> > As far as the comparison with fleas go, fleas have a completely
> >> > different set of interests, so you haven't really shown that I'm
> >> > failing to follow the principle of equal consideration of interests.
> >> > That is not what I mean by speciesism.
>
> >> Don't fleas have an interest in survival?
>
> > Well, they may or may not, I'm not sure whether they are capable of
> > conscious experience. If they do have an interest in survival, then
> > that is one thing that they have in common with pigs, but it still
> > remains true that the set of interests a flea has is very different in
> > many important ways to the set of interests that a pig has. So even if
> > you were extending equal consideration to similar interests, you still
> > might end up treating a flea very differently to the way you would
> > treat a pig.
>
> I'm not talking about conscious experience or suggesting they are aware that
> they have an interest in survival, but that they behave as if they have it.

On Apr 25, 5:41*pm, George Plimpton > wrote:
> On 4/25/2012 12:34 AM, Rupert wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Apr 23, 10:41 pm, George > *wrote:
> >> On 4/23/2012 1:21 PM, Rupert wrote:
>
> >>> On Apr 23, 8:22 pm, George > * *wrote:
> >>>> On 4/23/2012 10:26 AM, Rupert wrote:
>
> >>>>> On Apr 23, 5:11 pm, George > * * *wrote:
> >>>>>> On 4/23/2012 1:07 AM, Rupert wrote:
>
> >>>>>>> On Apr 22, 6:26 pm, George > * * * *wrote:
> >>>>>>>> On 4/22/2012 1:34 AM, Rupert wrote:
>
> >>>>>>>>> On Apr 22, 6:38 am, George > * * * * *wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>> On 4/21/2012 12:48 PM, Rupert wrote:
>
> >>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 21, 9:25 pm, George > * * * * * *wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/21/2012 10:39 AM, Dutch wrote:
>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> > * * * * * *wrote
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 21, 9:41 am, > * * * * * *wrote:
>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Let's not get too far off topic. We're not talking about animal
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> welfare, the
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> subject is "speciesism" and "equal consideration". I give greater
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> consideration to a gorilla than a pig, and more to a pig than to a
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sponge.
>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Unfortunately you don't seem willing to specify in detail what kind of
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> moral consideration you give to a pig, so I suppose I'm never going to
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> learn all that much about what your views are.
>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I'm willing to discuss the treatment of pigs, its just not on point at
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> the moment. My view on the current discussion is that "equal
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> consideration" (or 'non-speciesism') is at the very least a misnomer, a
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> misguided notion.
>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> Good job on not letting Woopert steer the conversation off topic. *It's
> >>>>>>>>>>>> one of his regular tactics.
>
> >>>>>>>>>>> Dutch is claiming that otherspeciesare due less moral consideration.
> >>>>>>>>>>> I am trying to getting him to make this concrete by expounding his
> >>>>>>>>>>> views with regard to a specific example. It's not going off topic.
>
> >>>>>>>>>> Trying to get him to explain in detail the *degree* of consideration he
> >>>>>>>>>> gives pigs, when the issue is the binary one of giving equal
> >>>>>>>>>> consideration or not giving equal consideration to animals, is going off
> >>>>>>>>>> topic.
>
> >>>>>>>>> No, it's not
>
> >>>>>>>> It is. *The particular weight he gives to pigs' interests has nothing to
> >>>>>>>> do with the principle ofspecies-specific consideration.
>
> >>>>>>>> You're engaging in your usual invalid debate tactics.
>
> >>>>>>> Why is asking someone a question to get them to clarify their views an
> >>>>>>> "invalid debate tactic"?
>
> >>>>>> It's a time-wasting evasion that is *not* asking him to clarify his
> >>>>>> views. *His contention is that a different level of consideration for
> >>>>>> animals on aspeciesbyspeciesbasis is morally permissible. *How much
> >>>>>> consideration he gives to members of a particularspeciesis irrelevant
> >>>>>> to the topic.
>
> >>>>> It is asking him to clarify his views. And it is relevant because he
> >>>>> has not refuted the AMC.
>
> >>>> The AMC was never really anargument, and what little bit ofargumentis
> >>>> in it is refuted by the ASN, which no "ara" has ever properly understood
> >>>> and so has never refuted.
>
> >>> I directed you towards a critical discussion of the ASN. You have not
> >>> provided a satisfactory response.
>
> >> I did. *You and all the other "ar" extremists don't get ASN.
>
> > What you said is "They don't get it". This is not a satisfactory
> > response.
>
> It's a fact.
>

You have not established that it's a fact, and however that may be,
it's not a satisfactory response.

> >>>> Rights and moral consideration of interests are evolutionary
> >>>> developments of humans, and they evolved because they are successful at
> >>>> helping to regulate human interactions.
>
> >>> In what sense?
>
> >> You continue to exhibit problems with basic English language.
>
> > It's not a problem with the English language.
>
> It appears it is.

It doesn't appear that way to any reasonably intelligent person. Any
reasonably intelligent person would acknowledge that I've pointed out
that you haven't given a precise meaning to your notion of
"successful".

"Rupert" > wrote in message
...
> On Apr 25, 8:17 pm, "Dutch" > wrote:
>> "Rupert" > wrote in message
>>
>> ...
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> > On Apr 25, 9:43 am, "Dutch" > wrote:
>> >> "Rupert" > wrote in message
>>
>> ...
>>
>> >> > On Apr 24, 7:09 am, "Dutch" > wrote:
>> >> >> "Rupert" > wrote
>>
>> >> >> > On Apr 23, 8:09 pm, "Dutch" > wrote:
>> >> >> >> > It is asking him to clarify his views. And it is relevant
>> >> >> >> > because
>> >> >> >> > he
>> >> >> >> > has not refuted the AMC.
>>
>> >> >> >> I have.
>>
>> >> >> > What's the refutation?
>>
>> >> >> moralstat99
>>
>> >> > How would you define "capabilities"?
>>
>> >> From moralstat99
>> >> -----------------------------------------------
>> >> A rebuttal of the argument from marginal cases
>> >> It may well be that Warren's proposal at this point is more adequate
>> >> in
>> >> relation to common sense than the positions of Regan or Singer.
>> >> Nevertheless, it appears that all three of them have based their
>> >> arguments on the assumption that the concepts of a moral person and a
>> >> moral agent are synonymous or equivalent. This assumption can be
>> >> contested, and if it is rejected, it seems that their arguments will
>> >> not
>> >> work.
>> >> An alternative to their assumption has been developed by Jens Saugstad
>> >> in his doctoral thesis on The Moral Ontology of Human Fetuses; A
>> >> Metaphysical Investigation of Personhood (1994). On Saugstad's
>> >> interpretation, Kant's concept of a moral person is generic in
>> >> relation
>> >> to that of a moral agent. This implies that the class of moral agents
>> >> is
>> >> a subclass of moral persons; some moral persons are moral agents,
>> >> others
>> >> are not.
>> >> On the conceptual level Saugstad gets this result by distinguishing
>> >> two
>> >> kinds of capacities: capabilities and abilities. In order to be a
>> >> moral
>> >> agent, a person must be able to take a moral responsibility for his or
>> >> her actions, and to be answerable for them. This requires not only the
>> >> capabilities of free will, reason and a linguistic competence; but
>> >> also
>> >> the operative ability of realising these capabilities in practice.
>> >> However, a subject may have the capabilities of moral agency without
>> >> having the operative abilities. In that case the subject is a moral
>> >> person without being a moral agent, since moral personhood is grounded
>> >> on the actual capability and not on the potential ability.
>> >> Two consequences follow from this solution. In the first place, it
>> >> extends moral status to sentient marginal humans. The sufficient and
>> >> necessary condition for this extension is the presence of the
>> >> capability
>> >> of moral agency. If this is present, it is not necessary that the
>> >> operative ability is also present. On this ground equal inherent value
>> >> and equal basic rights can be ascribed to both marginal and normal
>> >> human
>> >> beings.
>> >> Admittedly, the assumption about the presence of this capability is
>> >> not
>> >> equally verifiable in all cases. In some cases it is verifiable, such
>> >> as
>> >> in normal youths, children, neonates, and foetuses in the later stages
>> >> of pregnancy. They do not have the actual ability of being moral
>> >> agents,
>> >> but they have it potentially and it will be actualised in due time.
>> >> Still they may be assumed to have the capability as an actual internal
>> >> property, and this is the ground for considering them to be persons.
>> >> It
>> >> may be asked whether this argument justifies the assumption about
>> >> equal
>> >> moral status value. Would it not be possible to introduce grading on
>> >> the
>> >> basis of how far the potentiality for moral agency has developed? This
>> >> view has been propounded in discussions about abortion. On the basis
>> >> of
>> >> the present argument, however, it must be rejected, since moral status
>> >> value is assumed to be grounded on capabilities of agency, which are
>> >> actual, and not on potential abilities.
>> >> In other cases there are humans who have been moral agents, but have
>> >> lost the required abilities. This pertains to many cases of the
>> >> severely
>> >> brain damaged and the severely senile. If we assume that they have
>> >> retained their capabilities of being moral agents, we still have a
>> >> sufficient reason for ascribing equal inherent value to them. Against
>> >> this it may be objected that they may have lost not only their ability
>> >> of being moral agents, but also their capability. There is room for
>> >> much
>> >> empirical doubt about these borderline cases, and for that reason
>> >> there
>> >> is also room for giving them the benefit of doubt. Admittedly, this is
>> >> a
>> >> somewhat ad hoc assumption. Even if it is not a good scientific
>> >> explanation, however, it may be a good moral reason.
>> >> This kind of argument can also be applied to the most difficult cases
>> >> of
>> >> marginal humans who have never had the ability of being moral agents
>> >> and
>> >> will never get it, such as the severely mentally retarded.
>> >> Theoretically, it is not inconceivable that the capability is still
>> >> there, and that this can be used as a ground for ascribing an equal
>> >> moral status value to them. If this justification is not accepted,
>> >> however, it does not necessarily follow that they have no moral status
>> >> value at all. They may have a gradual moral status value, depending on
>> >> the argument which we shall discuss below. As for those who are borne
>> >> without a brain, they do seem to be excluded.
>> >> According to the present argument, inherent value is ascribed equally
>> >> to
>> >> all moral persons. Hence this position is universalistic and
>> >> egalitarian. If this way of understanding the relation between moral
>> >> persons and moral agents works, there will be no need to distinguish
>> >> Agent's Rights and Human Rights the way Warren does. They will be
>> >> grounded in the same internal property of moral persons, and there
>> >> will
>> >> be no need for a supplementary justification based on an external
>> >> relation such as membership in a human society.
>> >> The second consequence which follows from this position is that there
>> >> will be a relevant difference between human and non-human beings,
>> >> which
>> >> can justify a differential treatment with regard to the ascription of
>> >> moral status. Humans have a property which other animals lack, notably
>> >> the capability of being moral agents, and if this property is accepted
>> >> to be a necessary condition for the ascription of moral status, then
>> >> its
>> >> absence in other animals will be a sufficient condition for denying
>> >> moral status to them. In this way Kant's anthropocentrism is
>> >> vindicated,
>> >> albeit with the proviso mentioned earlier that this rests on the
>> >> contingent fact that only humans are moral persons. Theoretically,
>> >> there
>> >> might be other moral persons also, but there seem to be none,
>> >> excepting
>> >> perhaps some of our closest relatives among the primates.
>> >> ----------------------------------------------------------------
>>
>> > Yes, I just re-read that passage this morning.
>>
>> > The difficulty is that no definition of the central term "capability"
>> > is given.
>>
>> A capability is an inherent ability in any state, potential, latent,
>> active,
>> or disabled.
>>
>> An eagle has (or "eagles have") the capability of flight before ever
>> leaving the egg, but the ability doesn't develop until later.
>>
>> > Let us suppose that we have a human who has always been very seriously
>> > mentally impaired ever since he was born, and has never had cognitive
>> > abilities greater than that of a dog. Wetlesen claims that there is
>> > some possibility that he might still have the capability to be a moral
>> > agent, and therefore we have moral reason to extend the benefit of the
>> > doubt and treat the individual as though he does in fact have that
>> > capability. I assume that there is meant to be an objective fact of
>> > the matter about whether the capability is in fact present. Suppose
>> > that I were a scientist trying to resolve this question. How would I
>> > go about trying to resolve it?
>>
>> I don't know that there is a way to prove it, perhaps someday with
>> advances
>> in biology they will discover exactly where each ability originates in
>> the
>> brain, they already know most of them. But he is suggesting that it is
>> reasonable to assume that it exists and that its the ability to develop
>> or
>> manifest the capability in an ability that has been lost. The person
>> probably has all the right types of brain cells, they just don't work or
>> connect properly. He would not have a dog brain. Anyway these marginal
>> cases
>> don't prove anything, because we normally have a list of subjective
>> reasons
>> to view and treat those humans differently, just as we have subjective
>> reasons to treat individual animals in special ways, such as pets or
>> "special" species.
>>
>> We can't make the assumption that advanced cognitive capacities exist
>> with
>> any other species because no member of those species has ever manifested
>> those abilities. We give consideration to animals based on an educated
>> guess
>> as to their capacities. Until a flea or a dog or a pig exhibits advanced
>> cognitive abilities we can safely assume that those capacities do not
>> exist
>> in those species. As soon as *one* does, then we would be compelled in my
>> opinion to assume that every member of that species possesses those
>> capabilities, just as we do with humans. Therefore we are giving them
>> equal
>> consideration.
>
> I am extremely skeptical that "capabilities" is a meaningful concept.

That's interesting, since organisms are living before they begin to manifest
all the abilities typical of their species, how would you describe those
latent, potential as-yet-not-demonstrated abilities? Are they not "concept
worthy"? Birds possess something, inherently, while they are only a clump of
cells, that leads to them in time to be able to fly. You had the capability
at one time to become a mathematician, before you were one. That was in no
small part due to your species.

"Rupert" > wrote in message
...
> On Apr 25, 8:24 pm, "Dutch" > wrote:
>> "Rupert" > wrote in message
>>
>> ...
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> > On Apr 25, 9:45 am, "Dutch" > wrote:
>> >> "Rupert" > wrote in message
>>
>> ...
>>
>> >> > On Apr 24, 7:18 am, "Dutch" > wrote:
>> >> >> "Rupert" > wrote
>>
>> >> >> > On Apr 23, 9:14 pm, "Dutch" > wrote:
>> >> >> >> The first thing to consider is that the moment you use the broad
>> >> >> >> term
>> >> >> >> "animals" the argument against "speciesism" immediately falls
>> >> >> >> apart
>> >> >> >> because
>> >> >> >> no argument for equal consideration of animals can *possibly*
>> >> >> >> include
>> >> >> >> all
>> >> >> >> animal life (e.g there is animal life in your hair, in the
>> >> >> >> carpet,
>> >> >> >> etc...)
>> >> >> >> so the assumption must be made that it refers to certain animals
>> >> >> >> only,
>> >> >> >> and
>> >> >> >> as soon as you do that you are engaging in "speciesism". And if
>> >> >> >> the
>> >> >> >> ARA
>> >> >> >> says, no I am not selecting by species, I am selecting by the
>> >> >> >> attributes
>> >> >> >> of
>> >> >> >> certain species, such as sentience or intelligence, the
>> >> >> >> response,
>> >> >> >> that
>> >> >> >> is
>> >> >> >> exactly what we are doing too.
>>
>> >> >> > But you refuse to spell out the details of your views, such as
>> >> >> > for
>> >> >> > example what it entails about how pigs should be treated.
>>
>> >> >> The details are beside the point, bigger and better pens, no tail
>> >> >> docking,
>> >> >> more light, soothing music, whatever is shown to make them content,
>> >> >> etc.
>> >> >> The
>> >> >> point is that I believe that they deserve a lot more consideration
>> >> >> than
>> >> >> fleas, and so do you, therefore both of us are "speciesist". I just
>> >> >> don't
>> >> >> have the same set of speciesist attitudes about the same species
>> >> >> that
>> >> >> you
>> >> >> do. It would be folly to not use the information that an animal's
>> >> >> species
>> >> >> conveys to inform our ways of relating to them.
>>
>> >> > As far as the comparison with fleas go, fleas have a completely
>> >> > different set of interests, so you haven't really shown that I'm
>> >> > failing to follow the principle of equal consideration of interests.
>> >> > That is not what I mean by speciesism.
>>
>> >> Don't fleas have an interest in survival?
>>
>> > Well, they may or may not, I'm not sure whether they are capable of
>> > conscious experience. If they do have an interest in survival, then
>> > that is one thing that they have in common with pigs, but it still
>> > remains true that the set of interests a flea has is very different in
>> > many important ways to the set of interests that a pig has. So even if
>> > you were extending equal consideration to similar interests, you still
>> > might end up treating a flea very differently to the way you would
>> > treat a pig.
>>
>> I'm not talking about conscious experience or suggesting they are aware
>> that
>> they have an interest in survival, but that they behave as if they have
>> it.
>> I doubt if pigs are aware that they have an interest in survival either,
>> like the flea and every other animal other than humans they simply are
>> wired
>> to pursue that interest. If you are saying that consideration should be
>> based on the degree to which animals have conscious experience then I
>> would
>> say that humans are far ahead of every other animal.
>
> I don't think an organism can be meaningfully said to have an interest
> in a particular outcome unless that organism has the capacity for
> conscious experience.

How are you measuring or defining "conscious experience"? I would argue that
the conscious experience of animals in pursuit of their interests is nothing
at all like the human conscious experience. Animals respond to triggers they
receive with their senses, instincts and appetites, they aren't "thinking
about" anything beyond the here and now.

> I also don't think that there is any meaningful
> sense in which humans have "more" capacity for conscious experience
> than nonhuman animals, I don't think that means anything.

You dismiss a lot of pretty obvious notions when they threaten your biases.
The human capacity for deep, profound levels of conscious experience is what
sets us apart from other species more than any other factor.

> What
> (typical) humans have is better cognitive abilities.

Those *vastly* better abilities lead to a much richer conscious experience.
Animals have many far superior sensory abilities.

"Rupert" > wrote in message
...
> On Apr 25, 5:41 pm, George Plimpton > wrote:
>> On 4/25/2012 12:34 AM, Rupert wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> > On Apr 23, 10:41 pm, George > wrote:
>> >> On 4/23/2012 1:21 PM, Rupert wrote:
>>
>> >>> On Apr 23, 8:22 pm, George > wrote:
>> >>>> On 4/23/2012 10:26 AM, Rupert wrote:
>>
>> >>>>> On Apr 23, 5:11 pm, George > wrote:
>> >>>>>> On 4/23/2012 1:07 AM, Rupert wrote:
>>
>> >>>>>>> On Apr 22, 6:26 pm, George > wrote:
>> >>>>>>>> On 4/22/2012 1:34 AM, Rupert wrote:
>>
>> >>>>>>>>> On Apr 22, 6:38 am, George >
>> >>>>>>>>> wrote:
>> >>>>>>>>>> On 4/21/2012 12:48 PM, Rupert wrote:
>>
>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 21, 9:25 pm, George >
>> >>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/21/2012 10:39 AM, Dutch wrote:
>>
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> > wrote
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 21, 9:41 am, >
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Let's not get too far off topic. We're not talking about
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> animal
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> welfare, the
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> subject is "speciesism" and "equal consideration". I give
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> greater
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> consideration to a gorilla than a pig, and more to a pig
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> than to a
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sponge.
>>
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Unfortunately you don't seem willing to specify in detail
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> what kind of
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> moral consideration you give to a pig, so I suppose I'm
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> never going to
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> learn all that much about what your views are.
>>
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I'm willing to discuss the treatment of pigs, its just not
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> on point at
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> the moment. My view on the current discussion is that
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> "equal
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> consideration" (or 'non-speciesism') is at the very least a
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> misnomer, a
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> misguided notion.
>>
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Good job on not letting Woopert steer the conversation off
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> topic. It's
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> one of his regular tactics.
>>
>> >>>>>>>>>>> Dutch is claiming that otherspeciesare due less moral
>> >>>>>>>>>>> consideration.
>> >>>>>>>>>>> I am trying to getting him to make this concrete by
>> >>>>>>>>>>> expounding his
>> >>>>>>>>>>> views with regard to a specific example. It's not going off
>> >>>>>>>>>>> topic.
>>
>> >>>>>>>>>> Trying to get him to explain in detail the *degree* of
>> >>>>>>>>>> consideration he
>> >>>>>>>>>> gives pigs, when the issue is the binary one of giving equal
>> >>>>>>>>>> consideration or not giving equal consideration to animals, is
>> >>>>>>>>>> going off
>> >>>>>>>>>> topic.
>>
>> >>>>>>>>> No, it's not
>>
>> >>>>>>>> It is. The particular weight he gives to pigs' interests has
>> >>>>>>>> nothing to
>> >>>>>>>> do with the principle ofspecies-specific consideration.
>>
>> >>>>>>>> You're engaging in your usual invalid debate tactics.
>>
>> >>>>>>> Why is asking someone a question to get them to clarify their
>> >>>>>>> views an
>> >>>>>>> "invalid debate tactic"?
>>
>> >>>>>> It's a time-wasting evasion that is *not* asking him to clarify
>> >>>>>> his
>> >>>>>> views. His contention is that a different level of consideration
>> >>>>>> for
>> >>>>>> animals on aspeciesbyspeciesbasis is morally permissible. How
>> >>>>>> much
>> >>>>>> consideration he gives to members of a particularspeciesis
>> >>>>>> irrelevant
>> >>>>>> to the topic.
>>
>> >>>>> It is asking him to clarify his views. And it is relevant because
>> >>>>> he
>> >>>>> has not refuted the AMC.
>>
>> >>>> The AMC was never really anargument, and what little bit
>> >>>> ofargumentis
>> >>>> in it is refuted by the ASN, which no "ara" has ever properly
>> >>>> understood
>> >>>> and so has never refuted.
>>
>> >>> I directed you towards a critical discussion of the ASN. You have not
>> >>> provided a satisfactory response.
>>
>> >> I did. You and all the other "ar" extremists don't get ASN.
>>
>> > What you said is "They don't get it". This is not a satisfactory
>> > response.
>>
>> It's a fact.
>>
>
> You have not established that it's a fact, and however that may be,
> it's not a satisfactory response.
>
>> >>>> Rights and moral consideration of interests are evolutionary
>> >>>> developments of humans, and they evolved because they are successful
>> >>>> at
>> >>>> helping to regulate human interactions.
>>
>> >>> In what sense?
>>
>> >> You continue to exhibit problems with basic English language.
>>
>> > It's not a problem with the English language.
>>
>> It appears it is.
>
> It doesn't appear that way to any reasonably intelligent person. Any
> reasonably intelligent person would acknowledge that I've pointed out
> that you haven't given a precise meaning to your notion of
> "successful".

They limit conflict and damage and maximize safety and security.

On 4/25/2012 1:26 PM, Rupert wrote:
> On Apr 25, 5:41 pm, George > wrote:
>> On 4/25/2012 12:34 AM, Rupert wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> On Apr 23, 10:41 pm, George > wrote:
>>>> On 4/23/2012 1:21 PM, Rupert wrote:
>>
>>>>> On Apr 23, 8:22 pm, George > wrote:
>>>>>> On 4/23/2012 10:26 AM, Rupert wrote:
>>
>>>>>>> On Apr 23, 5:11 pm, George > wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 4/23/2012 1:07 AM, Rupert wrote:
>>
>>>>>>>>> On Apr 22, 6:26 pm, George > wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 4/22/2012 1:34 AM, Rupert wrote:
>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 22, 6:38 am, George > wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/21/2012 12:48 PM, Rupert wrote:
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 21, 9:25 pm, George > wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/21/2012 10:39 AM, Dutch wrote:
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > wrote
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 21, 9:41 am, > wrote:
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Let's not get too far off topic. We're not talking about animal
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> welfare, the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> subject is "speciesism" and "equal consideration". I give greater
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> consideration to a gorilla than a pig, and more to a pig than to a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sponge.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Unfortunately you don't seem willing to specify in detail what kind of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> moral consideration you give to a pig, so I suppose I'm never going to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> learn all that much about what your views are.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I'm willing to discuss the treatment of pigs, its just not on point at
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the moment. My view on the current discussion is that "equal
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> consideration" (or 'non-speciesism') is at the very least a misnomer, a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> misguided notion.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Good job on not letting Woopert steer the conversation off topic. It's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> one of his regular tactics.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Dutch is claiming that otherspeciesare due less moral consideration.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am trying to getting him to make this concrete by expounding his
>>>>>>>>>>>>> views with regard to a specific example. It's not going off topic.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Trying to get him to explain in detail the *degree* of consideration he
>>>>>>>>>>>> gives pigs, when the issue is the binary one of giving equal
>>>>>>>>>>>> consideration or not giving equal consideration to animals, is going off
>>>>>>>>>>>> topic.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>> No, it's not
>>
>>>>>>>>>> It is. The particular weight he gives to pigs' interests has nothing to
>>>>>>>>>> do with the principle ofspecies-specific consideration.
>>
>>>>>>>>>> You're engaging in your usual invalid debate tactics.
>>
>>>>>>>>> Why is asking someone a question to get them to clarify their views an
>>>>>>>>> "invalid debate tactic"?
>>
>>>>>>>> It's a time-wasting evasion that is *not* asking him to clarify his
>>>>>>>> views. His contention is that a different level of consideration for
>>>>>>>> animals on aspeciesbyspeciesbasis is morally permissible. How much
>>>>>>>> consideration he gives to members of a particularspeciesis irrelevant
>>>>>>>> to the topic.
>>
>>>>>>> It is asking him to clarify his views. And it is relevant because he
>>>>>>> has not refuted the AMC.
>>
>>>>>> The AMC was never really anargument, and what little bit ofargumentis
>>>>>> in it is refuted by the ASN, which no "ara" has ever properly understood
>>>>>> and so has never refuted.
>>
>>>>> I directed you towards a critical discussion of the ASN. You have not
>>>>> provided a satisfactory response.
>>
>>>> I did. You and all the other "ar" extremists don't get ASN.
>>
>>> What you said is "They don't get it". This is not a satisfactory
>>> response.
>>
>> It's a fact.
>>
>
> You have not established that it's a fact,

I have. You don't get it because even after hearing or reading it, you
continue to insist that it's about some quality possessed individually,
and it isn't. Clearly you and all the other "ar" loons misapprehend it.


>
>>>>>> Rights and moral consideration of interests are evolutionary
>>>>>> developments of humans, and they evolved because they are successful at
>>>>>> helping to regulate human interactions.
>>
>>>>> In what sense?
>>
>>>> You continue to exhibit problems with basic English language.
>>
>>> It's not a problem with the English language.
>>
>> It appears it is.
>
> It doesn't appear that way to any reasonably intelligent person.

That's precisely to whom it appears that way.

On Apr 25, 11:13*pm, "Dutch" > wrote:
> "Rupert" > wrote in message
>
> ...
>
> > On Apr 25, 8:17 pm, "Dutch" > wrote:
> >> "Rupert" > wrote in message
>
> ....
>
> >> > On Apr 25, 9:43 am, "Dutch" > wrote:
> >> >> "Rupert" > wrote in message
>
> >> ...
>
> >> >> > On Apr 24, 7:09 am, "Dutch" > wrote:
> >> >> >> "Rupert" > wrote
>
> >> >> >> > On Apr 23, 8:09 pm, "Dutch" > wrote:
> >> >> >> >> > It is asking him to clarify his views. And it is relevant
> >> >> >> >> > because
> >> >> >> >> > he
> >> >> >> >> > has not refuted the AMC.
>
> >> >> >> >> I have.
>
> >> >> >> > What's the refutation?
>
> >> >> >> moralstat99
>
> >> >> > How would you define "capabilities"?
>
> >> >> From moralstat99
> >> >> -----------------------------------------------
> >> >> A rebuttal of the argument from marginal cases
> >> >> It may well be that Warren's proposal at this point is more adequate
> >> >> in
> >> >> relation to common sense than the positions of Regan or Singer.
> >> >> Nevertheless, it appears that all three of them have based their
> >> >> arguments on the assumption that the concepts of a moral person and a
> >> >> moral agent are synonymous or equivalent. This assumption can be
> >> >> contested, and if it is rejected, it seems that their arguments will
> >> >> not
> >> >> work.
> >> >> An alternative to their assumption has been developed by Jens Saugstad
> >> >> in his doctoral thesis on The Moral Ontology of Human Fetuses; A
> >> >> Metaphysical Investigation of Personhood (1994). On Saugstad's
> >> >> interpretation, Kant's concept of a moral person is generic in
> >> >> relation
> >> >> to that of a moral agent. This implies that the class of moral agents
> >> >> is
> >> >> a subclass of moral persons; some moral persons are moral agents,
> >> >> others
> >> >> are not.
> >> >> On the conceptual level Saugstad gets this result by distinguishing
> >> >> two
> >> >> kinds of capacities: capabilities and abilities. In order to be a
> >> >> moral
> >> >> agent, a person must be able to take a moral responsibility for his or
> >> >> her actions, and to be answerable for them. This requires not only the
> >> >> capabilities of free will, reason and a linguistic competence; but
> >> >> also
> >> >> the operative ability of realising these capabilities in practice.
> >> >> However, a subject may have the capabilities of moral agency without
> >> >> having the operative abilities. In that case the subject is a moral
> >> >> person without being a moral agent, since moral personhood is grounded
> >> >> on the actual capability and not on the potential ability.
> >> >> Two consequences follow from this solution. In the first place, it
> >> >> extends moral status to sentient marginal humans. The sufficient and
> >> >> necessary condition for this extension is the presence of the
> >> >> capability
> >> >> of moral agency. If this is present, it is not necessary that the
> >> >> operative ability is also present. On this ground equal inherent value
> >> >> and equal basic rights can be ascribed to both marginal and normal
> >> >> human
> >> >> beings.
> >> >> Admittedly, the assumption about the presence of this capability is
> >> >> not
> >> >> equally verifiable in all cases. In some cases it is verifiable, such
> >> >> as
> >> >> in normal youths, children, neonates, and foetuses in the later stages
> >> >> of pregnancy. They do not have the actual ability of being moral
> >> >> agents,
> >> >> but they have it potentially and it will be actualised in due time.
> >> >> Still they may be assumed to have the capability as an actual internal
> >> >> property, and this is the ground for considering them to be persons..
> >> >> It
> >> >> may be asked whether this argument justifies the assumption about
> >> >> equal
> >> >> moral status value. Would it not be possible to introduce grading on
> >> >> the
> >> >> basis of how far the potentiality for moral agency has developed? This
> >> >> view has been propounded in discussions about abortion. On the basis
> >> >> of
> >> >> the present argument, however, it must be rejected, since moral status
> >> >> value is assumed to be grounded on capabilities of agency, which are
> >> >> actual, and not on potential abilities.
> >> >> In other cases there are humans who have been moral agents, but have
> >> >> lost the required abilities. This pertains to many cases of the
> >> >> severely
> >> >> brain damaged and the severely senile. If we assume that they have
> >> >> retained their capabilities of being moral agents, we still have a
> >> >> sufficient reason for ascribing equal inherent value to them. Against
> >> >> this it may be objected that they may have lost not only their ability
> >> >> of being moral agents, but also their capability. There is room for
> >> >> much
> >> >> empirical doubt about these borderline cases, and for that reason
> >> >> there
> >> >> is also room for giving them the benefit of doubt. Admittedly, this is
> >> >> a
> >> >> somewhat ad hoc assumption. Even if it is not a good scientific
> >> >> explanation, however, it may be a good moral reason.
> >> >> This kind of argument can also be applied to the most difficult cases
> >> >> of
> >> >> marginal humans who have never had the ability of being moral agents
> >> >> and
> >> >> will never get it, such as the severely mentally retarded.
> >> >> Theoretically, it is not inconceivable that the capability is still
> >> >> there, and that this can be used as a ground for ascribing an equal
> >> >> moral status value to them. If this justification is not accepted,
> >> >> however, it does not necessarily follow that they have no moral status
> >> >> value at all. They may have a gradual moral status value, depending on
> >> >> the argument which we shall discuss below. As for those who are borne
> >> >> without a brain, they do seem to be excluded.
> >> >> According to the present argument, inherent value is ascribed equally
> >> >> to
> >> >> all moral persons. Hence this position is universalistic and
> >> >> egalitarian. If this way of understanding the relation between moral
> >> >> persons and moral agents works, there will be no need to distinguish
> >> >> Agent's Rights and Human Rights the way Warren does. They will be
> >> >> grounded in the same internal property of moral persons, and there
> >> >> will
> >> >> be no need for a supplementary justification based on an external
> >> >> relation such as membership in a human society.
> >> >> The second consequence which follows from this position is that there
> >> >> will be a relevant difference between human and non-human beings,
> >> >> which
> >> >> can justify a differential treatment with regard to the ascription of
> >> >> moral status. Humans have a property which other animals lack, notably
> >> >> the capability of being moral agents, and if this property is accepted
> >> >> to be a necessary condition for the ascription of moral status, then
> >> >> its
> >> >> absence in other animals will be a sufficient condition for denying
> >> >> moral status to them. In this way Kant's anthropocentrism is
> >> >> vindicated,
> >> >> albeit with the proviso mentioned earlier that this rests on the
> >> >> contingent fact that only humans are moral persons. Theoretically,
> >> >> there
> >> >> might be other moral persons also, but there seem to be none,
> >> >> excepting
> >> >> perhaps some of our closest relatives among the primates.
> >> >> ----------------------------------------------------------------
>
> >> > Yes, I just re-read that passage this morning.
>
> >> > The difficulty is that no definition of the central term "capability"
> >> > is given.
>
> >> A capability is an inherent ability in any state, potential, latent,
> >> active,
> >> or disabled.
>
> >> An eagle has *(or "eagles have") the capability of flight before ever
> >> leaving the egg, but the ability doesn't develop until later.
>
> >> > Let us suppose that we have a human who has always been very seriously
> >> > mentally impaired ever since he was born, and has never had cognitive
> >> > abilities greater than that of a dog. Wetlesen claims that there is
> >> > some possibility that he might still have the capability to be a moral
> >> > agent, and therefore we have moral reason to extend the benefit of the
> >> > doubt and treat the individual as though he does in fact have that
> >> > capability. I assume that there is meant to be an objective fact of
> >> > the matter about whether the capability is in fact present. Suppose
> >> > that I were a scientist trying to resolve this question. How would I
> >> > go about trying to resolve it?
>
> >> I don't know that there is a way to prove it, perhaps someday with
> >> advances
> >> in biology they will discover exactly where each ability originates in
> >> the
> >> brain, they already know most of them. But he is suggesting that it is
> >> reasonable to assume that it exists and that its the ability to develop
> >> or
> >> manifest the capability in an ability that has been lost. The person
> >> probably has all the right types of brain cells, they just don't work or
> >> connect properly. He would not have a dog brain. Anyway these marginal
> >> cases
> >> don't prove anything, because we normally have a list of subjective
> >> reasons
> >> to view and treat those humans differently, just as we have subjective
> >> reasons to treat individual animals in special ways, such as pets or
> >> "special" species.
>
> >> We can't make the assumption that advanced cognitive capacities exist
> >> with
> >> any other species because no member of those species has ever manifested
> >> those abilities. We give consideration to animals based on an educated
> >> guess
> >> as to their capacities. Until a flea or a dog or a pig exhibits advanced
> >> cognitive abilities we can safely assume that those capacities do not
> >> exist
> >> in those species. As soon as *one* does, then we would be compelled in my
> >> opinion to assume that every member of that species possesses those
> >> capabilities, just as we do with humans. Therefore we are giving them
> >> equal
> >> consideration.
>
> > I am extremely skeptical that "capabilities" is a meaningful concept.
>
> That's interesting, since organisms are living before they begin to manifest
> all the abilities typical of their species, how would you describe those
> latent, potential as-yet-not-demonstrated abilities? Are they not "concept
> worthy"? Birds possess something, inherently, while they are only a clump of
> cells, that leads to them in time to be able to fly. You had the capability
> at one time to become a mathematician, before you were one. That was in no
> small part due to your species.

The problem is that if we define "capability" to mean "potential
ability", then it is obvious that the permanently severely retarded
human lacks it, but you want to leave that question open.

On Apr 25, 11:13*pm, "Dutch" > wrote:
> "Rupert" > wrote in message
>
> ...
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Apr 25, 8:24 pm, "Dutch" > wrote:
> >> "Rupert" > wrote in message
>
> ....
>
> >> > On Apr 25, 9:45 am, "Dutch" > wrote:
> >> >> "Rupert" > wrote in message
>
> >> ...
>
> >> >> > On Apr 24, 7:18 am, "Dutch" > wrote:
> >> >> >> "Rupert" > wrote
>
> >> >> >> > On Apr 23, 9:14 pm, "Dutch" > wrote:
> >> >> >> >> The first thing to consider is that the moment you use the broad
> >> >> >> >> term
> >> >> >> >> "animals" the argument against "speciesism" immediately falls
> >> >> >> >> apart
> >> >> >> >> because
> >> >> >> >> no argument for equal consideration of animals can *possibly*
> >> >> >> >> include
> >> >> >> >> all
> >> >> >> >> animal life (e.g there is animal life in your hair, in the
> >> >> >> >> carpet,
> >> >> >> >> etc...)
> >> >> >> >> so the assumption must be made that it refers to certain animals
> >> >> >> >> only,
> >> >> >> >> and
> >> >> >> >> as soon as you do that you are engaging in "speciesism". And if
> >> >> >> >> the
> >> >> >> >> ARA
> >> >> >> >> says, no I am not selecting by species, I am selecting by the
> >> >> >> >> attributes
> >> >> >> >> of
> >> >> >> >> certain species, such as sentience or intelligence, the
> >> >> >> >> response,
> >> >> >> >> that
> >> >> >> >> is
> >> >> >> >> exactly what we are doing too.
>
> >> >> >> > But you refuse to spell out the details of your views, such as
> >> >> >> > for
> >> >> >> > example what it entails about how pigs should be treated.
>
> >> >> >> The details are beside the point, bigger and better pens, no tail
> >> >> >> docking,
> >> >> >> more light, soothing music, whatever is shown to make them content,
> >> >> >> etc.
> >> >> >> The
> >> >> >> point is that I believe that they deserve a lot more consideration
> >> >> >> than
> >> >> >> fleas, and so do you, therefore both of us are "speciesist". I just
> >> >> >> don't
> >> >> >> have the same set of speciesist attitudes about the same species
> >> >> >> that
> >> >> >> you
> >> >> >> do. It would be folly to not use the information that an animal's
> >> >> >> species
> >> >> >> conveys to inform our ways of relating to them.
>
> >> >> > As far as the comparison with fleas go, fleas have a completely
> >> >> > different set of interests, so you haven't really shown that I'm
> >> >> > failing to follow the principle of equal consideration of interests.
> >> >> > That is not what I mean by speciesism.
>
> >> >> Don't fleas have an interest in survival?
>
> >> > Well, they may or may not, I'm not sure whether they are capable of
> >> > conscious experience. If they do have an interest in survival, then
> >> > that is one thing that they have in common with pigs, but it still
> >> > remains true that the set of interests a flea has is very different in
> >> > many important ways to the set of interests that a pig has. So even if
> >> > you were extending equal consideration to similar interests, you still
> >> > might end up treating a flea very differently to the way you would
> >> > treat a pig.
>
> >> I'm not talking about conscious experience or suggesting they are aware
> >> that
> >> they have an interest in survival, but that they behave as if they have
> >> it.
> >> I doubt if pigs are aware that they have an interest in survival either,
> >> like the flea and every other animal other than humans they simply are
> >> wired
> >> to pursue that interest. If you are saying that consideration should be
> >> based on the degree to which animals have conscious experience then I
> >> would
> >> say that humans are far ahead of every other animal.
>
> > I don't think an organism can be meaningfully said to have an interest
> > in a particular outcome unless that organism has the capacity for
> > conscious experience.
>
> How are you measuring or defining "conscious experience"?

"A conscious mental state is a mental state that it is like something
to be in." Thomas Nagel.

> I would argue that
> the conscious experience of animals in pursuit of their interests is nothing
> at all like the human conscious experience. Animals respond to triggers they
> receive with their senses, instincts and appetites, they aren't "thinking
> about" anything beyond the here and now.
>

It probably is quite different to human conscious experience,
obviously, although I would be careful about underestimating animals'
ability to "think about" things.

> > I also don't think that there is any meaningful
> > sense in which humans have "more" capacity for conscious experience
> > than nonhuman animals, I don't think that means anything.
>
> You dismiss a lot of pretty obvious notions when they threaten your biases.
> The human capacity for deep, profound levels of conscious experience is what
> sets us apart from other species more than any other factor.
>

I wouldn't characterise this as "more capacity for conscious
experience". I think either you've got the capacity for conscious
experience or you don't.

> > What
> > (typical) humans have is better cognitive abilities.
>
> Those *vastly* better abilities lead to a much richer conscious experience.
> Animals have many far superior sensory abilities.

Obviously I agree that most humans have vastly better cognitive
abilities than nonhuman animals, but the trouble is that you refuse to
spell out what follows exactly if those abilities are not present, and
when I ask you I am accused of going off topic, which I find a bit
frustrating.

On Apr 25, 11:48*pm, George Plimpton > wrote:
> On 4/25/2012 1:26 PM, Rupert wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Apr 25, 5:41 pm, George > *wrote:
> >> On 4/25/2012 12:34 AM, Rupert wrote:
>
> >>> On Apr 23, 10:41 pm, George > * *wrote:
> >>>> On 4/23/2012 1:21 PM, Rupert wrote:
>
> >>>>> On Apr 23, 8:22 pm, George > * * *wrote:
> >>>>>> On 4/23/2012 10:26 AM, Rupert wrote:
>
> >>>>>>> On Apr 23, 5:11 pm, George > * * * *wrote:
> >>>>>>>> On 4/23/2012 1:07 AM, Rupert wrote:
>
> >>>>>>>>> On Apr 22, 6:26 pm, George > * * * * *wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>> On 4/22/2012 1:34 AM, Rupert wrote:
>
> >>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 22, 6:38 am, George > * * * * * *wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/21/2012 12:48 PM, Rupert wrote:
>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 21, 9:25 pm, George > * * * * * * *wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/21/2012 10:39 AM, Dutch wrote:
>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > * * * * * * *wrote
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 21, 9:41 am, > * * * * * * *wrote:
>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Let's not get too far off topic. We're not talking about animal
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> welfare, the
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> subject is "speciesism" and "equal consideration". I give greater
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> consideration to a gorilla than a pig, and more to a pig than to a
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sponge.
>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Unfortunately you don't seem willing to specify in detail what kind of
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> moral consideration you give to a pig, so I suppose I'm never going to
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> learn all that much about what your views are.
>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I'm willing to discuss the treatment of pigs, its just not on point at
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the moment. My view on the current discussion is that "equal
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> consideration" (or 'non-speciesism') is at the very least a misnomer, a
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> misguided notion.
>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Good job on not letting Woopert steer the conversation off topic. *It's
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> one of his regular tactics.
>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Dutch is claiming that otherspeciesare due less moral consideration.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I am trying to getting him to make this concrete by expounding his
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> views with regard to a specific example. It's not going off topic.
>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> Trying to get him to explain in detail the *degree* of consideration he
> >>>>>>>>>>>> gives pigs, when the issue is the binary one of giving equal
> >>>>>>>>>>>> consideration or not giving equal consideration to animals, is going off
> >>>>>>>>>>>> topic.
>
> >>>>>>>>>>> No, it's not
>
> >>>>>>>>>> It is. *The particular weight he gives to pigs' interests has nothing to
> >>>>>>>>>> do with the principle ofspecies-specific consideration.
>
> >>>>>>>>>> You're engaging in your usual invalid debate tactics.
>
> >>>>>>>>> Why is asking someone a question to get them to clarify their views an
> >>>>>>>>> "invalid debate tactic"?
>
> >>>>>>>> It's a time-wasting evasion that is *not* asking him to clarify his
> >>>>>>>> views. *His contention is that a different level of consideration for
> >>>>>>>> animals on aspeciesbyspeciesbasis is morally permissible. *How much
> >>>>>>>> consideration he gives to members of a particularspeciesis irrelevant
> >>>>>>>> to the topic.
>
> >>>>>>> It is asking him to clarify his views. And it is relevant because he
> >>>>>>> has not refuted the AMC.
>
> >>>>>> The AMC was never really anargument, and what little bit ofargumentis
> >>>>>> in it is refuted by the ASN, which no "ara" has ever properly understood
> >>>>>> and so has never refuted.
>
> >>>>> I directed you towards a critical discussion of the ASN. You have not
> >>>>> provided a satisfactory response.
>
> >>>> I did. *You and all the other "ar" extremists don't get ASN.
>
> >>> What you said is "They don't get it". This is not a satisfactory
> >>> response.
>
> >> It's a fact.
>
> > You have not established that it's a fact,
>
> I have. *You don't get it because even after hearing or reading it, you
> continue to insist that it's about some quality possessed individually,
> and it isn't. *Clearly you and all the other "ar" loons misapprehend it..
>

Where do Nobis and Graham make that misinterpretation?

>
>
> >>>>>> Rights and moral consideration of interests are evolutionary
> >>>>>> developments of humans, and they evolved because they are successful at
> >>>>>> helping to regulate human interactions.
>
> >>>>> In what sense?
>
> >>>> You continue to exhibit problems with basic English language.
>
> >>> It's not a problem with the English language.
>
> >> It appears it is.
>
> > It doesn't appear that way to any reasonably intelligent person.
>
> That's precisely to whom it appears that way.

"Rupert" > wrote in message
...
> On Apr 25, 11:13 pm, "Dutch" > wrote:
>> "Rupert" > wrote in message
>>
>> ...
>>
>> > On Apr 25, 8:17 pm, "Dutch" > wrote:
>> >> "Rupert" > wrote in message
>>
>> ...
>>
>> >> > On Apr 25, 9:43 am, "Dutch" > wrote:
>> >> >> "Rupert" > wrote in message
>>
>> >> ...
>>
>> >> >> > On Apr 24, 7:09 am, "Dutch" > wrote:
>> >> >> >> "Rupert" > wrote
>>
>> >> >> >> > On Apr 23, 8:09 pm, "Dutch" > wrote:
>> >> >> >> >> > It is asking him to clarify his views. And it is relevant
>> >> >> >> >> > because
>> >> >> >> >> > he
>> >> >> >> >> > has not refuted the AMC.
>>
>> >> >> >> >> I have.
>>
>> >> >> >> > What's the refutation?
>>
>> >> >> >> moralstat99
>>
>> >> >> > How would you define "capabilities"?
>>
>> >> >> From moralstat99
>> >> >> -----------------------------------------------
>> >> >> A rebuttal of the argument from marginal cases
>> >> >> It may well be that Warren's proposal at this point is more
>> >> >> adequate
>> >> >> in
>> >> >> relation to common sense than the positions of Regan or Singer.
>> >> >> Nevertheless, it appears that all three of them have based their
>> >> >> arguments on the assumption that the concepts of a moral person and
>> >> >> a
>> >> >> moral agent are synonymous or equivalent. This assumption can be
>> >> >> contested, and if it is rejected, it seems that their arguments
>> >> >> will
>> >> >> not
>> >> >> work.
>> >> >> An alternative to their assumption has been developed by Jens
>> >> >> Saugstad
>> >> >> in his doctoral thesis on The Moral Ontology of Human Fetuses; A
>> >> >> Metaphysical Investigation of Personhood (1994). On Saugstad's
>> >> >> interpretation, Kant's concept of a moral person is generic in
>> >> >> relation
>> >> >> to that of a moral agent. This implies that the class of moral
>> >> >> agents
>> >> >> is
>> >> >> a subclass of moral persons; some moral persons are moral agents,
>> >> >> others
>> >> >> are not.
>> >> >> On the conceptual level Saugstad gets this result by distinguishing
>> >> >> two
>> >> >> kinds of capacities: capabilities and abilities. In order to be a
>> >> >> moral
>> >> >> agent, a person must be able to take a moral responsibility for his
>> >> >> or
>> >> >> her actions, and to be answerable for them. This requires not only
>> >> >> the
>> >> >> capabilities of free will, reason and a linguistic competence; but
>> >> >> also
>> >> >> the operative ability of realising these capabilities in practice.
>> >> >> However, a subject may have the capabilities of moral agency
>> >> >> without
>> >> >> having the operative abilities. In that case the subject is a moral
>> >> >> person without being a moral agent, since moral personhood is
>> >> >> grounded
>> >> >> on the actual capability and not on the potential ability.
>> >> >> Two consequences follow from this solution. In the first place, it
>> >> >> extends moral status to sentient marginal humans. The sufficient
>> >> >> and
>> >> >> necessary condition for this extension is the presence of the
>> >> >> capability
>> >> >> of moral agency. If this is present, it is not necessary that the
>> >> >> operative ability is also present. On this ground equal inherent
>> >> >> value
>> >> >> and equal basic rights can be ascribed to both marginal and normal
>> >> >> human
>> >> >> beings.
>> >> >> Admittedly, the assumption about the presence of this capability is
>> >> >> not
>> >> >> equally verifiable in all cases. In some cases it is verifiable,
>> >> >> such
>> >> >> as
>> >> >> in normal youths, children, neonates, and foetuses in the later
>> >> >> stages
>> >> >> of pregnancy. They do not have the actual ability of being moral
>> >> >> agents,
>> >> >> but they have it potentially and it will be actualised in due time.
>> >> >> Still they may be assumed to have the capability as an actual
>> >> >> internal
>> >> >> property, and this is the ground for considering them to be
>> >> >> persons.
>> >> >> It
>> >> >> may be asked whether this argument justifies the assumption about
>> >> >> equal
>> >> >> moral status value. Would it not be possible to introduce grading
>> >> >> on
>> >> >> the
>> >> >> basis of how far the potentiality for moral agency has developed?
>> >> >> This
>> >> >> view has been propounded in discussions about abortion. On the
>> >> >> basis
>> >> >> of
>> >> >> the present argument, however, it must be rejected, since moral
>> >> >> status
>> >> >> value is assumed to be grounded on capabilities of agency, which
>> >> >> are
>> >> >> actual, and not on potential abilities.
>> >> >> In other cases there are humans who have been moral agents, but
>> >> >> have
>> >> >> lost the required abilities. This pertains to many cases of the
>> >> >> severely
>> >> >> brain damaged and the severely senile. If we assume that they have
>> >> >> retained their capabilities of being moral agents, we still have a
>> >> >> sufficient reason for ascribing equal inherent value to them.
>> >> >> Against
>> >> >> this it may be objected that they may have lost not only their
>> >> >> ability
>> >> >> of being moral agents, but also their capability. There is room for
>> >> >> much
>> >> >> empirical doubt about these borderline cases, and for that reason
>> >> >> there
>> >> >> is also room for giving them the benefit of doubt. Admittedly, this
>> >> >> is
>> >> >> a
>> >> >> somewhat ad hoc assumption. Even if it is not a good scientific
>> >> >> explanation, however, it may be a good moral reason.
>> >> >> This kind of argument can also be applied to the most difficult
>> >> >> cases
>> >> >> of
>> >> >> marginal humans who have never had the ability of being moral
>> >> >> agents
>> >> >> and
>> >> >> will never get it, such as the severely mentally retarded.
>> >> >> Theoretically, it is not inconceivable that the capability is still
>> >> >> there, and that this can be used as a ground for ascribing an equal
>> >> >> moral status value to them. If this justification is not accepted,
>> >> >> however, it does not necessarily follow that they have no moral
>> >> >> status
>> >> >> value at all. They may have a gradual moral status value, depending
>> >> >> on
>> >> >> the argument which we shall discuss below. As for those who are
>> >> >> borne
>> >> >> without a brain, they do seem to be excluded.
>> >> >> According to the present argument, inherent value is ascribed
>> >> >> equally
>> >> >> to
>> >> >> all moral persons. Hence this position is universalistic and
>> >> >> egalitarian. If this way of understanding the relation between
>> >> >> moral
>> >> >> persons and moral agents works, there will be no need to
>> >> >> distinguish
>> >> >> Agent's Rights and Human Rights the way Warren does. They will be
>> >> >> grounded in the same internal property of moral persons, and there
>> >> >> will
>> >> >> be no need for a supplementary justification based on an external
>> >> >> relation such as membership in a human society.
>> >> >> The second consequence which follows from this position is that
>> >> >> there
>> >> >> will be a relevant difference between human and non-human beings,
>> >> >> which
>> >> >> can justify a differential treatment with regard to the ascription
>> >> >> of
>> >> >> moral status. Humans have a property which other animals lack,
>> >> >> notably
>> >> >> the capability of being moral agents, and if this property is
>> >> >> accepted
>> >> >> to be a necessary condition for the ascription of moral status,
>> >> >> then
>> >> >> its
>> >> >> absence in other animals will be a sufficient condition for denying
>> >> >> moral status to them. In this way Kant's anthropocentrism is
>> >> >> vindicated,
>> >> >> albeit with the proviso mentioned earlier that this rests on the
>> >> >> contingent fact that only humans are moral persons. Theoretically,
>> >> >> there
>> >> >> might be other moral persons also, but there seem to be none,
>> >> >> excepting
>> >> >> perhaps some of our closest relatives among the primates.
>> >> >> ----------------------------------------------------------------
>>
>> >> > Yes, I just re-read that passage this morning.
>>
>> >> > The difficulty is that no definition of the central term
>> >> > "capability"
>> >> > is given.
>>
>> >> A capability is an inherent ability in any state, potential, latent,
>> >> active,
>> >> or disabled.
>>
>> >> An eagle has (or "eagles have") the capability of flight before ever
>> >> leaving the egg, but the ability doesn't develop until later.
>>
>> >> > Let us suppose that we have a human who has always been very
>> >> > seriously
>> >> > mentally impaired ever since he was born, and has never had
>> >> > cognitive
>> >> > abilities greater than that of a dog. Wetlesen claims that there is
>> >> > some possibility that he might still have the capability to be a
>> >> > moral
>> >> > agent, and therefore we have moral reason to extend the benefit of
>> >> > the
>> >> > doubt and treat the individual as though he does in fact have that
>> >> > capability. I assume that there is meant to be an objective fact of
>> >> > the matter about whether the capability is in fact present. Suppose
>> >> > that I were a scientist trying to resolve this question. How would I
>> >> > go about trying to resolve it?
>>
>> >> I don't know that there is a way to prove it, perhaps someday with
>> >> advances
>> >> in biology they will discover exactly where each ability originates in
>> >> the
>> >> brain, they already know most of them. But he is suggesting that it is
>> >> reasonable to assume that it exists and that its the ability to
>> >> develop
>> >> or
>> >> manifest the capability in an ability that has been lost. The person
>> >> probably has all the right types of brain cells, they just don't work
>> >> or
>> >> connect properly. He would not have a dog brain. Anyway these marginal
>> >> cases
>> >> don't prove anything, because we normally have a list of subjective
>> >> reasons
>> >> to view and treat those humans differently, just as we have subjective
>> >> reasons to treat individual animals in special ways, such as pets or
>> >> "special" species.
>>
>> >> We can't make the assumption that advanced cognitive capacities exist
>> >> with
>> >> any other species because no member of those species has ever
>> >> manifested
>> >> those abilities. We give consideration to animals based on an educated
>> >> guess
>> >> as to their capacities. Until a flea or a dog or a pig exhibits
>> >> advanced
>> >> cognitive abilities we can safely assume that those capacities do not
>> >> exist
>> >> in those species. As soon as *one* does, then we would be compelled in
>> >> my
>> >> opinion to assume that every member of that species possesses those
>> >> capabilities, just as we do with humans. Therefore we are giving them
>> >> equal
>> >> consideration.
>>
>> > I am extremely skeptical that "capabilities" is a meaningful concept.
>>
>> That's interesting, since organisms are living before they begin to
>> manifest
>> all the abilities typical of their species, how would you describe those
>> latent, potential as-yet-not-demonstrated abilities? Are they not
>> "concept
>> worthy"? Birds possess something, inherently, while they are only a clump
>> of
>> cells, that leads to them in time to be able to fly. You had the
>> capability
>> at one time to become a mathematician, before you were one. That was in
>> no
>> small part due to your species.
>
> The problem is that if we define "capability" to mean "potential
> ability", then it is obvious that the permanently severely retarded
> human lacks it, but you want to leave that question open.

We don't know that they lack it, we only know that they are not manifesting
it. It is not unreasonable to give them the benefit of the doubt and assume
they may still possess the quality. Even if they lack it, we usually extend
consideration for other reasons.

"Rupert" > wrote in message
...
> On Apr 25, 11:13 pm, "Dutch" > wrote:
>> "Rupert" > wrote in message
>>
>> ...
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> > On Apr 25, 8:24 pm, "Dutch" > wrote:
>> >> "Rupert" > wrote in message
>>
>> ...
>>
>> >> > On Apr 25, 9:45 am, "Dutch" > wrote:
>> >> >> "Rupert" > wrote in message
>>
>> >> ...
>>
>> >> >> > On Apr 24, 7:18 am, "Dutch" > wrote:
>> >> >> >> "Rupert" > wrote
>>
>> >> >> >> > On Apr 23, 9:14 pm, "Dutch" > wrote:
>> >> >> >> >> The first thing to consider is that the moment you use the
>> >> >> >> >> broad
>> >> >> >> >> term
>> >> >> >> >> "animals" the argument against "speciesism" immediately falls
>> >> >> >> >> apart
>> >> >> >> >> because
>> >> >> >> >> no argument for equal consideration of animals can *possibly*
>> >> >> >> >> include
>> >> >> >> >> all
>> >> >> >> >> animal life (e.g there is animal life in your hair, in the
>> >> >> >> >> carpet,
>> >> >> >> >> etc...)
>> >> >> >> >> so the assumption must be made that it refers to certain
>> >> >> >> >> animals
>> >> >> >> >> only,
>> >> >> >> >> and
>> >> >> >> >> as soon as you do that you are engaging in "speciesism". And
>> >> >> >> >> if
>> >> >> >> >> the
>> >> >> >> >> ARA
>> >> >> >> >> says, no I am not selecting by species, I am selecting by the
>> >> >> >> >> attributes
>> >> >> >> >> of
>> >> >> >> >> certain species, such as sentience or intelligence, the
>> >> >> >> >> response,
>> >> >> >> >> that
>> >> >> >> >> is
>> >> >> >> >> exactly what we are doing too.
>>
>> >> >> >> > But you refuse to spell out the details of your views, such as
>> >> >> >> > for
>> >> >> >> > example what it entails about how pigs should be treated.
>>
>> >> >> >> The details are beside the point, bigger and better pens, no
>> >> >> >> tail
>> >> >> >> docking,
>> >> >> >> more light, soothing music, whatever is shown to make them
>> >> >> >> content,
>> >> >> >> etc.
>> >> >> >> The
>> >> >> >> point is that I believe that they deserve a lot more
>> >> >> >> consideration
>> >> >> >> than
>> >> >> >> fleas, and so do you, therefore both of us are "speciesist". I
>> >> >> >> just
>> >> >> >> don't
>> >> >> >> have the same set of speciesist attitudes about the same species
>> >> >> >> that
>> >> >> >> you
>> >> >> >> do. It would be folly to not use the information that an
>> >> >> >> animal's
>> >> >> >> species
>> >> >> >> conveys to inform our ways of relating to them.
>>
>> >> >> > As far as the comparison with fleas go, fleas have a completely
>> >> >> > different set of interests, so you haven't really shown that I'm
>> >> >> > failing to follow the principle of equal consideration of
>> >> >> > interests.
>> >> >> > That is not what I mean by speciesism.
>>
>> >> >> Don't fleas have an interest in survival?
>>
>> >> > Well, they may or may not, I'm not sure whether they are capable of
>> >> > conscious experience. If they do have an interest in survival, then
>> >> > that is one thing that they have in common with pigs, but it still
>> >> > remains true that the set of interests a flea has is very different
>> >> > in
>> >> > many important ways to the set of interests that a pig has. So even
>> >> > if
>> >> > you were extending equal consideration to similar interests, you
>> >> > still
>> >> > might end up treating a flea very differently to the way you would
>> >> > treat a pig.
>>
>> >> I'm not talking about conscious experience or suggesting they are
>> >> aware
>> >> that
>> >> they have an interest in survival, but that they behave as if they
>> >> have
>> >> it.
>> >> I doubt if pigs are aware that they have an interest in survival
>> >> either,
>> >> like the flea and every other animal other than humans they simply are
>> >> wired
>> >> to pursue that interest. If you are saying that consideration should
>> >> be
>> >> based on the degree to which animals have conscious experience then I
>> >> would
>> >> say that humans are far ahead of every other animal.
>>
>> > I don't think an organism can be meaningfully said to have an interest
>> > in a particular outcome unless that organism has the capacity for
>> > conscious experience.
>>
>> How are you measuring or defining "conscious experience"?
>
> "A conscious mental state is a mental state that it is like something
> to be in." Thomas Nagel.
>
>> I would argue that
>> the conscious experience of animals in pursuit of their interests is
>> nothing
>> at all like the human conscious experience. Animals respond to triggers
>> they
>> receive with their senses, instincts and appetites, they aren't "thinking
>> about" anything beyond the here and now.
>>
>
> It probably is quite different to human conscious experience,
> obviously, although I would be careful about underestimating animals'
> ability to "think about" things.
>
>> > I also don't think that there is any meaningful
>> > sense in which humans have "more" capacity for conscious experience
>> > than nonhuman animals, I don't think that means anything.
>>
>> You dismiss a lot of pretty obvious notions when they threaten your
>> biases.
>> The human capacity for deep, profound levels of conscious experience is
>> what
>> sets us apart from other species more than any other factor.
>>
>
> I wouldn't characterise this as "more capacity for conscious
> experience". I think either you've got the capacity for conscious
> experience or you don't.

I disagree, obviously, see above. There is a wide range of capacity for
conscious experience even among humans.

>
>> > What
>> > (typical) humans have is better cognitive abilities.
>>
>> Those *vastly* better abilities lead to a much richer conscious
>> experience.
>> Animals have many far superior sensory abilities.
>
> Obviously I agree that most humans have vastly better cognitive
> abilities than nonhuman animals, but the trouble is that you refuse to
> spell out what follows exactly if those abilities are not present, and
> when I ask you I am accused of going off topic, which I find a bit
> frustrating.

You mean opinions about animal welfare? Isn't that jumping ahead a little?

On Apr 26, 10:25*am, "Dutch" > wrote:
> "Rupert" > wrote in message
>
> ...
>
> > On Apr 25, 11:13 pm, "Dutch" > wrote:
> >> "Rupert" > wrote in message
>
> ....
>
> >> > On Apr 25, 8:17 pm, "Dutch" > wrote:
> >> >> "Rupert" > wrote in message
>
> >> ...
>
> >> >> > On Apr 25, 9:43 am, "Dutch" > wrote:
> >> >> >> "Rupert" > wrote in message
>
> >> >> ...
>
> >> >> >> > On Apr 24, 7:09 am, "Dutch" > wrote:
> >> >> >> >> "Rupert" > wrote
>
> >> >> >> >> > On Apr 23, 8:09 pm, "Dutch" > wrote:
> >> >> >> >> >> > It is asking him to clarify his views. And it is relevant
> >> >> >> >> >> > because
> >> >> >> >> >> > he
> >> >> >> >> >> > has not refuted the AMC.
>
> >> >> >> >> >> I have.
>
> >> >> >> >> > What's the refutation?
>
> >> >> >> >> moralstat99
>
> >> >> >> > How would you define "capabilities"?
>
> >> >> >> From moralstat99
> >> >> >> -----------------------------------------------
> >> >> >> A rebuttal of the argument from marginal cases
> >> >> >> It may well be that Warren's proposal at this point is more
> >> >> >> adequate
> >> >> >> in
> >> >> >> relation to common sense than the positions of Regan or Singer.
> >> >> >> Nevertheless, it appears that all three of them have based their
> >> >> >> arguments on the assumption that the concepts of a moral person and
> >> >> >> a
> >> >> >> moral agent are synonymous or equivalent. This assumption can be
> >> >> >> contested, and if it is rejected, it seems that their arguments
> >> >> >> will
> >> >> >> not
> >> >> >> work.
> >> >> >> An alternative to their assumption has been developed by Jens
> >> >> >> Saugstad
> >> >> >> in his doctoral thesis on The Moral Ontology of Human Fetuses; A
> >> >> >> Metaphysical Investigation of Personhood (1994). On Saugstad's
> >> >> >> interpretation, Kant's concept of a moral person is generic in
> >> >> >> relation
> >> >> >> to that of a moral agent. This implies that the class of moral
> >> >> >> agents
> >> >> >> is
> >> >> >> a subclass of moral persons; some moral persons are moral agents,
> >> >> >> others
> >> >> >> are not.
> >> >> >> On the conceptual level Saugstad gets this result by distinguishing
> >> >> >> two
> >> >> >> kinds of capacities: capabilities and abilities. In order to be a
> >> >> >> moral
> >> >> >> agent, a person must be able to take a moral responsibility for his
> >> >> >> or
> >> >> >> her actions, and to be answerable for them. This requires not only
> >> >> >> the
> >> >> >> capabilities of free will, reason and a linguistic competence; but
> >> >> >> also
> >> >> >> the operative ability of realising these capabilities in practice.
> >> >> >> However, a subject may have the capabilities of moral agency
> >> >> >> without
> >> >> >> having the operative abilities. In that case the subject is a moral
> >> >> >> person without being a moral agent, since moral personhood is
> >> >> >> grounded
> >> >> >> on the actual capability and not on the potential ability.
> >> >> >> Two consequences follow from this solution. In the first place, it
> >> >> >> extends moral status to sentient marginal humans. The sufficient
> >> >> >> and
> >> >> >> necessary condition for this extension is the presence of the
> >> >> >> capability
> >> >> >> of moral agency. If this is present, it is not necessary that the
> >> >> >> operative ability is also present. On this ground equal inherent
> >> >> >> value
> >> >> >> and equal basic rights can be ascribed to both marginal and normal
> >> >> >> human
> >> >> >> beings.
> >> >> >> Admittedly, the assumption about the presence of this capability is
> >> >> >> not
> >> >> >> equally verifiable in all cases. In some cases it is verifiable,
> >> >> >> such
> >> >> >> as
> >> >> >> in normal youths, children, neonates, and foetuses in the later
> >> >> >> stages
> >> >> >> of pregnancy. They do not have the actual ability of being moral
> >> >> >> agents,
> >> >> >> but they have it potentially and it will be actualised in due time.
> >> >> >> Still they may be assumed to have the capability as an actual
> >> >> >> internal
> >> >> >> property, and this is the ground for considering them to be
> >> >> >> persons.
> >> >> >> It
> >> >> >> may be asked whether this argument justifies the assumption about
> >> >> >> equal
> >> >> >> moral status value. Would it not be possible to introduce grading
> >> >> >> on
> >> >> >> the
> >> >> >> basis of how far the potentiality for moral agency has developed?
> >> >> >> This
> >> >> >> view has been propounded in discussions about abortion. On the
> >> >> >> basis
> >> >> >> of
> >> >> >> the present argument, however, it must be rejected, since moral
> >> >> >> status
> >> >> >> value is assumed to be grounded on capabilities of agency, which
> >> >> >> are
> >> >> >> actual, and not on potential abilities.
> >> >> >> In other cases there are humans who have been moral agents, but
> >> >> >> have
> >> >> >> lost the required abilities. This pertains to many cases of the
> >> >> >> severely
> >> >> >> brain damaged and the severely senile. If we assume that they have
> >> >> >> retained their capabilities of being moral agents, we still have a
> >> >> >> sufficient reason for ascribing equal inherent value to them.
> >> >> >> Against
> >> >> >> this it may be objected that they may have lost not only their
> >> >> >> ability
> >> >> >> of being moral agents, but also their capability. There is room for
> >> >> >> much
> >> >> >> empirical doubt about these borderline cases, and for that reason
> >> >> >> there
> >> >> >> is also room for giving them the benefit of doubt. Admittedly, this
> >> >> >> is
> >> >> >> a
> >> >> >> somewhat ad hoc assumption. Even if it is not a good scientific
> >> >> >> explanation, however, it may be a good moral reason.
> >> >> >> This kind of argument can also be applied to the most difficult
> >> >> >> cases
> >> >> >> of
> >> >> >> marginal humans who have never had the ability of being moral
> >> >> >> agents
> >> >> >> and
> >> >> >> will never get it, such as the severely mentally retarded.
> >> >> >> Theoretically, it is not inconceivable that the capability is still
> >> >> >> there, and that this can be used as a ground for ascribing an equal
> >> >> >> moral status value to them. If this justification is not accepted,
> >> >> >> however, it does not necessarily follow that they have no moral
> >> >> >> status
> >> >> >> value at all. They may have a gradual moral status value, depending
> >> >> >> on
> >> >> >> the argument which we shall discuss below. As for those who are
> >> >> >> borne
> >> >> >> without a brain, they do seem to be excluded.
> >> >> >> According to the present argument, inherent value is ascribed
> >> >> >> equally
> >> >> >> to
> >> >> >> all moral persons. Hence this position is universalistic and
> >> >> >> egalitarian. If this way of understanding the relation between
> >> >> >> moral
> >> >> >> persons and moral agents works, there will be no need to
> >> >> >> distinguish
> >> >> >> Agent's Rights and Human Rights the way Warren does. They will be
> >> >> >> grounded in the same internal property of moral persons, and there
> >> >> >> will
> >> >> >> be no need for a supplementary justification based on an external
> >> >> >> relation such as membership in a human society.
> >> >> >> The second consequence which follows from this position is that
> >> >> >> there
> >> >> >> will be a relevant difference between human and non-human beings,
> >> >> >> which
> >> >> >> can justify a differential treatment with regard to the ascription
> >> >> >> of
> >> >> >> moral status. Humans have a property which other animals lack,
> >> >> >> notably
> >> >> >> the capability of being moral agents, and if this property is
> >> >> >> accepted
> >> >> >> to be a necessary condition for the ascription of moral status,
> >> >> >> then
> >> >> >> its
> >> >> >> absence in other animals will be a sufficient condition for denying
> >> >> >> moral status to them. In this way Kant's anthropocentrism is
> >> >> >> vindicated,
> >> >> >> albeit with the proviso mentioned earlier that this rests on the
> >> >> >> contingent fact that only humans are moral persons. Theoretically,
> >> >> >> there
> >> >> >> might be other moral persons also, but there seem to be none,
> >> >> >> excepting
> >> >> >> perhaps some of our closest relatives among the primates.
> >> >> >> ----------------------------------------------------------------
>
> >> >> > Yes, I just re-read that passage this morning.
>
> >> >> > The difficulty is that no definition of the central term
> >> >> > "capability"
> >> >> > is given.
>
> >> >> A capability is an inherent ability in any state, potential, latent,
> >> >> active,
> >> >> or disabled.
>
> >> >> An eagle has *(or "eagles have") the capability of flight before ever
> >> >> leaving the egg, but the ability doesn't develop until later.
>
> >> >> > Let us suppose that we have a human who has always been very
> >> >> > seriously
> >> >> > mentally impaired ever since he was born, and has never had
> >> >> > cognitive
> >> >> > abilities greater than that of a dog. Wetlesen claims that there is
> >> >> > some possibility that he might still have the capability to be a
> >> >> > moral
> >> >> > agent, and therefore we have moral reason to extend the benefit of
> >> >> > the
> >> >> > doubt and treat the individual as though he does in fact have that
> >> >> > capability. I assume that there is meant to be an objective fact of
> >> >> > the matter about whether the capability is in fact present. Suppose
> >> >> > that I were a scientist trying to resolve this question. How would I
> >> >> > go about trying to resolve it?
>
> >> >> I don't know that there is a way to prove it, perhaps someday with
> >> >> advances
> >> >> in biology they will discover exactly where each ability originates in
> >> >> the
> >> >> brain, they already know most of them. But he is suggesting that it is
> >> >> reasonable to assume that it exists and that its the ability to
> >> >> develop
> >> >> or
> >> >> manifest the capability in an ability that has been lost. The person
> >> >> probably has all the right types of brain cells, they just don't work
> >> >> or
> >> >> connect properly. He would not have a dog brain. Anyway these marginal
> >> >> cases
> >> >> don't prove anything, because we normally have a list of subjective
> >> >> reasons
> >> >> to view and treat those humans differently, just as we have subjective
> >> >> reasons to treat individual animals in special ways, such as pets or
> >> >> "special" species.
>
> >> >> We can't make the assumption that advanced cognitive capacities exist
> >> >> with
> >> >> any other species because no member of those species has ever
> >> >> manifested
> >> >> those abilities. We give consideration to animals based on an educated
> >> >> guess
> >> >> as to their capacities. Until a flea or a dog or a pig exhibits
> >> >> advanced
> >> >> cognitive abilities we can safely assume that those capacities do not
> >> >> exist
> >> >> in those species. As soon as *one* does, then we would be compelled in
> >> >> my
> >> >> opinion to assume that every member of that species possesses those
> >> >> capabilities, just as we do with humans. Therefore we are giving them
> >> >> equal
> >> >> consideration.
>
> >> > I am extremely skeptical that "capabilities" is a meaningful concept..
>
> >> That's interesting, since organisms are living before they begin to
> >> manifest
> >> all the abilities typical of their species, how would you describe those
> >> latent, potential as-yet-not-demonstrated abilities? Are they not
> >> "concept
> >> worthy"? Birds possess something, inherently, while they are only a clump
> >> of
> >> cells, that leads to them in time to be able to fly. You had the
> >> capability
> >> at one time to become a mathematician, before you were one. That was in
> >> no
> >> small part due to your species.
>
> > The problem is that if we define "capability" to mean "potential
> > ability", then it is obvious that the permanently severely retarded
> > human lacks it, but you want to leave that question open.
>
> We don't know that they lack it, we only know that they are not manifesting
> it. It is not unreasonable to give them the benefit of the doubt and assume
> they may still possess the quality. Even if they lack it, we usually extend
> consideration for other reasons.

When you say that you make it clear that by "capability" you do not
mean "potential ability", as Wetlesen also makes clear. So it's your
job to explain what you do mean.

You say that we don't know that a permanently severely retarded human
lacks the capability. What does this question even mean? Just imagine
you were an omniscient scientist, you knew absolutely everything there
was to know about the state of the world. What criteria would you use
to determine whether the capability was present?

On Apr 26, 10:33*am, "Dutch" > wrote:
> "Rupert" > wrote in message
>
> ...
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Apr 25, 11:13 pm, "Dutch" > wrote:
> >> "Rupert" > wrote in message
>
> ....
>
> >> > On Apr 25, 8:24 pm, "Dutch" > wrote:
> >> >> "Rupert" > wrote in message
>
> >> ...
>
> >> >> > On Apr 25, 9:45 am, "Dutch" > wrote:
> >> >> >> "Rupert" > wrote in message
>
> >> >> ...
>
> >> >> >> > On Apr 24, 7:18 am, "Dutch" > wrote:
> >> >> >> >> "Rupert" > wrote
>
> >> >> >> >> > On Apr 23, 9:14 pm, "Dutch" > wrote:
> >> >> >> >> >> The first thing to consider is that the moment you use the
> >> >> >> >> >> broad
> >> >> >> >> >> term
> >> >> >> >> >> "animals" the argument against "speciesism" immediately falls
> >> >> >> >> >> apart
> >> >> >> >> >> because
> >> >> >> >> >> no argument for equal consideration of animals can *possibly*
> >> >> >> >> >> include
> >> >> >> >> >> all
> >> >> >> >> >> animal life (e.g there is animal life in your hair, in the
> >> >> >> >> >> carpet,
> >> >> >> >> >> etc...)
> >> >> >> >> >> so the assumption must be made that it refers to certain
> >> >> >> >> >> animals
> >> >> >> >> >> only,
> >> >> >> >> >> and
> >> >> >> >> >> as soon as you do that you are engaging in "speciesism". And
> >> >> >> >> >> if
> >> >> >> >> >> the
> >> >> >> >> >> ARA
> >> >> >> >> >> says, no I am not selecting by species, I am selecting by the
> >> >> >> >> >> attributes
> >> >> >> >> >> of
> >> >> >> >> >> certain species, such as sentience or intelligence, the
> >> >> >> >> >> response,
> >> >> >> >> >> that
> >> >> >> >> >> is
> >> >> >> >> >> exactly what we are doing too.
>
> >> >> >> >> > But you refuse to spell out the details of your views, such as
> >> >> >> >> > for
> >> >> >> >> > example what it entails about how pigs should be treated.
>
> >> >> >> >> The details are beside the point, bigger and better pens, no
> >> >> >> >> tail
> >> >> >> >> docking,
> >> >> >> >> more light, soothing music, whatever is shown to make them
> >> >> >> >> content,
> >> >> >> >> etc.
> >> >> >> >> The
> >> >> >> >> point is that I believe that they deserve a lot more
> >> >> >> >> consideration
> >> >> >> >> than
> >> >> >> >> fleas, and so do you, therefore both of us are "speciesist". I
> >> >> >> >> just
> >> >> >> >> don't
> >> >> >> >> have the same set of speciesist attitudes about the same species
> >> >> >> >> that
> >> >> >> >> you
> >> >> >> >> do. It would be folly to not use the information that an
> >> >> >> >> animal's
> >> >> >> >> species
> >> >> >> >> conveys to inform our ways of relating to them.
>
> >> >> >> > As far as the comparison with fleas go, fleas have a completely
> >> >> >> > different set of interests, so you haven't really shown that I'm
> >> >> >> > failing to follow the principle of equal consideration of
> >> >> >> > interests.
> >> >> >> > That is not what I mean by speciesism.
>
> >> >> >> Don't fleas have an interest in survival?
>
> >> >> > Well, they may or may not, I'm not sure whether they are capable of
> >> >> > conscious experience. If they do have an interest in survival, then
> >> >> > that is one thing that they have in common with pigs, but it still
> >> >> > remains true that the set of interests a flea has is very different
> >> >> > in
> >> >> > many important ways to the set of interests that a pig has. So even
> >> >> > if
> >> >> > you were extending equal consideration to similar interests, you
> >> >> > still
> >> >> > might end up treating a flea very differently to the way you would
> >> >> > treat a pig.
>
> >> >> I'm not talking about conscious experience or suggesting they are
> >> >> aware
> >> >> that
> >> >> they have an interest in survival, but that they behave as if they
> >> >> have
> >> >> it.
> >> >> I doubt if pigs are aware that they have an interest in survival
> >> >> either,
> >> >> like the flea and every other animal other than humans they simply are
> >> >> wired
> >> >> to pursue that interest. If you are saying that consideration should
> >> >> be
> >> >> based on the degree to which animals have conscious experience then I
> >> >> would
> >> >> say that humans are far ahead of every other animal.
>
> >> > I don't think an organism can be meaningfully said to have an interest
> >> > in a particular outcome unless that organism has the capacity for
> >> > conscious experience.
>
> >> How are you measuring or defining "conscious experience"?
>
> > "A conscious mental state is a mental state that it is like something
> > to be in." Thomas Nagel.
>
> >> I would argue that
> >> the conscious experience of animals in pursuit of their interests is
> >> nothing
> >> at all like the human conscious experience. Animals respond to triggers
> >> they
> >> receive with their senses, instincts and appetites, they aren't "thinking
> >> about" anything beyond the here and now.
>
> > It probably is quite different to human conscious experience,
> > obviously, although I would be careful about underestimating animals'
> > ability to "think about" things.
>
> >> > I also don't think that there is any meaningful
> >> > sense in which humans have "more" capacity for conscious experience
> >> > than nonhuman animals, I don't think that means anything.
>
> >> You dismiss a lot of pretty obvious notions when they threaten your
> >> biases.
> >> The human capacity for deep, profound levels of conscious experience is
> >> what
> >> sets us apart from other species more than any other factor.
>
> > I wouldn't characterise this as "more capacity for conscious
> > experience". I think either you've got the capacity for conscious
> > experience or you don't.
>
> I disagree, obviously, see above. There is a wide range of capacity for
> conscious experience even among humans.
>
>
>
> >> > What
> >> > (typical) humans have is better cognitive abilities.
>
> >> Those *vastly* better abilities lead to a much richer conscious
> >> experience.
> >> Animals have many far superior sensory abilities.
>
> > Obviously I agree that most humans have vastly better cognitive
> > abilities than nonhuman animals, but the trouble is that you refuse to
> > spell out what follows exactly if those abilities are not present, and
> > when I ask you I am accused of going off topic, which I find a bit
> > frustrating.
>
> You mean opinions about animal welfare? Isn't that jumping ahead a little?

You want to claim that if a being lacks certain cognitive capacities
then less moral consideration is due to that being, right? Shouldn't
you flesh out this claim by being a bit more specific about what kind
of moral consideration is due in such a case? Otherwise the claim
could mean almost anything.

On 4/25/2012 10:19 PM, Rupert wrote:
> On Apr 25, 11:48 pm, George > wrote:
>> On 4/25/2012 1:26 PM, Rupert wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> On Apr 25, 5:41 pm, George > wrote:
>>>> On 4/25/2012 12:34 AM, Rupert wrote:
>>
>>>>> On Apr 23, 10:41 pm, George > wrote:
>>>>>> On 4/23/2012 1:21 PM, Rupert wrote:
>>
>>>>>>> On Apr 23, 8:22 pm, George > wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 4/23/2012 10:26 AM, Rupert wrote:
>>
>>>>>>>>> On Apr 23, 5:11 pm, George > wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 4/23/2012 1:07 AM, Rupert wrote:
>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 22, 6:26 pm, George > wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/22/2012 1:34 AM, Rupert wrote:
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 22, 6:38 am, George > wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/21/2012 12:48 PM, Rupert wrote:
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 21, 9:25 pm, George > wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/21/2012 10:39 AM, Dutch wrote:
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > wrote
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 21, 9:41 am, > wrote:
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Let's not get too far off topic. We're not talking about animal
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> welfare, the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> subject is "speciesism" and "equal consideration". I give greater
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> consideration to a gorilla than a pig, and more to a pig than to a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sponge.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Unfortunately you don't seem willing to specify in detail what kind of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> moral consideration you give to a pig, so I suppose I'm never going to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> learn all that much about what your views are.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I'm willing to discuss the treatment of pigs, its just not on point at
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the moment. My view on the current discussion is that "equal
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> consideration" (or 'non-speciesism') is at the very least a misnomer, a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> misguided notion.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Good job on not letting Woopert steer the conversation off topic. It's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> one of his regular tactics.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Dutch is claiming that otherspeciesare due less moral consideration.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am trying to getting him to make this concrete by expounding his
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views with regard to a specific example. It's not going off topic.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Trying to get him to explain in detail the *degree* of consideration he
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> gives pigs, when the issue is the binary one of giving equal
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> consideration or not giving equal consideration to animals, is going off
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> topic.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> No, it's not
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> It is. The particular weight he gives to pigs' interests has nothing to
>>>>>>>>>>>> do with the principle ofspecies-specific consideration.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> You're engaging in your usual invalid debate tactics.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Why is asking someone a question to get them to clarify their views an
>>>>>>>>>>> "invalid debate tactic"?
>>
>>>>>>>>>> It's a time-wasting evasion that is *not* asking him to clarify his
>>>>>>>>>> views. His contention is that a different level of consideration for
>>>>>>>>>> animals on aspeciesbyspeciesbasis is morally permissible. How much
>>>>>>>>>> consideration he gives to members of a particularspeciesis irrelevant
>>>>>>>>>> to the topic.
>>
>>>>>>>>> It is asking him to clarify his views. And it is relevant because he
>>>>>>>>> has not refuted the AMC.
>>
>>>>>>>> The AMC was never really an argument, and what little bit of argument is
>>>>>>>> in it is refuted by the ASN, which no "ara" has ever properly understood
>>>>>>>> and so has never refuted.
>>
>>>>>>> I directed you towards a critical discussion of the ASN. You have not
>>>>>>> provided a satisfactory response.
>>
>>>>>> I did. You and all the other "ar" extremists don't get ASN.
>>
>>>>> What you said is "They don't get it". This is not a satisfactory
>>>>> response.
>>
>>>> It's a fact.
>>
>>> You have not established that it's a fact,
>>
>> I have. You don't get it because even after hearing or reading it, you
>> continue to insist that it's about some quality possessed individually,
>> and it isn't. Clearly you and all the other "ar" loons misapprehend it.
>>
>
> Where do Nobis and Graham make that misinterpretation?

You ****wit:

"The [AMC], simply put, is that there are many human beings who,
intuitively, have moral rights (or, to bypass talk of rights,
would be morally wrong to raise and kill to eat, wear, experiment
on and use for other exploitative purposes) even though they lack
such sophisticated mental abilities that Machan claims are
necessary for having rights."

Even though they talk about human beings as plural, they are referring
to the lack of ability for moral agency afflicting each of them
individually. Clearly if one of your two ****wits' "many human beings"
were to regain his ability to act as a moral agent, he wouldn't be
included among the marginal cases.

You ****wits just don't understand that the capabilities to which
Wetlesen and Cohen and others are referring are inhere in being human,
*not* in being "a" human.

The AMC has been thoroughly rubbished.

On 4/26/2012 7:00 AM, Rupert wrote:
> On Apr 26, 10:25 am, > wrote:
>> > wrote in message
>>
>> ...
>>
>>> On Apr 25, 11:13 pm, > wrote:
>>>> > wrote in message
>>
>>>> ...
>>
>>>>> On Apr 25, 8:17 pm, > wrote:
>>>>>> > wrote in message
>>
>>>>>> ...
>>
>>>>>>> On Apr 25, 9:43 am, > wrote:
>>>>>>>> > wrote in message
>>
>>>>>>>> ...
>>
>>>>>>>>> On Apr 24, 7:09 am, > wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> > wrote
>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 23, 8:09 pm, > wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is asking him to clarify his views. And it is relevant
>>>>>>>>>>>>> because
>>>>>>>>>>>>> he
>>>>>>>>>>>>> has not refuted the AMC.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> I have.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>> What's the refutation?
>>
>>>>>>>>>> moralstat99
>>
>>>>>>>>> How would you define "capabilities"?
>>
>>>>>>>> From moralstat99
>>>>>>>> -----------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>> A rebuttal of the argument from marginal cases
>>>>>>>> It may well be that Warren's proposal at this point is more
>>>>>>>> adequate
>>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>> relation to common sense than the positions of Regan or Singer.
>>>>>>>> Nevertheless, it appears that all three of them have based their
>>>>>>>> arguments on the assumption that the concepts of a moral person and
>>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>>> moral agent are synonymous or equivalent. This assumption can be
>>>>>>>> contested, and if it is rejected, it seems that their arguments
>>>>>>>> will
>>>>>>>> not
>>>>>>>> work.
>>>>>>>> An alternative to their assumption has been developed by Jens
>>>>>>>> Saugstad
>>>>>>>> in his doctoral thesis on The Moral Ontology of Human Fetuses; A
>>>>>>>> Metaphysical Investigation of Personhood (1994). On Saugstad's
>>>>>>>> interpretation, Kant's concept of a moral person is generic in
>>>>>>>> relation
>>>>>>>> to that of a moral agent. This implies that the class of moral
>>>>>>>> agents
>>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>> a subclass of moral persons; some moral persons are moral agents,
>>>>>>>> others
>>>>>>>> are not.
>>>>>>>> On the conceptual level Saugstad gets this result by distinguishing
>>>>>>>> two
>>>>>>>> kinds of capacities: capabilities and abilities. In order to be a
>>>>>>>> moral
>>>>>>>> agent, a person must be able to take a moral responsibility for his
>>>>>>>> or
>>>>>>>> her actions, and to be answerable for them. This requires not only
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> capabilities of free will, reason and a linguistic competence; but
>>>>>>>> also
>>>>>>>> the operative ability of realising these capabilities in practice.
>>>>>>>> However, a subject may have the capabilities of moral agency
>>>>>>>> without
>>>>>>>> having the operative abilities. In that case the subject is a moral
>>>>>>>> person without being a moral agent, since moral personhood is
>>>>>>>> grounded
>>>>>>>> on the actual capability and not on the potential ability.
>>>>>>>> Two consequences follow from this solution. In the first place, it
>>>>>>>> extends moral status to sentient marginal humans. The sufficient
>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>> necessary condition for this extension is the presence of the
>>>>>>>> capability
>>>>>>>> of moral agency. If this is present, it is not necessary that the
>>>>>>>> operative ability is also present. On this ground equal inherent
>>>>>>>> value
>>>>>>>> and equal basic rights can be ascribed to both marginal and normal
>>>>>>>> human
>>>>>>>> beings.
>>>>>>>> Admittedly, the assumption about the presence of this capability is
>>>>>>>> not
>>>>>>>> equally verifiable in all cases. In some cases it is verifiable,
>>>>>>>> such
>>>>>>>> as
>>>>>>>> in normal youths, children, neonates, and foetuses in the later
>>>>>>>> stages
>>>>>>>> of pregnancy. They do not have the actual ability of being moral
>>>>>>>> agents,
>>>>>>>> but they have it potentially and it will be actualised in due time.
>>>>>>>> Still they may be assumed to have the capability as an actual
>>>>>>>> internal
>>>>>>>> property, and this is the ground for considering them to be
>>>>>>>> persons.
>>>>>>>> It
>>>>>>>> may be asked whether this argument justifies the assumption about
>>>>>>>> equal
>>>>>>>> moral status value. Would it not be possible to introduce grading
>>>>>>>> on
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> basis of how far the potentiality for moral agency has developed?
>>>>>>>> This
>>>>>>>> view has been propounded in discussions about abortion. On the
>>>>>>>> basis
>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>> the present argument, however, it must be rejected, since moral
>>>>>>>> status
>>>>>>>> value is assumed to be grounded on capabilities of agency, which
>>>>>>>> are
>>>>>>>> actual, and not on potential abilities.
>>>>>>>> In other cases there are humans who have been moral agents, but
>>>>>>>> have
>>>>>>>> lost the required abilities. This pertains to many cases of the
>>>>>>>> severely
>>>>>>>> brain damaged and the severely senile. If we assume that they have
>>>>>>>> retained their capabilities of being moral agents, we still have a
>>>>>>>> sufficient reason for ascribing equal inherent value to them.
>>>>>>>> Against
>>>>>>>> this it may be objected that they may have lost not only their
>>>>>>>> ability
>>>>>>>> of being moral agents, but also their capability. There is room for
>>>>>>>> much
>>>>>>>> empirical doubt about these borderline cases, and for that reason
>>>>>>>> there
>>>>>>>> is also room for giving them the benefit of doubt. Admittedly, this
>>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>>> somewhat ad hoc assumption. Even if it is not a good scientific
>>>>>>>> explanation, however, it may be a good moral reason.
>>>>>>>> This kind of argument can also be applied to the most difficult
>>>>>>>> cases
>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>> marginal humans who have never had the ability of being moral
>>>>>>>> agents
>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>> will never get it, such as the severely mentally retarded.
>>>>>>>> Theoretically, it is not inconceivable that the capability is still
>>>>>>>> there, and that this can be used as a ground for ascribing an equal
>>>>>>>> moral status value to them. If this justification is not accepted,
>>>>>>>> however, it does not necessarily follow that they have no moral
>>>>>>>> status
>>>>>>>> value at all. They may have a gradual moral status value, depending
>>>>>>>> on
>>>>>>>> the argument which we shall discuss below. As for those who are
>>>>>>>> borne
>>>>>>>> without a brain, they do seem to be excluded.
>>>>>>>> According to the present argument, inherent value is ascribed
>>>>>>>> equally
>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>> all moral persons. Hence this position is universalistic and
>>>>>>>> egalitarian. If this way of understanding the relation between
>>>>>>>> moral
>>>>>>>> persons and moral agents works, there will be no need to
>>>>>>>> distinguish
>>>>>>>> Agent's Rights and Human Rights the way Warren does. They will be
>>>>>>>> grounded in the same internal property of moral persons, and there
>>>>>>>> will
>>>>>>>> be no need for a supplementary justification based on an external
>>>>>>>> relation such as membership in a human society.
>>>>>>>> The second consequence which follows from this position is that
>>>>>>>> there
>>>>>>>> will be a relevant difference between human and non-human beings,
>>>>>>>> which
>>>>>>>> can justify a differential treatment with regard to the ascription
>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>> moral status. Humans have a property which other animals lack,
>>>>>>>> notably
>>>>>>>> the capability of being moral agents, and if this property is
>>>>>>>> accepted
>>>>>>>> to be a necessary condition for the ascription of moral status,
>>>>>>>> then
>>>>>>>> its
>>>>>>>> absence in other animals will be a sufficient condition for denying
>>>>>>>> moral status to them. In this way Kant's anthropocentrism is
>>>>>>>> vindicated,
>>>>>>>> albeit with the proviso mentioned earlier that this rests on the
>>>>>>>> contingent fact that only humans are moral persons. Theoretically,
>>>>>>>> there
>>>>>>>> might be other moral persons also, but there seem to be none,
>>>>>>>> excepting
>>>>>>>> perhaps some of our closest relatives among the primates.
>>>>>>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------
>>
>>>>>>> Yes, I just re-read that passage this morning.
>>
>>>>>>> The difficulty is that no definition of the central term
>>>>>>> "capability"
>>>>>>> is given.
>>
>>>>>> A capability is an inherent ability in any state, potential, latent,
>>>>>> active,
>>>>>> or disabled.
>>
>>>>>> An eagle has (or "eagles have") the capability of flight before ever
>>>>>> leaving the egg, but the ability doesn't develop until later.
>>
>>>>>>> Let us suppose that we have a human who has always been very
>>>>>>> seriously
>>>>>>> mentally impaired ever since he was born, and has never had
>>>>>>> cognitive
>>>>>>> abilities greater than that of a dog. Wetlesen claims that there is
>>>>>>> some possibility that he might still have the capability to be a
>>>>>>> moral
>>>>>>> agent, and therefore we have moral reason to extend the benefit of
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> doubt and treat the individual as though he does in fact have that
>>>>>>> capability. I assume that there is meant to be an objective fact of
>>>>>>> the matter about whether the capability is in fact present. Suppose
>>>>>>> that I were a scientist trying to resolve this question. How would I
>>>>>>> go about trying to resolve it?
>>
>>>>>> I don't know that there is a way to prove it, perhaps someday with
>>>>>> advances
>>>>>> in biology they will discover exactly where each ability originates in
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> brain, they already know most of them. But he is suggesting that it is
>>>>>> reasonable to assume that it exists and that its the ability to
>>>>>> develop
>>>>>> or
>>>>>> manifest the capability in an ability that has been lost. The person
>>>>>> probably has all the right types of brain cells, they just don't work
>>>>>> or
>>>>>> connect properly. He would not have a dog brain. Anyway these marginal
>>>>>> cases
>>>>>> don't prove anything, because we normally have a list of subjective
>>>>>> reasons
>>>>>> to view and treat those humans differently, just as we have subjective
>>>>>> reasons to treat individual animals in special ways, such as pets or
>>>>>> "special" species.
>>
>>>>>> We can't make the assumption that advanced cognitive capacities exist
>>>>>> with
>>>>>> any other species because no member of those species has ever
>>>>>> manifested
>>>>>> those abilities. We give consideration to animals based on an educated
>>>>>> guess
>>>>>> as to their capacities. Until a flea or a dog or a pig exhibits
>>>>>> advanced
>>>>>> cognitive abilities we can safely assume that those capacities do not
>>>>>> exist
>>>>>> in those species. As soon as *one* does, then we would be compelled in
>>>>>> my
>>>>>> opinion to assume that every member of that species possesses those
>>>>>> capabilities, just as we do with humans. Therefore we are giving them
>>>>>> equal
>>>>>> consideration.
>>
>>>>> I am extremely skeptical that "capabilities" is a meaningful concept.
>>
>>>> That's interesting, since organisms are living before they begin to
>>>> manifest
>>>> all the abilities typical of their species, how would you describe those
>>>> latent, potential as-yet-not-demonstrated abilities? Are they not
>>>> "concept
>>>> worthy"? Birds possess something, inherently, while they are only a clump
>>>> of
>>>> cells, that leads to them in time to be able to fly. You had the
>>>> capability
>>>> at one time to become a mathematician, before you were one. That was in
>>>> no
>>>> small part due to your species.
>>
>>> The problem is that if we define "capability" to mean "potential
>>> ability", then it is obvious that the permanently severely retarded
>>> human lacks it, but you want to leave that question open.
>>
>> We don't know that they lack it, we only know that they are not manifesting
>> it. It is not unreasonable to give them the benefit of the doubt and assume
>> they may still possess the quality. Even if they lack it, we usually extend
>> consideration for other reasons.
>
> When you say that you make it clear that by "capability" you do not
> mean "potential ability", as Wetlesen also makes clear. So it's your
> job to explain what you do mean.

It has been clarified for you. You're bullshitting evasively, as usual.

"Rupert" > wrote
> On Apr 26, 10:25 am, "Dutch" > wrote:

>> > The problem is that if we define "capability" to mean "potential
>> > ability", then it is obvious that the permanently severely retarded
>> > human lacks it, but you want to leave that question open.
>>
>> We don't know that they lack it, we only know that they are not
>> manifesting
>> it. It is not unreasonable to give them the benefit of the doubt and
>> assume
>> they may still possess the quality. Even if they lack it, we usually
>> extend
>> consideration for other reasons.
>
> When you say that you make it clear that by "capability" you do not
> mean "potential ability", as Wetlesen also makes clear. So it's your
> job to explain what you do mean.
>
> You say that we don't know that a permanently severely retarded human
> lacks the capability. What does this question even mean? Just imagine
> you were an omniscient scientist, you knew absolutely everything there
> was to know about the state of the world. What criteria would you use
> to determine whether the capability was present?

I would check the part of the dna where the capability for higher reasoning
resides and see if it was there and intact. Once I identified the problem I
would repair it. If I did the same test on a pig it would not be there at
all.

"Rupert" > wrote

> You want to claim that if a being lacks certain cognitive capacities
> then less moral consideration is due to that being, right?

We both believe that. You give a bedbug no moral consideration. You say it
depends on the the animal's capacity for conscious awareness, don't you?

> Shouldn't
> you flesh out this claim by being a bit more specific about what kind
> of moral consideration is due in such a case?

I don't see why. That seems like a different topic.

> Otherwise the claim
> could mean almost anything.

Not true, it only means what it says.

On Apr 27, 6:00*am, "Dutch" > wrote:
> "Rupert" > wrote
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Apr 26, 10:25 am, "Dutch" > wrote:
> >> > The problem is that if we define "capability" to mean "potential
> >> > ability", then it is obvious that the permanently severely retarded
> >> > human lacks it, but you want to leave that question open.
>
> >> We don't know that they lack it, we only know that they are not
> >> manifesting
> >> it. It is not unreasonable to give them the benefit of the doubt and
> >> assume
> >> they may still possess the quality. Even if they lack it, we usually
> >> extend
> >> consideration for other reasons.
>
> > When you say that you make it clear that by "capability" you do not
> > mean "potential ability", as Wetlesen also makes clear. So it's your
> > job to explain what you do mean.
>
> > You say that we don't know that a permanently severely retarded human
> > lacks the capability. What does this question even mean? Just imagine
> > you were an omniscient scientist, you knew absolutely everything there
> > was to know about the state of the world. What criteria would you use
> > to determine whether the capability was present?
>
> I would check the part of the dna where the capability for higher reasoning
> resides and see if it was there and intact. Once I identified the problem I
> would repair it. If I did the same test on a pig it would not be there at
> all.

Ok.

On Apr 26, 6:59*pm, George Plimpton > wrote:
> On 4/25/2012 10:19 PM, Rupert wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Apr 25, 11:48 pm, George > *wrote:
> >> On 4/25/2012 1:26 PM, Rupert wrote:
>
> >>> On Apr 25, 5:41 pm, George > * *wrote:
> >>>> On 4/25/2012 12:34 AM, Rupert wrote:
>
> >>>>> On Apr 23, 10:41 pm, George > * * *wrote:
> >>>>>> On 4/23/2012 1:21 PM, Rupert wrote:
>
> >>>>>>> On Apr 23, 8:22 pm, George > * * * *wrote:
> >>>>>>>> On 4/23/2012 10:26 AM, Rupert wrote:
>
> >>>>>>>>> On Apr 23, 5:11 pm, George > * * * * *wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>> On 4/23/2012 1:07 AM, Rupert wrote:
>
> >>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 22, 6:26 pm, George > * * * * * *wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/22/2012 1:34 AM, Rupert wrote:
>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 22, 6:38 am, George > * * * * * * *wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/21/2012 12:48 PM, Rupert wrote:
>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 21, 9:25 pm, George > * * * * * * * *wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/21/2012 10:39 AM, Dutch wrote:
>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > * * * * * * * *wrote
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 21, 9:41 am, > * * * * * * * *wrote:
>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Let's not get too far off topic. We're not talking about animal
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> welfare, the
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> subject is "speciesism" and "equal consideration". I give greater
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> consideration to a gorilla than a pig, and more to a pig than to a
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sponge.
>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Unfortunately you don't seem willing to specify in detail what kind of
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> moral consideration you give to a pig, so I suppose I'm never going to
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> learn all that much about what your views are.
>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I'm willing to discuss the treatment of pigs, its just not on point at
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the moment. My view on the current discussion is that "equal
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> consideration" (or 'non-speciesism') is at the very least a misnomer, a
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> misguided notion.
>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Good job on not letting Woopert steer the conversation off topic. *It's
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> one of his regular tactics.
>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Dutch is claiming that otherspeciesare due less moral consideration.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am trying to getting him to make this concrete by expounding his
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views with regard to a specific example. It's not going off topic.
>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Trying to get him to explain in detail the *degree* of consideration he
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> gives pigs, when the issue is the binary one of giving equal
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> consideration or not giving equal consideration to animals, is going off
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> topic.
>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> No, it's not
>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> It is. *The particular weight he gives to pigs' interests has nothing to
> >>>>>>>>>>>> do with the principle ofspecies-specific consideration.
>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> You're engaging in your usual invalid debate tactics.
>
> >>>>>>>>>>> Why is asking someone a question to get them to clarify their views an
> >>>>>>>>>>> "invalid debate tactic"?
>
> >>>>>>>>>> It's a time-wasting evasion that is *not* asking him to clarify his
> >>>>>>>>>> views. *His contention is that a different level of consideration for
> >>>>>>>>>> animals on aspeciesbyspeciesbasis is morally permissible. *How much
> >>>>>>>>>> consideration he gives to members of a particularspeciesis irrelevant
> >>>>>>>>>> to the topic.
>
> >>>>>>>>> It is asking him to clarify his views. And it is relevant because he
> >>>>>>>>> has not refuted the AMC.
>
> >>>>>>>> The AMC was never really an argument, and what little bit of argument is
> >>>>>>>> in it is refuted by the ASN, which no "ara" has ever properly understood
> >>>>>>>> and so has never refuted.
>
> >>>>>>> I directed you towards a critical discussion of the ASN. You have not
> >>>>>>> provided a satisfactory response.
>
> >>>>>> I did. *You and all the other "ar" extremists don't get ASN.
>
> >>>>> What you said is "They don't get it". This is not a satisfactory
> >>>>> response.
>
> >>>> It's a fact.
>
> >>> You have not established that it's a fact,
>
> >> I have. *You don't get it because even after hearing or reading it, you
> >> continue to insist that it's about some quality possessed individually,
> >> and it isn't. *Clearly you and all the other "ar" loons misapprehend it.
>
> > Where do Nobis and Graham make that misinterpretation?
>
> You ****wit:
>
> * * * "The [AMC], simply put, is that there are many human beings who,
> * * * intuitively, have moral rights (or, to bypass talk of rights,
> * * * would be morally wrong to raise and kill to eat, wear, experiment
> * * * on and use for other exploitative purposes) even though they lack
> * * * such sophisticated mental abilities that Machan claims are
> * * * necessary for having rights."
>
> Even though they talk about human beings as plural, they are referring
> to the lack of ability for moral agency afflicting each of them
> individually. *Clearly if one of your two ****wits' "many human beings"
> were to regain his ability to act as a moral agent, he wouldn't be
> included among the marginal cases.
>
> You ****wits just don't understand that the capabilities to which
> Wetlesen and Cohen and others are referring are inhere in being human,
> *not* in being "a" human.
>
> The AMC has been thoroughly rubbished.

Wetlesen's argument is different to Cohen's argument, and to the ASN,
(which your pal Dutch isn't much impressed with), and no, the
capabilities don't "inhere in being human", whatever that may mean.

If you want to claim that the "AMC has been thoroughly rubbished" you
should make up your mind which counter-argument you want to defend.

On Apr 26, 7:29*pm, George Plimpton > wrote:
> On 4/26/2012 7:00 AM, Rupert wrote:
>
> > On Apr 26, 10:25 am, > *wrote:
> >> > *wrote in message
>
> ....
>
> >>> On Apr 25, 11:13 pm, > *wrote:
> >>>> > *wrote in message
>
> ....
>
> >>>>> On Apr 25, 8:17 pm, > *wrote:
> >>>>>> > *wrote in message
>
> ...
>
> >>>>>>> On Apr 25, 9:43 am, > *wrote:
> >>>>>>>> > *wrote in message
>
> ...
>
> >>>>>>>>> On Apr 24, 7:09 am, > *wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>> > *wrote
>
> >>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 23, 8:09 pm, > *wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> It is asking him to clarify his views. And it is relevant
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> because
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> he
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> has not refuted the AMC.
>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> I have.
>
> >>>>>>>>>>> What's the refutation?
>
> >>>>>>>>>> moralstat99
>
> >>>>>>>>> How would you define "capabilities"?
>
> >>>>>>>> *From moralstat99
> >>>>>>>> -----------------------------------------------
> >>>>>>>> A rebuttal of the argument from marginal cases
> >>>>>>>> It may well be that Warren's proposal at this point is more
> >>>>>>>> adequate
> >>>>>>>> in
> >>>>>>>> relation to common sense than the positions of Regan or Singer.
> >>>>>>>> Nevertheless, it appears that all three of them have based their
> >>>>>>>> arguments on the assumption that the concepts of a moral person and
> >>>>>>>> a
> >>>>>>>> moral agent are synonymous or equivalent. This assumption can be
> >>>>>>>> contested, and if it is rejected, it seems that their arguments
> >>>>>>>> will
> >>>>>>>> not
> >>>>>>>> work.
> >>>>>>>> An alternative to their assumption has been developed by Jens
> >>>>>>>> Saugstad
> >>>>>>>> in his doctoral thesis on The Moral Ontology of Human Fetuses; A
> >>>>>>>> Metaphysical Investigation of Personhood (1994). On Saugstad's
> >>>>>>>> interpretation, Kant's concept of a moral person is generic in
> >>>>>>>> relation
> >>>>>>>> to that of a moral agent. This implies that the class of moral
> >>>>>>>> agents
> >>>>>>>> is
> >>>>>>>> a subclass of moral persons; some moral persons are moral agents,
> >>>>>>>> others
> >>>>>>>> are not.
> >>>>>>>> On the conceptual level Saugstad gets this result by distinguishing
> >>>>>>>> two
> >>>>>>>> kinds of capacities: capabilities and abilities. In order to be a
> >>>>>>>> moral
> >>>>>>>> agent, a person must be able to take a moral responsibility for his
> >>>>>>>> or
> >>>>>>>> her actions, and to be answerable for them. This requires not only
> >>>>>>>> the
> >>>>>>>> capabilities of free will, reason and a linguistic competence; but
> >>>>>>>> also
> >>>>>>>> the operative ability of realising these capabilities in practice.
> >>>>>>>> However, a subject may have the capabilities of moral agency
> >>>>>>>> without
> >>>>>>>> having the operative abilities. In that case the subject is a moral
> >>>>>>>> person without being a moral agent, since moral personhood is
> >>>>>>>> grounded
> >>>>>>>> on the actual capability and not on the potential ability.
> >>>>>>>> Two consequences follow from this solution. In the first place, it
> >>>>>>>> extends moral status to sentient marginal humans. The sufficient
> >>>>>>>> and
> >>>>>>>> necessary condition for this extension is the presence of the
> >>>>>>>> capability
> >>>>>>>> of moral agency. If this is present, it is not necessary that the
> >>>>>>>> operative ability is also present. On this ground equal inherent
> >>>>>>>> value
> >>>>>>>> and equal basic rights can be ascribed to both marginal and normal
> >>>>>>>> human
> >>>>>>>> beings.
> >>>>>>>> Admittedly, the assumption about the presence of this capability is
> >>>>>>>> not
> >>>>>>>> equally verifiable in all cases. In some cases it is verifiable,
> >>>>>>>> such
> >>>>>>>> as
> >>>>>>>> in normal youths, children, neonates, and foetuses in the later
> >>>>>>>> stages
> >>>>>>>> of pregnancy. They do not have the actual ability of being moral
> >>>>>>>> agents,
> >>>>>>>> but they have it potentially and it will be actualised in due time.
> >>>>>>>> Still they may be assumed to have the capability as an actual
> >>>>>>>> internal
> >>>>>>>> property, and this is the ground for considering them to be
> >>>>>>>> persons.
> >>>>>>>> It
> >>>>>>>> may be asked whether this argument justifies the assumption about
> >>>>>>>> equal
> >>>>>>>> moral status value. Would it not be possible to introduce grading
> >>>>>>>> on
> >>>>>>>> the
> >>>>>>>> basis of how far the potentiality for moral agency has developed?
> >>>>>>>> This
> >>>>>>>> view has been propounded in discussions about abortion. On the
> >>>>>>>> basis
> >>>>>>>> of
> >>>>>>>> the present argument, however, it must be rejected, since moral
> >>>>>>>> status
> >>>>>>>> value is assumed to be grounded on capabilities of agency, which
> >>>>>>>> are
> >>>>>>>> actual, and not on potential abilities.
> >>>>>>>> In other cases there are humans who have been moral agents, but
> >>>>>>>> have
> >>>>>>>> lost the required abilities. This pertains to many cases of the
> >>>>>>>> severely
> >>>>>>>> brain damaged and the severely senile. If we assume that they have
> >>>>>>>> retained their capabilities of being moral agents, we still have a
> >>>>>>>> sufficient reason for ascribing equal inherent value to them.
> >>>>>>>> Against
> >>>>>>>> this it may be objected that they may have lost not only their
> >>>>>>>> ability
> >>>>>>>> of being moral agents, but also their capability. There is room for
> >>>>>>>> much
> >>>>>>>> empirical doubt about these borderline cases, and for that reason
> >>>>>>>> there
> >>>>>>>> is also room for giving them the benefit of doubt. Admittedly, this
> >>>>>>>> is
> >>>>>>>> a
> >>>>>>>> somewhat ad hoc assumption. Even if it is not a good scientific
> >>>>>>>> explanation, however, it may be a good moral reason.
> >>>>>>>> This kind of argument can also be applied to the most difficult
> >>>>>>>> cases
> >>>>>>>> of
> >>>>>>>> marginal humans who have never had the ability of being moral
> >>>>>>>> agents
> >>>>>>>> and
> >>>>>>>> will never get it, such as the severely mentally retarded.
> >>>>>>>> Theoretically, it is not inconceivable that the capability is still
> >>>>>>>> there, and that this can be used as a ground for ascribing an equal
> >>>>>>>> moral status value to them. If this justification is not accepted,
> >>>>>>>> however, it does not necessarily follow that they have no moral
> >>>>>>>> status
> >>>>>>>> value at all. They may have a gradual moral status value, depending
> >>>>>>>> on
> >>>>>>>> the argument which we shall discuss below. As for those who are
> >>>>>>>> borne
> >>>>>>>> without a brain, they do seem to be excluded.
> >>>>>>>> According to the present argument, inherent value is ascribed
> >>>>>>>> equally
> >>>>>>>> to
> >>>>>>>> all moral persons. Hence this position is universalistic and
> >>>>>>>> egalitarian. If this way of understanding the relation between
> >>>>>>>> moral
> >>>>>>>> persons and moral agents works, there will be no need to
> >>>>>>>> distinguish
> >>>>>>>> Agent's Rights and Human Rights the way Warren does. They will be
> >>>>>>>> grounded in the same internal property of moral persons, and there
> >>>>>>>> will
> >>>>>>>> be no need for a supplementary justification based on an external
> >>>>>>>> relation such as membership in a human society.
> >>>>>>>> The second consequence which follows from this position is that
> >>>>>>>> there
> >>>>>>>> will be a relevant difference between human and non-human beings,
> >>>>>>>> which
> >>>>>>>> can justify a differential treatment with regard to the ascription
> >>>>>>>> of
> >>>>>>>> moral status. Humans have a property which other animals lack,
> >>>>>>>> notably
> >>>>>>>> the capability of being moral agents, and if this property is
> >>>>>>>> accepted
> >>>>>>>> to be a necessary condition for the ascription of moral status,
> >>>>>>>> then
> >>>>>>>> its
> >>>>>>>> absence in other animals will be a sufficient condition for denying
> >>>>>>>> moral status to them. In this way Kant's anthropocentrism is
> >>>>>>>> vindicated,
> >>>>>>>> albeit with the proviso mentioned earlier that this rests on the
> >>>>>>>> contingent fact that only humans are moral persons. Theoretically,
> >>>>>>>> there
> >>>>>>>> might be other moral persons also, but there seem to be none,
> >>>>>>>> excepting
> >>>>>>>> perhaps some of our closest relatives among the primates.
> >>>>>>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------
>
> >>>>>>> Yes, I just re-read that passage this morning.
>
> >>>>>>> The difficulty is that no definition of the central term
> >>>>>>> "capability"
> >>>>>>> is given.
>
> >>>>>> A capability is an inherent ability in any state, potential, latent,
> >>>>>> active,
> >>>>>> or disabled.
>
> >>>>>> An eagle has *(or "eagles have") the capability of flight before ever
> >>>>>> leaving the egg, but the ability doesn't develop until later.
>
> >>>>>>> Let us suppose that we have a human who has always been very
> >>>>>>> seriously
> >>>>>>> mentally impaired ever since he was born, and has never had
> >>>>>>> cognitive
> >>>>>>> abilities greater than that of a dog. Wetlesen claims that there is
> >>>>>>> some possibility that he might still have the capability to be a
> >>>>>>> moral
> >>>>>>> agent, and therefore we have moral reason to extend the benefit of
> >>>>>>> the
> >>>>>>> doubt and treat the individual as though he does in fact have that
> >>>>>>> capability. I assume that there is meant to be an objective fact of
> >>>>>>> the matter about whether the capability is in fact present. Suppose
> >>>>>>> that I were a scientist trying to resolve this question. How would I
> >>>>>>> go about trying to resolve it?
>
> >>>>>> I don't know that there is a way to prove it, perhaps someday with
> >>>>>> advances
> >>>>>> in biology they will discover exactly where each ability originates in
> >>>>>> the
> >>>>>> brain, they already know most of them. But he is suggesting that it is
> >>>>>> reasonable to assume that it exists and that its the ability to
> >>>>>> develop
> >>>>>> or
> >>>>>> manifest the capability in an ability that has been lost. The person
> >>>>>> probably has all the right types of brain cells, they just don't work
> >>>>>> or
> >>>>>> connect properly. He would not have a dog brain. Anyway these marginal
> >>>>>> cases
> >>>>>> don't prove anything, because we normally have a list of subjective
> >>>>>> reasons
> >>>>>> to view and treat those humans differently, just as we have subjective
> >>>>>> reasons to treat individual animals in special ways, such as pets or
> >>>>>> "special" species.
>
> >>>>>> We can't make the assumption that advanced cognitive capacities exist
> >>>>>> with
> >>>>>> any other species because no member of those species has ever
> >>>>>> manifested
> >>>>>> those abilities. We give consideration to animals based on an educated
> >>>>>> guess
> >>>>>> as to their capacities. Until a flea or a dog or a pig exhibits
> >>>>>> advanced
> >>>>>> cognitive abilities we can safely assume that those capacities do not
> >>>>>> exist
> >>>>>> in those species. As soon as *one* does, then we would be compelled in
> >>>>>> my
> >>>>>> opinion to assume that every member of that species possesses those
> >>>>>> capabilities, just as we do with humans. Therefore we are giving them
> >>>>>> equal
> >>>>>> consideration.
>
> >>>>> I am extremely skeptical that "capabilities" is a meaningful concept.

On 4/26/2012 10:15 PM, Rupert wrote:
> On Apr 26, 6:59 pm, George > wrote:
>> On 4/25/2012 10:19 PM, Rupert wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> On Apr 25, 11:48 pm, George > wrote:
>>>> On 4/25/2012 1:26 PM, Rupert wrote:
>>
>>>>> On Apr 25, 5:41 pm, George > wrote:
>>>>>> On 4/25/2012 12:34 AM, Rupert wrote:
>>
>>>>>>> On Apr 23, 10:41 pm, George > wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 4/23/2012 1:21 PM, Rupert wrote:
>>
>>>>>>>>> On Apr 23, 8:22 pm, George > wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 4/23/2012 10:26 AM, Rupert wrote:
>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 23, 5:11 pm, George > wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/23/2012 1:07 AM, Rupert wrote:
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 22, 6:26 pm, George > wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/22/2012 1:34 AM, Rupert wrote:
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 22, 6:38 am, George > wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/21/2012 12:48 PM, Rupert wrote:
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 21, 9:25 pm, George > wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/21/2012 10:39 AM, Dutch wrote:
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > wrote
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 21, 9:41 am, > wrote:
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Let's not get too far off topic. We're not talking about animal
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> welfare, the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> subject is "speciesism" and "equal consideration". I give greater
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> consideration to a gorilla than a pig, and more to a pig than to a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sponge.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Unfortunately you don't seem willing to specify in detail what kind of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> moral consideration you give to a pig, so I suppose I'm never going to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> learn all that much about what your views are.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I'm willing to discuss the treatment of pigs, its just not on point at
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the moment. My view on the current discussion is that "equal
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> consideration" (or 'non-speciesism') is at the very least a misnomer, a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> misguided notion.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Good job on not letting Woopert steer the conversation off topic. It's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> one of his regular tactics.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Dutch is claiming that otherspeciesare due less moral consideration.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am trying to getting him to make this concrete by expounding his
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views with regard to a specific example. It's not going off topic.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Trying to get him to explain in detail the *degree* of consideration he
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> gives pigs, when the issue is the binary one of giving equal
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> consideration or not giving equal consideration to animals, is going off
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> topic.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> No, it's not
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is. The particular weight he gives to pigs' interests has nothing to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> do with the principle ofspecies-specific consideration.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You're engaging in your usual invalid debate tactics.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Why is asking someone a question to get them to clarify their views an
>>>>>>>>>>>>> "invalid debate tactic"?
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> It's a time-wasting evasion that is *not* asking him to clarify his
>>>>>>>>>>>> views. His contention is that a different level of consideration for
>>>>>>>>>>>> animals on aspeciesbyspeciesbasis is morally permissible. How much
>>>>>>>>>>>> consideration he gives to members of a particularspeciesis irrelevant
>>>>>>>>>>>> to the topic.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>> It is asking him to clarify his views. And it is relevant because he
>>>>>>>>>>> has not refuted the AMC.
>>
>>>>>>>>>> The AMC was never really an argument, and what little bit of argument is
>>>>>>>>>> in it is refuted by the ASN, which no "ara" has ever properly understood
>>>>>>>>>> and so has never refuted.
>>
>>>>>>>>> I directed you towards a critical discussion of the ASN. You have not
>>>>>>>>> provided a satisfactory response.
>>
>>>>>>>> I did. You and all the other "ar" extremists don't get ASN.
>>
>>>>>>> What you said is "They don't get it". This is not a satisfactory
>>>>>>> response.
>>
>>>>>> It's a fact.
>>
>>>>> You have not established that it's a fact,
>>
>>>> I have. You don't get it because even after hearing or reading it, you
>>>> continue to insist that it's about some quality possessed individually,
>>>> and it isn't. Clearly you and all the other "ar" loons misapprehend it.
>>
>>> Where do Nobis and Graham make that misinterpretation?
>>
>> You ****wit:
>>
>> "The [AMC], simply put, is that there are many human beings who,
>> intuitively, have moral rights (or, to bypass talk of rights,
>> would be morally wrong to raise and kill to eat, wear, experiment
>> on and use for other exploitative purposes) even though they lack
>> such sophisticated mental abilities that Machan claims are
>> necessary for having rights."
>>
>> Even though they talk about human beings as plural, they are referring
>> to the lack of ability for moral agency afflicting each of them
>> individually. Clearly if one of your two ****wits' "many human beings"
>> were to regain his ability to act as a moral agent, he wouldn't be
>> included among the marginal cases.
>>
>> You ****wits just don't understand that the capabilities to which
>> Wetlesen and Cohen and others are referring are inhere in being human,
>> *not* in being "a" human.
>>
>> The AMC has been thoroughly rubbished.
>
> Wetlesen's argument is different to Cohen's argument, and to the ASN,
> (which your pal Dutch isn't much impressed with), and no, the
> capabilities don't "inhere in being human", whatever that may mean.

They do, and you know what it means. Cut the shit.

On 4/26/2012 10:28 PM, Rupert wrote:
> On Apr 26, 7:29 pm, George > wrote:
>> On 4/26/2012 7:00 AM, Rupert wrote:
>>
>>> On Apr 26, 10:25 am, > wrote:
>>>> > wrote in message
>>
>>>> ...
>>
>>>>> On Apr 25, 11:13 pm, > wrote:
>>>>>> > wrote in message
>>
>>>>>> ...
>>
>>>>>>> On Apr 25, 8:17 pm, > wrote:
>>>>>>>> > wrote in message
>>
>>>>>>>> ...
>>
>>>>>>>>> On Apr 25, 9:43 am, > wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> > wrote in message
>>
>>>>>>>>>> ...
>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 24, 7:09 am, > wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> > wrote
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 23, 8:09 pm, > wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is asking him to clarify his views. And it is relevant
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> because
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> he
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> has not refuted the AMC.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I have.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> What's the refutation?
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> moralstat99
>>
>>>>>>>>>>> How would you define "capabilities"?
>>
>>>>>>>>>> From moralstat99
>>>>>>>>>> -----------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>>> A rebuttal of the argument from marginal cases
>>>>>>>>>> It may well be that Warren's proposal at this point is more
>>>>>>>>>> adequate
>>>>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>>>> relation to common sense than the positions of Regan or Singer.
>>>>>>>>>> Nevertheless, it appears that all three of them have based their
>>>>>>>>>> arguments on the assumption that the concepts of a moral person and
>>>>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>>>>> moral agent are synonymous or equivalent. This assumption can be
>>>>>>>>>> contested, and if it is rejected, it seems that their arguments
>>>>>>>>>> will
>>>>>>>>>> not
>>>>>>>>>> work.
>>>>>>>>>> An alternative to their assumption has been developed by Jens
>>>>>>>>>> Saugstad
>>>>>>>>>> in his doctoral thesis on The Moral Ontology of Human Fetuses; A
>>>>>>>>>> Metaphysical Investigation of Personhood (1994). On Saugstad's
>>>>>>>>>> interpretation, Kant's concept of a moral person is generic in
>>>>>>>>>> relation
>>>>>>>>>> to that of a moral agent. This implies that the class of moral
>>>>>>>>>> agents
>>>>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>>>> a subclass of moral persons; some moral persons are moral agents,
>>>>>>>>>> others
>>>>>>>>>> are not.
>>>>>>>>>> On the conceptual level Saugstad gets this result by distinguishing
>>>>>>>>>> two
>>>>>>>>>> kinds of capacities: capabilities and abilities. In order to be a
>>>>>>>>>> moral
>>>>>>>>>> agent, a person must be able to take a moral responsibility for his
>>>>>>>>>> or
>>>>>>>>>> her actions, and to be answerable for them. This requires not only
>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>> capabilities of free will, reason and a linguistic competence; but
>>>>>>>>>> also
>>>>>>>>>> the operative ability of realising these capabilities in practice.
>>>>>>>>>> However, a subject may have the capabilities of moral agency
>>>>>>>>>> without
>>>>>>>>>> having the operative abilities. In that case the subject is a moral
>>>>>>>>>> person without being a moral agent, since moral personhood is
>>>>>>>>>> grounded
>>>>>>>>>> on the actual capability and not on the potential ability.
>>>>>>>>>> Two consequences follow from this solution. In the first place, it
>>>>>>>>>> extends moral status to sentient marginal humans. The sufficient
>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>> necessary condition for this extension is the presence of the
>>>>>>>>>> capability
>>>>>>>>>> of moral agency. If this is present, it is not necessary that the
>>>>>>>>>> operative ability is also present. On this ground equal inherent
>>>>>>>>>> value
>>>>>>>>>> and equal basic rights can be ascribed to both marginal and normal
>>>>>>>>>> human
>>>>>>>>>> beings.
>>>>>>>>>> Admittedly, the assumption about the presence of this capability is
>>>>>>>>>> not
>>>>>>>>>> equally verifiable in all cases. In some cases it is verifiable,
>>>>>>>>>> such
>>>>>>>>>> as
>>>>>>>>>> in normal youths, children, neonates, and foetuses in the later
>>>>>>>>>> stages
>>>>>>>>>> of pregnancy. They do not have the actual ability of being moral
>>>>>>>>>> agents,
>>>>>>>>>> but they have it potentially and it will be actualised in due time.
>>>>>>>>>> Still they may be assumed to have the capability as an actual
>>>>>>>>>> internal
>>>>>>>>>> property, and this is the ground for considering them to be
>>>>>>>>>> persons.
>>>>>>>>>> It
>>>>>>>>>> may be asked whether this argument justifies the assumption about
>>>>>>>>>> equal
>>>>>>>>>> moral status value. Would it not be possible to introduce grading
>>>>>>>>>> on
>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>> basis of how far the potentiality for moral agency has developed?
>>>>>>>>>> This
>>>>>>>>>> view has been propounded in discussions about abortion. On the
>>>>>>>>>> basis
>>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>> the present argument, however, it must be rejected, since moral
>>>>>>>>>> status
>>>>>>>>>> value is assumed to be grounded on capabilities of agency, which
>>>>>>>>>> are
>>>>>>>>>> actual, and not on potential abilities.
>>>>>>>>>> In other cases there are humans who have been moral agents, but
>>>>>>>>>> have
>>>>>>>>>> lost the required abilities. This pertains to many cases of the
>>>>>>>>>> severely
>>>>>>>>>> brain damaged and the severely senile. If we assume that they have
>>>>>>>>>> retained their capabilities of being moral agents, we still have a
>>>>>>>>>> sufficient reason for ascribing equal inherent value to them.
>>>>>>>>>> Against
>>>>>>>>>> this it may be objected that they may have lost not only their
>>>>>>>>>> ability
>>>>>>>>>> of being moral agents, but also their capability. There is room for
>>>>>>>>>> much
>>>>>>>>>> empirical doubt about these borderline cases, and for that reason
>>>>>>>>>> there
>>>>>>>>>> is also room for giving them the benefit of doubt. Admittedly, this
>>>>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>>>>> somewhat ad hoc assumption. Even if it is not a good scientific
>>>>>>>>>> explanation, however, it may be a good moral reason.
>>>>>>>>>> This kind of argument can also be applied to the most difficult
>>>>>>>>>> cases
>>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>> marginal humans who have never had the ability of being moral
>>>>>>>>>> agents
>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>> will never get it, such as the severely mentally retarded.
>>>>>>>>>> Theoretically, it is not inconceivable that the capability is still
>>>>>>>>>> there, and that this can be used as a ground for ascribing an equal
>>>>>>>>>> moral status value to them. If this justification is not accepted,
>>>>>>>>>> however, it does not necessarily follow that they have no moral
>>>>>>>>>> status
>>>>>>>>>> value at all. They may have a gradual moral status value, depending
>>>>>>>>>> on
>>>>>>>>>> the argument which we shall discuss below. As for those who are
>>>>>>>>>> borne
>>>>>>>>>> without a brain, they do seem to be excluded.
>>>>>>>>>> According to the present argument, inherent value is ascribed
>>>>>>>>>> equally
>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>> all moral persons. Hence this position is universalistic and
>>>>>>>>>> egalitarian. If this way of understanding the relation between
>>>>>>>>>> moral
>>>>>>>>>> persons and moral agents works, there will be no need to
>>>>>>>>>> distinguish
>>>>>>>>>> Agent's Rights and Human Rights the way Warren does. They will be
>>>>>>>>>> grounded in the same internal property of moral persons, and there
>>>>>>>>>> will
>>>>>>>>>> be no need for a supplementary justification based on an external
>>>>>>>>>> relation such as membership in a human society.
>>>>>>>>>> The second consequence which follows from this position is that
>>>>>>>>>> there
>>>>>>>>>> will be a relevant difference between human and non-human beings,
>>>>>>>>>> which
>>>>>>>>>> can justify a differential treatment with regard to the ascription
>>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>> moral status. Humans have a property which other animals lack,
>>>>>>>>>> notably
>>>>>>>>>> the capability of being moral agents, and if this property is
>>>>>>>>>> accepted
>>>>>>>>>> to be a necessary condition for the ascription of moral status,
>>>>>>>>>> then
>>>>>>>>>> its
>>>>>>>>>> absence in other animals will be a sufficient condition for denying
>>>>>>>>>> moral status to them. In this way Kant's anthropocentrism is
>>>>>>>>>> vindicated,
>>>>>>>>>> albeit with the proviso mentioned earlier that this rests on the
>>>>>>>>>> contingent fact that only humans are moral persons. Theoretically,
>>>>>>>>>> there
>>>>>>>>>> might be other moral persons also, but there seem to be none,
>>>>>>>>>> excepting
>>>>>>>>>> perhaps some of our closest relatives among the primates.
>>>>>>>>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------
>>
>>>>>>>>> Yes, I just re-read that passage this morning.
>>
>>>>>>>>> The difficulty is that no definition of the central term
>>>>>>>>> "capability"
>>>>>>>>> is given.
>>
>>>>>>>> A capability is an inherent ability in any state, potential, latent,
>>>>>>>> active,
>>>>>>>> or disabled.
>>
>>>>>>>> An eagle has (or "eagles have") the capability of flight before ever
>>>>>>>> leaving the egg, but the ability doesn't develop until later.
>>
>>>>>>>>> Let us suppose that we have a human who has always been very
>>>>>>>>> seriously
>>>>>>>>> mentally impaired ever since he was born, and has never had
>>>>>>>>> cognitive
>>>>>>>>> abilities greater than that of a dog. Wetlesen claims that there is
>>>>>>>>> some possibility that he might still have the capability to be a
>>>>>>>>> moral
>>>>>>>>> agent, and therefore we have moral reason to extend the benefit of
>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> doubt and treat the individual as though he does in fact have that
>>>>>>>>> capability. I assume that there is meant to be an objective fact of
>>>>>>>>> the matter about whether the capability is in fact present. Suppose
>>>>>>>>> that I were a scientist trying to resolve this question. How would I
>>>>>>>>> go about trying to resolve it?
>>
>>>>>>>> I don't know that there is a way to prove it, perhaps someday with
>>>>>>>> advances
>>>>>>>> in biology they will discover exactly where each ability originates in
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> brain, they already know most of them. But he is suggesting that it is
>>>>>>>> reasonable to assume that it exists and that its the ability to
>>>>>>>> develop
>>>>>>>> or
>>>>>>>> manifest the capability in an ability that has been lost. The person
>>>>>>>> probably has all the right types of brain cells, they just don't work
>>>>>>>> or
>>>>>>>> connect properly. He would not have a dog brain. Anyway these marginal
>>>>>>>> cases
>>>>>>>> don't prove anything, because we normally have a list of subjective
>>>>>>>> reasons
>>>>>>>> to view and treat those humans differently, just as we have subjective
>>>>>>>> reasons to treat individual animals in special ways, such as pets or
>>>>>>>> "special" species.
>>
>>>>>>>> We can't make the assumption that advanced cognitive capacities exist
>>>>>>>> with
>>>>>>>> any other species because no member of those species has ever
>>>>>>>> manifested
>>>>>>>> those abilities. We give consideration to animals based on an educated
>>>>>>>> guess
>>>>>>>> as to their capacities. Until a flea or a dog or a pig exhibits
>>>>>>>> advanced
>>>>>>>> cognitive abilities we can safely assume that those capacities do not
>>>>>>>> exist
>>>>>>>> in those species. As soon as *one* does, then we would be compelled in
>>>>>>>> my
>>>>>>>> opinion to assume that every member of that species possesses those
>>>>>>>> capabilities, just as we do with humans. Therefore we are giving them
>>>>>>>> equal
>>>>>>>> consideration.
>>
>>>>>>> I am extremely skeptical that "capabilities" is a meaningful concept.
>>
>>>>>> That's interesting, since organisms are living before they begin to
>>>>>> manifest
>>>>>> all the abilities typical of their species, how would you describe those
>>>>>> latent, potential as-yet-not-demonstrated abilities? Are they not
>>>>>> "concept
>>>>>> worthy"? Birds possess something, inherently, while they are only a clump
>>>>>> of
>>>>>> cells, that leads to them in time to be able to fly. You had the
>>>>>> capability
>>>>>> at one time to become a mathematician, before you were one. That was in
>>>>>> no
>>>>>> small part due to your species.
>>
>>>>> The problem is that if we define "capability" to mean "potential
>>>>> ability", then it is obvious that the permanently severely retarded
>>>>> human lacks it, but you want to leave that question open.
>>
>>>> We don't know that they lack it, we only know that they are not manifesting
>>>> it. It is not unreasonable to give them the benefit of the doubt and assume
>>>> they may still possess the quality. Even if they lack it, we usually extend
>>>> consideration for other reasons.
>>
>>> When you say that you make it clear that by "capability" you do not
>>> mean "potential ability", as Wetlesen also makes clear. So it's your
>>> job to explain what you do mean.
>>
>> It has been clarified for you. You're bullshitting evasively, as usual.
>
> It has not been clarified,

It has been. You're bullshitting, again.

On Apr 27, 8:35*am, George Plimpton > wrote:
> On 4/26/2012 10:28 PM, Rupert wrote:
>
> > On Apr 26, 7:29 pm, George > *wrote:
> >> On 4/26/2012 7:00 AM, Rupert wrote:
>
> >>> On Apr 26, 10:25 am, > * *wrote:
> >>>> > * *wrote in message
>
> ...
>
> >>>>> On Apr 25, 11:13 pm, > * *wrote:
> >>>>>> > * *wrote in message
>
> ...
>
> >>>>>>> On Apr 25, 8:17 pm, > * *wrote:
> >>>>>>>> > * *wrote in message
>
> ...
>
> >>>>>>>>> On Apr 25, 9:43 am, > * *wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>> > * *wrote in message
>
> ...
>
> >>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 24, 7:09 am, > * *wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>>>> > * *wrote
>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 23, 8:09 pm, > * *wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is asking him to clarify his views. And it is relevant
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> because
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> he
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> has not refuted the AMC.
>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> I have.
>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> What's the refutation?
>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> moralstat99
>
> >>>>>>>>>>> How would you define "capabilities"?
>
> >>>>>>>>>> * From moralstat99
> >>>>>>>>>> -----------------------------------------------
> >>>>>>>>>> A rebuttal of the argument from marginal cases
> >>>>>>>>>> It may well be that Warren's proposal at this point is more
> >>>>>>>>>> adequate
> >>>>>>>>>> in
> >>>>>>>>>> relation to common sense than the positions of Regan or Singer..
> >>>>>>>>>> Nevertheless, it appears that all three of them have based their
> >>>>>>>>>> arguments on the assumption that the concepts of a moral person and
> >>>>>>>>>> a
> >>>>>>>>>> moral agent are synonymous or equivalent. This assumption can be
> >>>>>>>>>> contested, and if it is rejected, it seems that their arguments
> >>>>>>>>>> will
> >>>>>>>>>> not
> >>>>>>>>>> work.
> >>>>>>>>>> An alternative to their assumption has been developed by Jens
> >>>>>>>>>> Saugstad
> >>>>>>>>>> in his doctoral thesis on The Moral Ontology of Human Fetuses; A
> >>>>>>>>>> Metaphysical Investigation of Personhood (1994). On Saugstad's
> >>>>>>>>>> interpretation, Kant's concept of a moral person is generic in
> >>>>>>>>>> relation
> >>>>>>>>>> to that of a moral agent. This implies that the class of moral
> >>>>>>>>>> agents
> >>>>>>>>>> is
> >>>>>>>>>> a subclass of moral persons; some moral persons are moral agents,
> >>>>>>>>>> others
> >>>>>>>>>> are not.
> >>>>>>>>>> On the conceptual level Saugstad gets this result by distinguishing
> >>>>>>>>>> two
> >>>>>>>>>> kinds of capacities: capabilities and abilities. In order to be a
> >>>>>>>>>> moral
> >>>>>>>>>> agent, a person must be able to take a moral responsibility for his
> >>>>>>>>>> or
> >>>>>>>>>> her actions, and to be answerable for them. This requires not only
> >>>>>>>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>>> capabilities of free will, reason and a linguistic competence; but
> >>>>>>>>>> also
> >>>>>>>>>> the operative ability of realising these capabilities in practice.
> >>>>>>>>>> However, a subject may have the capabilities of moral agency
> >>>>>>>>>> without
> >>>>>>>>>> having the operative abilities. In that case the subject is a moral
> >>>>>>>>>> person without being a moral agent, since moral personhood is
> >>>>>>>>>> grounded
> >>>>>>>>>> on the actual capability and not on the potential ability.
> >>>>>>>>>> Two consequences follow from this solution. In the first place, it
> >>>>>>>>>> extends moral status to sentient marginal humans. The sufficient
> >>>>>>>>>> and
> >>>>>>>>>> necessary condition for this extension is the presence of the
> >>>>>>>>>> capability
> >>>>>>>>>> of moral agency. If this is present, it is not necessary that the
> >>>>>>>>>> operative ability is also present. On this ground equal inherent
> >>>>>>>>>> value
> >>>>>>>>>> and equal basic rights can be ascribed to both marginal and normal
> >>>>>>>>>> human
> >>>>>>>>>> beings.
> >>>>>>>>>> Admittedly, the assumption about the presence of this capability is
> >>>>>>>>>> not
> >>>>>>>>>> equally verifiable in all cases. In some cases it is verifiable,
> >>>>>>>>>> such
> >>>>>>>>>> as
> >>>>>>>>>> in normal youths, children, neonates, and foetuses in the later
> >>>>>>>>>> stages
> >>>>>>>>>> of pregnancy. They do not have the actual ability of being moral
> >>>>>>>>>> agents,
> >>>>>>>>>> but they have it potentially and it will be actualised in due time.
> >>>>>>>>>> Still they may be assumed to have the capability as an actual
> >>>>>>>>>> internal
> >>>>>>>>>> property, and this is the ground for considering them to be
> >>>>>>>>>> persons.
> >>>>>>>>>> It
> >>>>>>>>>> may be asked whether this argument justifies the assumption about
> >>>>>>>>>> equal
> >>>>>>>>>> moral status value. Would it not be possible to introduce grading
> >>>>>>>>>> on
> >>>>>>>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>>> basis of how far the potentiality for moral agency has developed?
> >>>>>>>>>> This
> >>>>>>>>>> view has been propounded in discussions about abortion. On the
> >>>>>>>>>> basis
> >>>>>>>>>> of
> >>>>>>>>>> the present argument, however, it must be rejected, since moral
> >>>>>>>>>> status
> >>>>>>>>>> value is assumed to be grounded on capabilities of agency, which
> >>>>>>>>>> are
> >>>>>>>>>> actual, and not on potential abilities.
> >>>>>>>>>> In other cases there are humans who have been moral agents, but
> >>>>>>>>>> have
> >>>>>>>>>> lost the required abilities. This pertains to many cases of the
> >>>>>>>>>> severely
> >>>>>>>>>> brain damaged and the severely senile. If we assume that they have
> >>>>>>>>>> retained their capabilities of being moral agents, we still have a
> >>>>>>>>>> sufficient reason for ascribing equal inherent value to them.
> >>>>>>>>>> Against
> >>>>>>>>>> this it may be objected that they may have lost not only their
> >>>>>>>>>> ability
> >>>>>>>>>> of being moral agents, but also their capability. There is room for
> >>>>>>>>>> much
> >>>>>>>>>> empirical doubt about these borderline cases, and for that reason
> >>>>>>>>>> there
> >>>>>>>>>> is also room for giving them the benefit of doubt. Admittedly, this
> >>>>>>>>>> is
> >>>>>>>>>> a
> >>>>>>>>>> somewhat ad hoc assumption. Even if it is not a good scientific
> >>>>>>>>>> explanation, however, it may be a good moral reason.
> >>>>>>>>>> This kind of argument can also be applied to the most difficult
> >>>>>>>>>> cases
> >>>>>>>>>> of
> >>>>>>>>>> marginal humans who have never had the ability of being moral
> >>>>>>>>>> agents
> >>>>>>>>>> and
> >>>>>>>>>> will never get it, such as the severely mentally retarded.
> >>>>>>>>>> Theoretically, it is not inconceivable that the capability is still
> >>>>>>>>>> there, and that this can be used as a ground for ascribing an equal
> >>>>>>>>>> moral status value to them. If this justification is not accepted,
> >>>>>>>>>> however, it does not necessarily follow that they have no moral
> >>>>>>>>>> status
> >>>>>>>>>> value at all. They may have a gradual moral status value, depending
> >>>>>>>>>> on
> >>>>>>>>>> the argument which we shall discuss below. As for those who are
> >>>>>>>>>> borne
> >>>>>>>>>> without a brain, they do seem to be excluded.
> >>>>>>>>>> According to the present argument, inherent value is ascribed
> >>>>>>>>>> equally
> >>>>>>>>>> to
> >>>>>>>>>> all moral persons. Hence this position is universalistic and
> >>>>>>>>>> egalitarian. If this way of understanding the relation between
> >>>>>>>>>> moral
> >>>>>>>>>> persons and moral agents works, there will be no need to
> >>>>>>>>>> distinguish
> >>>>>>>>>> Agent's Rights and Human Rights the way Warren does. They will be
> >>>>>>>>>> grounded in the same internal property of moral persons, and there
> >>>>>>>>>> will
> >>>>>>>>>> be no need for a supplementary justification based on an external
> >>>>>>>>>> relation such as membership in a human society.
> >>>>>>>>>> The second consequence which follows from this position is that
> >>>>>>>>>> there
> >>>>>>>>>> will be a relevant difference between human and non-human beings,
> >>>>>>>>>> which
> >>>>>>>>>> can justify a differential treatment with regard to the ascription
> >>>>>>>>>> of
> >>>>>>>>>> moral status. Humans have a property which other animals lack,
> >>>>>>>>>> notably
> >>>>>>>>>> the capability of being moral agents, and if this property is
> >>>>>>>>>> accepted
> >>>>>>>>>> to be a necessary condition for the ascription of moral status,
> >>>>>>>>>> then
> >>>>>>>>>> its
> >>>>>>>>>> absence in other animals will be a sufficient condition for denying
> >>>>>>>>>> moral status to them. In this way Kant's anthropocentrism is
> >>>>>>>>>> vindicated,
> >>>>>>>>>> albeit with the proviso mentioned earlier that this rests on the
> >>>>>>>>>> contingent fact that only humans are moral persons. Theoretically,
> >>>>>>>>>> there
> >>>>>>>>>> might be other moral persons also, but there seem to be none,
> >>>>>>>>>> excepting
> >>>>>>>>>> perhaps some of our closest relatives among the primates.
> >>>>>>>>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------
>
> >>>>>>>>> Yes, I just re-read that passage this morning.
>
> >>>>>>>>> The difficulty is that no definition of the central term
> >>>>>>>>> "capability"
> >>>>>>>>> is given.
>
> >>>>>>>> A capability is an inherent ability in any state, potential, latent,
> >>>>>>>> active,
> >>>>>>>> or disabled.
>
> >>>>>>>> An eagle has *(or "eagles have") the capability of flight before ever
> >>>>>>>> leaving the egg, but the ability doesn't develop until later.
>
> >>>>>>>>> Let us suppose that we have a human who has always been very
> >>>>>>>>> seriously
> >>>>>>>>> mentally impaired ever since he was born, and has never had
> >>>>>>>>> cognitive
> >>>>>>>>> abilities greater than that of a dog. Wetlesen claims that there is
> >>>>>>>>> some possibility that he might still have the capability to be a
> >>>>>>>>> moral
> >>>>>>>>> agent, and therefore we have moral reason to extend the benefit of
> >>>>>>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>> doubt and treat the individual as though he does in fact have that
> >>>>>>>>> capability. I assume that there is meant to be an objective fact of
> >>>>>>>>> the matter about whether the capability is in fact present. Suppose
> >>>>>>>>> that I were a scientist trying to resolve this question. How would I
> >>>>>>>>> go about trying to resolve it?
>
> >>>>>>>> I don't know that there is a way to prove it, perhaps someday with
> >>>>>>>> advances
> >>>>>>>> in biology they will discover exactly where each ability originates in
> >>>>>>>> the
> >>>>>>>> brain, they already know most of them. But he is suggesting that it is
> >>>>>>>> reasonable to assume that it exists and that its the ability to
> >>>>>>>> develop
> >>>>>>>> or
> >>>>>>>> manifest the capability in an ability that has been lost. The person
> >>>>>>>> probably has all the right types of brain cells, they just don't work
> >>>>>>>> or
> >>>>>>>> connect properly. He would not have a dog brain. Anyway these marginal
> >>>>>>>> cases
> >>>>>>>> don't prove anything, because we normally have a list of subjective
> >>>>>>>> reasons
> >>>>>>>> to view and treat those humans differently, just as we have subjective
> >>>>>>>> reasons to treat individual animals in special ways, such as pets or
> >>>>>>>> "special" species.
>
> >>>>>>>> We can't make the assumption that advanced cognitive capacities exist
> >>>>>>>> with
> >>>>>>>> any other species because no member of those species has ever
> >>>>>>>> manifested
> >>>>>>>> those abilities. We give consideration to animals based on an educated
> >>>>>>>> guess
> >>>>>>>> as to their capacities. Until a flea or a dog or a pig exhibits
> >>>>>>>> advanced
> >>>>>>>> cognitive abilities we can safely assume that those capacities do not
> >>>>>>>> exist
> >>>>>>>> in those species. As soon as *one* does, then we would be compelled in
> >>>>>>>> my
> >>>>>>>> opinion to assume that every member of that species possesses those
> >>>>>>>> capabilities, just as we do with humans. Therefore we are giving them
> >>>>>>>> equal
> >>>>>>>> consideration.
>
> >>>>>>> I am extremely skeptical that "capabilities" is a meaningful concept.
>
> >>>>>> That's interesting, since organisms are living before they begin to
> >>>>>> manifest
> >>>>>> all the abilities typical of their species, how would you describe those
> >>>>>> latent, potential as-yet-not-demonstrated abilities? Are they not
> >>>>>> "concept
> >>>>>> worthy"? Birds possess something, inherently, while they are only a clump
> >>>>>> of
> >>>>>> cells, that leads to them in time to be able to fly. You had the
> >>>>>> capability
> >>>>>> at one time to become a mathematician, before you were one. That was in
> >>>>>> no
> >>>>>> small part due to your species.
>
> >>>>> The problem is that if we define "capability" to mean "potential
> >>>>> ability", then it is obvious that the permanently severely retarded
> >>>>> human lacks it, but you want to leave that question open.
>
> >>>> We don't know that they lack it, we only know that they are not manifesting
> >>>> it. It is not unreasonable to give them the benefit of the doubt and assume
> >>>> they may still possess the quality. Even if they lack it, we usually extend
> >>>> consideration for other reasons.
>
> >>> When you say that you make it clear that by "capability" you do not
> >>> mean "potential ability", as Wetlesen also makes clear. So it's your
> >>> job to explain what you do mean.
>
> >> It has been clarified for you. *You're bullshitting evasively, as usual.
>
> > It has not been clarified,
>
> It has been. *You're bullshitting, again.

Neither Jon Wetlesen nor Dutch has given a satisfactory explanation of
what the capability for moral agency is, except in Dutch's most recent
post where he suggests that it is a property of the DNA.

I'm not bullshitting, I'm just asking people to define their central
terms, as I do with David Harrison and his central term "life of
positive value".

On Apr 27, 8:31*am, George Plimpton > wrote:
> On 4/26/2012 10:15 PM, Rupert wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Apr 26, 6:59 pm, George > *wrote:
> >> On 4/25/2012 10:19 PM, Rupert wrote:
>
> >>> On Apr 25, 11:48 pm, George > * *wrote:
> >>>> On 4/25/2012 1:26 PM, Rupert wrote:
>
> >>>>> On Apr 25, 5:41 pm, George > * * *wrote:
> >>>>>> On 4/25/2012 12:34 AM, Rupert wrote:
>
> >>>>>>> On Apr 23, 10:41 pm, George > * * * *wrote:
> >>>>>>>> On 4/23/2012 1:21 PM, Rupert wrote:
>
> >>>>>>>>> On Apr 23, 8:22 pm, George > * * * * *wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>> On 4/23/2012 10:26 AM, Rupert wrote:
>
> >>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 23, 5:11 pm, George > * * * * * *wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/23/2012 1:07 AM, Rupert wrote:
>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 22, 6:26 pm, George > * * * * * * *wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/22/2012 1:34 AM, Rupert wrote:
>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 22, 6:38 am, George > * * * * * * * *wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/21/2012 12:48 PM, Rupert wrote:
>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 21, 9:25 pm, George > * * * * * * * * *wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/21/2012 10:39 AM, Dutch wrote:
>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > * * * * * * * * *wrote
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 21, 9:41 am, > * * * * * * * * *wrote:
>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Let's not get too far off topic. We're not talking about animal
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> welfare, the
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> subject is "speciesism" and "equal consideration". I give greater
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> consideration to a gorilla than a pig, and more to a pig than to a
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sponge.
>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Unfortunately you don't seem willing to specify in detail what kind of
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> moral consideration you give to a pig, so I suppose I'm never going to
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> learn all that much about what your views are.
>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I'm willing to discuss the treatment of pigs, its just not on point at
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the moment. My view on the current discussion is that "equal
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> consideration" (or 'non-speciesism') is at the very least a misnomer, a
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> misguided notion.
>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Good job on not letting Woopert steer the conversation off topic. *It's
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> one of his regular tactics.
>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Dutch is claiming that otherspeciesare due less moral consideration.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am trying to getting him to make this concrete by expounding his
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views with regard to a specific example. It's not going off topic.
>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Trying to get him to explain in detail the *degree* of consideration he
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> gives pigs, when the issue is the binary one of giving equal
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> consideration or not giving equal consideration to animals, is going off
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> topic.
>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> No, it's not
>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is. *The particular weight he gives to pigs' interests has nothing to
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> do with the principle ofspecies-specific consideration.
>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> You're engaging in your usual invalid debate tactics.
>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Why is asking someone a question to get them to clarify their views an
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> "invalid debate tactic"?
>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> It's a time-wasting evasion that is *not* asking him to clarify his
> >>>>>>>>>>>> views. *His contention is that a different level of consideration for
> >>>>>>>>>>>> animals on aspeciesbyspeciesbasis is morally permissible. *How much
> >>>>>>>>>>>> consideration he gives to members of a particularspeciesis irrelevant
> >>>>>>>>>>>> to the topic.
>
> >>>>>>>>>>> It is asking him to clarify his views. And it is relevant because he
> >>>>>>>>>>> has not refuted the AMC.
>
> >>>>>>>>>> The AMC was never really an argument, and what little bit of argument is
> >>>>>>>>>> in it is refuted by the ASN, which no "ara" has ever properly understood
> >>>>>>>>>> and so has never refuted.
>
> >>>>>>>>> I directed you towards a critical discussion of the ASN. You have not
> >>>>>>>>> provided a satisfactory response.
>
> >>>>>>>> I did. *You and all the other "ar" extremists don't get ASN.
>
> >>>>>>> What you said is "They don't get it". This is not a satisfactory
> >>>>>>> response.
>
> >>>>>> It's a fact.
>
> >>>>> You have not established that it's a fact,
>
> >>>> I have. *You don't get it because even after hearing or reading it, you
> >>>> continue to insist that it's about some quality possessed individually,
> >>>> and it isn't. *Clearly you and all the other "ar" loons misapprehend it.
>
> >>> Where do Nobis and Graham make that misinterpretation?
>
> >> You ****wit:
>
> >> * * * *"The [AMC], simply put, is that there are many human beings who,
> >> * * * *intuitively, have moral rights (or, to bypass talk of rights,
> >> * * * *would be morally wrong to raise and kill to eat, wear, experiment
> >> * * * *on and use for other exploitative purposes) even though they lack
> >> * * * *such sophisticated mental abilities that Machan claims are
> >> * * * *necessary for having rights."
>
> >> Even though they talk about human beings as plural, they are referring
> >> to the lack of ability for moral agency afflicting each of them
> >> individually. *Clearly if one of your two ****wits' "many human beings"
> >> were to regain his ability to act as a moral agent, he wouldn't be
> >> included among the marginal cases.
>
> >> You ****wits just don't understand that the capabilities to which
> >> Wetlesen and Cohen and others are referring are inhere in being human,
> >> *not* in being "a" human.
>
> >> The AMC has been thoroughly rubbished.
>
> > Wetlesen's argument is different to Cohen's argument, and to the ASN,
> > (which your pal Dutch isn't much impressed with), and no, the
> > capabilities don't "inhere in being human", whatever that may mean.
>
> They do, and you know what it means. *Cut the shit.

I doubt very much that *you* know what you mean.

"Rupert" > wrote
> On Apr 27, 8:31 am, George Plimpton > wrote:

>> > Wetlesen's argument is different to Cohen's argument, and to the ASN,
>> > (which your pal Dutch isn't much impressed with), and no, the
>> > capabilities don't "inhere in being human", whatever that may mean.
>>
>> They do, and you know what it means. Cut the shit.
>
> I doubt very much that *you* know what you mean.

From the moment of conception that little bundle of cells contains all the
information necessary to become a fully functioning human being. How is that
possible? Because all the attributes of what it means to be a person
*inhere* in those cells. The "capability" to develop high level cognitive
function already exists.

It never exists in other species.

On Apr 27, 10:25*am, "Dutch" > wrote:
> "Rupert" > wrote
>
> > On Apr 27, 8:31 am, George Plimpton > wrote:
> >> > Wetlesen's argument is different to Cohen's argument, and to the ASN,
> >> > (which your pal Dutch isn't much impressed with), and no, the
> >> > capabilities don't "inhere in being human", whatever that may mean.
>
> >> They do, and you know what it means. *Cut the shit.
>
> > I doubt very much that *you* know what you mean.
>
> From the moment of conception that little bundle of cells contains all the
> information necessary to become a fully functioning human being. How is that
> possible? Because all the attributes of what it means to be a person
> *inhere* in those cells. The "capability" to develop high level cognitive
> function already exists.
>
> It never exists in other species.

Is the capability present in an individual with anencephaly?

On 4/27/2012 12:07 AM, Rupert wrote:
> On Apr 27, 8:35 am, George > wrote:
>> On 4/26/2012 10:28 PM, Rupert wrote:
>>
>>> On Apr 26, 7:29 pm, George > wrote:
>>>> On 4/26/2012 7:00 AM, Rupert wrote:
>>
>>>>> On Apr 26, 10:25 am, > wrote:
>>>>>> > wrote in message
>>
>>>>>> ...
>>
>>>>>>> On Apr 25, 11:13 pm, > wrote:
>>>>>>>> > wrote in message
>>
>>>>>>>> ...
>>
>>>>>>>>> On Apr 25, 8:17 pm, > wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> > wrote in message
>>
>>>>>>>>>> ...
>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 25, 9:43 am, > wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> > wrote in message
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> ...
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 24, 7:09 am, > wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > wrote
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 23, 8:09 pm, > wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is asking him to clarify his views. And it is relevant
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> because
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> he
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> has not refuted the AMC.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I have.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> What's the refutation?
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> moralstat99
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> How would you define "capabilities"?
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> From moralstat99
>>>>>>>>>>>> -----------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>>>>> A rebuttal of the argument from marginal cases
>>>>>>>>>>>> It may well be that Warren's proposal at this point is more
>>>>>>>>>>>> adequate
>>>>>>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>>>>>> relation to common sense than the positions of Regan or Singer.
>>>>>>>>>>>> Nevertheless, it appears that all three of them have based their
>>>>>>>>>>>> arguments on the assumption that the concepts of a moral person and
>>>>>>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>>>>>>> moral agent are synonymous or equivalent. This assumption can be
>>>>>>>>>>>> contested, and if it is rejected, it seems that their arguments
>>>>>>>>>>>> will
>>>>>>>>>>>> not
>>>>>>>>>>>> work.
>>>>>>>>>>>> An alternative to their assumption has been developed by Jens
>>>>>>>>>>>> Saugstad
>>>>>>>>>>>> in his doctoral thesis on The Moral Ontology of Human Fetuses; A
>>>>>>>>>>>> Metaphysical Investigation of Personhood (1994). On Saugstad's
>>>>>>>>>>>> interpretation, Kant's concept of a moral person is generic in
>>>>>>>>>>>> relation
>>>>>>>>>>>> to that of a moral agent. This implies that the class of moral
>>>>>>>>>>>> agents
>>>>>>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>>>>>> a subclass of moral persons; some moral persons are moral agents,
>>>>>>>>>>>> others
>>>>>>>>>>>> are not.
>>>>>>>>>>>> On the conceptual level Saugstad gets this result by distinguishing
>>>>>>>>>>>> two
>>>>>>>>>>>> kinds of capacities: capabilities and abilities. In order to be a
>>>>>>>>>>>> moral
>>>>>>>>>>>> agent, a person must be able to take a moral responsibility for his
>>>>>>>>>>>> or
>>>>>>>>>>>> her actions, and to be answerable for them. This requires not only
>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>> capabilities of free will, reason and a linguistic competence; but
>>>>>>>>>>>> also
>>>>>>>>>>>> the operative ability of realising these capabilities in practice.
>>>>>>>>>>>> However, a subject may have the capabilities of moral agency
>>>>>>>>>>>> without
>>>>>>>>>>>> having the operative abilities. In that case the subject is a moral
>>>>>>>>>>>> person without being a moral agent, since moral personhood is
>>>>>>>>>>>> grounded
>>>>>>>>>>>> on the actual capability and not on the potential ability.
>>>>>>>>>>>> Two consequences follow from this solution. In the first place, it
>>>>>>>>>>>> extends moral status to sentient marginal humans. The sufficient
>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>> necessary condition for this extension is the presence of the
>>>>>>>>>>>> capability
>>>>>>>>>>>> of moral agency. If this is present, it is not necessary that the
>>>>>>>>>>>> operative ability is also present. On this ground equal inherent
>>>>>>>>>>>> value
>>>>>>>>>>>> and equal basic rights can be ascribed to both marginal and normal
>>>>>>>>>>>> human
>>>>>>>>>>>> beings.
>>>>>>>>>>>> Admittedly, the assumption about the presence of this capability is
>>>>>>>>>>>> not
>>>>>>>>>>>> equally verifiable in all cases. In some cases it is verifiable,
>>>>>>>>>>>> such
>>>>>>>>>>>> as
>>>>>>>>>>>> in normal youths, children, neonates, and foetuses in the later
>>>>>>>>>>>> stages
>>>>>>>>>>>> of pregnancy. They do not have the actual ability of being moral
>>>>>>>>>>>> agents,
>>>>>>>>>>>> but they have it potentially and it will be actualised in due time.
>>>>>>>>>>>> Still they may be assumed to have the capability as an actual
>>>>>>>>>>>> internal
>>>>>>>>>>>> property, and this is the ground for considering them to be
>>>>>>>>>>>> persons.
>>>>>>>>>>>> It
>>>>>>>>>>>> may be asked whether this argument justifies the assumption about
>>>>>>>>>>>> equal
>>>>>>>>>>>> moral status value. Would it not be possible to introduce grading
>>>>>>>>>>>> on
>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>> basis of how far the potentiality for moral agency has developed?
>>>>>>>>>>>> This
>>>>>>>>>>>> view has been propounded in discussions about abortion. On the
>>>>>>>>>>>> basis
>>>>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>>>> the present argument, however, it must be rejected, since moral
>>>>>>>>>>>> status
>>>>>>>>>>>> value is assumed to be grounded on capabilities of agency, which
>>>>>>>>>>>> are
>>>>>>>>>>>> actual, and not on potential abilities.
>>>>>>>>>>>> In other cases there are humans who have been moral agents, but
>>>>>>>>>>>> have
>>>>>>>>>>>> lost the required abilities. This pertains to many cases of the
>>>>>>>>>>>> severely
>>>>>>>>>>>> brain damaged and the severely senile. If we assume that they have
>>>>>>>>>>>> retained their capabilities of being moral agents, we still have a
>>>>>>>>>>>> sufficient reason for ascribing equal inherent value to them.
>>>>>>>>>>>> Against
>>>>>>>>>>>> this it may be objected that they may have lost not only their
>>>>>>>>>>>> ability
>>>>>>>>>>>> of being moral agents, but also their capability. There is room for
>>>>>>>>>>>> much
>>>>>>>>>>>> empirical doubt about these borderline cases, and for that reason
>>>>>>>>>>>> there
>>>>>>>>>>>> is also room for giving them the benefit of doubt. Admittedly, this
>>>>>>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>>>>>>> somewhat ad hoc assumption. Even if it is not a good scientific
>>>>>>>>>>>> explanation, however, it may be a good moral reason.
>>>>>>>>>>>> This kind of argument can also be applied to the most difficult
>>>>>>>>>>>> cases
>>>>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>>>> marginal humans who have never had the ability of being moral
>>>>>>>>>>>> agents
>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>> will never get it, such as the severely mentally retarded.
>>>>>>>>>>>> Theoretically, it is not inconceivable that the capability is still
>>>>>>>>>>>> there, and that this can be used as a ground for ascribing an equal
>>>>>>>>>>>> moral status value to them. If this justification is not accepted,
>>>>>>>>>>>> however, it does not necessarily follow that they have no moral
>>>>>>>>>>>> status
>>>>>>>>>>>> value at all. They may have a gradual moral status value, depending
>>>>>>>>>>>> on
>>>>>>>>>>>> the argument which we shall discuss below. As for those who are
>>>>>>>>>>>> borne
>>>>>>>>>>>> without a brain, they do seem to be excluded.
>>>>>>>>>>>> According to the present argument, inherent value is ascribed
>>>>>>>>>>>> equally
>>>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>> all moral persons. Hence this position is universalistic and
>>>>>>>>>>>> egalitarian. If this way of understanding the relation between
>>>>>>>>>>>> moral
>>>>>>>>>>>> persons and moral agents works, there will be no need to
>>>>>>>>>>>> distinguish
>>>>>>>>>>>> Agent's Rights and Human Rights the way Warren does. They will be
>>>>>>>>>>>> grounded in the same internal property of moral persons, and there
>>>>>>>>>>>> will
>>>>>>>>>>>> be no need for a supplementary justification based on an external
>>>>>>>>>>>> relation such as membership in a human society.
>>>>>>>>>>>> The second consequence which follows from this position is that
>>>>>>>>>>>> there
>>>>>>>>>>>> will be a relevant difference between human and non-human beings,
>>>>>>>>>>>> which
>>>>>>>>>>>> can justify a differential treatment with regard to the ascription
>>>>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>>>> moral status. Humans have a property which other animals lack,
>>>>>>>>>>>> notably
>>>>>>>>>>>> the capability of being moral agents, and if this property is
>>>>>>>>>>>> accepted
>>>>>>>>>>>> to be a necessary condition for the ascription of moral status,
>>>>>>>>>>>> then
>>>>>>>>>>>> its
>>>>>>>>>>>> absence in other animals will be a sufficient condition for denying
>>>>>>>>>>>> moral status to them. In this way Kant's anthropocentrism is
>>>>>>>>>>>> vindicated,
>>>>>>>>>>>> albeit with the proviso mentioned earlier that this rests on the
>>>>>>>>>>>> contingent fact that only humans are moral persons. Theoretically,
>>>>>>>>>>>> there
>>>>>>>>>>>> might be other moral persons also, but there seem to be none,
>>>>>>>>>>>> excepting
>>>>>>>>>>>> perhaps some of our closest relatives among the primates.
>>>>>>>>>>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------
>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Yes, I just re-read that passage this morning.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>> The difficulty is that no definition of the central term
>>>>>>>>>>> "capability"
>>>>>>>>>>> is given.
>>
>>>>>>>>>> A capability is an inherent ability in any state, potential, latent,
>>>>>>>>>> active,
>>>>>>>>>> or disabled.
>>
>>>>>>>>>> An eagle has (or "eagles have") the capability of flight before ever
>>>>>>>>>> leaving the egg, but the ability doesn't develop until later.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Let us suppose that we have a human who has always been very
>>>>>>>>>>> seriously
>>>>>>>>>>> mentally impaired ever since he was born, and has never had
>>>>>>>>>>> cognitive
>>>>>>>>>>> abilities greater than that of a dog. Wetlesen claims that there is
>>>>>>>>>>> some possibility that he might still have the capability to be a
>>>>>>>>>>> moral
>>>>>>>>>>> agent, and therefore we have moral reason to extend the benefit of
>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>> doubt and treat the individual as though he does in fact have that
>>>>>>>>>>> capability. I assume that there is meant to be an objective fact of
>>>>>>>>>>> the matter about whether the capability is in fact present. Suppose
>>>>>>>>>>> that I were a scientist trying to resolve this question. How would I
>>>>>>>>>>> go about trying to resolve it?
>>
>>>>>>>>>> I don't know that there is a way to prove it, perhaps someday with
>>>>>>>>>> advances
>>>>>>>>>> in biology they will discover exactly where each ability originates in
>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>> brain, they already know most of them. But he is suggesting that it is
>>>>>>>>>> reasonable to assume that it exists and that its the ability to
>>>>>>>>>> develop
>>>>>>>>>> or
>>>>>>>>>> manifest the capability in an ability that has been lost. The person
>>>>>>>>>> probably has all the right types of brain cells, they just don't work
>>>>>>>>>> or
>>>>>>>>>> connect properly. He would not have a dog brain. Anyway these marginal
>>>>>>>>>> cases
>>>>>>>>>> don't prove anything, because we normally have a list of subjective
>>>>>>>>>> reasons
>>>>>>>>>> to view and treat those humans differently, just as we have subjective
>>>>>>>>>> reasons to treat individual animals in special ways, such as pets or
>>>>>>>>>> "special" species.
>>
>>>>>>>>>> We can't make the assumption that advanced cognitive capacities exist
>>>>>>>>>> with
>>>>>>>>>> any other species because no member of those species has ever
>>>>>>>>>> manifested
>>>>>>>>>> those abilities. We give consideration to animals based on an educated
>>>>>>>>>> guess
>>>>>>>>>> as to their capacities. Until a flea or a dog or a pig exhibits
>>>>>>>>>> advanced
>>>>>>>>>> cognitive abilities we can safely assume that those capacities do not
>>>>>>>>>> exist
>>>>>>>>>> in those species. As soon as *one* does, then we would be compelled in
>>>>>>>>>> my
>>>>>>>>>> opinion to assume that every member of that species possesses those
>>>>>>>>>> capabilities, just as we do with humans. Therefore we are giving them
>>>>>>>>>> equal
>>>>>>>>>> consideration.
>>
>>>>>>>>> I am extremely skeptical that "capabilities" is a meaningful concept.
>>
>>>>>>>> That's interesting, since organisms are living before they begin to
>>>>>>>> manifest
>>>>>>>> all the abilities typical of their species, how would you describe those
>>>>>>>> latent, potential as-yet-not-demonstrated abilities? Are they not
>>>>>>>> "concept
>>>>>>>> worthy"? Birds possess something, inherently, while they are only a clump
>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>> cells, that leads to them in time to be able to fly. You had the
>>>>>>>> capability
>>>>>>>> at one time to become a mathematician, before you were one. That was in
>>>>>>>> no
>>>>>>>> small part due to your species.
>>
>>>>>>> The problem is that if we define "capability" to mean "potential
>>>>>>> ability", then it is obvious that the permanently severely retarded
>>>>>>> human lacks it, but you want to leave that question open.
>>
>>>>>> We don't know that they lack it, we only know that they are not manifesting
>>>>>> it. It is not unreasonable to give them the benefit of the doubt and assume
>>>>>> they may still possess the quality. Even if they lack it, we usually extend
>>>>>> consideration for other reasons.
>>
>>>>> When you say that you make it clear that by "capability" you do not
>>>>> mean "potential ability", as Wetlesen also makes clear. So it's your
>>>>> job to explain what you do mean.
>>
>>>> It has been clarified for you. You're bullshitting evasively, as usual.
>>
>>> It has not been clarified,
>>
>> It has been. You're bullshitting, again.
>
> Neither Jon Wetlesen nor Dutch has given a satisfactory explanation of
> what the capability for moral agency is,

Bullshit. You're just desperately trying to cling to the one crappy
pseudo-argument you falsely think is some kind of nuclear bomb. The
argument has been demolished.