Rupert wrote:
> On Jul 30, 1:50 pm, Dutch > wrote:
>> Rupert wrote:
>>> On Jul 30, 6:56 am, Dutch > wrote:
>>>> Rupert wrote:
>>>>> On Jul 29, 5:40 am, Dutch > wrote:
>>>> [..]
>>>>>>> What would it take for the capability not to be there? This idea of
>>>>>>> the ability being somehow "inherent but not operative" is totally
>>>>>>> obscure to me. You either have an ability or you don't.
>>>>>> Do you understand having wings but not being able to fly?
>>>>> Yes, that's fine.
>>>> It's exactly like that. Such an animal has the capability of flight but
>>>> not the ability.
>>> Well, on that basis it sounds to me as though having the capability
>>> involves having a structure present which in normal contexts gives one
>>> the ability.
>> Right
>>
>> So I would say the issue of whether neonates, fetuses, or
>>
>>> radically cognitively impaired humans have the capability for
>>> linguistic competence, moral agency, and so forth, is a matter for
>>> scientific investigation, not something that can be inferred from
>>> everyday observation.
>> I disagree. Although it is difficult to generalize about which abilities
>> any particular impaired person may retain, it is readily observable that
>> young at any stage do develop human abilities, thereby confirming that
>> they had innate capabilities.
>>
>
> Above you said the test was whether there was a structure present that
> provided the ability in ordinary context. Now you seem to be saying
> that the test is whether there is reason to think that the ability
> will eventually develop under normal circumstances. Those are two
> different tests.

And? Is there a rule that there can be only test to verify something?
It's pretty difficult, at least for a lay person to understand
neurological mechanisms, but it's quite easy to observe that B follows
A. Both are true.

>>>>>> Do you
>>>>>> understand having the capability of speech but not being able to talk?
>>>>> Well, this could use a little more elaboration. You mean someone with
>>>>> laryngitis?
>>>> That would be one possible example, there could be many others, infants
>>>> for example,
>>> I don't think you'll find many people will find it plausible to say
>>> that infants have the capability of speech.
>> You're talking about "ability", not capability.
>>
>
> There's no distinction in ordinary usage.

But we're not talking about ordinary usage here, that was already agreed
on, long ago.

Wetlesen says "Infants have
> the capability, but not the ability, for speech." The meaning of this
> is obscure to me, and I believe it would be obscure to most native
> English speakers as well.

I'm incredulous that a person of your intelligence would find this
obscure. It means that whatever the mechanisms that permit a human being
to talk they are not yet fully formed in an infant. The same goes for
it's ability to walk. Yet they do have the capability to develop these
skills, given time and the right environment. No reasonably intelligent
person would find this obscure I'm quite sure. I submit that you are
having trouble with this because you believe that there may be an
unpleasant a consequence to "getting it" and you are not prepared to
accept that consequence.

>>>> or someone suffering from brain trauma or stress disorder.
>>> I would say that would depend on the brain trauma.
>> Of course, but it's an example of how a person could have the ability to
>> speak damaged. They could and many do subsequently learn all over again.
>>
>
> So the ability is termporarily lost. But apparently the capability
> stays there permanently. What's the basis for saying that? What
> actually happens is that neural pathways are damaged and then
> gradually re-formed. What's the basis for saying the capability was
> never lost?

The verification is in the reforming of neural pathways, the return of
the ability.

> In what sense is it always there?

Apparently the capacity to form neural pathways to enable abilities to
manifest remained. Perhaps the very same mechanism that the person's
brain used as an infant. A neuroscientist would likely have a more
technical explanation, but that hardly matters, there obviously *is* an
explanation.


>>>> The primary way we know with relative certainty that these individuals
>>>> have the capability of speech is by their species. This is exactly the
>>>> same principle as the flightless bird above.
>>> It's not clear enough how to generalize from the case of the
>>> flightless bird. Do chickens have the capability of flight? Why, or
>>> why not?
>> No, observing the rest of the species tells us that. Why, I'm not sure.
>>
>
> So it looks like we now have three different tests.
>
> (1) Is there a structure present which realizes the ability in normal
> contexts?
> (2) Do we know that the ability will eventually develop under normal
> circumstances?
> (3) Do conspecifics have the ability?
>
> Those are very different tests.

That's all good right? The more the merrier, unless one test comes out
different than the others, and I don't think that is the case.

>>> In the case of the advanced cognitive abilities, what brain
>>> structures have to be there for the capability to be present? What
>>> kinds of brain damage would mean the capability was no longer there?
>>> Why? You're just vaguely saying "oh, they're the same species as us,
>>> so it's reasonable to assume they have the same capabilities as us",
>>> as if it were self-evident what that meant. It's just not good enough.
>>> You have to give a scientific account of what it is to have the
>>> capabilities and give evidence that they actually have them.
>> It's always good to have more information, as humans we crave knowledge,
>> but the present purpose we have enough to know that only humans have the
>> abilities in question.
>>
>
> But it's crucial to argument that we have good reason to suspect that
> all humans with a brain have the capabilities, but no reason to
> suspect this in the case of nonhumans. Whatever "capabilities" means.
> You need to substantiate this claim.

The tests you listed above pretty much do that as far as I can see,
along with the complete absence of these abilities in non-humans.

>>>>>> Advanced cognitive abilities are no different.
>>>>> This really doesn't tell me anything. You're talking as though it were
>>>>> self-evident how to generalize those two examples. It's not.
>>>> Just like the eagle with underdeveloped wings, we know from long
>>>> experience observing members of their species that they have the
>>>> capability of flight. If the bird were a baby emu we would not make that
>>>> assumption, we would assume that they will never be able to fly.
>>> Well, that's interesting. So it's relevant whether the structure has
>>> the potential to become functional. So, what about the case of a
>>> radically brain-damaged human, then?
>> We would not be able to define that individual's precise disability,
>> because it is specific to him. In any case we would not form any
>> conclusions about dogs on that basis. The idea is actually absurd when
>> you look at from that angle.
>>
>
> I don't understand why there is a reason to give a brain-damaged human
> the benefit of the doubt

Because of the considerations under tests #2 and #3.

>(why is there any doubt at all, using the
> test you gave just above?)

We can't verify test #1 without a neurological examination, at CT scan
perhaps, even that would probably be inconclusive. Some humans with
massive catastrophic brain damage have fully recovered functionality.

> but it's "absurd" to do the same for a dog.

I meant it is absurd to attempt to conclude anything about dogs at all
by considering brain-damaged humans.

> You've given me three different tests so far, only the one based on
> species does the job of making the distinction, but I need to be told
> why species is such a big deal.

As long as humans continue to develop these abilities and no non-humans
do, people will, being bears for efficiency, use species as a simple way
to determine if these capabilities likely exist in a particular
indivdual. As soon as other species start exhibiting these abilities
that strategy will have to be abandoned.

>>>>>> None of the abilities an
>>>>>> ape displays are evident in young apes.
>>>>>>> I guess you're
>>>>>>> somehow alluding to the fact that the machinery which gives rise to
>>>>>>> the ability in normal contexts is all there.
>>>>>> You don't have to guess, I have made it abundantly clear what I mean.
>>>>> Part of the way I earn my living is by explaining mathematical
>>>>> concepts to teenagers. I find it very rewarding work. Now, often those
>>>>> teenagers fail to understand something which is crystal clear to me.
>>>>> If I were to say to them under those circumstances, "you don't have to
>>>>> guess, I have made it abundantly clear what I mean", I don't think
>>>>> they'd be hiring me for too much longer. I would be shirking my
>>>>> professional responsibilities and I would also be delusional, I would
>>>>> be flying in the face of the obvious reality that I hadn't succeeding
>>>>> in doing my job of conveying my understanding to them.
>>>>> I'm just going with this analogy for the sake of argument. I have to
>>>>> confess that I find it very difficult to maintain this image of you
>>>>> somehow standing in the same relation to me as I do to those teenagers
>>>>> with a straight face, but never mind that. Let's say for the sake of
>>>>> argument that you're the patient, long-suffering teacher and I'm the
>>>>> slow-witted student. You still have to accept the obvious fact that
>>>>> you're not conveying anything to me. Whatever that says about me, it's
>>>>> part of the reality. Saying "I've already made it clear" is pretty
>>>>> lame, don't you think? Surely it would be more rational to say "Well,
>>>>> so far I haven't made it clear to you, I guess I'll either give up or
>>>>> try a bit harder."
>>>> That's a very good way of putting it. I will try harder. It's not like
>>>> there are a plethora of intelligent people willing to discuss this
>>>> subject with me..
>>> Jolly good. And I'll do my best to be fair and open-minded. But I do
>>> think there are some serious problems here.
>> Yea, oh well, let's soldier on.
>>
>>
>>
>>>>>>> You might be able to give
>>>>>>> that idea a precise sense in some contexts, though you haven't done
>>>>>>> that yet.
>>>>>> Every example I have given does it.
>>>>> You think it's straightforward how to generalize those examples. I
>>>>> don't. I'm really quite surprised it's not clear to you, based on what
>>>>> I've said, why I find this talk of "capability" so vague.
>>>> Can you maybe articulate why you find it difficult to generalize? The
>>>> capability of flight is a fairly complex ability, as is the set of
>>>> advanced cognitive functions we're discussing. In both cases we only
>>>> know of the capability by making assumptions from prior observations of
>>>> similar animals. In neither case do we require a thorough understanding
>>>> of the mechanics of the ability.
>>> Okay, let's see. You say "a baby eagle has the capability of flight
>>> but not the ability, a baby emu doesn't have the capability". And
>>> Wetlesen says that capability is not the same as potential ability.
>> No he doesn't. You're forgetting that you misread that sentence. He
>> makes in quite clear that capability *is* latent, undeveloped ability.
>> If you can't agree to this I could ask him to clarify it, but I am
>> positive about it.
>>
>
> Well, I'll have another look. If capability is latent ability then we
> need to be told the reason for suspecting that a radically cognitively
> impaired human has any latent ability, any more than a dog.

This is trivial, history offers us NO examples of dogs developing these
abilities, while humans, impaired or otherwise do exhibit them. The
*only* room for reasonable doubt is with humans. With the vast majority
of all humans, there's no doubt at all that these abilities *do* exist
to some degree.


>> So
>>
>>> do I know what you mean? Well, the best I can do is speculate that by
>>> having "the capability of flight" you mean the presence of some
>>> structure which is in some sense sufficiently like the structure which
>>> actually enables the ability in the cases where the ability is
>>> present. It's a bit vague exactly where to draw the line, but assuming
>>> you mean something like this, then I've got some understanding of the
>>> concept you want to use. But to generalize it to the context of
>>> advanced cognitive abilities, I think I need to know more about
>>> exactly what structures you regard as most essential. The way in which
>>> our brain structures give us advanced cognitive abilities is a bit
>>> different to the way in which wings give birds the ability for flight.
>>> It's a bit more complicated.
>> I agree that it's all complicated, but the essence of it is the same. It
>> is ability in some form that is part of the structure of the organism
>> that can develop under the right circumstances.
>>
>
> But I see no reason to think that radically cognitively impaired
> humans have such a thing.

Of course it's plausible that there are some number of human beings so
radically impaired that virtually all semblance of "humanity", if you
will, is absent. What would you expect people do with them? Kill them?
Why would you expect that? People don't kill their dogs for being dumb.
People don't kill any animal for being dumb.


>>>> [..]
>>>>> Where's the definition? I didn't see one.
>>>> A capability is defined as a non-operative ability. The status of being
>>>> non-operative may be due to a number of factors which we previously
>>>> discussed.
>>> Well, you can put it that way if you want, but I think you're straying
>>> a bit from the way Wetlesen puts it.
>> Not at all, that it exactly what he says. There is one sentence where he
>> uses the word ability where he means capability but if you read the
>> whole section it is quite clear what he means.
>>
>>> You're saying a capability is a
>>> special case of an ability, Wetlesen says a capability can be present
>>> without the corresponding ability being present.
>> The two don't seem contradictory, capability doesn't disappear when
>> ability begins, it becomes temporarily sidelined, secondary.
>>
>>> I mean, this may seem
>>> like splitting hairs, but my problem is that when Wetlesen uses
>>> "ability" to mean only abilities that are operative, the sense is
>>> clear to me, but when you use "ability" to mean abilities that may or
>>> may not be operative, the same difficulties of interpretation come up
>>> as in the case of "capability".
>> Let's use the example of the ability to solve complex equations, you
>> developed the ability to do this from your basic capability and a lot of
>> study. Let's say you stop doing math and lose the ability to do them,
>> you would retain the capability and with some effort you would regain
>> the ability you have now.
>>
>>
>>
>>>> [..]
>>>>>>> How far is it allowed to be from being in working order?
>>>>>> That doesn't matter.
>>>>> It does matter if you want to understand the concept. Without some way
>>>>> of going about deciding where to draw the line, I can't accept that
>>>>> this is a well-defined enough concept to do the job that's being
>>>>> required of it.
>>>>> These are important questions. You're kidding yourself if you think
>>>>> that you're seriously engaging with a philosophical issue if you brush
>>>>> off questions like this with "It doesn't matter".
>>>> I think you misunderstood the response. I didn't mean to brush your
>>>> question off, I mean literally that it_doesn't_matter how far the
>>>> capability is from being in working order. All that matters is that we
>>>> have decided that it exists or that there is a reasonable possibility
>>>> that it may exist.
>>> But you have to convince me that it's reasonable to give all humans
>>> with a brain the benefit of the doubt and not to give any nonhumans
>>> the benefit of the doubt. Hence the issue of where to draw the line
>>> becomes relevant.
>> There is no doubt to give non-humans with respect to higher cognitive
>> abilities, we simply have no evidence they have such capabilities. There
>> is some inkling that great apes may approach such capabilities, enough
>> that I think they should be protected with basic moral consideration.
>>
>
> I don't understand why there is a doubt the benefit of which to give
> in the case of radically cognitively impaired humans, but not in the
> case of nonhumans.

Let's disconnect the two cases to clarify things.

With respect to non-humans first, there is *no doubt*, period. Not one
has ever exhibited these particular abilities so we have zero reason to
believe they have them. That's that, end of story.

Due to the similarities between great apes and humans it might make
sense to protect them with some higher moral status, but even they have
not actually demonstrated the kind of higher brain functions we're
talking about.

With respect to impaired humans, every one is different, every diagnosis
is different. All we know for sure is that humans as a rule do have
these capabilities. Maybe this person has some rich inner experience
going on, it's possible. That's the doubt.


>>>> It's the capability itself on which we are placing
>>>> the value, not the becoming operative. When we decide that fish or cows
>>>> lack the capability we mean there is zero possibility that those
>>>> abilities would ever manifest.
>>> But there are plenty of human cases where there is also zero
>>> possibility.
>> I would say not zero,
>
> I wouldn't. That seems to be the problem.

Even if that were the case, it doesn't actually present the problem that
you propose with this argument. We don't assign moral status to marginal
humans based on their cognitive abilities, we do so for a long list of
other reasons, not the least of which are simply compassionate grounds.
If animals are to ever earn elevated moral status by default, they will
not get it by breaking down the back door, they will need to earn it by
acquiring higher cognitive capabilities.

You may wish to argue that all animals and non-humans should have the
same moral status regardless, but that's a different argument, and just
as hard a sell as this one.

>
>> almost all cases involve some level of
>> diminishment, leaving some functionality. In any case, besides the faint
>> hope principle, there is a long list of social, legal, personal,
>> religious, logistic, and other reasons why we maintain moral
>> consideration for impaired humans. There is no possibility that this
>> backwards approach using marginal humans will ever convince us that we
>> treat animals incorrectly.
>>
>
> I find it pretty convincing. So do lots of other people.

There are groups of people who believe in just about anything you can
think of, beliefs are funny that way. Once you decide to commit to
believing something and invest some of yourself in that belief it's not
easy to stop. It's a very good reason to cultivate skepticism.
Mathematics doesn't tend to be like this.

>
>>>>>>> And,
>>>>>>> anyway, what is supposed to be the morally big deal about the
>>>>>>> machinery being there?
>>>>>> The inherent capability is necessary for the operative ability to ever
>>>>>> be expressed. Morally, life dictates that we "draw lines" since there is
>>>>>> no practical way to avoid causing harm, therefore we use concepts like
>>>>>> sentience to rationalize the way we interact with the world. We all do
>>>>>> it. You dismiss the interests of some organisms as subservient to your
>>>>>> own based largely on some sentience-type criteria, as well as convenience.
>>>>> Yes, I have some criteria for determining what sort of consideration I
>>>>> give to various beings. We've talked about those. Now your job is to
>>>>> explain to me what you think Wetlesen's criteria are and defend them.
>>>> Wetlesen's criterion is sentience, the same as yours, and mine.
>>> I thought it was capability.
>> For sentience. Page 2. "In the following I shall argue for a biocentric
>> answer to the main question. This is an individualistic version of a
>> nonanthropocentric position. It ascribes moral status to all individual
>> living organisms; humans, other animals, plants, and micro-organisms.
>> This position is congenial to Albert Schweitzer's 'reverence for life'.
>> To me it has a strong appeal with both philosophical and religious
>> overtones. On the other hand, I do not accept Schweitzer's assumption
>> that all living organisms should be ascribed an equal moral status
>> value. Such a strong assumption seems to be counter-intuitive, and
>> besides, unnecessary. Instead, I shall argue for a grading of moral
>> status value, as well as of the strength of our corresponding duties to
>> moral subjects. There will be one exception from this grading, however,
>> pertaining to human beings. They are ascribed the highest moral status
>> value, not because they are humans but because they are moral agents or
>> moral persons. This will be a universalistic and egalitarian view of
>> human dignity and basic human rights. Other living beings are ascribed
>> degrees of moral status value depending on their degree of relevant
>> similarity to moral persons. Presumably, animals with self-consciousness
>> or consciousness and sentience have a higher moral status value than
>> nonconscious and nonsentient organisms. Even so, however, the organisms
>> with a lesser moral status value are not devoid of moral status, and for
>> this reason we do have a prima facie duty not to cause avoidable harm to
>> them. Or if we cannot avoid harming them in order to survive ourselves,
>> then we have at least a subsidiary duty to cause the least harm."
>>
>> >> He
>>
>>>> proposes that consideration be accorded in a graded fashion based on
>>>> degrees of sentience.
>>> Well, that sounds fine to me, except that I think that no meaningful
>>> distinction can be drawn between radically cognitive impaired humans
>>> and nonhumans, so I accept the argument from marginal cases.
>> None of the reasons we extend consideration to marginal humans apply to
>> non-humans.
>>
>
> How about their capacity to suffer?

I assumed that the marginal humans could not even suffer. If that is the
case then I reject your argument even more vehemently.

> I don't accept that you've given any good reason why we should make a
> distinction.

I don't argue that we should ignore the suffering of animals, but
suffering in itself is not an advanced cognitive ability, although I
would say that those abilities probably tend to intensify suffering.

>>>> It is an approach that mirrors how most of us
>>>> already think. Popper's notion of the natural selection of theories
>>>> would lead us to conclude that this is a very useful idea.
>>> For Popper, the key criterion would be the extent to which the theory
>>> subjects itself to the risk of empirical falsification.
>> Not according to the quote I found.
>>
>
> Yes, according to the quote you found, correctly interpreted. I know
> Popper's philosophy of science. I'll find quotes in support of my
> interpretation if you like.
>
>> What would it
>>
>>> take to falsify the hypothesis that all humans with a brain can be
>>> reasonably assumed to have the capability for linguistic competence
>>> and moral agency, but no nonhumans can?
>> That's not a reasonable hypothesis, it contains absolutes and absolutes
>> don't lend themselves to reasonable hypotheses about social realities.
>>
>
> Quite. But the hypothesis must be sustained if the AMC is to be
> rebutted. So it's a shame for you that it's not reasonable.

No it doesn't, the AMC contains assumptions that cannot be verified. For
one thing, radically impaired humans are treated as a special disability
case, they are not judged in the same way as fully functioning animals
are judged, and you cannot simply presuppose that they should be before
making your argument. If you are going to second guess how we view
radically impaired humans vs how we view animals then you must begin by
accepting the actual reasons we view radically impaired humans as we do.
You don't do that, you presume to claim that our treatment of them vis
vis moral status is tied to their cognitive abilities, and that is
clearly not the case. Once this link is broken you cannot reconnect it.
Radically impaired humans are given a certain moral status for a list of
reasons which you must accept as reality. In short, along with being a
backwards argument, and an argument based on creating a rule from an ad
hoc exception, it is circular.


>
>>>>>>>> Explain what is inadequate about the above description. I'll tell you,
>>>>>>>> nothing.
>>>>>>> Everything. You haven't given any indication of what having the
>>>>>>> capability consists in.
>>>>>> The way we determine if an organism has specific capabilities is by
>>>>>> observation. The primary clue is species.
>>>>> That's pretty much all you've said so far. Species is a big clue.
>>>>> That's all we know so far. You haven't explained why, you've just
>>>>> asserted it. All right, so species is a big clue, maybe we'll hear
>>>>> more about why that is later. Now, what else is relevant? What are the
>>>>> criteria? How do we go about determining it?
>>>> Species is relevant in this argument because an animal's species tells
>>>> us most of the story of that animal's capabilities and limitations.
>>> That's pretty much just repeating what you've already said.
>> Something similar to how you keep repeating the argument from marginal
>> cases you mean?
>>
>
> Which has not yet been rebutted.

Done, to death.

>>> Could you
>>> perhaps tell me why species gives us so much information,
>> It just does.
>
> Not very informative.

Yes, actually it tells us A LOT.

>> Why can birds fly? Why can we breathe air?
>>
>
> I assume biologists could help you out there.

As they could you.

>> and more
>>
>>> importantly *what* is it giving us information about?
>> About members of the species, their abilities and limitations.
>>
>
> I thought it was giving us information about the capabilities of the
> members of the species who lacked the abilities. And I was craving
> some explication of what this meant.

Ask a neurobiologist if you think it will make a difference.

>>
>>>> [..]
>>>>> really is true. Shouldn't you be a little bit more open to the
>>>>> possibility that maybe there is some validity to my point of view and
>>>>> maybe this concept is not quite as clear as you think it is?
>>>> Yes, I acknowledge that it is not clear to you. It is clear to me
>>>> however. My theory about why it is not clear to you, fwiw, has to do
>>>> with "cognitive dissonance". Since the theory disrupts a strongly held
>>>> existing idea in your brain, your brain is setting up interference that
>>>> is preventing you from internalizing it. This interference is causing
>>>> you to perceive the idea as confusing. The idea in itself is not really
>>>> difficult or vague however. The reason I mention this is not to be
>>>> patronizing, I offer it as an plausible theory which may help you to
>>>> deal with moving forward in this exercise. I do have some personal
>>>> experience with cognitive dissonance, I experienced it, and at the point
>>>> when I finally consciously confronted the underlying conflict I
>>>> experienced a kind of physical discomfort in the brain, a dizziness and
>>>> a buzzing in my ears, followed shortly by a kind of feeling of relief
>>>> and elevated mental clarity. The brain will attempt to punish you to
>>>> stop you from threatening the existing belief.
>>>> > So see how you go at
>>>>> dispelling the webs of confusion. Or not. It's up to you.
>>>> Maybe if I lay it out in point form
>>>> 1. There are such things as advanced cognitive abilities.
>>>> 2. There is such a thing as the capability to develop these abilities,
>>>> otherwise the abilities would not exist.
>>> If there is the slightest reason to suspect that a radically
>>> cognitively impaired human has any "capability to develop the
>>> abilities", then I'm not clear on what "capability to develop the
>>> abilities" means.
>> There is the slightest reason, they are human, therefore the possibility
>> exists, not only of advancing,
>
> No, in many cases that doesn't exist.

You can't say that. It is sufficent if someone important *believes*
there is hope.
>
>> but that some exists already,
>
> I don't see that, given that in many cases it's a certainty that
> they'll never develop the abilities.

"The" abilities? Which ones, to what degree? Every case is unique and
difficult to categorize clearly.

>> and in most
>> cases it probably does. Then there are the other reasons...
>>
>
> I'm not impressed with the other reasons.

It doesn't matter if you're impressed with the other reasons, it doesn't
matter if some of the reasons are completely irrational, the fact is,
they ARE real reasons, and they explain why exceptional status is
accorded such individuals. That effectively breaks the link to the
cognitive capability argument.
>
>>
>>>> 3. Up until the present time only humans have exhibited these abilities.
>>>> 4. Therefore only humans (as far as we know) possess the capability to
>>>> develop these abilities.
>>> And not all humans with a brain, so far as I can tell...
>> We should avoid the absolute "all" in this context, it leads to confusion.
>
> You need to defend the contention that all humans with a brain can be
> reasonably assumed to have the relevant capabilities in order to rebut
> the AMC.

I rebutted the AMC right above. Once there exists a list of actual
*other* reasons why as humans we extend moral status to marginal cases,
and such a list exists, then the argument for extending them to animals
based on cognitive similarities between them and animals evaporates.
Cognitive abilities don't come into it. And it doesn't matter what the
reasons are, provided they are plausibly actual reasons.