On Jul 2, 1:31 pm, "Dutch" > wrote:
> "Rupert" > wrote in message
>
> oups.com...
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Jun 29, 6:02 pm, "Dutch" > wrote:
> >> "Rupert" > wrote
>
> >> > On Jun 29, 2:19 pm, "Dutch" > wrote:
>
> >> [..]
>
> >> >> >> There is no plausible similarity between chickens and humans that
> >> >> >> would
> >> >> >> compel us to treat them similarly.
>
> >> >> > You're missing the point. I am not advocating that humans and
> >> >> > chickens
> >> >> > be treated similarly - I am not advocating that we try to teach
> >> >> > chickens mathematics, for example, or give them the right to vote.
>
> >> >> That's a strawman, I never suggested that is what was meant by
> >> >> "similar".
>
> >> > What did you mean, then?
>
> >> Protection of their very lives with something like murder laws that we
> >> are
> >> protected by. The relevant similarity between humans and chickens is the
> >> ability to feel pain.
>
> > Don't chickens have an interest in continuing to live? Isn't that
> > another relevant similarity?
>
> No similarity there at all, chickens have no "interest in continuing to
> live" in the sense that humans do. Chickens, as with most animals, simply
> live from moment to moment, responding to whatever stimuli happen to be
> occuring at the time. Humans on the other hand have a conscious awareness
> and interest in continuing to live for a particular period of time, they
> grasp the notion of dying, and no longer existing, for eternity. In this
> respect chickens may as well be dandelions.
>

Some people do draw a distinction between a human's interest in
continuing to live and a chicken's interest in continuing to live,
such as Peter Singer. However, there is some degree of similarity, and
it is not true that a chicken is relevantly like a dandelion. A
chicken benefits from being allowed to continue to live. In this
respect they are like us. There's no justification for terminating a
chicken's life just to satisfy some trivial desire of our own.

>
>
>
>
> >> >> > Equal consideration of their interests with that which we would give
> >> >> > the relevantly similar interests of a human does not entail that we
> >> >> > treat them similarly to typical humans.
>
> >> >> Say what it *is*, not what it is *not*. Define "relevantly similar
> >> >> interests" as it applies to humans and chickens. Get beyond theory and
> >> >> into
> >> >> application.
>
> >> > Well, I've referred you to a few places in the literature which
> >> > clarify how equal consideration applies in various practical situation
> >> > and you've told me you're not interested.
>
> >> To hell with "the literature", that's a diversion. Say it in your own
> >> words.
>
> > I have to some extent. I've been starting by discussing Singer's
> > views, just for the purpose of explaining what they are, not of
> > defending them. You haven't been very willing to listen. It's a
> > complex issue and there are many different positions available which
> > are consistent with equal consideration. If you really want to
> > familiarize yourself with the issues, the best way is to read a bit of
> > the literature.
>
> That was just a way of saying that you're incapable of expressing an idea
> without making yourself look dumb.
>
> It didn't work, I see through it. It makes you look inarticulate.
>

No, you're wrong. I haven't been making myself look dumb at all. I've
been patiently trying to educate you and so far you've proved
ineducable.

>
>
>
>
> >> >> > When you say "There are
> >> >> > distinctions between typical humans and chickens, therefore we are
> >> >> > justified in treating them differently" you're basically conceding
> >> >> > my
> >> >> > point: discrimination requires justification by means of a morally
> >> >> > relevant difference.
>
> >> >> I never argued that we should act indiscriminately, and I'm not
> >> >> conceding
> >> >> the argument from marginal cases, if that is what you are trying to
> >> >> suggest.
>
> >> > No, I'm not suggesting that. I think that your attempted rebuttal of
> >> > the argument from marginal cases (which I'll get around to addressing
> >> > shortly) is still consistent with the basic point that I am making
> >> > here, which is the formal principle of justice, although perhaps not
> >> > with equal consideration.
>
> >> Whatever that is supposed to mean.
>
> >> >> > There are distinctions between typical humans and
> >> >> > chickens which do justify us in treating them differently, but the
> >> >> > point that we should give equal consideration to their interests
> >> >> > with
> >> >> > that which we would give to the relevantly similar interests of a
> >> >> > human remains, and in *this* respect the situation is analogous with
> >> >> > the requirement to give equal consideration to the relevantly
> >> >> > similar
> >> >> > interests of people with fair skin and people with dark skin.
>
> >> >> It's only analagous in the most extreme broad understanding of the
> >> >> word
> >> >> discrimination. In real terms there is as much similarity between a
> >> >> human
> >> >> and a chicken as there is between a chicken and a beetle.
> >> >> Moralstat99.doc
> >> >> makes this point effectively.
>
> >> > The point being made is that *no* amount of dissimilarity is any good
> >> > reason for refusing to give equal consideration to relevantly similar
> >> > interests.
>
> >> Such as?
>
> > The interest in not suffering, and the interest in staying alive (when
> > that is relevantly similar).
>
> Not remotely similar due to the difference in sentience.
>

In that case we should say the same about certain humans, such as
newborn infants. It's a complex issue, but in many cases there is some
degree of similarity.

>
>
>
>
> >> > There is some dispute about the extent to which there are
> >> > dissimilarities between fair-skinned and dark-skinned people. But this
> >> > dispute has no bearing on the issue of whether their interests should
> >> > be given equal consideration.
>
> >> >> If
>
> >> >> > people with dark skin were on average significantly less intelligent
> >> >> > than us, as used to be widely believed, that would entail some
> >> >> > differences in how we treat them - there would be certain forms of
> >> >> > advanced education which would be appropriate for them less often,
> >> >> > for
> >> >> > example, and certain forms of employment which would be appropriate
> >> >> > for them less often. The general point that their relevantly similar
> >> >> > interests should be given equal consideration would still remain,
> >> >> > even
> >> >> > if this claim were correct. Getting people to change their beliefs
> >> >> > that people with dark skin were less intelligent no doubt provided
> >> >> > some welcome help to the cause of getting them better treatment, but
> >> >> > strictly speaking the case for giving them equal consideration was
> >> >> > unaffected by this factual issue. In this respect, the situations
> >> >> > are
> >> >> > analogous. You have not undermined this analogy.
>
> >> >> You have failed to connect the dots. The only morally relevant
> >> >> characteristic of a chicken is its ability to suffer pain and
> >> >> deprivation.
> >> >> Accordingly, we are obliged to take measures to alleviate those
> >> >> effects
> >> >> in
> >> >> animals in our care. Which other "morally relevant characteristics" do
> >> >> you
> >> >> claim chickens possess?
>
> >> > Um, yeah, that's pretty much all I'm saying at this point: we should
> >> > make them suffer unnecessarily in order to satisfy our trivial
> >> > interests. That would have fairly radical implications.
>
> >> What else could it mean?
>
> > Well, it would entail that a lot of modern farming is morally
> > indefensible, for a start.
>
> Ought we not begin with the premise that human race gets to continue?
>

Well, you can if you want, I don't see how that would affect the above
point.

>
>
>
>
> >> >> >> The only similarity is that morally
> >> >> >> significant is that chickens can also experience suffering,
> >> >> >> therefore
> >> >> >> we
> >> >> >> ought to alleviate that suffering. But that is a characteristic of
> >> >> >> chickens,
> >> >> >> the relation to human sensitivity to pain is really immaterial.
>
> >> >> I see that I already made this point, but you missed it.
>
> >> > I agree, we could just argue "chickens suffer, so we should avoid
> >> > unnecessarily causing them to suffer", but apparently people who run
> >> > battery-cage farms don't find this argument compelling, so we try to
> >> > reinforce it with the argument from equal consideration.
>
> >> I don't find that useful. Even as a person sympathetic to the strongest
> >> possible welfare measures, "equal consideration" seems to me like a
> >> collossal misnomer for an ideal.
>
> > Well, why? What's wrong with equal consideration?
>
> It's completely untenable. It doesn't begin to accurately describe what ANY
> moral ideal attempts to do, much less reality.
>

Well, you think so. But you've given no evidence for this point of
view, and no evidence that you really understand what equal
consideration means.

> > How do you justify
> > less than equal consideration?
>
> By the need to live within a ecosystem crammed with other living organisms,
> and by a vast gap in sentience between humans and other organisms.
>

Differences in cognitive complexity don't affect the basic issue of
equal consideration. I see no evidence that the need to live in an
ecosystem affects the case for equal consideration.

> How can you justify *suggesting* "equal consideration"? The phrase should
> be jettisoned out-of-hand.
>

You still don't understand what it means.

>
>
>
>
> >> >> >> > Sure you can say,
> >> >> >> > negroes have similar cognitive capacities to typical Caucasian
> >> >> >> > humans
>
> >> >> >> Not similar, equal, identical.
>
> >> >> >> > and chickens don't, but that's basically conceding my point,
> >> >> >> > inasmuch
> >> >> >> > as you're making an effort to meet the burden of proof.
>
> >> >> >> My attempts to explain why your analogy is invalid in no way
> >> >> >> relieve
> >> >> >> you
> >> >> >> of
> >> >> >> the burden to show that it is valid.
>
> >> >> > Your attempts to undermine the analogy miss the point, that is what
> >> >> > I
> >> >> > am trying to explain to you.
>
> >> >> You are not making a valid point. You are asserting that relevant
> >> >> similarity
> >> >> exists without defining it.
>
> >> > There are some relevant similarities and some relevant
> >> > dissimilarities. I can't discern any difference between our views
> >> > about what those are.
>
> >> I can, you are focused around the rights notions of AR which are
> >> something
> >> else again.
>
> > Can you elaborate?
>
> Not right now. It should be obvious anyway.- Hide quoted text -
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