On 4/21/2012 10:35 AM, Immortalist wrote:
> On Apr 20, 10:24 am, George > wrote:
>> It has degrees; it isn't absolute. If I see my neighbor Smith's dog get
>> loose and attack my neighbor Jones's cat, I'll try to stop the attack
>> and save Jones's cat. If I see Smith's dog attack a squirrel in the
>> front yard, I probably won't try to save the squirrel; if I do try to
>> stop the attack, it will be more out of consideration for Smith and how
>> he wants his dog to behave. If I see a coyote come down the street and
>> attack the squirrel, for certain I won't do anything to try to save the
>> squirrel.
>>
>> The squirrel simply doesn't enter into my imprecise calculus of moral
>> consideration in the same way that Jones's cat does, and to the extent
>> it enters into it at all, it's highly context-dependent. No one gives
>> equal moral consideration to the interests of all beings capable of
>> suffering, nor should we be expected to do so. We may not be able to
>> say exactly where we draw lines, but that doesn't mean it's arbitrary.
>> In any case, the "ar" radicals tell us that arbitrariness sometimes
>> doesn't matter, or sometimes it does, so they are being arbitrary.
>>
>> For example, I am told that it is permissible for me to take my kinship
>> with my child into account in deciding whether to rescue him or some
>> other child from an impending catastrophe where I have time to rescue
>> only one of them. However, the same source would tell me that if
>> neither of the two children were my known relatives, but if one were of
>> my race and the other were of a different race, I would not be able to
>> use race - also an indication of kinship, even if much more remotely so
>> than family - in deciding which one to rescue.
>>
>> The sophists are trying somehow, any way they can, to find a means to
>> salvage something they intuitively like. There is no rigor to it at all.
>
> If humans and other social animals have a propensity to be groupish,
> dividing the world into an us vs them, then, would that justify making
> moral choicees based upon this instinct such as helping one group but
> not helping another group merely based upon a biological preference
> for group identification?

If it's a natural human tendency, then why would it need moral
justification?