On Apr 26, 5:53*pm, George Plimpton > wrote:
> On 4/26/2012 6:56 AM, Rupert wrote:
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> > On Apr 26, 5:59 am, George > *wrote:
> >> On 7/26/2007 5:02 AM, Rupert wrote:
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> >>> On Jul 26, 6:06 pm, > * *wrote:
> >>>> Rupert wrote:
> >>>>> On Jul 6, 5:41 pm, > * *wrote:
> >>>>>>> That's not the meaning of "discrimination" we're talking about here.
> >>>>>>> We're saying that, if you make different moral judgements about two
> >>>>>>> different cases, you're under an obligation to specify a morally
> >>>>>>> relevant difference between them.
> >>>>>> How many times do I have to repeat this? The chief morally relevant
> >>>>>> differences between humans and non-humans, in fact among all organisms, are
> >>>>>> intelligence and sentience.
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> >>>>> But this doesn't distinguish *all* humans from *all* nonhumans. How
> >>>>> many times do I have to repeat *that*?
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> >>>> You never even have to think it again, it has been dispelled by an
> >>>> alternative way of approaching the whole subject of moral beings.
> >>>> "THE MORAL STATUS OF BEINGS WHO ARE NOT PERSONS;
> >>>> A CASUISTIC ARGUMENT "
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> >>> Yes, I know you're impressed by that essay. I'm not impressed by that
> >>> part of it, as it stands. I don't find the explanation of the crucial
> >>> notion of "capacity" to be anything approaching adequate.
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> >> Why not? *Just because it doesn't fit with what you want to believe?
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> >> You /could/ learn what it is, but you're too lazy and self-absorbed for
> >> it. *Here's a start:
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> >> * * * *"Thus, asked whether she can multiply two digit numbers, a child
> >> * * * *who at present can only multiply one-digit numbers may say that
> >> * * * *she cannot do so at present (ability), but that she is sure she
> >> * * * *could learn to do so if properly instructed (capability)."
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> > Where's this from? Is this from Jon Wetlesen's essay?
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> What the **** difference does it make where it's from, you ****ing
> retard? *It illustrates the difference between ability and capability.
> You may no longer try to be evasive on that issue.
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It illustrates *one* possible distinction that might be made between
abilty and capability, which is probably different to what Wetlesen
had in mind because Wetlesen explicitly denied that capability meant
the same thing as potential ability.

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> >>>> The class of beings called "moral persons" satisfies this objection. No
> >>>> non-human possesses the inherent capacity to be a moral agent or to
> >>>> display the other markers for advanced intelligence and sentience. You
> >>>> have tried to hang your hat on a supposed lack of clarity of the word
> >>>> "capacity",
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> >>> Pretty much no attempt has been made to explain this crucial concept.
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> >> Bullshit. *You're just too ****ing lazy to go find it. *I found it, and
> >> I don't pretend to be a specialist.
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> > In order for Wetlesen's argument to be a successful rebuttal of the
> > AMC, he has to argue that there is at least a possibility that a
> > permanently severely retarded human being possesses the capability for
> > moral agency.
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> No, he doesn't. *You show that you *still* don't understand that fully
> equal moral considerability is *NOT* dependent on some individual
> property possessed by the person. *You just don't get it.
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Wetlesen *does* agree with me that it must be dependent on some
individual property, because he accepts the formal principle of
justice. You ought to read his essay.

> You and the other AMC-addicts just don't get it.
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> >>> He's saying there's some property that all humans have and no
> >>> nonhumans have.
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> >> No, he isn't. *He isn't saying what all humans have at all.
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> >>> Fine, then it's his burden to state what it is.
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> >> Except that he's not saying it.
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> >>> He hasn't even begun to embark on this task.
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> >> Nor will he - he doesn't need to do so.
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> > He acknowledges that in order to rebut the AMC he needs to identify
> > some property that marginal humans have and nonhumans lack,
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> Where does he acknowledge that? *Show us.
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> You're *still* stuck on this idea of *individuals*, and that's simply wrong.

"According to the present argument, inherent value is ascribed equally
to all moral persons. Hence this position is universalistic and
egalitarian. If this way of understanding the relation between moral
persons and moral agents works, there will be no need to distinguish
Agent's Rights and Human Rights the way Warren does. They will be
grounded in the same internal property of moral persons, and there
will be no need for a supplementary justification based on an external
relation such as membership in a human society.

The second consequence which follows from this position is that there
will be a relevant difference between human and non-human beings,
which can justify a differential treatment with regard to the
ascription of moral status. Humans have a property which other animals
lack, notably the capability of being moral agents, and if this
property is accepted to be a necessary condition for the ascription of
moral status, then its absence in other animals will be a sufficient
condition for denying moral status to them."

(It should be noted that later in the essay Wetlesen in fact argues
that all individual biological organisms have moral status, and
speculates that ethical vegetarianism may be obligatory on these
grounds, because of a duty to do the least possible harm.)

Wetlesen most definitely agrees that the moral status of individuals
should be grounded in individual internal or relational properties
that they have. This is clear when you read his essay. You should
understand the argument and the way it differs from the ASN before
rushing to its defence.