"Dutch" > wrote in message news:b7Pli.111629$NV3.46277@pd7urf2no...
> "pearl" > wrote
>
> > No "moral personhood" in sight, either in inter-species
> > or human relationships. So according to Dutch you're
> > disqualified from moral consideration and rights. lol.
>
> I realize you are attempting humour here, but for the record, "moral
> personhood" does not depend on actions or even operative abilities, it's
> based on inherent capabilities. (moralstat99.doc, Pp 18-19)
Ball shows no sign of that either. And don't think that he cares
about you just because he works with you at times. It suits him
as you meet his need for followers and adulation. He uses you.
> A rebuttal of the argument from marginal cases
> It may well be that Warren's proposal at this point is more adequate in
> relation to common sense than the positions of Regan or Singer.
> Nevertheless, it appears that all three of them have based their arguments
> on the assumption that the concepts of a moral person and a moral agent are
> synonymous or equivalent. This assumption can be contested, and if it is
> rejected, it seems that their arguments will not work.
>
> An alternative to their assumption has been developed by Jens Saugstad in
> his doctoral thesis on The Moral Ontology of Human Fetuses; A Metaphysical
> Investigation of Personhood (1994). On Saugstad's interpretation, Kant's
> concept of a moral person is generic in relation to that of a moral agent.
> This implies that the class of moral agents is a subclass of moral persons;
> some moral persons are moral agents, others are not.
> On the conceptual level Saugstad gets this result by distinguishing two
> kinds of capacities: capabilities and abilities. In order to be a moral
> agent, a person must be able to take a moral responsibility for his or her
> actions, and to be answerable for them. This requires not only the
> capabilities of free will, reason and a linguistic competence; but also the
> operative ability of realising these capabilities in practice. However, a
> subject may have the capabilities of moral agency without having the
> operative abilities. In that case the subject is a moral person without
> being a moral agent, since moral personhood is grounded on the actual
> capability and not on the potential ability.
> Two consequences follow from this solution. In the first place, it extends
> moral status to sentient marginal humans. The sufficient and necessary
> condition for this extension is the presence of the capability of moral
> agency. If this is present, it is not necessary that the operative ability
> is also present. On this ground equal inherent value and equal basic rights
> can be ascribed to both marginal and normal human beings.
".... the capability of moral agency. "
'Brain potentials implicate temporal lobe abnormalities in
criminal psychopaths.
Kiehl KA, Bates AT, Laurens KR, Hare RD, Liddle PF
Clinical Cognitive Neuroscience Laboratory, Olin
Neuropsychiatry Research Center, Institute of Living,
Hartford, CT 06106, USA.
Psychopathy is associated with abnormalities in attention and
orienting. However, few studies have examined the neural
systems underlying these processes. To address this issue,
the authors recorded event-related potentials (ERPs) while
80 incarcerated men, classified as psychopathic or
nonpsychopathic via the Hare Psychopathy Checklist --
Revised (R. D. Hare, 1991, 2003), completed an auditory
oddball task. Consistent with hypotheses, processing of
targets elicited larger frontocentral negativities (N550) in
psychopaths than in nonpsychopaths. Psychopaths also
showed an enlarged N2 and reduced P3 during target
detection. Similar ERP modulations have been reported in
patients with amygdala and temporal lobe damage. The data
are interpreted as supporting the hypothesis that psychopathy
may be related to dysfunction of the paralimbic system -- a
system that includes parts of the temporal and frontal lobes.
Journal of abnormal psychology. (2006)
http://www.ihop-net.org/UniPub/iHOP/...?pmid=16866585
"Brain Abnormality Linked To Pathology "
by Erica Goode The New York Times, February 15, 2000
"Ask the average social scientist why people become
criminals, and the answer is apt to center on poverty and
abuse, not brain structure and neurochemicals.
But in a new study, appearing in the February issue of the
Archives of General Psychiatry, researchers report that 21
men with antisocial personality disorder, a psychiatric
diagnosis often applied to people with a history of criminal
behavior, and a history of violence had subtle abnormalities
in the structure of the brain's frontal lobe.
The abnormalities, the researchers found, distinguished the
men with the disorder from healthy subjects, as well as from
subjects who abused alcohol or drugs, or who suffered
from other psychiatric disorders like schizophrenia.
When combined with the results of previous studies, write
the researchers, led by Dr. Adrian Raine, Robert Wright
Professor of Psychology at the University of Southern
California, the findings suggest ''that there is a significant
brain basis to APD over and above contributions from the
psychosocial environment, and that these neurobehavioral
processes are relevant to understanding violence in
everyday society.''
The official diagnostic manual of the American Psychiatric
Association lists a variety of criteria for a diagnosis of
antisocial personality disorder, including 'a failure to
conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors,'
deceitfulness, impulsiveness, reckless disregard for the
safety of self or others, lack of remorse and 'consistent
irresponsibility.'
....'
http://www.forensic-psych.com/articles/artGoode.html