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Dutch Dutch is offline
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Default Nathan Nobis vs. Carl Cohen


"Dave" > wrote
> Dutch wrote:


[..]

>> > Why is this distinction more relevant than the distinction between
>> > collateral and intentional animal deaths?

>>
>> Because harm to animals in agriculture is not increasing the long-term
>> risk
>> of cancer in mice, it is systematic and repeated decimation of their
>> populations.

>
> Difference in numbers involved is a difference of degree rather than
> kind. Many of the animal deaths that you accuse vegans of hypocrisy
> over are "statistical", rather than "intentional", just like the human
> deaths caused by global warming. Birds flying into electricity pylons,
> fish deaths due to water pollution, pesticide accumulation in the food
> chain, animals mangled by farm machinery are all examples of
> "statistical" deaths.


Some of that is valid, but the majority of animal harm in agriculture is
much more immediate and large-scale. Pesticides and herbicides are lethal to
small animals, and Davis concludes that running machinery through fields is
also.

>> > There is little doubt that
>> > human activity causes global warming and little doubt that global
>> > warming increases the number of natural disasters like droughts,
>> > floods, storms and heatwaves as well as increasing the incidence
>> > of tropical diseases. IOW people, who would otherwise live, die as
>> > a consequence of greenhouse gas emmissions.

>>
>> It's not the same at all, c'mon Dave use your head. To be analagous to
>> the
>> treatment of animals we would have to level whole occupied subdivisions
>> with
>> giant machines, and spray them with deadly nerve gas.

>
> If you simply want to count numbers of deaths then the difference is
> entirely of degree.


A difference in numbers counted in many orders of magnitude amounts to a
difference in kind.

If you wish to make distinctions based on how
> "direct"
> ,for want of a better word, the deaths are then there is no reason to
> deny similar distinctions between shooting an animal in the head and
> undertaking activities that endanger their lives in some way.


It's not a matter of directness, that wasn't my point. If using a field for
agriculture negatively impacts *most* of the animals on the land, killing,
poisoning, injuring or displacing them, then that is different than
acknowledging that once in a while an animal is caught in the thresher. The
latter would be classed as a statistical anomaly and not a moral factor.


>>
>> >> >> We don't
>> >> >> continue with anything which involves the routine slaughter of
>> >> >> humans.
>> >> >
>> >> > Not on anything like the same scale as the slaughter of animals but
>> >> > it
>> >> > is still there.
>> >>
>> >> On a statisical scale, but except for incidents like nuclear
>> >> accidents,
>> >> not
>> >> on a comparable scale to the harm caused to animals.
>> >
>> > Granted.

>>
>> That's where the difference lies. Statistical probablilty of *some* harm
>> always exists, in every situation, that does not form a case.

>
> That's precisely my problem with the collateral deaths argument, Etter
> style.


It depends on how you figure the degree of harm. I assume that it is
massive, you may think it's statisically insignificant.

> By contrast I find the more modest formulation aka the "least
> harm principle" quite pertinent.


He does not conclude that the harm done by threshing machines alone is
statistically insignificant, not even factoring in plowing or spraying. He
finds that animal populations are seriously decimated.

>> >> >> If we
>> >> >> are going to inevitably decide that harm to *some* animals is
>> >> >> acceptable,
>> >> >> then the theoretical concept of "animals rights" collapses utterly
>> >> >> and
>> >> >> must
>> >> >> be discarded in favor of a more logical world-view.
>> >> >
>> >> > Alternatively we can take the view that incidental animal deaths
>> >> > that
>> >> > are
>> >> > an almost unavoidable consequence of modern human technological
>> >> > activity are acceptable but don't justify deliberate slaughter of
>> >> > yet
>> >> > more
>> >> > animals.
>> >>
>> >> It's not that they justify the slaughter of animals or not, they place
>> >> it
>> >> into context. If it were the case that abstaining from animal products
>> >> actually was a "cruelty-free" lifestyle as many vegans tend to think,
>> >> then
>> >> that would be an entirely different reality. As it is, animals die
>> >> either
>> >> way,
>> >
>> > Yes but the numbers of animals that die are not equivalent, not that
>> > simple death counts are a sensible way of comparing different diets.

>>
>> The numbers of animals that are harmed or killed will vary with the
>> production of a particular food, depending on where, when and how it's
>> produced.

>
> Of course.


Which is why it's a fallacy to simple compare vegetables and meat.
>
>> >> so it's just not justifiable to assume a right/wrong good/bad
>> >> dichotomy
>> >> between farming animals and not doing so,
>> >
>> > Indeed. It's more like relatively good, relatively bad, somewhere in
>> > between,...

>>
>> If you are placing a value on animals harmed, you have to consider
>> collateral deaths, which means that vegan foods can be trumped by
>> non-vegan
>> foods. This must be acknowledged and factored into the moral equation.

>
> Sure. The appeal of veganism is that it is a very simple and easy rule
> to follow whereas comparisons between difficult degrees of "harm" are
> rather harder to establish.


It's simple to follow, if you place very little value on enjoyment of food,
but it apparently is not simple to follow AND at the same time acknowledge
the limitations of the diet philosophy.


>> >> provided that animals are not forced to suffer unduly.
>> >
>> > Yes. That's a very important qualification.
>> >
>> >> >> <----end----->
>> >> >>
>> >> >> The point being made here is that the implicit "compassionate diet"
>> >> >> status
>> >> >> that vegans like to pretend to is a sham.
>> >> >
>> >> > Vegans frequently generalise and overstate their case but to claim
>> >> > that
>> >> > it is a totally worthless, empty gesture is disingenuous.
>> >>
>> >> I can accept what you're saying, but I believe that the overstating,
>> >> misrepresenting taints what they do to a great degree. If it were done
>> >> with
>> >> honesty and humility it would be much less objectionable.
>> >>
>> >> >> Animals are killed in large
>> >> >> numbers by all forms of agriculture, so the "animal rights"
>> >> >> dichotomy
>> >> >> in
>> >> >> that light is an outright lie.
>> >> >
>> >> > This is the more modest version of the CD argument and is rather
>> >> > more
>> >> > convincing to me. Of course CDs apply just the same to animal feed
>> >> > but
>> >> > it is plausible that some game and grass fed meat products involve
>> >> > fewer violations of animal rights than most readily available plant
>> >> > foods.
>> >>
>> >> That's what I mean by a holistic, inclusive view.
>> >
>> > The CD argument is certainly a useful tool but in my view livestock
>> > farming can even be justified without invoking it. I might attempt
>> > that some day.

>>
>> Read this. http://www.rawfoodinfo.com/articles/...malsplace.html

>
> Thanks for that. There was one particular fragment of the article that
> made an impression on me: " a human morality based on individual
> rights makes for an awkward fit when applied to the natural world.
> This should come as no surprise: morality is an artifact of human
> culture, devised to help us negotiate social relations. It's very good
> for that. But just as we recognize that nature doesn't provide an
> adequate guide for human social conduct, isn't it anthropocentric
> to assume that our moral system offers an adequate guide for nature?"
>
> It makes a certain pragmatic sense to adopt a moral duality; a system
> of thought to guide our conduct within the "human realm" and a seperate
>
> system to guide our conduct within the "natural realm".


This is common sense, and it's a point I have been trying to get across.
ARAs cry foul because they imagine that we ought to use "equal
consideration" when dealing with humans and animals, yet any attempts to
define what that means in practice fail, predictably, because it's not
plausible.


>> >> >
>> >> >> It's a dishonest world-view, which is why it
>> >> >> must be discarded in favour of something more holistic and
>> >> >> inclusive.
>> >> >

>