On Jun 30, 4:45 am, Rudy Canoza > wrote:
> Following Dutch's reply to this ranting-and-raving post
> of rupie's, I had to go back and revisit it.
>
> Rupert wrote:
> > On Jun 29, 4:32 pm, Rudy Canoza > wrote:
> >> Rupert wrote:
> >>> Suppose I said that blue-eyed people were more entitled to
> >>> consideration than brown-eyed people. Would I not have a burden of
> >>> proof to meet?
> >> Yes. And identically, if you say to blue-eyed people
> >> that brown-eyed people are entitled to equal
> >> consideration, the burden of proof is *also* on you,
> >> for the same reason: you're making the assertion that
> >> you wish others to accept.
>
> > Hang on a moment. This is incoherent.
>
> No, it isn't. You *plainly* didn't understand what I
> wrote.
>

On the contrary, you plainly don't understand how burden of proof
arguments work.

> > You can't say the burden of
> > proof is on those who claim P, and also on those who claim ~P.
>
> Nor *did* I say that, rupie. Re-read it.
>
> > Having a burden of proof is an asymmetrical situation. You're maintaining
> > that in the nineteenth century, when people claimed that negroes were
> > not entitled to equal consideration, they had no burden of proof to
> > meet.
>
> No, I never maintained that. Just how far up your
> rectum did you have to reach to find that little
> nugget, rupie? It's shit. I never said anything like
> that. We never, at any point, were talking about what
> those who supported unequal consideration for Negroes
> (it's a proper noun, you idiot) said, because in their
> society, it was just assumed; they didn't go around
> making any assertions about it.
>

Well, you *are* making assertions that animals are not entitled to
equal consideration, repeatedly. So presumably it's your job to
justify them. When you say the burden of proof is on me, I understand
that to mean you are denying that you have any obligation to support
your assertion. This is not consistent with what you are saying here.

> But suppose that a southerner who supported slavery, or
> at least some form of unequal treatment for Negroes,
> had gone to the north for a visit. And suppose further
> that the place he visited had recognized, in a basic
> sense, complete political and legal and moral equality
> among different races and ethnicities - so much so that
> no one who accepted that equality ever thought it
> necessary to state the case for it, because it was just
> reality. Now suppose this southerner is astonished at
> this, and wants to tell the northerners that they've
> got it all wrong, that Negroes do not deserve equal
> moral (and thus political and legal) consideration.
> Where does the burden of proof now lay, rupie? It
> plainly lays with the southerner, who is the one making
> an assertion.
>

Very interesting. How does he meet it? And how do you meet your burden
of proof that animals are not entitled to equal consideration? Are you
saying the burden of proof is always on the one who's in the minority,
is that it? That's simply not true. Atheists are in a minority in the
US, but the burden of proof is still on the theist.


> > It was their opponents' job to refute them.
>
> It was the opponents' - the abolitionists' - job to
> support their assertion that Negroes were entitled to
> equal consideration, and they met it.

How?

> You can't meet
> your similar burden.
>
> > If they *did* have a burden of proof to meet,
>
> They didn't have any burden of proof because they
> weren't making any assertions at all, rupie. They were
> simply going about life as they had always known it.
>

Jolly good. But people who explicitly defend the status quo regarding
animals, such as yourself, are making positive assertions and so
presumably do have a burden of proof to meet.

> > then the move "Show us why negroes shouldn't
> > get equal consideration" would have been legitimate, contrary to what
> > you're claiming.
>
> No, rupie, it would not have been. Those asserting the
> moral equality of Negroes would have had the burden.
> *Anyone* making such an assertion, regardless of the
> direction of the assertion, always has the burden of proof.
>
> > So make up your mind.
>
> It already was, and is.
>

So you're saying you can escape the burden of proof just by not saying
anything. Well, that's a very neat trick, but the trouble is it's not
what you've been doing. You've constantly been making positive
assertions. So you have a burden of proof to meet.

> > Where does the burden of proof
> > lie, with those who advocate equal consideration for negroes, or those
> > who deny it?
>
> It lies with whomever is making an assertion trying to
> persuade someone else of some position contrary to the
> one the listener holds _ex ante_. If it's a
> segregationist trying to persuade an
> equal-consideration adherent that consideration
> shouldn't be equal, then the burden is on the
> segregationist. If the roles are reversed, then the
> burden is on the equal-consideration proponent. The
> burden is always on the person making an assertion
> intended to persuade.
>

Great. So convince me that your view of the moral status of animals is
the correct one.

> > It can't be on both.
>
> I never said it was, rupie. You misread in order to
> think I did. I said it could be *either*, depending on
> who was talking to whom.
>

So, if it's not a legitimate move to ask someone to justify a pattern
of discrimination, then can you give me just one historical example of
a valid argument for ending discrimination?

> > It must be on one or the other, and
> > you've been maintaining it was on the advocates of equal
> > consideration.
>
> And I'm correct, given the context.
>
> The problem for you in this, rupie, is that you are so
> incoherently convinced of the *intrinsic* rightness of
> what you believe, that you want to consider it
> axiomatic. This is a very surprising position for
> someone allegedly with a Ph.D. in mathematics. In
> math, there are theorems that *become* axioms, but they
> don't start out that way. Once a theorem is proved, it
> may be subsequently taken as axiomatic in the
> elaboration and proof of other theorems, but only
> because the truth of the axiom was already proved,
> rather than simply assumed out of thin air.
>

You obviously don't know much about mathematical logic. A theorem
doesn't become an axiom. What you're talking about is the Cut rule,
whereby we may introduce a previously proved theorem into a proof as
though it were an axiom. This rule is a correct derived rule for a lot
of systems of logic, including first-order logic.

I'm not taking my position as axiomatic. Moral reasoning isn't like
mathematical reasoning. What I'm doing is appealling to the formal
principle of justice. I'm saying, judging two cases differently
requires pointing out a morally relevant distinction. You're saying
this is not valid, even when challenging a pattern of arbitrary
discrimination the burden of proof is still on the challenger, and
asking for a justification for the pattern of discrimination is not a
legitimate move. I maintain that, if this were the case, there would
have been no valid argument for ending discrimination based on race or
sex. You have given me no reason to think otherwise.


> You *want* the proposition that animals deserve equal
> moral consideration to be considered axiomatic, rupie,
> but it is not. That's why there's still so much debate
> on it. Your desire is motivated by
>
> a) your irrationally passionate gut-level, not
> intellectual, attachment to animals ("Bambi"
> syndrome)
>
> b) your basic philosophical laziness and inability
>
> You don't *want* to have to prove the propostion,
> because you're a lazy, narcissistic **** who likes the
> easy life on your imaginary moral pedestal. You like
> thinking of yourself as morally superior merely because
> of having declared yourself free of cruelty to animals.
> Your position is bullshit.

I've given a good explanation of why the burden of proof is on someone
who wants to deny equal consideration. Others, such as David DeGrazia,
have written at greater length about this issue. You're offering an
alternative view (without argument), but you're not adequately
explaining how your view can account for past moral progress.