On Jun 29, 6:02 pm, "Dutch" > wrote:
> "Rupert" > wrote
>
> > On Jun 29, 2:19 pm, "Dutch" > wrote:
>
> [..]
>
> >> >> There is no plausible similarity between chickens and humans that
> >> >> would
> >> >> compel us to treat them similarly.
>
> >> > You're missing the point. I am not advocating that humans and chickens
> >> > be treated similarly - I am not advocating that we try to teach
> >> > chickens mathematics, for example, or give them the right to vote.
>
> >> That's a strawman, I never suggested that is what was meant by "similar".
>
> > What did you mean, then?
>
> Protection of their very lives with something like murder laws that we are
> protected by. The relevant similarity between humans and chickens is the
> ability to feel pain.
>

Don't chickens have an interest in continuing to live? Isn't that
another relevant similarity?

>
>
> >> > Equal consideration of their interests with that which we would give
> >> > the relevantly similar interests of a human does not entail that we
> >> > treat them similarly to typical humans.
>
> >> Say what it *is*, not what it is *not*. Define "relevantly similar
> >> interests" as it applies to humans and chickens. Get beyond theory and
> >> into
> >> application.
>
> > Well, I've referred you to a few places in the literature which
> > clarify how equal consideration applies in various practical situation
> > and you've told me you're not interested.
>
> To hell with "the literature", that's a diversion. Say it in your own words.
>

I have to some extent. I've been starting by discussing Singer's
views, just for the purpose of explaining what they are, not of
defending them. You haven't been very willing to listen. It's a
complex issue and there are many different positions available which
are consistent with equal consideration. If you really want to
familiarize yourself with the issues, the best way is to read a bit of
the literature.

>
>
>
>
>
>
> >> > When you say "There are
> >> > distinctions between typical humans and chickens, therefore we are
> >> > justified in treating them differently" you're basically conceding my
> >> > point: discrimination requires justification by means of a morally
> >> > relevant difference.
>
> >> I never argued that we should act indiscriminately, and I'm not conceding
> >> the argument from marginal cases, if that is what you are trying to
> >> suggest.
>
> > No, I'm not suggesting that. I think that your attempted rebuttal of
> > the argument from marginal cases (which I'll get around to addressing
> > shortly) is still consistent with the basic point that I am making
> > here, which is the formal principle of justice, although perhaps not
> > with equal consideration.
>
> Whatever that is supposed to mean.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> >> > There are distinctions between typical humans and
> >> > chickens which do justify us in treating them differently, but the
> >> > point that we should give equal consideration to their interests with
> >> > that which we would give to the relevantly similar interests of a
> >> > human remains, and in *this* respect the situation is analogous with
> >> > the requirement to give equal consideration to the relevantly similar
> >> > interests of people with fair skin and people with dark skin.
>
> >> It's only analagous in the most extreme broad understanding of the word
> >> discrimination. In real terms there is as much similarity between a human
> >> and a chicken as there is between a chicken and a beetle. Moralstat99.doc
> >> makes this point effectively.
>
> > The point being made is that *no* amount of dissimilarity is any good
> > reason for refusing to give equal consideration to relevantly similar
> > interests.
>
> Such as?
>

The interest in not suffering, and the interest in staying alive (when
that is relevantly similar).

>
>
>
>
> > There is some dispute about the extent to which there are
> > dissimilarities between fair-skinned and dark-skinned people. But this
> > dispute has no bearing on the issue of whether their interests should
> > be given equal consideration.
>
> >> If
>
> >> > people with dark skin were on average significantly less intelligent
> >> > than us, as used to be widely believed, that would entail some
> >> > differences in how we treat them - there would be certain forms of
> >> > advanced education which would be appropriate for them less often, for
> >> > example, and certain forms of employment which would be appropriate
> >> > for them less often. The general point that their relevantly similar
> >> > interests should be given equal consideration would still remain, even
> >> > if this claim were correct. Getting people to change their beliefs
> >> > that people with dark skin were less intelligent no doubt provided
> >> > some welcome help to the cause of getting them better treatment, but
> >> > strictly speaking the case for giving them equal consideration was
> >> > unaffected by this factual issue. In this respect, the situations are
> >> > analogous. You have not undermined this analogy.
>
> >> You have failed to connect the dots. The only morally relevant
> >> characteristic of a chicken is its ability to suffer pain and
> >> deprivation.
> >> Accordingly, we are obliged to take measures to alleviate those effects
> >> in
> >> animals in our care. Which other "morally relevant characteristics" do
> >> you
> >> claim chickens possess?
>
> > Um, yeah, that's pretty much all I'm saying at this point: we should
> > make them suffer unnecessarily in order to satisfy our trivial
> > interests. That would have fairly radical implications.
>
> What else could it mean?
>

Well, it would entail that a lot of modern farming is morally
indefensible, for a start.

>
>
> >> >> The only similarity is that morally
> >> >> significant is that chickens can also experience suffering, therefore
> >> >> we
> >> >> ought to alleviate that suffering. But that is a characteristic of
> >> >> chickens,
> >> >> the relation to human sensitivity to pain is really immaterial.
>
> >> I see that I already made this point, but you missed it.
>
> > I agree, we could just argue "chickens suffer, so we should avoid
> > unnecessarily causing them to suffer", but apparently people who run
> > battery-cage farms don't find this argument compelling, so we try to
> > reinforce it with the argument from equal consideration.
>
> I don't find that useful. Even as a person sympathetic to the strongest
> possible welfare measures, "equal consideration" seems to me like a
> collossal misnomer for an ideal.
>

Well, why? What's wrong with equal consideration? How do you justify
less than equal consideration?

>
>
>
>
> >> >> > Sure you can say,
> >> >> > negroes have similar cognitive capacities to typical Caucasian
> >> >> > humans
>
> >> >> Not similar, equal, identical.
>
> >> >> > and chickens don't, but that's basically conceding my point,
> >> >> > inasmuch
> >> >> > as you're making an effort to meet the burden of proof.
>
> >> >> My attempts to explain why your analogy is invalid in no way relieve
> >> >> you
> >> >> of
> >> >> the burden to show that it is valid.
>
> >> > Your attempts to undermine the analogy miss the point, that is what I
> >> > am trying to explain to you.
>
> >> You are not making a valid point. You are asserting that relevant
> >> similarity
> >> exists without defining it.
>
> > There are some relevant similarities and some relevant
> > dissimilarities. I can't discern any difference between our views
> > about what those are.
>
> I can, you are focused around the rights notions of AR which are something
> else again.

Can you elaborate?