Ok, they eat vegetarian dog food. What they dig out of the ground is
news to me.

Rudy Canoza wrote:
> Justin E. Miller wrote:
>>
>>
>> Prisoner at War wrote:
>>> On Feb 16, 4:08 pm, "Doug Freese" > wrote:
>>> And lastly, I'm curious
>>> what vegetarians and vegans might make of their meat-eating pets! Any
>>> vegans with pet snakes here??
>>
>>
>> Actually, my dogs are vegetarians just like me.
>
> I doubt it, but at least it wouldn't kill them. Don't try it with cats,
> though.

On 2008-02-20, dh@. <dh@.> wrote:
> On Sat, 16 Feb 2008 02:06:09 -0800 (PST), Prisoner at War > wrote:
> · Vegans contribute to the deaths of animals by their use of
> wood and paper products, electricity, roads and all types of
> buildings, their own diet, etc... just as everyone else does.

This isn't much of an argument. Doing less harm is preferable to doing more.

The argument that an omnivore diet results in less harm to animals is simply
not very convincing. Very few people who adopt a diet with the intent on
minimizing harm to animals are omnivores, and most people who advance this
argument are more interested in discouraging people from adopting veg diets
than they are in advancing the cause of animal welfare.

[snip]
> The meat industry provides life for the animals that it
> slaughters, and the animals live and die as a result of it
> as animals do in other habitats. They also depend on it for
> their lives as animals do in other habitats. If people consume
> animal products from animals they think are raised in decent
> ways, they will be promoting life for more such animals in the
> future.

This needs to be weighed against the moral issues involving taking life.

Were we talking about raising humans for slaughter, I've little doubt that
we would agree that it is unacceptable, even if those humans enjoyed a good
life.

> People who want to contribute to decent lives for livestock
> with their lifestyle must do it by being conscientious
> consumers of animal products, because they can not do it by
> being vegan.

Again, if you knew that humans were being raised for slaughter, would you give
money to the slaughter facility that provides the best life for those they
raise ? Or would you risk "failing to contribute to decent lives" for these
people, because of your refusal to participate in the system ? Perhaps you would
decide that it would be better if we didn't breed those "cattle people", or at
least, that none were bred on your account.

> From the life and death of a thousand pound grass raised
> steer and whatever he happens to kill during his life, people
> get over 500 pounds of human consumable meat...that's well
> over 500 servings of meat. From a grass raised dairy cow people
> get thousands of dairy servings. Due to the influence of farm
> machinery, and *icides, and in the case of rice the flooding and
> draining of fields, one serving of soy or rice based product is
> likely to involve more animal deaths than hundreds of servings
> derived from grass raised animals. Grass raised animal products
> contribute to fewer wildlife deaths, better wildlife habitat, and
> better lives for livestock than soy or rice products. ·

Meat animals need to be fed, and that involves providing them with some sort of
plant food (usually corn in the US). I think you're going to have a tough time
making the case that meat is more efficient use of land than grains, especially
when the cheap consumer-grade meat is all based on grains.

>>hard-scrabbled ******* that
>>I am, it's the least I can do to not put such food in my mouth, to
>>fuel my lifts at the gym on the lifelong suffering of animals
>
> · Because there are so many different situations
> involved in the raising of meat animals, it is completely
> unfair to the animals to think of them all in the same
> way, as "ARAs" appear to do. To think that all of it is

They vary greatly, but I think we all agree that they do all end with the
animal being slaughtered.

Cheers,
--
Elflord

Elflord wrote:
> On 2008-02-20, dh@. <dh@.> wrote:
>> On Sat, 16 Feb 2008 02:06:09 -0800 (PST), Prisoner at War > wrote:
>> · Vegans contribute to the deaths of animals by their use of
>> wood and paper products, electricity, roads and all types of
>> buildings, their own diet, etc... just as everyone else does.
>
> This isn't much of an argument. Doing less harm is preferable to doing more.

Being "vegan" in no way establishes that you are doing
less harm.


> The argument that an omnivore diet results in less harm to animals is simply
> not very convincing.

Some meat-including diet can almost certainly "beat"
any "vegan" diet you wish to adopt, if reducing harm to
animals is the goal.


> Very few people who adopt a diet with the intent on
> minimizing harm to animals are omnivores, and most people who advance this
> argument are more interested in discouraging people from adopting veg diets
> than they are in advancing the cause of animal welfare.

No one is particularly interested in discouraging
anyone from adopting whatever diet they choose; that's
a red herring. What omnivores who criticize "vegans"
are using as the grounds for criticism is that the
"vegan" position is badly thought out incoherent
bullshit. It is based on a logical fallacy: denying
the antecedent. Even when the occasional "vegan" backs
away from his initially false and fallacy-based belief
that he isn't harming animals, the resulting fall-back
positions are no better.

The first false fall-back position is that the "vegan"
is "minimizing" harm to animals, even if not avoiding
all harm. But that is clearly bullshit: the "vegan"
has *never* measured the harm, and you must measure in
order to make a legitimate claim of minimization. My
favorite way of demolishing this bullshit claim is to
point out that even within an all-vegetarian or "vegan"
diet, there is still a lot of variability in the amount
of collateral harm inflicted on animals. If you
haven't measured the "death toll" of each and every
item you consume, then picked the truly least-harm
combination of consumption goods, you cannot be said to
be "minimizing".

The next false, and morally loathsome, fall-back
position is one of comparative virtue. The "vegan",
chased first from his absolute (and absolutely false)
"no harm" claim, and subsequently chased from the
equally false "minimization" claim, eventually settles
on a claim of doing less harm than the omnivore, and
basing his claim to virtue on that. But that is still
a false claim, and is now an even shittier moral
position, because virtue *NEVER* is established by
comparing oneself to someone else; virtue *ONLY* is
established by following correct moral principles.

It's easy to show this: if your brother ****s the
six-year-old boy next door up the ass eight times a
week, while you "only" **** the same boy up the ass
four times, you can hardly be said to be "better" than
your brother. You *both* are criminal scum who should
be executed in that case. Now let's say your brother
increases his ass-****ing rapes of the boy to eighteen
times a week, while you only increase yours to six.
Relative to your filthy criminal brother, you now are
even more "virtuous" than before, because the ratio of
your rapes to his has fallen, from 1/2 to 1/3. But you
actually *increased* the number of filthy criminal
assaults you commit against the poor six-year-old boy.

There is absolutely nothing left to "veganism" in terms
of the bloated but false sense of moral superiority
with which all "vegans" first start. In fact, the only
thing that's left is the complete certainty that ego
and self-exaltation are all that really motivated the
"vegan" in the first place.

On 2008-02-21, Rudy Canoza > wrote:

>> This isn't much of an argument. Doing less harm is preferable to doing more.
>
> Being "vegan" in no way establishes that you are doing less harm.

In my opinion, it greatly increases the likelihood that you are doing less harm.

I'll grant you that it doesn't make it certain, but it's a good start.

>> The argument that an omnivore diet results in less harm to animals is simply
>> not very convincing.
>
> Some meat-including diet can almost certainly "beat"
> any "vegan" diet you wish to adopt, if reducing harm to
> animals is the goal.

Then please do explain how killing animals causes less harm than not killing animals.

>> Very few people who adopt a diet with the intent on
>> minimizing harm to animals are omnivores, and most people who advance this
>> argument are more interested in discouraging people from adopting veg diets
>> than they are in advancing the cause of animal welfare.
>
> No one is particularly interested in discouraging
> anyone from adopting whatever diet they choose; that's
> a red herring. What omnivores who criticize "vegans"
> are using as the grounds for criticism is that the
> "vegan" position is badly thought out incoherent
> bullshit. It is based on a logical fallacy: denying
> the antecedent. Even when the occasional "vegan" backs
> away from his initially false and fallacy-based belief
> that he isn't harming animals, the resulting fall-back
> positions are no better.
>
> The first false fall-back position is that the "vegan"
> is "minimizing" harm to animals, even if not avoiding
> all harm. But that is clearly bullshit: the "vegan"
> has *never* measured the harm, and you must measure in
> order to make a legitimate claim of minimization. My

Has anyone measured this harm ? How would precisely would one measure it ?

When a murderer goes to court, do the prosecution have the burden of proving
that killing that person didn't result in a net positive to public well being ?

> favorite way of demolishing this bullshit claim is to
> point out that even within an all-vegetarian or "vegan"
> diet, there is still a lot of variability in the amount
> of collateral harm inflicted on animals. If you

I don't think the argument that you *might be* doing something that causes collateral
harm is a very good justification for doing deliberate harm. If everyone avoided
actions that were *known* to cause harm, less harm would be done.

To adopt a moral principal that is designed to minimize harm, it is not necessary to
prove that every instance of adherance to that principal, in every forseeable context
always results in less harm.

> haven't measured the "death toll" of each and every
> item you consume, then picked the truly least-harm
> combination of consumption goods, you cannot be said to
> be "minimizing".
>
> The next false, and morally loathsome, fall-back
> position is one of comparative virtue. The "vegan",
> chased first from his absolute (and absolutely false)
> "no harm" claim, and subsequently chased from the
> equally false "minimization" claim, eventually settles
> on a claim of doing less harm than the omnivore, and
> basing his claim to virtue on that. But that is still

I agree with you on this point, this is simply a bad argument.

> a false claim, and is now an even shittier moral
> position, because virtue *NEVER* is established by
> comparing oneself to someone else; virtue *ONLY* is
> established by following correct moral principles.

Like, "abstain from taking of life". That's a moral principal, and variations of
it are almost universal.

The prevailing presumption is that not killing is less harmful than killing.
For each murder that you don't commit, aren't expected to justify not
committing that murder. This is the case even though killing some people given
the opportunity might actually make the world a happier place.

Cheers,
--
Elflord

Elflord wrote:
> On 2008-02-21, Rudy Canoza > wrote:
>
>>> This isn't much of an argument. Doing less harm is preferable to doing more.
>> Being "vegan" in no way establishes that you are doing less harm.
>
> In my opinion, it greatly increases the likelihood that you are doing less harm.
>
> I'll grant you that it doesn't make it certain, but it's a good start.

You ran your mouth too soon. You ought to have read
the whole post first.


>
>>> The argument that an omnivore diet results in less harm to animals is simply
>>> not very convincing.
>> Some meat-including diet can almost certainly "beat"
>> any "vegan" diet you wish to adopt, if reducing harm to
>> animals is the goal.
>
> Then please do explain how killing animals causes less harm than not killing animals.

You just showed that you're *still* committing the
classic "vegan" fallacy: assuming that because you
don't eat animal parts, you don't harm animals. That
is provably false. Animals die all the time in the
course of commercial agriculture, and you *do* eat
commercially grown fruits and vegetables. The *fact*
is, you have no idea how much death is caused by the
cultivation, harvesting, processing and distribution of
the plant foods you eat.

Answer this question. Which causes more animal death,
a pound of venison or a pound of rice?


>>> Very few people who adopt a diet with the intent on
>>> minimizing harm to animals are omnivores, and most people who advance this
>>> argument are more interested in discouraging people from adopting veg diets
>>> than they are in advancing the cause of animal welfare.
>> No one is particularly interested in discouraging
>> anyone from adopting whatever diet they choose; that's
>> a red herring. What omnivores who criticize "vegans"
>> are using as the grounds for criticism is that the
>> "vegan" position is badly thought out incoherent
>> bullshit. It is based on a logical fallacy: denying
>> the antecedent. Even when the occasional "vegan" backs
>> away from his initially false and fallacy-based belief
>> that he isn't harming animals, the resulting fall-back
>> positions are no better.
>>
>> The first false fall-back position is that the "vegan"
>> is "minimizing" harm to animals, even if not avoiding
>> all harm. But that is clearly bullshit: the "vegan"
>> has *never* measured the harm, and you must measure in
>> order to make a legitimate claim of minimization.
>
> Has anyone measured this harm ? How would precisely would one measure it ?

The point is, you can't claim to be "minimizing" unless
you have measured, and no "vegan" has ever measured.
So, the claim goes out the window. It is irretrievable.


>
> When a murderer goes to court, do the prosecution have the burden of proving
> that killing that person didn't result in a net positive to public well being ?

No, because murder is wrong and criminal in and of
itself. Killing animals isn't.


>
>> My favorite way of demolishing this bullshit claim is to
>> point out that even within an all-vegetarian or "vegan"
>> diet, there is still a lot of variability in the amount
>> of collateral harm inflicted on animals. If you
>
> I don't think the argument that you *might be* doing something that causes collateral
> harm is a very good justification for doing deliberate harm. If everyone avoided
> actions that were *known* to cause harm, less harm would be done.

No, you *ARE* doing something that causes collateral
harm. You *know* you are. You *know* animals die in
the course of growing, harvesting, processing and
distributing the foods you eat.

Let's go back to my question from a moment ago, and
change it. Which causes more animal death, a pound of
rice or a pound of wheat? If one unequivocally causes
more than the other, then you cannot possibly include
*any* quantity of the higher death food and still
maintain your claim to be "minimizing".

Rice as it is most commonly produced is exceptionally
lethal to animals. When rice paddies are flooded,
ground-dwelling mammals and quite a lot of birds are
drowned. While the paddies are flooded, amphibians and
other water-dwelling animals take up residence. Then
the paddies are drained, and the water dwelling animals
die.

How much rice do you eat? Do you have any idea how
many animals die in the course of getting that rice
onto your plate. No, you don't know; no idea at all.


>
> To adopt a moral principal that is designed to minimize harm, it is not necessary to
> prove that every instance of adherance to that principal, in every forseeable context
> always results in less harm.

The bogus "principle" underlying "veganism" isn't a
principle at all, and not putting animal parts in your
mouth in no way establishes that you're minimizing the
animal harm toll you cause.


>
>> haven't measured the "death toll" of each and every
>> item you consume, then picked the truly least-harm
>> combination of consumption goods, you cannot be said to
>> be "minimizing".

You really whiffed on this point. Take any two
different "vegan" diets. Unless you're willing to make
the absurd assumption that each vegetable and fruit
crop causes exactly the same amount of harm to animals,
on a per-serving basis, then *CLEARLY* the two diets
cause different amounts of harm. Yet some "vegan" who
chooses the higher-harm diet will delude herself into
thinking she is "minimizing" the harm she inflicts on
animals as a result of her diet. She is not.


>>
>> The next false, and morally loathsome, fall-back
>> position is one of comparative virtue. The "vegan",
>> chased first from his absolute (and absolutely false)
>> "no harm" claim, and subsequently chased from the
>> equally false "minimization" claim, eventually settles
>> on a claim of doing less harm than the omnivore, and
>> basing his claim to virtue on that. But that is still
>
> I agree with you on this point, this is simply a bad argument.

I have argued long and hard with many "vegans" in this
group, over the last nine years, over that very
argument. You're to be commended for acknowledging
that it is a very bad and completely untenable
argument, but it is one commonly made by "vegans" after
they have been pushed off their earlier ones.


>
>> a false claim, and is now an even shittier moral
>> position, because virtue *NEVER* is established by
>> comparing oneself to someone else; virtue *ONLY* is
>> established by following correct moral principles.
>
> Like, "abstain from taking of life". That's a moral principal, and variations of
> it are almost universal.

But if you eat food, you are violating the principle.
More broadly, if you live life, you are violating the
principle.


>
> The prevailing presumption is that not killing is less harmful than killing.

But killing of animals takes place in the course of
producing not only your food, but myriad other
consumption goods. The fact that you personally don't
do it is of no importance.


> For each murder that you don't commit, aren't expected to justify not
> committing that murder. This is the case even though killing some people given
> the opportunity might actually make the world a happier place.

But murder is wrong per se. Say you decide to kill
someone in your neighborhood known to be a burglar.
We'll even presume the guy commits a burglary every
week. Even in a "three strikes" state, this felon, if
caught and convicted, would not be put to death. The
presumption is that burglary, while causing distress
and a welfare loss to the victims, does not warrant
loss of life as punishment. So, you decide to kill the
guy - just track him down and blow him away, while he
is not in the commission of a crime. Clearly this
particular felon will commit no more felonies, but you
have imposed a "sentence" on him that is harsher than
that which would result even if he were apprehended and
convicted of a third-strike crime.

Briefly, the issue of morality simply doesn't admit of
a strictly utilitarian calculation such as you have
attempted. Yes, the utility of society would be
improved by your criminal removal of this felon from
society, but this kind of utility/welfare calculation
is not the only thing to consider. It's worth noting
that the underlying initial presumption of "veganism"
is not utilitarian, but rather deontological: that
killing animals is wrong, irrespective of whatever
positive increment of utility results from killing them.

On 2008-02-21, Rudy Canoza > wrote:
>>> The first false fall-back position is that the "vegan"
>>> is "minimizing" harm to animals, even if not avoiding
>>> all harm. But that is clearly bullshit: the "vegan"
>>> has *never* measured the harm, and you must measure in
>>> order to make a legitimate claim of minimization.
>>
>> Has anyone measured this harm ? How would precisely would one measure it ?
>
> The point is, you can't claim to be "minimizing" unless
> you have measured, and no "vegan" has ever measured.
> So, the claim goes out the window. It is irretrievable.

So it seems that no-one really knows.

The bottom line is though, I don't buy this moral equivalence between
collateral harm and deliberate killing.

> No, you *ARE* doing something that causes collateral
> harm. You *know* you are. You *know* animals die in
> the course of growing, harvesting, processing and
> distributing the foods you eat.

You don't know that the apple that you're eating is directly linked to
the death of an animal. At best, it is linked to some probabilistic
and unknown(!) average.

This is not in my opinion a moral equivalent of direct and intentional harm.

Cheers,
--
Elflord

Elflord wrote:
> On 2008-02-21, Rudy Canoza > wrote:
>>>> The first false fall-back position is that the "vegan"
>>>> is "minimizing" harm to animals, even if not avoiding
>>>> all harm. But that is clearly bullshit: the "vegan"
>>>> has *never* measured the harm, and you must measure in
>>>> order to make a legitimate claim of minimization.
>>> Has anyone measured this harm ? How would precisely would one measure it ?
>> The point is, you can't claim to be "minimizing" unless
>> you have measured, and no "vegan" has ever measured.
>> So, the claim goes out the window. It is irretrievable.
>
> So it seems that no-one really knows.

No one knows with any precision, but that's a problem
for "vegans", not for omnivores. The reason is that
omnivores aren't making a fatuous moral claim based on
their diet in the first place, but "vegans" are.


>
> The bottom line is though, I don't buy this moral equivalence between
> collateral harm and deliberate killing.

First, a dead animal is a dead animal. Second, not all
the animals whose deaths are attached to your diet were
killed collaterally. Third, collateral doesn't equate
to accidental. Farmers may not set out to chop animals
to bits in fields, but they don't take any steps to
avoid it, either. If you drive your car through a
municipal park as a shortcut and mow down a few
children, and then say, "Well, I wasn't actually trying
to hit any children; I just wanted the shortcut because
I was in a hurry", your "defense" will fail.


>
>> No, you *ARE* doing something that causes collateral
>> harm. You *know* you are. You *know* animals die in
>> the course of growing, harvesting, processing and
>> distributing the foods you eat.
>
> You don't know that the apple that you're eating is directly linked to
> the death of an animal. At best, it is linked to some probabilistic
> and unknown(!) average.

Some foods, you *know* cause animal death. And you
*know* that those deaths were caused by the equivalent
of reckless endangerment, i.e., no steps were taken to
try to prevent or avoid the deaths.


>
> This is not in my opinion a moral equivalent of direct and intentional harm.

It doesn't get you off the hook, and all of the
fallback positions fail.

On Thu, 21 Feb 2008 14:59:35 +0000 (UTC), Elflord > wrote:
[..]

>The bottom line is though, I don't buy this moral equivalence between
>collateral harm and deliberate killing.

And nor should you, because it's a bogus equivalence on a
number of grounds. Unlike the buying of meat which always
goes through death to obtain it, the buying of vegetables is
a morally neutral act because it doesn't have to go through
death to obtain it, and nor does it always incidentally go
through death to obtain it. The collateral deaths found in
agriculture, though unfortunate, are merely "the double effect"
of buying veg.

The Double Effect;

It states that an action having an unintended, harmful effect
(collateral deaths*) is defensible on four conditions as follows:

1) the nature of the act (buying veg*) is itself good, or at least
morally neutral;
2) the intention is for the good effect (buying veg*) and not the bad;
3) the good effect outweighs the bad effect in a situation sufficiently
grave to merit the risk of yielding the bad effect (e.g., risking
collateral deaths*);
4) the good effect (obtaining vegetables*) does not go through the
bad effect (e.g., collateral deaths*).

Although different writers state the doctrine in different ways, it
always claims that there is a moral difference between courses of
action such as the following although this is not a full description:

1)An agent that deliberately causes harm in order to promote some
good. (Not permitted by the doctrine)

(using animals as tools and models to produce drugs, buying meat*)


2) An agent that promotes some good in such a way that harm is
caused as a foreseen side-effect. (Permitted)

(buying veg*)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Double_effect (*my edit)

There's quite a lot of discussion on "The double effect", so I've included
a couple of extra links, if it interests you.

[The doctrine (or principle) of double effect is often invoked to explain
the permissibility of an action that causes a serious harm, such as the
death of a human being, as a side effect of promoting some good end.
It is claimed that sometimes it is permissible to cause such a harm as
a side effect (or “double effect”) of bringing about a good result even
though it would not be permissible to cause such a harm as a means to
bringing about the same good end. This reasoning is summarized with
the claim that sometimes it is permissible to bring about as a merely
foreseen side effect a harmful event that it would be impermissible to
bring about intentionally.
......
The conditions provided by Joseph Mangan include the explicit
requirement that the bad effect not be intended:

A person may licitly perform an action that he foresees will produce a
good effect and a bad effect provided that four conditions are verified
at one and the same time:

1) that the action in itself from its very object be good or at least indifferent;
2) that the good effect and not the evil effect be intended;
3) that the good effect be not produced by means of the evil effect;
4) that there be a proportionately grave reason for permitting the evil effect”]
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/double-effect/

[..]

On 2008-02-21, Rudy Canoza > wrote:

> No one knows with any precision, but that's a problem
> for "vegans", not for omnivores. The reason is that
> omnivores aren't making a fatuous moral claim based on
> their diet in the first place, but "vegans" are.

What claim are they making ?

>> The bottom line is though, I don't buy this moral equivalence between
>> collateral harm and deliberate killing.
>
> First, a dead animal is a dead animal. Second, not all
> the animals whose deaths are attached to your diet were
> killed collaterally. Third, collateral doesn't equate
> to accidental. Farmers may not set out to chop animals

You're arguing this from a purely utilitarian standpoint, but we both agree
that this is not adequate.

Could you elaborate a little on point (2) above ?

> to bits in fields, but they don't take any steps to
> avoid it, either. If you drive your car through a
> municipal park as a shortcut and mow down a few
> children, and then say, "Well, I wasn't actually trying
> to hit any children; I just wanted the shortcut because
> I was in a hurry", your "defense" will fail.

Yes, but it would not be considered *equivalent* to shooting
them for sport (even though they end up dead either way)

>> You don't know that the apple that you're eating is directly linked to
>> the death of an animal. At best, it is linked to some probabilistic
>> and unknown(!) average.
>
> Some foods, you *know* cause animal death. And you
> *know* that those deaths were caused by the equivalent
> of reckless endangerment, i.e., no steps were taken to
> try to prevent or avoid the deaths.

My position is that if I tell you "go get me a piece of dead animal", then I'm
accountable for the death of the animal, but if I tell you "go get me an
apple", and you happen to shoot an animal in the course of getting that animal,
I'm not.

Cheers,
--
Elflord

Elflord wrote:
> On 2008-02-21, Rudy Canoza > wrote:
>
>> No one knows with any precision, but that's a problem
>> for "vegans", not for omnivores. The reason is that
>> omnivores aren't making a fatuous moral claim based on
>> their diet in the first place, but "vegans" are.
>
> What claim are they making ?

I've already laid that out for you, and you've
responded to it.


>
>>> The bottom line is though, I don't buy this moral equivalence between
>>> collateral harm and deliberate killing.
>> First, a dead animal is a dead animal. Second, not all
>> the animals whose deaths are attached to your diet were
>> killed collaterally. Third, collateral doesn't equate
>> to accidental. Farmers may not set out to chop animals
>
> You're arguing this from a purely utilitarian standpoint, but we both agree
> that this is not adequate.

I'm not arguing from a utilitarian standpoint at all.
I'm not making any claim about the harm caused to
animals by my diet, or any other omnivore's diet. I'm
pointing out that the claims made by "vegans" - the
initial "no harm" claim and each of the fallback claims
- are untenable.


>
> Could you elaborate a little on point (2) above ?

Lots of animals are deliberately exterminated as pests
at various stages of tillage, cultivation, harvesting,
storage, processing and distribution of food. One of
the best examples is the extermination of rodents at
grain storage facilities.


>
>> to bits in fields, but they don't take any steps to
>> avoid it, either. If you drive your car through a
>> municipal park as a shortcut and mow down a few
>> children, and then say, "Well, I wasn't actually trying
>> to hit any children; I just wanted the shortcut because
>> I was in a hurry", your "defense" will fail.
>
> Yes, but it would not be considered *equivalent* to shooting
> them for sport (even though they end up dead either way)

You will be prosecuted criminally if you do it, and a
defense based on a claim that the deaths or injuries
were "accidental", i.e. not intended, will fail completely.

>
>>> You don't know that the apple that you're eating is directly linked to
>>> the death of an animal. At best, it is linked to some probabilistic
>>> and unknown(!) average.
>> Some foods, you *know* cause animal death. And you
>> *know* that those deaths were caused by the equivalent
>> of reckless endangerment, i.e., no steps were taken to
>> try to prevent or avoid the deaths.
>
> My position is that if I tell you "go get me a piece of dead animal", then I'm
> accountable for the death of the animal, but if I tell you "go get me an
> apple", and you happen to shoot an animal in the course of getting that animal,
> I'm not.

You're wrong. If you *know* that I cause harm to
animals in the course of getting you your food, and you
do know it, then you share in the moral responsibility
for it. You don't need to employ me as your agent at
all, if you're really interested in not causing, or
being a part of causing, harm to animals. You could
grow all your own food, on your own little "death free
zone" farm. You choose not to do that, and you know
that the farmers who produce the food you consume are
not taking any steps to avoid collateral animal deaths.

On 2008-02-21, Rudy Canoza > wrote:
> I'm not arguing from a utilitarian standpoint at all.
> I'm not making any claim about the harm caused to
> animals by my diet, or any other omnivore's diet. I'm
> pointing out that the claims made by "vegans" - the
> initial "no harm" claim and each of the fallback claims
> - are untenable.

OK, but I can't account for these "vegans" you are arguing
against. I agree that one can't make a "no harm" claim.

>>> to bits in fields, but they don't take any steps to
>>> avoid it, either. If you drive your car through a
>>> municipal park as a shortcut and mow down a few
>>> children, and then say, "Well, I wasn't actually trying
>>> to hit any children; I just wanted the shortcut because
>>> I was in a hurry", your "defense" will fail.
>>
>> Yes, but it would not be considered *equivalent* to shooting
>> them for sport (even though they end up dead either way)
>
> You will be prosecuted criminally if you do it, and a
> defense based on a claim that the deaths or injuries
> were "accidental", i.e. not intended, will fail completely.

Yes, it would still be considered criminal, but it's not equivalent.

>> My position is that if I tell you "go get me a piece of dead animal", then I'm
>> accountable for the death of the animal, but if I tell you "go get me an
>> apple", and you happen to shoot an animal in the course of getting that animal,
>> I'm not.
>
> You're wrong. If you *know* that I cause harm to
> animals in the course of getting you your food, and you
> do know it, then you share in the moral responsibility
> for it. You don't need to employ me as your agent at
> all, if you're really interested in not causing, or
> being a part of causing, harm to animals. You could
> grow all your own food, on your own little "death free
> zone" farm.

I don't buy that argument. If that were true, one could make arguments along
the same lines about employing agents who engage in unsafe labor practices and
claiming this is morally equivalent to deliberate killing.

Cheers,
--
Elflord

Elflord wrote:
> On 2008-02-21, Rudy Canoza > wrote:
>> I'm not arguing from a utilitarian standpoint at all.
>> I'm not making any claim about the harm caused to
>> animals by my diet, or any other omnivore's diet. I'm
>> pointing out that the claims made by "vegans" - the
>> initial "no harm" claim and each of the fallback claims
>> - are untenable.
>
> OK, but I can't account for these "vegans" you are arguing
> against. I agree that one can't make a "no harm" claim.

That "no harm" claim, however, is the starting point
for all "vegans".

>
>>>> to bits in fields, but they don't take any steps to
>>>> avoid it, either. If you drive your car through a
>>>> municipal park as a shortcut and mow down a few
>>>> children, and then say, "Well, I wasn't actually trying
>>>> to hit any children; I just wanted the shortcut because
>>>> I was in a hurry", your "defense" will fail.
>>> Yes, but it would not be considered *equivalent* to shooting
>>> them for sport (even though they end up dead either way)
>> You will be prosecuted criminally if you do it, and a
>> defense based on a claim that the deaths or injuries
>> were "accidental", i.e. not intended, will fail completely.
>
> Yes, it would still be considered criminal, but it's not equivalent.

But a person doing it, or repeatedly and voluntarily
and knowingly transacting with someone who does it,
cannot claim to be "minimizing" his involvement in such
deaths and injuries. Note that I don't have to show
any exact equivalence; all I have to do is falsify this
fall-back claim made by "vegans", and I have done that.


>
>>> My position is that if I tell you "go get me a piece of dead animal", then I'm
>>> accountable for the death of the animal, but if I tell you "go get me an
>>> apple", and you happen to shoot an animal in the course of getting that animal,
>>> I'm not.
>> You're wrong. If you *know* that I cause harm to
>> animals in the course of getting you your food, and you
>> do know it, then you share in the moral responsibility
>> for it. You don't need to employ me as your agent at
>> all, if you're really interested in not causing, or
>> being a part of causing, harm to animals. You could
>> grow all your own food, on your own little "death free
>> zone" farm.
>
> I don't buy that argument.

You can't refute it; you're merely discomfited by it,
because you want to believe in your moral superiority,
and the argument completely demolishes the basis for
the belief.


> If that were true, one could make arguments along
> the same lines about employing agents who engage in unsafe labor practices and
> claiming this is morally equivalent to deliberate killing.

What do you think boycotts are all about?

On 2008-02-21, Rudy Canoza > wrote:

>> Yes, it would still be considered criminal, but it's not equivalent.
>
> But a person doing it, or repeatedly and voluntarily
> and knowingly transacting with someone who does it,
> cannot claim to be "minimizing" his involvement in such
> deaths and injuries. Note that I don't have to show
> any exact equivalence; all I have to do is falsify this
> fall-back claim made by "vegans", and I have done that.

First, if the alternatives are not viable, they can indeed claim to
be "minimizing" this.

Second, they can certainly claim that they are not causing direct harm.

We do appear to agree that not causing direct harm does not oblige
one to also undertake to never have any role in collateral damage.

We certainly do undertake to avoid deliberately killing people, but it
is not common (indeed it is barely possible) to undertake to never have any
indirect role in accidental or negligent homicides. The fact that we
*can't* do the latter does not mean that we shouldn't do the former.

> You can't refute it; you're merely discomfited by it,
> because you want to believe in your moral superiority,

At what point did I assert that I am "morally superior" ?

>> If that were true, one could make arguments along
>> the same lines about employing agents who engage in unsafe labor practices and
>> claiming this is morally equivalent to deliberate killing.
>
> What do you think boycotts are all about?

Boycotts do not presume a moral equivalence between funding unsafe labour
practices and directly committing murder. When was the last time someone was
jailed for buying a diamond, or shoes made in China ? Is anyone on the record
advocating jail sentences for doing either of these ?

Cheers,
--
Elflord

Elflord wrote:
> On 2008-02-21, Rudy Canoza > wrote:
>
>>> Yes, it would still be considered criminal, but it's not equivalent.
>> But a person doing it, or repeatedly and voluntarily
>> and knowingly transacting with someone who does it,
>> cannot claim to be "minimizing" his involvement in such
>> deaths and injuries. Note that I don't have to show
>> any exact equivalence; all I have to do is falsify this
>> fall-back claim made by "vegans", and I have done that.
>
> First, if the alternatives are not viable, they can indeed claim to
> be "minimizing" this.

Are you serious? Are you suggesting that the failure
of *all* "vegans" to compare even among alternative
vegetarian diets is based on some kind of lack of
viability? That's bullshit.

Different strictly vegetarian diets are going to have
different harm levels associated with them. I've
already told you that rice cultivation is particularly
lethal to wildlife, first when the paddies are flooded
causing the drowning death of lots of animals, then by
the draining of the paddies causing death to
water-dwelling animals who took up residence while the
paddies were under water.

Does rice cause more, the same, or less animal
suffering than other nutritionally equivalent grains
you might eat? If you haven't done the comparison,
then you cannot be said to be minimizing.

This viability argument is rotten to the core. It's
perfectly viable for you to withdraw from all
commercial markets and produce all your own food.
Whether you can comfortably and easily do it is irrelevant.


>
> Second, they can certainly claim that they are not causing direct harm.

Irrelevant. They're an integral part of a process that
causes harm, and they need not be.


>
> We do appear to agree that not causing direct harm does not oblige
> one to also undertake to never have any role in collateral damage.

We're in no such agreement; you've imagined that. I'm
looking at the moral claims of "vegans", and find all
of them baseless.


>
> We certainly do undertake to avoid deliberately killing people, but it
> is not common (indeed it is barely possible) to undertake to never have any
> indirect role in accidental or negligent homicides.

Others do that on your behalf. One way they do it is
by passing and enforcing laws that punish those who
create or tolerate unsafe working conditions.



> The fact that we
> *can't* do the latter does not mean that we shouldn't do the former.

But you can't give a coherent explanation for why one
ought to avoid direct harm in the first place.


>> You can't refute it; you're merely discomfited by it,
>> because you want to believe in your moral superiority,
>
> At what point did I assert that I am "morally superior" ?

The claim is an implied inherent claim of "veganism".


>>> If that were true, one could make arguments along
>>> the same lines about employing agents who engage in unsafe labor practices and
>>> claiming this is morally equivalent to deliberate killing.
>> What do you think boycotts are all about?
>
> Boycotts do not presume a moral equivalence between funding unsafe labour
> practices and directly committing murder.

They don't have to assume any such equivalence. What
they assume is that there is moral culpability on the
part of the consumer, not necessarily rising to the
same level as the direct perpetrators, but culpability
all the same.


> When was the last time someone was
> jailed for buying a diamond, or shoes made in China ? Is anyone on the record
> advocating jail sentences for doing either of these ?

Not the point.

On 2008-02-21, Rudy Canoza > wrote:

>> Boycotts do not presume a moral equivalence between funding unsafe labour
>> practices and directly committing murder.
>
> They don't have to assume any such equivalence. What
> they assume is that there is moral culpability on the
> part of the consumer, not necessarily rising to the
> same level as the direct perpetrators, but culpability
> all the same.

Sure, but to justify *not* murdering, do you need to participate in each and
all of these boycotts ?

It seems you are engaging in a sort of all-or-nothing dichotomy. Either you
agree to all and any harm inflicted on animals, or you are obliged to ensure
that absolutely no harm, including collateral harm on the part of ones agents,
is committed.

This seems somewhat extraordinary, because similar standards are seldom applied
elsewhere.

Cheers,
--
Elflord

Elflord wrote:
> On 2008-02-21, Rudy Canoza > wrote:
>
>>> Boycotts do not presume a moral equivalence between funding unsafe labour
>>> practices and directly committing murder.
>> They don't have to assume any such equivalence. What
>> they assume is that there is moral culpability on the
>> part of the consumer, not necessarily rising to the
>> same level as the direct perpetrators, but culpability
>> all the same.
>
> Sure, but to justify *not* murdering, do you need to participate in each and
> all of these boycotts ?
>
> It seems you are engaging in a sort of all-or-nothing dichotomy. Either you
> agree to all and any harm inflicted on animals, or you are obliged to ensure
> that absolutely no harm, including collateral harm on the part of ones agents,
> is committed.
>
> This seems somewhat extraordinary, because similar standards are seldom applied
> elsewhere.

I'm not actually suggesting a course of action for
"vegans" to follow to try to salvage "veganism". I'm
pointing out what I see as fatal flaws in the belief
system that I think are irremediable. "veganism"
starts with a flawed premise, and it's fall-back
positions are no less flawed.

"veganism" starts from a shaky deontological position -
animals ought not be harmed - and ends up at an equally
shaky, but much weaker, utilitarian position. That is,
it does for those few adherents who ever take a serious
look at it. And even for those few, they can't
coherently explain the shifts to the weaker position,
and they can't explain their stopping rule, i.e. why
they don't do more than they do to refrain from causing
harm to animals, except in extremely vague terms of
personal convenience, which is utterly unsatisfactory
from a moral perspective.

"Elflord" > wrote in message
...
> On 2008-02-21, Rudy Canoza > wrote:
>>>> The first false fall-back position is that the "vegan"
>>>> is "minimizing" harm to animals, even if not avoiding
>>>> all harm. But that is clearly bullshit: the "vegan"
>>>> has *never* measured the harm, and you must measure in
>>>> order to make a legitimate claim of minimization.
>>>
>>> Has anyone measured this harm ? How would precisely would one measure it
>>> ?
>>
>> The point is, you can't claim to be "minimizing" unless
>> you have measured, and no "vegan" has ever measured.
>> So, the claim goes out the window. It is irretrievable.
>
> So it seems that no-one really knows.
>
> The bottom line is though, I don't buy this moral equivalence between
> collateral harm and deliberate killing.
>
>> No, you *ARE* doing something that causes collateral
>> harm. You *know* you are. You *know* animals die in
>> the course of growing, harvesting, processing and
>> distributing the foods you eat.
>
> You don't know that the apple that you're eating is directly linked to
> the death of an animal. At best, it is linked to some probabilistic
> and unknown(!) average.
>
> This is not in my opinion a moral equivalent of direct and intentional
> harm.
>

Do you never kill a lowly mosquito?

On 2008-02-21, Rudy Canoza > wrote:
> Elflord wrote:
>> On 2008-02-21, Rudy Canoza > wrote:
>>
>>>> Boycotts do not presume a moral equivalence between funding unsafe labour
>>>> practices and directly committing murder.
>>> They don't have to assume any such equivalence. What
>>> they assume is that there is moral culpability on the
>>> part of the consumer, not necessarily rising to the
>>> same level as the direct perpetrators, but culpability
>>> all the same.
>>
>> Sure, but to justify *not* murdering, do you need to participate in each and
>> all of these boycotts ?
>>
>> It seems you are engaging in a sort of all-or-nothing dichotomy. Either you
>> agree to all and any harm inflicted on animals, or you are obliged to ensure
>> that absolutely no harm, including collateral harm on the part of ones agents,
>> is committed.
>>
>> This seems somewhat extraordinary, because similar standards are seldom applied
>> elsewhere.
>
> I'm not actually suggesting a course of action for
> "vegans" to follow to try to salvage "veganism". I'm
> pointing out what I see as fatal flaws in the belief
> system that I think are irremediable. "veganism"
> starts with a flawed premise, and it's fall-back
> positions are no less flawed.
>
> "veganism" starts from a shaky deontological position -
> animals ought not be harmed - and ends up at an equally
> shaky, but much weaker, utilitarian position. That is,
> it does for those few adherents who ever take a serious
> look at it. And even for those few, they can't
> coherently explain the shifts to the weaker position,
> and they can't explain their stopping rule, i.e. why
> they don't do more than they do to refrain from causing
> harm to animals, except in extremely vague terms of
> personal convenience, which is utterly unsatisfactory
> from a moral perspective.

There are analogous "stopping rules" for causing indirect
harm to other humans (I have already provided examples).
However, the fact that the majority of people do not have
such clearly defined "stopping rules" should not in any
way be confused with a rebuttal of existing homicide laws.

The notion that we must define our morality in such a way
that we can pretend that we are without flaw is something
that I disagree with, indeed at least the religious notions
of morality I am familiar with operate under the premise
that we are all imperfect.

Having said all that, you do make a very convincing
argument.

Cheers,
--
Elflord

Elflord wrote:
> On 2008-02-21, Rudy Canoza > wrote:
>> Elflord wrote:
>>> On 2008-02-21, Rudy Canoza > wrote:
>>>
>>>>> Boycotts do not presume a moral equivalence between funding unsafe labour
>>>>> practices and directly committing murder.
>>>> They don't have to assume any such equivalence. What
>>>> they assume is that there is moral culpability on the
>>>> part of the consumer, not necessarily rising to the
>>>> same level as the direct perpetrators, but culpability
>>>> all the same.
>>> Sure, but to justify *not* murdering, do you need to participate in each and
>>> all of these boycotts ?
>>>
>>> It seems you are engaging in a sort of all-or-nothing dichotomy. Either you
>>> agree to all and any harm inflicted on animals, or you are obliged to ensure
>>> that absolutely no harm, including collateral harm on the part of ones agents,
>>> is committed.
>>>
>>> This seems somewhat extraordinary, because similar standards are seldom applied
>>> elsewhere.
>> I'm not actually suggesting a course of action for
>> "vegans" to follow to try to salvage "veganism". I'm
>> pointing out what I see as fatal flaws in the belief
>> system that I think are irremediable. "veganism"
>> starts with a flawed premise, and it's fall-back
>> positions are no less flawed.
>>
>> "veganism" starts from a shaky deontological position -
>> animals ought not be harmed - and ends up at an equally
>> shaky, but much weaker, utilitarian position. That is,
>> it does for those few adherents who ever take a serious
>> look at it. And even for those few, they can't
>> coherently explain the shifts to the weaker position,
>> and they can't explain their stopping rule, i.e. why
>> they don't do more than they do to refrain from causing
>> harm to animals, except in extremely vague terms of
>> personal convenience, which is utterly unsatisfactory
>> from a moral perspective.
>
> There are analogous "stopping rules" for causing indirect
> harm to other humans (I have already provided examples).

There is no such stopping rule regarding indirect harm
to humans that is remotely like the convenience-based
rules "vegans" set for themselves when it comes to how
much animal harm they permit themselves.


> However, the fact that the majority of people do not have
> such clearly defined "stopping rules" should not in any
> way be confused with a rebuttal of existing homicide laws.

*Any* human death in industry is investigated, and
serious consequences commonly ensue. *NO*
investigation is ever done for even deliberate animal
deaths in agriculture, let alone collateral ones. The
cases simply aren't comparable.


> The notion that we must define our morality in such a way
> that we can pretend that we are without flaw is something
> that I disagree with,

It's also a complete straw man on your part.


> indeed at least the religious notions
> of morality I am familiar with operate under the premise
> that we are all imperfect.
>
> Having said all that, you do make a very convincing
> argument.
>
> Cheers,

On 2008-02-22, Rudy Canoza > wrote:

>> There are analogous "stopping rules" for causing indirect
>> harm to other humans (I have already provided examples).
>
> There is no such stopping rule regarding indirect harm
> to humans that is remotely like the convenience-based
> rules "vegans" set for themselves when it comes to how
> much animal harm they permit themselves.

There are indeed rules that are largely convenience based.

>> However, the fact that the majority of people do not have
>> such clearly defined "stopping rules" should not in any
>> way be confused with a rebuttal of existing homicide laws.
>
> *Any* human death in industry is investigated, and
> serious consequences commonly ensue. *NO*

This is not really true. It is easy to escape consequences by outsourcing.
I hope you don't expect that the owners of DeBeers will be prosecuted for crimes
against humanity that were funded by the diamond trade any time soon.

Those who order action that results in substantial loss of life in
controversial and questionable military action (which often indirectly results
in civilian loss of life and possibly attrocities against civilians) are seldom
held accountable unless they are directly implicated in war crimes.

Companies (and their executives, shareholders, and employees) who supply armies
that are directly involved in war crimes are not held accountable.

So I don't really buy this notion that there are always serious consequences for
those who are indirectly involved in harming others.

> investigation is ever done for even deliberate animal
> deaths in agriculture, let alone collateral ones. The
> cases simply aren't comparable.

I understand that they are not equivalent, but they are analogous, and that is
good enough for me.

The point is that I don't agree that the "stopping point" problem you raise is
necessarily a fatal flaw.

>> The notion that we must define our morality in such a way
>> that we can pretend that we are without flaw is something
>> that I disagree with,
>
> It's also a complete straw man on your part.

But if that's the case, then I don't see why this apparent "stopping point" is a fatal
flaw with the vegan position.

Cheers,
--
Elflord

Elflord wrote:
> On 2008-02-22, Rudy Canoza > wrote:
>
>>> There are analogous "stopping rules" for causing indirect
>>> harm to other humans (I have already provided examples).
>> There is no such stopping rule regarding indirect harm
>> to humans that is remotely like the convenience-based
>> rules "vegans" set for themselves when it comes to how
>> much animal harm they permit themselves.
>
> There are indeed rules that are largely convenience based.

No, there aren't. As I said, you are prevented from
indirectly harming humans by rules that aggressively
try to prevent others from inflicting direct harm, and
which severely punish direct harm when it does occur
through recklessness or negligence. There are no such
rules pertaining to animals. It is convenient for you
that you don't have to worry about it as a consumer,
but those rules aren't for your convenience.

The stopping rule for "vegans" in attempting to
withdraw from involvement in processes that cause
indirect harm is indeed based on their own convenience.
They could if they chose stop buying any commercially
produced food and instead grow all their own, but they
find it too inconvenient; too much a diminution of
their utility. So, what started as a deontological
belief that it is wrong to harm animals suddenly gets
cast aside as a result of a purely utilitarian calculation.


>>> However, the fact that the majority of people do not have
>>> such clearly defined "stopping rules" should not in any
>>> way be confused with a rebuttal of existing homicide laws.
>> *Any* human death in industry is investigated, and
>> serious consequences commonly ensue. *NO*
>
> This is not really true.

Yes, it is.


> It is easy to escape consequences by outsourcing.
> I hope you don't expect that the owners of DeBeers will be prosecuted for crimes
> against humanity that were funded by the diamond trade any time soon.

How did you go from talking about food to talking about
diamonds?


>
> Those who order action that results in substantial loss of life in
> controversial and questionable military action (which often indirectly results
> in civilian loss of life and possibly attrocities against civilians) are seldom
> held accountable unless they are directly implicated in war crimes.

War is wholly irrelevant to the discussion.
Nonetheless, western militaries take seriously the
requirement to try to avoid collateral deaths and
injuries, while no such effort is made, anywhere,
regarding collateral animal death and injury in
agriculture.


>
> Companies (and their executives, shareholders, and employees) who supply armies
> that are directly involved in war crimes are not held accountable.
>
> So I don't really buy this notion that there are always serious consequences for
> those who are indirectly involved in harming others.
>
>> investigation is ever done for even deliberate animal
>> deaths in agriculture, let alone collateral ones. The
>> cases simply aren't comparable.
>
> I understand that they are not equivalent, but they are analogous, and that is
> good enough for me.

They are not comparable. Your attempted comparison is
sophistry.


>
> The point is that I don't agree that the "stopping point" problem you raise is
> necessarily a fatal flaw.

It is sufficient to show that "veganism" doesn't supply
the moral status to its adherents that they delude
themselves into thinking it does. In that sense, it's
fatal. They don't enjoy the moral stature for which
they falsely congratulate themselves.


>
>>> The notion that we must define our morality in such a way
>>> that we can pretend that we are without flaw is something
>>> that I disagree with,
>> It's also a complete straw man on your part.
>
> But if that's the case, then I don't see why this apparent "stopping point" is a fatal
> flaw with the vegan position.

Because it queers their belief about their moral
stature. We need to review: they began by believing
being "vegan" meant they weren't causing *any* animals
to be killed. We saw that this is based on a logical
fallacy: denying the antecedent. The first fall-back
position is that they're "minimizing" animal death and
injury by being "vegan", but again, we saw that being
"vegan" is in and of itself no guarantee of such
minimization, first by noting that there are
conceivable meat-including diets that "beat" some,
perhaps most, "vegan" diets in terms of amount of harm
caused to animals; and next by noting that some "vegan"
diets cause more harm than other "vegan" diets, and
that unless one has measured and selected the least
harmful from among all "vegan" diets, one cannot be
said to be minimizing harm. (We don't even need to go
to the next fall-back position, the disgusting
comparison with meat-eaters resulting in a loathsome
"at least I cause less than you" conclusion.)

The whole idea of the minimization argument is an
attempt to demonstrate virtue, the virtue supposedly
resulting in causing the least possible indirect harm
(even meat eaters don't cause direct harm to the
animals they eat, given that virtually no one in an
industrial society slaughters his own meat animals.)
So, the claim to virtue is based on a belief that one
is minimizing, but we see that the stopping rule
employed by "vegans" in no way entitles them to claim
they are minimizing the indirect harm they cause, and
so the claim of virtue is irretrievably out the window.
As long as they stop short of doing *everything*
conceivable to try to disengage from all animal-harming
processes, irrespective of the effect on their personal
convenience, then they are not minimizing, and the
claim to virtue is destroyed. As soon as you introduce
the element of convenience, which is usually
camouflaged in language about what's possible, then you
see that the stopping rule cannot coherently be
defended in terms of ones abidance by a supposed moral
principle. The supposed principle is not that harm to
animals is to be avoided; the supposed principle is
that harm to animals is *wrong*.

On 2008-02-22, Rudy Canoza > wrote:

> No, there aren't. As I said, you are prevented from
> indirectly harming humans by rules that aggressively
> try to prevent others from inflicting direct harm, and
> which severely punish direct harm when it does occur
> through recklessness or negligence. There are no such

On this point, we well have to disagree. In closing, my
position is that there are jurisdictions where those
protections are very weak (third world countries) or non
existent (conflict zones) and it is possible to take advantage
of this without being held to account.

Perhaps a closer analogy however, would be animal cruelty
laws, almost universal in the civilised world. It is clear
that the civilised world does not regard intentional direct
harm as morally equivalent to collateral harm.

> The stopping rule for "vegans" in attempting to
> withdraw from involvement in processes that cause
> indirect harm is indeed based on their own convenience.

As I pointed out, I believe non-vegans do the same.

> They could if they chose stop buying any commercially
> produced food and instead grow all their own, but they
> find it too inconvenient; too much a diminution of
> their utility. So, what started as a deontological
> belief that it is wrong to harm animals suddenly gets
> cast aside as a result of a purely utilitarian calculation.

I don't consider direct harm to be morally equivalent to
collateral harm. I don't see a need to back away from an
initial deontological position (the utilitarian position is
actually a weaker argument in my opinion)

>> It is easy to escape consequences by outsourcing.
>> I hope you don't expect that the owners of DeBeers will be prosecuted for crimes
>> against humanity that were funded by the diamond trade any time soon.
>
> How did you go from talking about food to talking about
> diamonds?

We're talking how non-vegans are involved in indirect harm, and yet this does
not invalidate the moral basis of homicide laws.

> War is wholly irrelevant to the discussion.
> Nonetheless, western militaries take seriously the
> requirement to try to avoid collateral deaths and
> injuries, while no such effort is made, anywhere,
> regarding collateral animal death and injury in
> agriculture.

Is "trying to avoid" good enough though ? How hard should they try, and at what
point do they say that it's "too expensive" to try harder ?

> Because it queers their belief about their moral
> stature. We need to review: they began by believing
> being "vegan" meant they weren't causing *any* animals
> to be killed. We saw that this is based on a logical
> fallacy: denying the antecedent.

Causing direct harm is not morally equivalent to being indirectly
linked to collateral harm.

[snip]
> to the next fall-back position, the disgusting
> comparison with meat-eaters resulting in a loathsome
> "at least I cause less than you" conclusion.)

You seem awfully angry about this. It seems that posting
these diatribes has not been a very succesful strategy
for dealing with your guilt (-;

> principle. The supposed principle is not that harm to
> animals is to be avoided; the supposed principle is
> that harm to animals is *wrong*.

Again, there is implicit in this a presumed moral equivalence
between causing direct harm and being indirectly linked to
collateral harm which in my opinion is a weakness in your
argument.

Cheers,
--
Elflord

On Feb 17, 5:00 am, wrote:
>
>
> I've been a life-long vegetarian, and it's never hurt my athletic
> prowess, nor cost me a race or lifting comp.

A race, yes, I can see that, but a lifting competition? Hmm...I think
a vegetarian lifter is more "impressive" than a vegetarian runner
since most runners are slim/skinny people anyway!

> I'm not a STRICT vegetarian though, I occasionally eat an egg, or
> maybe some milk, and once in a great while I have steaks, burgers,
> pork chops, chicken, turkey, venison, and bacon, but only once a day
> or so, so I think I still qualify as a vegetarian, right?

To me, certainly! I'm still doing the meat once a day or every-other-
day thing, in preparation for an all-out month-long lacto-ovo trial
soon...which will coincide nicely with "spring training" efforts to
lose winter fat! I'm just really concerned about losing and/or not
developing muscle....

On Feb 17, 10:12 am, Charlie Pendejo
>
> You almost hint at making that sound like plausibly an ambiguously bad
> thing, nearly.


Well, it's quite a funny scenario, really...reminds me of girls
parading in a bordello, actually...I also find that I have a LOT more
interest in sex when eating meat....

Elflord wrote:
> On 2008-02-22, Rudy Canoza > wrote:
>
>> No, there aren't. As I said, you are prevented from
>> indirectly harming humans by rules that aggressively
>> try to prevent others from inflicting direct harm, and
>> which severely punish direct harm when it does occur
>> through recklessness or negligence. There are no such
>
> On this point, we well have to disagree. In closing, my
> position is that there are jurisdictions where those
> protections are very weak (third world countries) or non
> existent (conflict zones) and it is possible to take advantage
> of this without being held to account.
>
> Perhaps a closer analogy however, would be animal cruelty
> laws, almost universal in the civilised world. It is clear
> that the civilised world does not regard intentional direct
> harm as morally equivalent to collateral harm.

Wholly irrelevant to the discussion. It still is
regarded as bad, and the starting point for "veganism"
- that it is wrong to cause *any* harm to animals -
means that a stopping rule that stops far short of
doing everything possible to avoid even indirect harm
completely vitiates "veganism" as a legitimate ethical
choice.


>
>> The stopping rule for "vegans" in attempting to
>> withdraw from involvement in processes that cause
>> indirect harm is indeed based on their own convenience.
>
> As I pointed out, I believe non-vegans do the same.

Non-"vegans" aren't starting from the same original
moral position as "vegans"; this should be obvious.
They don't believe that it is fully wrong to cause harm
to animals, and so they aren't under the same
obligation as "vegans".


>
>> They could if they chose stop buying any commercially
>> produced food and instead grow all their own, but they
>> find it too inconvenient; too much a diminution of
>> their utility. So, what started as a deontological
>> belief that it is wrong to harm animals suddenly gets
>> cast aside as a result of a purely utilitarian calculation.
>
> I don't consider direct harm to be morally equivalent to
> collateral harm.

I don't care if you do or not. It still is considered
wrong, period, based on the underlying element of
"vegan" belief; and the stopping rule for avoidance of
it is very different than the stopping rule for the
avoidance of harm to humans, but the difference cannot
coherently be explained.


> I don't see a need to back away from an
> initial deontological position (the utilitarian position is
> actually a weaker argument in my opinion)

But by switching to a utilitarian calculation, "vegans"
*have* backed away from the deontological position, by
implication. And it isn't even the utility of the
animals that is used as the rationale, but their own.


>
>>> It is easy to escape consequences by outsourcing.
>>> I hope you don't expect that the owners of DeBeers will be prosecuted for crimes
>>> against humanity that were funded by the diamond trade any time soon.
>> How did you go from talking about food to talking about
>> diamonds?
>
> We're talking how non-vegans are involved in indirect harm, and yet this does
> not invalidate the moral basis of homicide laws.

There is no harm caused to diamond miners that is
remotely comparable in scope or scale to that caused to
animals in normal commercial agriculture. Your
comparison is invalid sophistry.


>
>> War is wholly irrelevant to the discussion.
>> Nonetheless, western militaries take seriously the
>> requirement to try to avoid collateral deaths and
>> injuries, while no such effort is made, anywhere,
>> regarding collateral animal death and injury in
>> agriculture.
>
> Is "trying to avoid" good enough though ?

It is sufficient to show that the indirect harm to
humans doesn't damage the claim made by humans to be
abiding by the moral principles that underlie our
notions about rights. It is sufficient to gut your _tu
quoque_ argument in its particulars, although the fact
it is a _tu quoque_ is enough to stop considering it at
all.

The claim you're making is that "vegans" are not
contradicting their supposed moral beliefs in setting
their stopping rule (for the avoidance of indirect harm
to animals) at the point they do, and trying to make
that claim on the basis of an invalid _tu quoque_ won't do.

The fact is, "vegans'" stopping rule for avoidance of
indirect harm is entirely incoherent: they really
haven't given any thought to it at all, until pushed by
those who attack the original basis for "veganism".


> How hard should they try, and at what
> point do they say that it's "too expensive" to try harder ?
>
>> Because it queers their belief about their moral
>> stature. We need to review: they began by believing
>> being "vegan" meant they weren't causing *any* animals
>> to be killed. We saw that this is based on a logical
>> fallacy: denying the antecedent.
>
> Causing direct harm is not morally equivalent to being indirectly
> linked to collateral harm.

Irrelevant. They indirectly cause the collateral harm,
and their beliefs about animal "rights" dictate that
they ought not, and they can't explain why they do,
except in terms of their convenience. Their moral
position is untenable.


>
> [snip]
>> to the next fall-back position, the disgusting
>> comparison with meat-eaters resulting in a loathsome
>> "at least I cause less than you" conclusion.)
>
> You seem awfully angry about this.

It truly is loathsome, but ultimately it's all that's
left. If "vegans" were logical and honest, they would
abandon any pretense to any belief in their virtue for
being "vegan", but they don't.


> It seems that posting
> these diatribes has not been a very succesful strategy
> for dealing with your guilt

No guilt.


>> principle. The supposed principle is not that harm to
>> animals is to be avoided; the supposed principle is
>> that harm to animals is *wrong*.
>
> Again, there is implicit in this a presumed moral equivalence

No, there is not.

The inescapable conclusion is that "veganism" is all
about following a rule, a rule that has no coherent
moral principle behind it. The moral principle that
"vegans" falsely say is the motivation for "veganism"
dictates that they ought to do a lot more than merely
and easily refrain from putting animal bits in their
mouths, but they don't do it. "veganism" = hypocrisy.

On 2008-02-22, Rudy Canoza > wrote:

>> Perhaps a closer analogy however, would be animal cruelty
>> laws, almost universal in the civilised world. It is clear
>> that the civilised world does not regard intentional direct
>> harm as morally equivalent to collateral harm.
>
> Wholly irrelevant to the discussion.

I see it as entirely relevant, because it's yet another example
of a "stopping rule".

> It still is
> regarded as bad, and the starting point for "veganism"
> - that it is wrong to cause *any* harm to animals -

Clearly the vegan position is not that it is morally wrong to be directly or
indirectly linked to any collateral harm. That's just something that you made
up.

That it is wrong to cause direct harm does not mean that there is an obligation
to never be involved indirectly in collateral harm.

> There is no harm caused to diamond miners that is
> remotely comparable in scope or scale to that caused to
> animals in normal commercial agriculture. Your
> comparison is invalid sophistry.

The people who were harmed by the blood diamond trade were not the miners
themselves. The point was that diamond money was used to fund insurgencies.
Basically, diamond buyers were funding the African version of Hamas.

Cheers,
--
Elflord

Elflord wrote:
> On 2008-02-22, Rudy Canoza > wrote:
>
>>> Perhaps a closer analogy however, would be animal cruelty
>>> laws, almost universal in the civilised world. It is clear
>>> that the civilised world does not regard intentional direct
>>> harm as morally equivalent to collateral harm.
>> Wholly irrelevant to the discussion.
>
> I see it as entirely relevant, because it's yet another example
> of a "stopping rule".

It's irrelevant because it doesn't explain "vegans'"
stopping rule in any way.


>> It still is
>> regarded as bad, and the starting point for "veganism"
>> - that it is wrong to cause *any* harm to animals -
>
> Clearly the vegan position is not that it is morally wrong to be directly or
> indirectly linked to any collateral harm. That's just something that you made
> up.

No, that is definitely the shabby "vegan" position.
Note that meat eaters aren't directly linked to animal
deaths, either, at least those who buy their meat in
grocery stores. There's no more direct link to the
actual killing of animals in picking up a steak than
there is in picking up a bag of rice. But "vegans" see
some goofy moral imperative not to put the piece of
meat in their mouths.


>
> That it is wrong to cause direct harm does not mean that there is an obligation
> to never be involved indirectly in collateral harm.

Most consumers of meat cause no direct harm to animals.
If they slaughtered their own animals in their
backyards, that would be direct harm.

"vegans" cannot coherently explain how refusing to put
meat in their mouths distances them any further from
the infliction of direct harm to animals than the
distance of meat eaters from that direct harm. All
they're really doing is quibbling over the disposition
of corpses.


>
>> There is no harm caused to diamond miners that is
>> remotely comparable in scope or scale to that caused to
>> animals in normal commercial agriculture. Your
>> comparison is invalid sophistry.
>
> The people who were harmed by the blood diamond trade were not the miners
> themselves. The point was that diamond money was used to fund insurgencies.

Even more remote! Boy, you're going to hurt yourself
stretching like that without adequate warm-up.

On Feb 17, 7:44 am, "Doug Freese" > wrote:
>
>
> Then do your thing! I'm saving my outrage for the lying scumbag
> president that is killing people for oil.

I don't know why people expect so much from human beings -- especially
those who would be politicians.

> I don't see any reason why not as long as you make sure everyone gets
> all the necessary proteins that one usually get from eating meat. It's
> not easy to get little children to eat the necessary variety of food for
> a balanced diet. And then turn off the TV so they don't see the ads for
> the Double Whopper or KFC or etc.

Wasn't there some finding that children raised as vegetarians are
shorter??

> -D

On Feb 20, 2:34 pm, "Justin E. Miller" <justinmiller87> wrote:
>
>
> Actually, my dogs are vegetarians just like me.


Eh?? So what does he eat, grains? Tofu?? Seriously, cats and dogs
can survive on wheat gluten and such??

On Feb 19, 10:27 pm, "Dayrl" > wrote:
>
>
> Yea right. If they were doing it for oil, wouldn't prices go down? Drill
> the damn Anwar and flush the retarded liberals down the toilet with the rest
> of the turds!!!!


Well, if they'd won the war, the price would be much lower.

Ironically, if it weren't for liberal idealism and the Cold War, the
whole Middle East would have long been conveniently colonized.

Rudy Canoza wrote:
> Elflord wrote:
>> On 2008-02-22, Rudy Canoza > wrote:
>>
>>>> Perhaps a closer analogy however, would be animal cruelty laws,
>>>> almost universal in the civilised world. It is clear
>>>> that the civilised world does not regard intentional direct
>>>> harm as morally equivalent to collateral harm.
>>> Wholly irrelevant to the discussion.
>>
>> I see it as entirely relevant, because it's yet another example
>> of a "stopping rule".
>
> It's irrelevant because it doesn't explain "vegans'" stopping rule in
> any way.

I should have written, in any way other than a
repugnant _tu quoque_ attempt at redirecting the
accusation of lack of a coherent stopping rule.


>
>
>>> It still is regarded as bad, and the starting point for "veganism" -
>>> that it is wrong to cause *any* harm to animals -
>>
>> Clearly the vegan position is not that it is morally wrong to be
>> directly or
>> indirectly linked to any collateral harm. That's just something that
>> you made
>> up.
>
> No, that is definitely the shabby "vegan" position. Note that meat
> eaters aren't directly linked to animal deaths, either, at least those
> who buy their meat in grocery stores. There's no more direct link to
> the actual killing of animals in picking up a steak than there is in
> picking up a bag of rice. But "vegans" see some goofy moral imperative
> not to put the piece of meat in their mouths.
>
>
>>
>> That it is wrong to cause direct harm does not mean that there is an
>> obligation
>> to never be involved indirectly in collateral harm.
>
> Most consumers of meat cause no direct harm to animals. If they
> slaughtered their own animals in their backyards, that would be direct
> harm.
>
> "vegans" cannot coherently explain how refusing to put meat in their
> mouths distances them any further from the infliction of direct harm to
> animals than the distance of meat eaters from that direct harm. All
> they're really doing is quibbling over the disposition of corpses.
>
>
>>
>>> There is no harm caused to diamond miners that is remotely comparable
>>> in scope or scale to that caused to animals in normal commercial
>>> agriculture. Your comparison is invalid sophistry.
>>
>> The people who were harmed by the blood diamond trade were not the miners
>> themselves. The point was that diamond money was used to fund
>> insurgencies.
>
> Even more remote! Boy, you're going to hurt yourself stretching like
> that without adequate warm-up.

Mr. Canoza,
when you've stopped causing human collateral deaths and start telling others to
stop buying diamonds and driving their smoggy 4x4's and going without fossil-fuel
energy, the vegans might start takng some notice of you. Until then while you
continue to set impossible standards for them that you're unwilling to follow they'll
keep ignoring your argument because they'll see that it's you who's the hypocrite in
it rather than themselves. Live by by own standard or be that hypocrite.


"Rudy Canoza" > wrote in message
...
> Elflord wrote:
>> On 2008-02-22, Rudy Canoza > wrote:
>>
>>>> Perhaps a closer analogy however, would be animal cruelty laws, almost universal
>>>> in the civilised world. It is clear
>>>> that the civilised world does not regard intentional direct
>>>> harm as morally equivalent to collateral harm.
>>> Wholly irrelevant to the discussion.
>>
>> I see it as entirely relevant, because it's yet another example
>> of a "stopping rule".
>
> It's irrelevant because it doesn't explain "vegans'" stopping rule in any way.
>
>
>>> It still is regarded as bad, and the starting point for "veganism" - that it is
>>> wrong to cause *any* harm to animals -
>>
>> Clearly the vegan position is not that it is morally wrong to be directly or
>> indirectly linked to any collateral harm. That's just something that you made
>> up.
>
> No, that is definitely the shabby "vegan" position. Note that meat eaters aren't
> directly linked to animal deaths, either, at least those who buy their meat in
> grocery stores. There's no more direct link to the actual killing of animals in
> picking up a steak than there is in picking up a bag of rice. But "vegans" see
> some goofy moral imperative not to put the piece of meat in their mouths.
>
>
>>
>> That it is wrong to cause direct harm does not mean that there is an obligation
>> to never be involved indirectly in collateral harm.
>
> Most consumers of meat cause no direct harm to animals. If they slaughtered their
> own animals in their backyards, that would be direct harm.
>
> "vegans" cannot coherently explain how refusing to put meat in their mouths
> distances them any further from the infliction of direct harm to animals than the
> distance of meat eaters from that direct harm. All they're really doing is
> quibbling over the disposition of corpses.
>
>
>>
>>> There is no harm caused to diamond miners that is remotely comparable in scope or
>>> scale to that caused to animals in normal commercial agriculture. Your
>>> comparison is invalid sophistry.
>>
>> The people who were harmed by the blood diamond trade were not the miners
>> themselves. The point was that diamond money was used to fund insurgencies.
>
> Even more remote! Boy, you're going to hurt yourself stretching like that without
> adequate warm-up.

Jones wrote:
> Mr. Canoza,
> when you've stopped causing human collateral deaths and start telling others to
> stop buying diamonds and driving their smoggy 4x4's

_tu quoque_ argument; invalid, and repugnant.

"Rudy Canoza" > wrote in message
...
snip
>> Causing direct harm is not morally equivalent to being indirectly linked to
>> collateral harm.
>
> Irrelevant.

No it's not.

They indirectly cause the collateral harm,
> and their beliefs about animal "rights" dictate that they ought not, and they can't
> explain why they do, except in terms of their convenience. Their moral position is
> untenable.

You indirectly cause collateral human harm, and your beliefs about human rights
dictate that you ought not to, and you can't explain why you do, except in terms of
your convenience. Your moral position is untenable.


snip

On 2008-02-22, Rudy Canoza > wrote:
>>> I see it as entirely relevant, because it's yet another example
>>> of a "stopping rule".
>>
>> It's irrelevant because it doesn't explain "vegans'" stopping rule in
>> any way.
>
> I should have written, in any way other than a
> repugnant _tu quoque_ attempt at redirecting the
> accusation of lack of a coherent stopping rule.

It may well be a "tu quoque". However, it is not a counter-accusation
so much as it is a refusal to acknowledge that this requirement you
impose of having a "coherent stopping rule" has any validity. I don't
explain the lack of a stopping rule because I don't acknowledge that
your request for one has any legitimacy.

In fact to me, it smacks of a bogus slippery slope/excluded middles
fallacy.

Cheers,
--
Elflord

Jones wrote:
> "Rudy Canoza" > wrote in message
> ...
> snip
>>> Causing direct harm is not morally equivalent to being indirectly linked to
>>> collateral harm.
>> Irrelevant.
>
> No it's not.

Yes, it is. It has nothing to do with your failure to
explain your stopping rule, or even to give one at all.
Your attempt is a repugnant _tu quoque_ argument,
which is no defense at all for your failure.


>
> They indirectly cause the collateral harm,
>> and their beliefs about animal "rights" dictate that they ought not, and they can't
>> explain why they do, except in terms of their convenience. Their moral position is
>> untenable.
>
> You indirectly cause collateral human harm,

_tu quoque_ - a repugnant and fallacious argument.


You can't defend your failure to abide by your
so-called moral beliefs - beliefs which have no real
grounding in moral principle at all. "veganism" is
purely about following a rule, sort of like doing the
stations of the cross; there is no moral principle
underlying it.

I'm not trying to argue that vegans can cause indirect collateral harm because
you cause indirect human collateral harm. I'm asking you to abide by the standard
you're trying to set them and explain your stopping rule. Why do you refuse to kill
humans directly while killing them indirectly through a second party? The answer is
simple - - - you know that there's a moral diference between causing direct harm and
causing indirect harm through a second party.

If I shoot indiscriminantly from my car at speed through the streets, I will cause
humans to suffer and die.
I don't shoot from my car at speed through the streets, therefore I don't cause
humans to suffer and die.



"Rudy Canoza" > wrote in message
...
> Jones wrote:
>> Mr. Canoza,
>> when you've stopped causing human collateral deaths and start telling others
>> to stop buying diamonds and driving their smoggy 4x4's
>
> _tu quoque_ argument; invalid, and repugnant.

I'm not a vegan but I can see that your argument against them is a false one just
as well. How is your stopping rule wrt human deaths any different to the vegan's
stopping rule wrt animal deaths, and why won't you at least acknowledge that if yours
is a valid stopping rule, then so must their's be?

"Rudy Canoza" > wrote in message
...
> Jones wrote:
>> "Rudy Canoza" > wrote in message
>> ...
>> snip
>>>> Causing direct harm is not morally equivalent to being indirectly linked to
>>>> collateral harm.
>>> Irrelevant.
>>
>> No it's not.
>
> Yes, it is. It has nothing to do with your failure to explain your stopping rule,
> or even to give one at all. Your attempt is a repugnant _tu quoque_ argument, which
> is no defense at all for your failure.
>
>
>>
>> They indirectly cause the collateral harm,
>>> and their beliefs about animal "rights" dictate that they ought not, and they
>>> can't explain why they do, except in terms of their convenience. Their moral
>>> position is untenable.
>>
>> You indirectly cause collateral human harm,
>
> _tu quoque_ - a repugnant and fallacious argument.
>
>
> You can't defend your failure to abide by your so-called moral beliefs - beliefs
> which have no real grounding in moral principle at all. "veganism" is purely about
> following a rule, sort of like doing the stations of the cross; there is no moral
> principle underlying it.

Elflord wrote:
> On 2008-02-22, Rudy Canoza > wrote:
>>>> I see it as entirely relevant, because it's yet another example
>>>> of a "stopping rule".
>>> It's irrelevant because it doesn't explain "vegans'" stopping rule in
>>> any way.
>> I should have written, in any way other than a
>> repugnant _tu quoque_ attempt at redirecting the
>> accusation of lack of a coherent stopping rule.
>
> It may well be a "tu quoque".

It is, and it is worthless as a defense for the (lack
of) stopping rule in "veganism's" prescriptions.



> However, it is not a counter-accusation

Yes, that's precisely what it is.


> so much as it is a refusal to acknowledge that this requirement you
> impose of having a "coherent stopping rule" has any validity.

You haven't really refuted my claim that not having a
coherent stopping rule is a problem, a fatal one, for
the "vegan's" belief in his own virtue.

This can't really be separated from an awareness and
analysis of the "vegans'" progressive falling back to
weaker and weaker moral claims. The initial position
held by all "vegans" is that they aren't causing *any*
harm to animals, solely as a result of not consuming
any animal parts. It's obvious that there's a stopping
rule he stop at zero consumption of animal parts,
and you will _ipso facto_ not be harming animals. Of
course, we know that this stopping rule is a joke,
because it is predicated on a logical fallacy. But it
cannot be questioned that the very basis of "veganism"
is predicated on a stopping rule.

Now we move on to the weaker position, that of causing
"minimal" animal harm. First, I have already shown
that the claim is false: in order to be minimizing you
necessarily must count, and we know that no "vegan" has
done that. They're simply operating on an assumption
that a "lifestyle" that doesn't include animal parts
must in and of itself have a the lowest possible
animal-harm toll associated with it. But we have shown
that assumption to be false: some animal
products-including consumption patterns can easily
cause less total harm to animals than many "vegan"
lifestyles; and not all "vegan" lifestyles cause the
same amount of harm to animals. Merely being "vegan"
does not mean one is minimizing. This is not in
rational dispute.

The only remaining position, the weakest of all, is the
vile comparison with others, and that isn't even worth
discussing.

So, what moral impact does the "vegan's" complete
abstention from consuming animal parts have? Does it
get her to the point of causing zero morally
impermissible harm to animals? No. Does it get her to
the point of causing the absolute minimum? No. Does
it get her to the point of causing the least possible
subject to the constraint that her ease and comfort and
convenience not be adversely affected? Certainly not,
if she hasn't compared all possible "vegan" lifestyles,
or compared "vegan" lifestyles with animal
product-including ones to search for an alternative
with a lower harm total.

The point is, once moved off the absurd zero-harm
initial claim, the "vegan" has *NO* logical basis for
making any moral claim about the effect of her
"veganism"; and yet they do anyway.




> I don't
> explain the lack of a stopping rule because I don't acknowledge that
> your request for one has any legitimacy.

You just reject it out of hand. But you're still faced
with having to find any moral impact to being "vegan",
and we've already seen that this bogus distinction
between direct and indirect harm can't help you,
because the consumer of animal parts almost never
inflicts any direct harm himself.

Jones wrote:
> I'm not trying to argue that vegans can cause indirect collateral harm because
> you cause indirect human collateral harm.

Yes, that's exactly what you're doing.


> I'm asking you to abide by the standard
> you're trying to set them and explain your stopping rule.

That is no defense for the ethical bankruptcy of
"veganism". It doesn't do anything to demonstrate
moral behavior.



> Why do you refuse to kill
> humans directly while killing them indirectly through a second party? The answer is
> simple - - - you know that there's a moral diference between causing direct harm and
> causing indirect harm through a second party.

No, there isn't. The extent of my culpability might
change based on the moral character of the event that
causes the harm, but there's no change in my moral
status based merely on considerations of direct versus
indirect involvement. This is reflected in the
criminal law as well. The driver of the getaway car in
a robbery in which an innocent bystander is killed can
be charged in the death, even though he played no
direct role in it. The "fence", the receiver of stolen
property, is subject to criminal prosecution, and his
claim that he didn't commit the actual theft is
disregarded.

You simply can't show that "veganism" has any
meaningful moral impact.