"pearl" > wrote

> No "moral personhood" in sight, either in inter-species
> or human relationships. So according to Dutch you're
> disqualified from moral consideration and rights. lol.

I realize you are attempting humour here, but for the record, "moral
personhood" does not depend on actions or even operative abilities, it's
based on inherent capabilities. (moralstat99.doc, Pp 18-19)

A rebuttal of the argument from marginal cases
It may well be that Warren's proposal at this point is more adequate in
relation to common sense than the positions of Regan or Singer.
Nevertheless, it appears that all three of them have based their arguments
on the assumption that the concepts of a moral person and a moral agent are
synonymous or equivalent. This assumption can be contested, and if it is
rejected, it seems that their arguments will not work.

An alternative to their assumption has been developed by Jens Saugstad in
his doctoral thesis on The Moral Ontology of Human Fetuses; A Metaphysical
Investigation of Personhood (1994). On Saugstad's interpretation, Kant's
concept of a moral person is generic in relation to that of a moral agent.
This implies that the class of moral agents is a subclass of moral persons;
some moral persons are moral agents, others are not.
On the conceptual level Saugstad gets this result by distinguishing two
kinds of capacities: capabilities and abilities. In order to be a moral
agent, a person must be able to take a moral responsibility for his or her
actions, and to be answerable for them. This requires not only the
capabilities of free will, reason and a linguistic competence; but also the
operative ability of realising these capabilities in practice. However, a
subject may have the capabilities of moral agency without having the
operative abilities. In that case the subject is a moral person without
being a moral agent, since moral personhood is grounded on the actual
capability and not on the potential ability.
Two consequences follow from this solution. In the first place, it extends
moral status to sentient marginal humans. The sufficient and necessary
condition for this extension is the presence of the capability of moral
agency. If this is present, it is not necessary that the operative ability
is also present. On this ground equal inherent value and equal basic rights
can be ascribed to both marginal and normal human beings.