On Jul 13, 4:18 am, "Dutch" > wrote:
> "Rupert" > wrote in message
>
> oups.com...
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Jul 12, 6:46 pm, "Dutch" > wrote:
> >> "Rupert" > wrote
>
> >> > On Jul 8, 6:30 am, "Dutch" > wrote:
>
> >> [..]
>
> >> > Okay, let's look at what he says:
>
> >> > "On the conceptual level Saugstad gets this result by distinguishing
> >> > two kinds of capacities: capabilities and abilities. In order to be a
> >> > moral agent, a person must be able to take a moral responsibility for
> >> > his or her actions, and to be answerable for them. This requires not
> >> > only the capabilities of free will, reason and a linguistic
> >> > competence; but also the operative ability of realising these
> >> > capabilities in practice. However, a subject may have the capabilities
> >> > of moral agency without having the operative abilities. In that case
> >> > the subject is a moral person without being a moral agent, since moral
> >> > personhood is grounded on the actual capability and not on the
> >> > potential ability."
>
> >> > The problem with this for me is that it leaves me in the dark about
> >> > what it is to have the capabilities of free will, reason, and
> >> > linguistic competence.
>
> >> I don't see what is mysterious about those capabilities, they are
> >> apparent
> >> when they manifest.
>
> >> > It's totally unclear to me in what sense
> >> > newborn infants have these capabilities and nonhuman animals don't.
>
> >> We know from experience that newborn infants have them because we have
> >> observed many, to put it mildly, mature and develop them into operative
> >> abilities, while at the same time we have yet to witness a nonhuman
> >> animal
> >> do so.
>
> > He draws a distinction between a capability and a potential ability. I
> > would like to be clearer what this distinction is, and why the
> > phenomena you point out are evidence for capability rather than
> > potential ability.
>
> Because adult non-humans have never demonstrated the abilities, therefore we
> can't assume that they have the capabilities, whereas human infants are
> rightly assumed to have the inherent capabilities since, barring mishap,
> they always develop the abilities.
>

Would any further scientific discoveries cause us to re-assess either
of these two judgements? I mean, is this a conjecture we make about
certain structures being present in the brain, or something of that
sort? See, when you say that no further scientific research is
necessary to settle the question of who has these capabilities and who
doesn't, I find that a bit puzzling. Do you say we can settle the
question of when I first developed these capabilities without doing
any further scientific research. I mean, once upon a time there was a
sperm and an egg. If you have a sperm and an egg in the laboratory and
you do the right procedure, then barring mishap you will end up with a
being with the abilities in question. (At the moment there is quite a
high probability that the embryo won't implant in the womb, but that
may change in the future and it's covered by "barring mishap". And you
may say that a lot of intervention is needed to get the being with the
abilities, but that's also true when you're bringing up a baby). I
mean, we still don't know very much about how brains develop. I can
infer from everyday observations that infants have conscious
experiences. But can I really infer from everyday observations that
infants have the capability for reason, free will, and linguistic
competence? What, exactly, entitles me to infer that which doesn't
also entitle me to infer that a fetus at 10 weeks gestation has such a
capability, or a pair consisting of a sperm and an egg has such a
capability?

> >> > He
> >> > really needs to elaborate. I mean, Chomsky has this hypothesis that
> >> > linguistic competence is somehow innate from birth, and only humans
> >> > have it. It's a trendy hypothesis at the moment, but I've read a book
> >> > which is highly critical of it. That might give one sense in which
> >> > infants have the "capability" for linguistic competence and nonhuman
> >> > animals don't. But we need to be clearer about what sort of scientific
> >> > hypotheses have to be vindicated in order for this argument to work.
>
> >> The science is in the laboratory of everyday life. Observations of
> >> countless
> >> billions of animals and humans leads to this inescapable conclusion.
>
> > I'm still lost on what you mean by "capability".
>
> An apple seed has the capability to one day grow apples, a carrot seed does
> not.
>
> > I mean, you say we
> > know they're present when they manifest, but when that's not the case
> > how do we go about deciding? When in our fetal development do we first
> > get these "capabilities"?
>
> They are inherent in the DNA of our species, they exist at conception.
>

So your position is tied to a view that we first acquire full moral
status at conception?

> > Can we ever lose them, apart from by death?
>
> Not completely.
>

You said being born without a brain meant you didn't have the
capability. Now, I don't know exactly what causes anencephaly. It may
be that, when an infant is born anencephalic, it was once a conceptus
just like the conceptus that you or I once were, but something went
awry in the process of development. So if you and I had the
capabilities at conception, what are we to say about the anencephalic
infant? Did it have the capabilities at conception and then lose them
during its development?

Anyway, I was going to say it's conceivable that the brain might be
completely destroyed and yet you might still be alive. Would that be
one example of losing the capabilities without dying? And what about
when there is a permanent loss of electrical activity in the cerebral
cortex, so that there is no prospect of ever regaining consciousness,
as sometimes happens? Anyway, these are just side-issues.

> > Do all humans have them?
>
> I think that a brain is required, as he says in the essay.
>
> > If *all* humans have them, then what exactly
> > are the grounds for thinking no nonhumans have them?
>
> No non-humans have ever exhibited the abilities, so it would be foolish to
> assume that they have the capabilities.
>
> > What would be the
> > criteria for answering such questions?
>
> Seems like common sense to me.
>

Well, it doesn't seem like common sense to me that all humans who have
a brain have uniquely human capabilities. That seems to me like the
sort of thing that has to be resolved by scientific investigation.

I mean, you're talking about the notion of "capability" as though it
were transparent. I started by conjecturing it might be something to
do with structures in the brain, you seem to want to say it's
something to do with genetic code, but on the other hand you do think
a brain is required. And you seem to be assuming that there's no need
to clarify this further, it's obvious that we all know what is meant
by "capability" and we can all infer from everyday observations alone
that all humans have these capabilities. I don't think a scientist
would find this very satisfactory.

You also seem to be assuming that Saugstad means the same thing as you
by "capability" and you don't need to read his thesis. Myself, I think
it might be worthwhile to have a look at his thesis.

>
>
>
>
> >> I
>
> >> > would say he is more raising questions about the argument from
> >> > marginal cases than giving a rebuttal, outlining a scientific research
> >> > programme which might undermine it. But he needs to get more specific
> >> > about what kind of scientific results he's hoping for here. Perhaps
> >> > Saugstad's thesis will be more illuminating about what exactly the
> >> > proposal is.
>
> >> There is no further "research" necessary, all that was needed was to
> >> propose
> >> the distinction between the notions of capability and ability and test
> >> the
> >> idea for plausibility. It turns out that it is completely plausible and
> >> descriptive of the way we think about rights. It even refutes the old saw
> >> "what if non-human aliens landed.." When you combine that with the idea
> >> that
> >> animals are accorded consideration based upon a wide range of levels of
> >> sentience eariler in the essay we have a comprehensive way to understand
> >> our
> >> moral thinking. I would submit that even "Animal Liberation" type
> >> thinking
> >> is not totally inconsistent with this approach, although the AMC is not.-
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