On Thu, 20 Jan 2005 09:57:54 -0500, Ron > wrote:
>In article >, Derek > wrote:
>> On Wed, 19 Jan 2005 21:08:28 -0500, Ron > wrote:
>> >In article >, Derek > wrote:
>> >> On Wed, 19 Jan 2005 10:27:58 -0500, Ron > wrote:
>> >> >In article >, Reynard > wrote:
>> >> >
>> >> >> Rather, they refuse to falsely take on any responsibility
>> >> >> for the farmer's wrong-doing because doing so would
>> >> >> make themselves apologists for and enablers of that
>> >> >> wrong-doing.
>> >> >
>> >> >Actions and wrongdoing are two separate issues. Wrongdoing is a judgment
>> >> >attached to an action. I agree that farmer kill animals. Where I need
>> >> >you to be clearer is on how you came to the conclusion that this action
>> >> >is "wrong".
>> >>
>> >> As Hume once said, "Take any action allowed to be vicious:
>> >> Wilful murder, for instance. Examine it in all lights, and see
>> >> if you can find that matter of fact, or real existence, which
>> >> you call vice. In which-ever way you take it, you find only
>> >> certain passions, motives, volitions and thoughts. There is no
>> >> other matter of fact in the case. The vice entirely escapes
>> >> you, as long as you consider the object. You never can find
>> >> it, till you turn your reflection into your own breast, and find
>> >> a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, towards
>> >> this action. Here is a matter of fact; but it is the object of
>> >> feeling, not of reason. It lies in yourself, not in the object.
>> >> So that when you pronounce any action or character to
>> >> be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution
>> >> of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame
>> >> from the contemplation of it.", so when I say that the action
>> >> is wrong, I'm not merely exhibiting the constitution of my
>> >> nature, I'm asserting that it's wrong because animals' rights
>> >> are being violated.
>> >
>> >More of the same.
>>
>> Of what?
>>
>> >First off, Hume isn't here to defend his position, I'll ignore what
>> >he says with the exception of the last which I assume you are
>> >supporting.
>>
>> That implies his position needs defending. Are you
>> contesting what he wrote concerning wrong actions
>> and our regard toward them?
>
>I'm stating that I am having discussion with you. If this is your
>position, I am interested in discussing that and with you.

It clearly is my position to some degree, and being that
Hume's position is well known and generally understood,
I thought it fitting to bring it here to explain my own
position more clearly to you.

>> >Animals don't have rights.
>>
>> Please make your case to support that assertion.
>
>Rights are a theoretical construct of humans.

If they are, then they can surely be constructed in such a
way so as to include animals. You've failed to make your
case on the basis you've given so far.

>Animals and millions of
>species have existed long before the presence of our species. I might
>find the argument convincing if you could establish that animals had
>rights before our species happened onto the scene. Or more specific,
>when did animals first have rights?

They held rights the same moment moral agents existed
to observe them. Obviously, they don't hold rights against
each other because a right can only be held against a
moral agent rather than a moral patient.

>> >Humans do as citizen's of nations and even
>> >this is not constitent.
>>
>> Are you trying to assert that only citizens of nations
>> hold the moral right against being killed by moral
>> agents while non-citizens fail to qualify as rights
>> equal rights bearers? If so, then please make your
>> case to support that assertion.
>
>You've altered your language.

I'm merely using what you use to qualify a rights bearer
and asking whether it's a valid qualifier when taking
non-citizens into account. You've claimed that humans
hold rights "as citizens of nations", and while you go on
to say that "even that [qualifier] is not consistent" it
doesn't explain why they are rights bearers on the basis
of citizenship. If anything, your argument which qualifies
a rights bearer is circular; Humans, as citizens are rights
bearers because they are human citizens.

>There are legally established rights and
>what you are now describing as moral rights. Consistency and clarity
>would make for an easier discussion.

I think you'll find that since my post concerns itself with
moral rights rather than legal rights, any inconsistency
you've seen must be an error on your part.

>Moral rights are theoretical constructs. Such constructs rely on the
>presence of another individual to recognize a "belief" or to violate a
>"belief". The "moral right" itself is merely an idea -- a thought. What
>is defined as morality does change over time and location.

Though they be theoretical constructs brought forward
by moral agents, moral patients such as children and
the mentally retarded who have nothing to do with this
theoretical construct do hold those rights we constructed
nevertheless, so you're still left wanting if you're to make
a case against the proposition of animals rights.

>> >Any right to life, be it human or other species
>> >is a contradiction in terms.
>>
>> Then I take it you would have no argument against
>> being used against your will for research purposes,
>> killed, and then discarded along with other family
>> members who were also treated in the same way
>> before you.
>
>You've tied two separate things together.

I'm merely showing that if you don't believe rights
exist, then you have no argument against being used
for medical research against your will and killed. I've
not tied anything together to reach that conclusion.

>I don't know what universal
>moral right you are referring to here, but the impression I have of your
>statements involves the lack of consent of the individual. Pay me enough
>and demonstrate the research is needed and I might make myself available
>for research.

The point being made is not whether you would
volunteer, but rather that you be used against your
will and killed, and whether you hold the right against
moral agents who might see fit to violate your right not
to be used and killed in that way. You clearly do hold
that right, so when you state that "Any right to life, be
it human or other species is a contradiction in terms.",
you give up any argument against those who would
trespass upon you and kill you for their own ends.

>As to the universality of this moral right, please
>indicate in some way how when the humans were traveling the globe
>following the last ice age that any humans had these rights.

Rights bearers only hold rights against moral agents.
If moral agents existed during those times, then
humans traveling the globe following the last ice age
would certainly be holding them against those moral
agents.

>> >Everything that lives dies. To proclaim any
>> >right universally for life is nonsensical.
>>
>> We hold no right against death itself, but we do hold
>> a right against moral agents who might see fit to kill
>> us for their own personal gains and the gains of others.
>
>On what grounds do you make this claim.

On the grounds that a notional social contract exists
to protect moral agents from each other, and which
carries an obligation to extend that contract onto moral
patients.

>And on what grounds do then
>implement a legal code to support the moral code.

I don't get involved with legal codes when discussing
moral rights. Laws don't codify whether a moral right
exists.

>> >> >Animals kill animals as part of the process of life and death on this
>> >> >planet. Humans are still animals despite what we like to think of
>> >> >ourselves.
>> >>
>> >> But, unlike other animals we have the capacity to act
>> >> according to our held taboos and prescriptions, and
>> >> this unique ability is what makes us the paragon of all
>> >> animals while being equal to them at the same time.
>> >
>> >There's that charming human arrogance that I'm familiar with.
>>
>> Why is it arrogant to assume we are the paragon of
>> all animals while being equal to them as rights bearers
>> at the same time?
>
>If you like to imagine us as superior then, that is a choice that you
>make.

I know you're uncomfortable with cites to support
a proposition, but here's (below) a sig I used to use
which illustrates my choice to believe that we are the
paragon of all animals quite well.

What a piece of work is a man! how noble in reason!
how infinite in faculty! in form and moving how
express and admirable! in action how like an angel!
in apprehension how like a god! the beauty of the
world! the paragon of animals!
Hamlet

>There is significant evidence to indicate that we are not the
>sharpest knives in the evolutionary drawer.

Show me a dolphin which can solve a quadratic equation
or produce the two unknowns from a simultaneous
equation and I'll concede.

>> >While you may want to adhere to some ridiculous notion that eating
>> >animal X is right and animal Y is wrong, I find the whole thing quite
>> >unrealistic and illogical.
>>
>> You've moved the goal posts from 'violating a being's
>> rights by killing them' to 'eating them'. Eating a dead
>> animal doesn't violate it's rights in any way, but killing
>> it for food certainly would.
>
>You have.

We were discussing rights and the violations of those
rights during the course of crop production. You then
moved the goal posts from that and onto eating meat.

>The incidence of eating meat once the animal has passed away
>from natural causes or some accident is not what happens.

Yet your next line asserts that it does happen, even if
only in some cases.

>The eating of
>meat requires the killing of an animal along the way in most cases.

As you can see, you've just contradicted yourself by
stating a premise and then denied its conclusion.

>Are we discussing the exception of what typically happens?

No.

>> >Rights are merely theoretical constructs that we attempt to create as
>> >reality in the physical world.
>>
>> Then how do you defend your entitlement to act in
>> certain ways or your entitlement to have moral agents
>> act in certain ways toward you without declaring the
>> existence of rights?
>
>You assume that I feel or think a sense of entitlement.

Then, do you feel you have no entitlement to act in
certain ways or to expect fellow moral agents to act
in certain ways toward you?

>I make the
>choices that I make because they satisfy my needs and wants.

Non sequitur. Your conclusion here does not follow
from your earlier premise concerning your sense of
entitlement, and takes nothing away from the fact that
you do have such entitlements.

>I could justify them as entitlements to you, but simply, I do
>what I do because I can.

No, that doesn't make the case for justifying your actions.
I can do many reprehensible things, but I don't do them
simply because I can, and I don't refrain from doing them
for that same reason either. Enter Kant, again.

>> >Rights can easily be changed.
>>
>> Legal rights can, but moral rights are universal and
>> remain the same.
>
>Moral rights are be specific to time and place and human theoretical
>constructions.

I disagree. I believe they are universal in time and space.
If a being is said to hold a moral right against moral agents
not to be intentionally harmed and killed for another's
personal gains or beliefs, then that principle stands for all
in time and in all space.

>Please indicate for us how the right not to be killed by
>another moral agent existed 15,000 years ago.

The inclusion of a moral agent in your comment reveals
that a potential victim during those times held a right
against that moral agent.

>Or more specifically,
>maybe I need to clarify how you use the term "universal".

I'm quite capable of clarifying the term without your
need to clarify it for me.