On Jul 31, 5:19 am, Dutch > wrote:
> The argument from marginal cases states that humans ought to treat
> marginal members of their own kind no differently than they treat
> non-humans with similar cognitive abilities.
>
> The first flaw in this argument is that assumes that cognitive abilities
> are the only criteria for moral consideration, and that "kind" itself is
> not one. This basic premise is not argued rigorously and is as Cohen
> says, non-intuitive to most people.

Make up your mind. Are we talking about Cohen's attempted rebuttal or
Wetlesen's attempted rebuttal?

Anyway, I don't agree. Cohen's "kind" argument is interesting, but I
find it fairly non-intuitive that the moral status of a being somehow
depends on what's typical for its kind, and I think most people would
agree. Also, there are all sorts of problems with this idea, such as
which kinds do we consider? Every being belongs to enormously many
different kinds. And even if we assume that we can somehow identify a
class of "natural kinds", there are still many apparent counter-
examples to the general thesis that the moral status of a being
depends on what's typical for its kind, such as the chimpanzee who can
do mathematics, or the fact that people who are mentally ill are
usually not held responsible for their actions, although typical
members of their kind are.

> All species of animal consider
> members of their own kind to be of special status.

We don't usually look to other animals for guidance about moral
behaviour.

> We should not hastily
> disregard our own strong intuition to do so as well. It has served us
> well as a species.
>

We might once have said the same thing about race. The point is that
judging the moral status of a being by what is typical for his or her
species is counter-intuitive, is contrary to what we do in many other
cases, and needs justification. Such justification has not been
forthcoming.

> But set that aside for now and consider cognitive abilities only, that
> is the set of abilities which include linguistic facility, and being a
> moral actor with the ability to consider and take responsibility for
> one's actions. This is admittedly a valid moral criterion. Wetlesen has
> advanced the notion that capacities can be viewed as operative and
> non-operative, and that non-operative abilities or "capabilities" are
> the actual criteria, not operative abilities.

But he's given no real clarification of the notion of a "non-operative
ability".

> This accounts for the
> moral status of infants and people with temporary or partial cognitive
> disabilities. As long as there exists at the least some prospect of the
> individual exhibiting the abilities at some future date then he is
> treated as if he had the operative abilities. It also accounts for the
> fact that non-humans have been denied full moral status, since full
> cognitive abilities have never been exhibited by a non-human.
>
> That leaves the case of the severely and permanently cognitively
> impaired person with no hope of improvement. To be in this class the
> person would have to have no vestige of human capabilities, they have
> the mental capacity of the family dog. This is certainly a rare and
> extreme level of impairment. As such, is it reasonable to use their
> impaired condition as a criterion for how we view non-human animals?
> That seems to be a leap at best.
>

It is clear that such a human has a high moral status. If anyone wants
to give a dog a lower moral status, they have an obligation to give a
justification for the differential pattern of judgement. That is the
argument from marginal cases. It remains unanswered.

> What other plausible reasons could there be for treating the person and
> the dog differently? Strong emotional or familial feelings on the part
> of other persons? A desire to avoid a euthanasia slippery slope?
> Religious considerations? A feeling of responsibility towards an
> unfortunate member of society? A bond with another of our kind? All
> plausible as moral considerations.
>

This is different to Wetlesen's argument. If you want to pursue these
lines of thought, go ahead. But I don't think they are satisfactory
because no-one thinks that the high moral status of the radically
cognitively impaired human depends only on such considerations. It
goes deeper than that. In particular, the appeal to religious
considerations is very weak. We're talking about secular ethics here.
You're not religious yourself.


> The next question is, is the way we treat this person really
> inconsistent with the way we treat the family dog? We treat both with
> affection, care for them and provide for their needs as long as they live.
>

But we would never think it permissible to treat the radically
cognitively impaired human in some of the ways in which we often think
it permissible to treat dogs.

> What substance remains of the argument from marginal cases?

It remains unscathed and unanswered.

> What would
> be the ramifications of carrying it to it's logical conclusion?

Radical reform in our treatment of animals, but perfectly feasible.

> I think
> it's time for proponents to stop demanding answers and start providing
> them. Let's see a thorough examination of *all* human-animal relations
> from the animal rights lobby, and a moratorium on finger-pointing and
> demands that the rest of us disprove their theories.