On 4/26/2012 10:25 PM, Rupert wrote:
> On Apr 26, 5:53 pm, George > wrote:
>> On 4/26/2012 6:56 AM, Rupert wrote:
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>>> On Apr 26, 5:59 am, George > wrote:
>>>> On 7/26/2007 5:02 AM, Rupert wrote:
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>>>>> On Jul 26, 6:06 pm, > wrote:
>>>>>> Rupert wrote:
>>>>>>> On Jul 6, 5:41 pm, > wrote:
>>>>>>>>> That's not the meaning of "discrimination" we're talking about here.
>>>>>>>>> We're saying that, if you make different moral judgements about two
>>>>>>>>> different cases, you're under an obligation to specify a morally
>>>>>>>>> relevant difference between them.
>>>>>>>> How many times do I have to repeat this? The chief morally relevant
>>>>>>>> differences between humans and non-humans, in fact among all organisms, are
>>>>>>>> intelligence and sentience.
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>>>>>>> But this doesn't distinguish *all* humans from *all* nonhumans. How
>>>>>>> many times do I have to repeat *that*?
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>>>>>> You never even have to think it again, it has been dispelled by an
>>>>>> alternative way of approaching the whole subject of moral beings.
>>>>>> "THE MORAL STATUS OF BEINGS WHO ARE NOT PERSONS;
>>>>>> A CASUISTIC ARGUMENT "
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>>>>> Yes, I know you're impressed by that essay. I'm not impressed by that
>>>>> part of it, as it stands. I don't find the explanation of the crucial
>>>>> notion of "capacity" to be anything approaching adequate.
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>>>> Why not? Just because it doesn't fit with what you want to believe?
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>>>> You /could/ learn what it is, but you're too lazy and self-absorbed for
>>>> it. Here's a start:
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>>>> "Thus, asked whether she can multiply two digit numbers, a child
>>>> who at present can only multiply one-digit numbers may say that
>>>> she cannot do so at present (ability), but that she is sure she
>>>> could learn to do so if properly instructed (capability)."
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>>> Where's this from? Is this from Jon Wetlesen's essay?
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>> What the **** difference does it make where it's from, you ****ing
>> retard? It illustrates the difference between ability and capability.
>> You may no longer try to be evasive on that issue.
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> It illustrates *one* possible distinction that might be made between
> abilty and capability, which is probably different to what Wetlesen
> had in mind because Wetlesen explicitly denied that capability meant
> the same thing as potential ability.
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>>>>>> The class of beings called "moral persons" satisfies this objection. No
>>>>>> non-human possesses the inherent capacity to be a moral agent or to
>>>>>> display the other markers for advanced intelligence and sentience. You
>>>>>> have tried to hang your hat on a supposed lack of clarity of the word
>>>>>> "capacity",
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>>>>> Pretty much no attempt has been made to explain this crucial concept.
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>>>> Bullshit. You're just too ****ing lazy to go find it. I found it, and
>>>> I don't pretend to be a specialist.
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>>> In order for Wetlesen's argument to be a successful rebuttal of the
>>> AMC, he has to argue that there is at least a possibility that a
>>> permanently severely retarded human being possesses the capability for
>>> moral agency.
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>> No, he doesn't. You show that you *still* don't understand that fully
>> equal moral considerability is *NOT* dependent on some individual
>> property possessed by the person. You just don't get it.
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> Wetlesen *does* agree with me that it must be dependent on some
> individual property, because he accepts the formal principle of
> justice. You ought to read his essay.
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>> You and the other AMC-addicts just don't get it.
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>>>>> He's saying there's some property that all humans have and no
>>>>> nonhumans have.
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>>>> No, he isn't. He isn't saying what all humans have at all.
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>>>>> Fine, then it's his burden to state what it is.
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>>>> Except that he's not saying it.
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>>>>> He hasn't even begun to embark on this task.
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>>>> Nor will he - he doesn't need to do so.
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>>> He acknowledges that in order to rebut the AMC he needs to identify
>>> some property that marginal humans have and nonhumans lack,
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>> Where does he acknowledge that? Show us.
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>> You're *still* stuck on this idea of *individuals*, and that's simply wrong.
>
> "According to the present argument, inherent value is ascribed equally
> to all moral persons. Hence this position is universalistic and
> egalitarian. If this way of understanding the relation between moral
> persons and moral agents works, there will be no need to distinguish
> Agent's Rights and Human Rights the way Warren does. They will be
> grounded in the same internal property of moral persons, and there
> will be no need for a supplementary justification based on an external
> relation such as membership in a human society.
>
> The second consequence which follows from this position is that there
> will be a relevant difference between human and non-human beings,

Yes - but not at an individual level that one measures and votes on.