Rupert wrote:
> On Jul 31, 5:19 am, Dutch > wrote:
>> The argument from marginal cases states that humans ought to treat
>> marginal members of their own kind no differently than they treat
>> non-humans with similar cognitive abilities.
>>
>> The first flaw in this argument is that assumes that cognitive abilities
>> are the only criteria for moral consideration, and that "kind" itself is
>> not one. This basic premise is not argued rigorously and is as Cohen
>> says, non-intuitive to most people.
>
> Make up your mind. Are we talking about Cohen's attempted rebuttal or
> Wetlesen's attempted rebuttal?

I am presenting an argument comprised of a number of parts, and I am
identifying the references where applicable, do you have a problem with
that?

> Anyway, I don't agree. Cohen's "kind" argument is interesting, but I
> find it fairly non-intuitive that the moral status of a being somehow
> depends on what's typical for its kind, and I think most people would
> agree.

I don't know why you employ that tortured wording Rupert, the argument
is that simply "kind" is morally relevant, not "what's typical for its
kind". Saying it that way simply muddies the waters.

> Also, there are all sorts of problems with this idea, such as
> which kinds do we consider? Every being belongs to enormously many
> different kinds.

The "kind" we are talking about is obvious, species.

> And even if we assume that we can somehow identify a
> class of "natural kinds", there are still many apparent counter-
> examples to the general thesis that the moral status of a being
> depends on what's typical for its kind

There's that tortured phrasing again. *KIND*, Rupert, not "what's
typical for its kind".

> such as the chimpanzee who can
> do mathematics, or the fact that people who are mentally ill are
> usually not held responsible for their actions, although typical
> members of their kind are.

Wetlesen deals with this aspect of the argument.

>> All species of animal consider
>> members of their own kind to be of special status.
>
> We don't usually look to other animals for guidance about moral
> behaviour.

We reject our basic nature not without risk. When we look at other
animals we are seeing reflections of our own basic natures. I would have
thought you'd be in agreement with that.

>> We should not hastily
>> disregard our own strong intuition to do so as well. It has served us
>> well as a species.
>>
>
> We might once have said the same thing about race. The point is that
> judging the moral status of a being by what is typical for his or her
> species is counter-intuitive,

There's that tortured phrasing again. Species (kind) is morally
significant mainly in that it captures many characteristics in one fell
swoop.

> is contrary to what we do in many other
> cases, and needs justification. Such justification has not been
> forthcoming.

In this case it seems intuitively correct to most people for a host of
reasons, many of which are discussed by Wetlesen, and so should not be
discarded so easily. In fact we require a good reason from YOU to
discard them. It has not been forthcoming.

>
>> But set that aside for now and consider cognitive abilities only, that
>> is the set of abilities which include linguistic facility, and being a
>> moral actor with the ability to consider and take responsibility for
>> one's actions. This is admittedly a valid moral criterion. Wetlesen has
>> advanced the notion that capacities can be viewed as operative and
>> non-operative, and that non-operative abilities or "capabilities" are
>> the actual criteria, not operative abilities.
>
> But he's given no real clarification of the notion of a "non-operative
> ability".

If a neurobiologist described the specific brain mechanisms involved in
having the capabilities in question but not the abilities what
difference would that make to the argument? This seems very much like a
pretext to reject the argument rather than a valid objection.


>> This accounts for the
>> moral status of infants and people with temporary or partial cognitive
>> disabilities. As long as there exists at the least some prospect of the
>> individual exhibiting the abilities at some future date then he is
>> treated as if he had the operative abilities. It also accounts for the
>> fact that non-humans have been denied full moral status, since full
>> cognitive abilities have never been exhibited by a non-human.
>>
>> That leaves the case of the severely and permanently cognitively
>> impaired person with no hope of improvement. To be in this class the
>> person would have to have no vestige of human capabilities, they have
>> the mental capacity of the family dog. This is certainly a rare and
>> extreme level of impairment. As such, is it reasonable to use their
>> impaired condition as a criterion for how we view non-human animals?
>> That seems to be a leap at best.
>>
>
> It is clear that such a human has a high moral status.

Based on what? There are very few humans so radically impaired that they
lack any vestige or hope of awareness, while retaining brain function,
and for those few that do exist, empathy for their unfortunate condition
*alone* explains why we feel they way we do towards them.

> If anyone wants
> to give a dog a lower moral status, they have an obligation to give a
> justification for the differential pattern of judgement. That is the
> argument from marginal cases. It remains unanswered.

It doesn't remain unanswered, you continue to reject answers that you
don't want to hear.


>> What other plausible reasons could there be for treating the person and
>> the dog differently? Strong emotional or familial feelings on the part
>> of other persons? A desire to avoid a euthanasia slippery slope?
>> Religious considerations? A feeling of responsibility towards an
>> unfortunate member of society? A bond with another of our kind? All
>> plausible as moral considerations.
>>
>
> This is different to Wetlesen's argument.

If I simply intended to parse Wetelesen I would have chosen a different
subject line. Surely it's apparent by now that I am presenting a broader
perspective. Do you wish to limit the scope of my argument?

> If you want to pursue these
> lines of thought, go ahead.

Help me understand how a rhetorical remark like that gets left in. I can
understand thinking it, even typing it, but not to edit it out before
posting is confounding.

> But I don't think they are satisfactory
> because no-one thinks that the high moral status of the radically
> cognitively impaired human depends only on such considerations.

You don't know that. In fact I am quite sure that many people believe
something quite similar. Radically impaired humans are not granted moral
consideration based on their level of cognition, that is for sure. If
all humans were so unfortunate then there would be no such thing as
moral consideration, because it's one of the ideas unique to humans. For
this reason also the argument from marginal cases fails, because it
demands that we assume that level of cognition be the sole criterion for
moral consideration, and that simply is not the case, whether you
approve of it or not. For that reason we cannot take it as a premise for
the argument.

It
> goes deeper than that. In particular, the appeal to religious
> considerations is very weak. We're talking about secular ethics here.
> You're not religious yourself.

Hang on a second. You introduced by this argument the notion that we
need to explain why we treat radically impaired humans the way we do.
That makes every true reason valid, no matter whether you think that
reason is worthy or not. A reason is a reason if that is why it is done
and they all go to provide an answer to YOUR question. The answer to
your question is that ALL the reasons come into play. You can't set up a
so-called conundrum then reject the actual answer to it because it
doesn't suit you.

>> The next question is, is the way we treat this person really
>> inconsistent with the way we treat the family dog? We treat both with
>> affection, care for them and provide for their needs as long as they live.
>>
>
> But we would never think it permissible to treat the radically
> cognitively impaired human in some of the ways in which we often think
> it permissible to treat dogs.

I might take issue with that, but the fact is, humans are not dogs,
impaired or not, and there is no way or reason to impose our view of
other humans onto our view of dogs, no matter how much we may like dogs.


>> What substance remains of the argument from marginal cases?
>
> It remains unscathed and unanswered.

In your present state of mind I expect no other response.

>> What would
>> be the ramifications of carrying it to it's logical conclusion?
>
> Radical reform in our treatment of animals, but perfectly feasible.

Time to "put up or shut up", and stop making sweeping statements with
nothing to back them up.


>> I think
>> it's time for proponents to stop demanding answers and start providing
>> them. Let's see a thorough examination of *all* human-animal relations
>> from the animal rights lobby, and a moratorium on finger-pointing and
>> demands that the rest of us disprove their theories.
>
>