On Jul 30, 6:56 am, Dutch > wrote:
> Rupert wrote:
> > On Jul 29, 5:40 am, Dutch > wrote:
>
> [..]
>
> >>> What would it take for the capability not to be there? This idea of
> >>> the ability being somehow "inherent but not operative" is totally
> >>> obscure to me. You either have an ability or you don't.
> >> Do you understand having wings but not being able to fly?
>
> > Yes, that's fine.
>
> It's exactly like that. Such an animal has the capability of flight but
> not the ability.
>

Well, on that basis it sounds to me as though having the capability
involves having a structure present which in normal contexts gives one
the ability. So I would say the issue of whether neonates, fetuses, or
radically cognitively impaired humans have the capability for
linguistic competence, moral agency, and so forth, is a matter for
scientific investigation, not something that can be inferred from
everyday observation.

> >> Do you
> >> understand having the capability of speech but not being able to talk?
>
> > Well, this could use a little more elaboration. You mean someone with
> > laryngitis?
>
> That would be one possible example, there could be many others, infants
> for example,

I don't think you'll find many people will find it plausible to say
that infants have the capability of speech.

> or someone suffering from brain trauma or stress disorder.

I would say that would depend on the brain trauma.

> The primary way we know with relative certainty that these individuals
> have the capability of speech is by their species. This is exactly the
> same principle as the flightless bird above.
>

It's not clear enough how to generalize from the case of the
flightless bird. Do chickens have the capability of flight? Why, or
why not? In the case of the advanced cognitive abilities, what brain
structures have to be there for the capability to be present? What
kinds of brain damage would mean the capability was no longer there?
Why? You're just vaguely saying "oh, they're the same species as us,
so it's reasonable to assume they have the same capabilities as us",
as if it were self-evident what that meant. It's just not good enough.
You have to give a scientific account of what it is to have the
capabilities and give evidence that they actually have them.


> >> Advanced cognitive abilities are no different.
>
> > This really doesn't tell me anything. You're talking as though it were
> > self-evident how to generalize those two examples. It's not.
>
> Just like the eagle with underdeveloped wings, we know from long
> experience observing members of their species that they have the
> capability of flight. If the bird were a baby emu we would not make that
> assumption, we would assume that they will never be able to fly.
>

Well, that's interesting. So it's relevant whether the structure has
the potential to become functional. So, what about the case of a
radically brain-damaged human, then?

>
>
>
>
> >> None of the abilities an
> >> ape displays are evident in young apes.
>
> >>> I guess you're
> >>> somehow alluding to the fact that the machinery which gives rise to
> >>> the ability in normal contexts is all there.
> >> You don't have to guess, I have made it abundantly clear what I mean.
>
> > Part of the way I earn my living is by explaining mathematical
> > concepts to teenagers. I find it very rewarding work. Now, often those
> > teenagers fail to understand something which is crystal clear to me.
> > If I were to say to them under those circumstances, "you don't have to
> > guess, I have made it abundantly clear what I mean", I don't think
> > they'd be hiring me for too much longer. I would be shirking my
> > professional responsibilities and I would also be delusional, I would
> > be flying in the face of the obvious reality that I hadn't succeeding
> > in doing my job of conveying my understanding to them.
>
> > I'm just going with this analogy for the sake of argument. I have to
> > confess that I find it very difficult to maintain this image of you
> > somehow standing in the same relation to me as I do to those teenagers
> > with a straight face, but never mind that. Let's say for the sake of
> > argument that you're the patient, long-suffering teacher and I'm the
> > slow-witted student. You still have to accept the obvious fact that
> > you're not conveying anything to me. Whatever that says about me, it's
> > part of the reality. Saying "I've already made it clear" is pretty
> > lame, don't you think? Surely it would be more rational to say "Well,
> > so far I haven't made it clear to you, I guess I'll either give up or
> > try a bit harder."
>
> That's a very good way of putting it. I will try harder. It's not like
> there are a plethora of intelligent people willing to discuss this
> subject with me..
>

Jolly good. And I'll do my best to be fair and open-minded. But I do
think there are some serious problems here.

> >>> You might be able to give
> >>> that idea a precise sense in some contexts, though you haven't done
> >>> that yet.
> >> Every example I have given does it.
>
> > You think it's straightforward how to generalize those examples. I
> > don't. I'm really quite surprised it's not clear to you, based on what
> > I've said, why I find this talk of "capability" so vague.
>
> Can you maybe articulate why you find it difficult to generalize? The
> capability of flight is a fairly complex ability, as is the set of
> advanced cognitive functions we're discussing. In both cases we only
> know of the capability by making assumptions from prior observations of
> similar animals. In neither case do we require a thorough understanding
> of the mechanics of the ability.
>

Okay, let's see. You say "a baby eagle has the capability of flight
but not the ability, a baby emu doesn't have the capability". And
Wetlesen says that capability is not the same as potential ability. So
do I know what you mean? Well, the best I can do is speculate that by
having "the capability of flight" you mean the presence of some
structure which is in some sense sufficiently like the structure which
actually enables the ability in the cases where the ability is
present. It's a bit vague exactly where to draw the line, but assuming
you mean something like this, then I've got some understanding of the
concept you want to use. But to generalize it to the context of
advanced cognitive abilities, I think I need to know more about
exactly what structures you regard as most essential. The way in which
our brain structures give us advanced cognitive abilities is a bit
different to the way in which wings give birds the ability for flight.
It's a bit more complicated.

> [..]
>
> > Where's the definition? I didn't see one.
>
> A capability is defined as a non-operative ability. The status of being
> non-operative may be due to a number of factors which we previously
> discussed.
>

Well, you can put it that way if you want, but I think you're straying
a bit from the way Wetlesen puts it. You're saying a capability is a
special case of an ability, Wetlesen says a capability can be present
without the corresponding ability being present. I mean, this may seem
like splitting hairs, but my problem is that when Wetlesen uses
"ability" to mean only abilities that are operative, the sense is
clear to me, but when you use "ability" to mean abilities that may or
may not be operative, the same difficulties of interpretation come up
as in the case of "capability".

> [..]
>
> >>> How far is it allowed to be from being in working order?
> >> That doesn't matter.
>
> > It does matter if you want to understand the concept. Without some way
> > of going about deciding where to draw the line, I can't accept that
> > this is a well-defined enough concept to do the job that's being
> > required of it.
>
> > These are important questions. You're kidding yourself if you think
> > that you're seriously engaging with a philosophical issue if you brush
> > off questions like this with "It doesn't matter".
>
> I think you misunderstood the response. I didn't mean to brush your
> question off, I mean literally that it_doesn't_matter how far the
> capability is from being in working order. All that matters is that we
> have decided that it exists or that there is a reasonable possibility
> that it may exist.

But you have to convince me that it's reasonable to give all humans
with a brain the benefit of the doubt and not to give any nonhumans
the benefit of the doubt. Hence the issue of where to draw the line
becomes relevant.

> It's the capability itself on which we are placing
> the value, not the becoming operative. When we decide that fish or cows
> lack the capability we mean there is zero possibility that those
> abilities would ever manifest.
>

But there are plenty of human cases where there is also zero
possibility.

>
>
> >>> And,
> >>> anyway, what is supposed to be the morally big deal about the
> >>> machinery being there?
> >> The inherent capability is necessary for the operative ability to ever
> >> be expressed. Morally, life dictates that we "draw lines" since there is
> >> no practical way to avoid causing harm, therefore we use concepts like
> >> sentience to rationalize the way we interact with the world. We all do
> >> it. You dismiss the interests of some organisms as subservient to your
> >> own based largely on some sentience-type criteria, as well as convenience.
>
> > Yes, I have some criteria for determining what sort of consideration I
> > give to various beings. We've talked about those. Now your job is to
> > explain to me what you think Wetlesen's criteria are and defend them.
>
> Wetlesen's criterion is sentience, the same as yours, and mine.

I thought it was capability.

> He
> proposes that consideration be accorded in a graded fashion based on
> degrees of sentience.

Well, that sounds fine to me, except that I think that no meaningful
distinction can be drawn between radically cognitive impaired humans
and nonhumans, so I accept the argument from marginal cases.

> It is an approach that mirrors how most of us
> already think. Popper's notion of the natural selection of theories
> would lead us to conclude that this is a very useful idea.
>

For Popper, the key criterion would be the extent to which the theory
subjects itself to the risk of empirical falsification. What would it
take to falsify the hypothesis that all humans with a brain can be
reasonably assumed to have the capability for linguistic competence
and moral agency, but no nonhumans can?

> >>>> Explain what is inadequate about the above description. I'll tell you,
> >>>> nothing.
> >>> Everything. You haven't given any indication of what having the
> >>> capability consists in.
> >> The way we determine if an organism has specific capabilities is by
> >> observation. The primary clue is species.
>
> > That's pretty much all you've said so far. Species is a big clue.
> > That's all we know so far. You haven't explained why, you've just
> > asserted it. All right, so species is a big clue, maybe we'll hear
> > more about why that is later. Now, what else is relevant? What are the
> > criteria? How do we go about determining it?
>
> Species is relevant in this argument because an animal's species tells
> us most of the story of that animal's capabilities and limitations.
>

That's pretty much just repeating what you've already said. Could you
perhaps tell me why species gives us so much information, and more
importantly *what* is it giving us information about?


> [..]
>
> > really is true. Shouldn't you be a little bit more open to the
> > possibility that maybe there is some validity to my point of view and
> > maybe this concept is not quite as clear as you think it is?
>
> Yes, I acknowledge that it is not clear to you. It is clear to me
> however. My theory about why it is not clear to you, fwiw, has to do
> with "cognitive dissonance". Since the theory disrupts a strongly held
> existing idea in your brain, your brain is setting up interference that
> is preventing you from internalizing it. This interference is causing
> you to perceive the idea as confusing. The idea in itself is not really
> difficult or vague however. The reason I mention this is not to be
> patronizing, I offer it as an plausible theory which may help you to
> deal with moving forward in this exercise. I do have some personal
> experience with cognitive dissonance, I experienced it, and at the point
> when I finally consciously confronted the underlying conflict I
> experienced a kind of physical discomfort in the brain, a dizziness and
> a buzzing in my ears, followed shortly by a kind of feeling of relief
> and elevated mental clarity. The brain will attempt to punish you to
> stop you from threatening the existing belief.
>
> > So see how you go at
>
> > dispelling the webs of confusion. Or not. It's up to you.
>
> Maybe if I lay it out in point form
>
> 1. There are such things as advanced cognitive abilities.
>
> 2. There is such a thing as the capability to develop these abilities,
> otherwise the abilities would not exist.
>

If there is the slightest reason to suspect that a radically
cognitively impaired human has any "capability to develop the
abilities", then I'm not clear on what "capability to develop the
abilities" means.

> 3. Up until the present time only humans have exhibited these abilities.
>
> 4. Therefore only humans (as far as we know) possess the capability to
> develop these abilities.
>

And not all humans with a brain, so far as I can tell...

> The issue of the moral significance of the capability or these abilities
> themselves is the topic for another lecture :>)- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -