On Apr 27, 5:34*pm, George Plimpton > wrote:
> On 4/27/2012 7:23 AM, Rupert wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Apr 27, 8:32 am, George > *wrote:
> >> On 4/26/2012 10:25 PM, Rupert wrote:
>
> >>> On Apr 26, 5:53 pm, George > * *wrote:
> >>>> On 4/26/2012 6:56 AM, Rupert wrote:
>
> >>>>> On Apr 26, 5:59 am, George > * * *wrote:
> >>>>>> On 7/26/2007 5:02 AM, Rupert wrote:
>
> >>>>>>> On Jul 26, 6:06 pm, > * * * *wrote:
> >>>>>>>> Rupert wrote:
> >>>>>>>>> On Jul 6, 5:41 pm, > * * * *wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>>> That's not the meaning of "discrimination" we're talking about here.
> >>>>>>>>>>> We're saying that, if you make different moral judgements about two
> >>>>>>>>>>> different cases, you're under an obligation to specify a morally
> >>>>>>>>>>> relevant difference between them.
> >>>>>>>>>> How many times do I have to repeat this? The chief morally relevant
> >>>>>>>>>> differences between humans and non-humans, in fact among all organisms, are
> >>>>>>>>>> intelligence and sentience.
>
> >>>>>>>>> But this doesn't distinguish *all* humans from *all* nonhumans. How
> >>>>>>>>> many times do I have to repeat *that*?
>
> >>>>>>>> You never even have to think it again, it has been dispelled by an
> >>>>>>>> alternative way of approaching the whole subject of moral beings..
> >>>>>>>> "THE MORAL STATUS OF BEINGS WHO ARE NOT PERSONS;
> >>>>>>>> A CASUISTIC ARGUMENT "
>
> >>>>>>> Yes, I know you're impressed by that essay. I'm not impressed by that
> >>>>>>> part of it, as it stands. I don't find the explanation of the crucial
> >>>>>>> notion of "capacity" to be anything approaching adequate.
>
> >>>>>> Why not? *Just because it doesn't fit with what you want to believe?
>
> >>>>>> You /could/ learn what it is, but you're too lazy and self-absorbed for
> >>>>>> it. *Here's a start:
>
> >>>>>> * * * * *"Thus, asked whether she can multiply two digit numbers, a child
> >>>>>> * * * * *who at present can only multiply one-digit numbers may say that
> >>>>>> * * * * *she cannot do so at present (ability), but that she is sure she
> >>>>>> * * * * *could learn to do so if properly instructed (capability)."
>
> >>>>> Where's this from? Is this from Jon Wetlesen's essay?
>
> >>>> What the **** difference does it make where it's from, you ****ing
> >>>> retard? *It illustrates the difference between ability and capability.
> >>>> You may no longer try to be evasive on that issue.
>
> >>> It illustrates *one* possible distinction that might be made between
> >>> abilty and capability, which is probably different to what Wetlesen
> >>> had in mind because Wetlesen explicitly denied that capability meant
> >>> the same thing as potential ability.
>
> >>>>>>>> The class of beings called "moral persons" satisfies this objection. No
> >>>>>>>> non-human possesses the inherent capacity to be a moral agent or to
> >>>>>>>> display the other markers for advanced intelligence and sentience. You
> >>>>>>>> have tried to hang your hat on a supposed lack of clarity of the word
> >>>>>>>> "capacity",
>
> >>>>>>> Pretty much no attempt has been made to explain this crucial concept.
>
> >>>>>> Bullshit. *You're just too ****ing lazy to go find it. *I found it, and
> >>>>>> I don't pretend to be a specialist.
>
> >>>>> In order for Wetlesen's argument to be a successful rebuttal of the
> >>>>> AMC, he has to argue that there is at least a possibility that a
> >>>>> permanently severely retarded human being possesses the capability for
> >>>>> moral agency.
>
> >>>> No, he doesn't. *You show that you *still* don't understand that fully
> >>>> equal moral considerability is *NOT* dependent on some individual
> >>>> property possessed by the person. *You just don't get it.
>
> >>> Wetlesen *does* agree with me that it must be dependent on some
> >>> individual property, because he accepts the formal principle of
> >>> justice. You ought to read his essay.
>
> >>>> You and the other AMC-addicts just don't get it.
>
> >>>>>>> He's saying there's some property that all humans have and no
> >>>>>>> nonhumans have.
>
> >>>>>> No, he isn't. *He isn't saying what all humans have at all.
>
> >>>>>>> Fine, then it's his burden to state what it is.
>
> >>>>>> Except that he's not saying it.
>
> >>>>>>> He hasn't even begun to embark on this task.
>
> >>>>>> Nor will he - he doesn't need to do so.
>
> >>>>> He acknowledges that in order to rebut the AMC he needs to identify
> >>>>> some property that marginal humans have and nonhumans lack,
>
> >>>> Where does he acknowledge that? *Show us.
>
> >>>> You're *still* stuck on this idea of *individuals*, and that's simply wrong.
>
> >>> "According to the present argument, inherent value is ascribed equally
> >>> to all moral persons. Hence this position is universalistic and
> >>> egalitarian. If this way of understanding the relation between moral
> >>> persons and moral agents works, there will be no need to distinguish
> >>> Agent's Rights and Human Rights the way Warren does. They will be
> >>> grounded in the same internal property of moral persons, and there
> >>> will be no need for a supplementary justification based on an external
> >>> relation such as membership in a human society.
>
> >>> The second consequence which follows from this position is that there
> >>> will be a relevant difference between human and non-human beings,
>
> >> Yes - but not at an individual level that one measures and votes on.
>
> > Wetlesen obviously accepts that if one wants to give one individual
> > moral status and deny it to another
>
> Wetlesen isn't literally talking about "one" and "another". *He's
> talking about kinds.

No, it is clear from his essay that he is talking about individuals.