On 4/27/2015 12:58 PM, graham wrote:
> On 27/04/2015 11:46 AM, sf wrote:
>> On Mon, 27 Apr 2015 11:16:28 -0600, graham > wrote:
>>
>>> I am against the NEED for unions!
>>
>> Aren't we all?
>>
> Unless you are a fundie xtian Repuglican it seems.
>
Name-calling a productive strategy for you?

Clearly substantive debate id not your forte.

Meanwhile:

http://capitalresearch.org/2012/01/t...o-the-economy/

For decades the Detroit auto industry offered a model for demonstrating
the power of a union cartel in action. By the early 1940s the United
Auto Workers (UAW) union had organized the Big Three automakers—General
Motors, Ford, and Chrysler. The companies could not hire employees
except on terms specified by the union.

Under the leadership of UAW President Walter Reuther, the UAW insisted
on very generous compensation at each company. Reuther engaged in
“pattern bargaining”—targeting one of the Big Three during contract
negotiations for terms of a new (and usually generous) contract.

If the automaker would not pay, the union would strike, shutting down
operations, sending business to the other two companies, and costing the
targeted firm billions. So the target company routinely conceded to
union demands. Reuther forced the other two automakers to accept
contracts with similar terms. This strategy allowed the UAW to raise
labor costs across the Big Three without putting any of the automakers
out of business.

This arrangement worked incredibly well for UAW members. Until the
automakers were forced into bankruptcy proceedings in 2008 their labor
costs (wages and benefits) exceeded $70 an hour. UAW members enjoyed
seven weeks of paid vacation and they could retire to generous pension
benefits after 30 years on the job, irrespective of age. They earned
more than many Ph.D. scientists.

However, the UAW—like all cartels—helped its members at the expense of
the rest of the economy. Detroit automakers passed along the cost of
inefficient work rules and higher labor costs by raising their prices.
Since the Big Three controlled almost the entire U.S. market for cars,
and since Reuther did not allow them to compete on labor costs, American
consumers had little choice but to pay more for their product. That
meant higher monthly car payments and less money to spend elsewhere. For
some people the higher costs made buying a car unaffordable. So Detroit
built and sold fewer cars—and needed to hire fewer workers. The UAW
raised its members’ wages by raising prices and by restricting the job
opportunities for everyone else.

How Unions Restrict Competition for Labor

An incident last September in Washington state illustrates the
importance unions attach to restricting competition for jobs. In a scene
that could have come from the 1954 movie On the Waterfront the
Associated Press reported, “Hundreds of angry longshoremen stormed
through a grain shipping terminal in Longview, Wash. early Thursday and
held security guards at bay while descending on a disputed train full of
grain, cutting brake lines and dumping cargo.”

The International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) attacked the
terminal to prevent another union from competing with it for dock work.
The ILWU had previously organized every port on the West Coast. And it
used its monopoly on dock labor to drive up the average wages of its
member employees to $125,000 a year, plus $80,000 in benefits.

An employer called EGT Development built a grain terminal at the Port of
Longview and hired workers from a different union to run it. This gave
farmers a port from which to ship their grain without paying ILWU
members $200,000 a year.

The ILWU didn’t want farmers to have that choice. So its members
overpowered guards, threw out grain, and sabotaged trains. The union
tried to physically prevent other American workers from competing with it.