On Mar 20, 6:14*pm, Buxqi > wrote:
> On 20 Mar, 23:22, Rupert > wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Mar 21, 2:35 am, Buxqi > wrote:
>
> > > On 18 Mar, 23:36, Rupert > wrote:
>
> > > > When my thesis is finished I
> > > > plan to start working on a writing project in animal ethics, exploring
> > > > the question of whether speciesism can be justified.
>
> > > Rudy Canoza recently made the interesting point that AR is
> > > speciesist assuming that you would lock up a human who
> > > harmed other humans but had a brain condition whereby he
> > > was incapable of making moral judgements and therefore should
> > > be considered a moral patient.
>
> > > If you are willing to lock him up yet unwilling to lock a predator
> > > animal up to prevent him from doing harm to non-human animals
> > > then you are guilty of speciesm. Can you refute that premise?
>
> > Okay, here's what I'm going to do, in outline.
>
> > We're going to look at two hypothetical cases, involving a scientific
> > research project which harms individuals in order to attempt to gain
> > knowledge about Parkinson's disease. This is based on an example which
> > Peter Singer recently said was an example of "justifiable research".
> > We'll have two hypothetical cases, one involving doing the research on
> > cognitively impaired humans, the other on chimpanzees. I'll attempt to
> > do a survey of everything in the literature which tries to provide
> > some support for the view that it's morally permissible to do the
> > project on the chimpanzees but not the humans.
>
> > We'll also explore the objection that rejecting speciesism would have
> > untenable consequences, which has been made by Carl Cohen and is
> > frequently made on this newsgroup.
>
> > This particular point you are talking about at the moment, I'm not
> > currently convinced that it's worth addressing. We do confine nonhuman
> > animals to prevent them from doing harm. We do take the view that some
> > humans do not have legal responsibility for their actions. More needs
> > to be done before I see an argument here that needs some discussion.
>
> Personally I think the argument is worth looking at, if only because
> any position that is demonstratably guilty of the quality (eg
> speciesm)
> that it explicitly rejects must be viewed with a certain scepticism.
>

If I take the stance "I think an acceptable moral theory must be non-
speciesist" and you can then demonstrate to me that I hold moral views
which are speciesist, then you have shown that I am being inconsistent
and this is certainly a ground for saying that my position as it
stands is not satisfactory. In my writing project, I intend to explore
objections to the effect that nobody sincerely believes in and acts
accordance with a moral theory that is non-speciesist. Carl Cohen has
made objections along these lines, and objections along these lines
are frequently made on this newsgroup. Various facts can be cited in
support of arguments along this line, which are frequently discussed
on this newsgroup. To take just two examples, plant-based agriculture
causes serious harm, in various ways, to large numbers of nonhuman
animals, and it is estimated that electrical power stations in the
United States cause the death of approximately one trillion fish per
year. Gary Francione has attempted some discussion of the significance
of facts like these for his position, but it does not seem to be very
satisfactory. I intend to explore objections like these and try to
form a considered view about what they achieve, and where we should go
from there.

You seem to believe that the argument that you have outlined is
another example of an argument which could be plausibly held to show
that certain moral views accepted by those who identify themselves as
animal rights advocates are speciesist. For me to become convinced of
this I would need further elaboration. First of all, you speak of
being unwilling to lock up a predator animal in order to prevent that
animal from doing harm. Let us suppose that a lion had escaped from
the zoo and was roaming through a densely populated city. One reading
of what you are saying is that you are suggesting that many who
identify themselves as animal rights advocates would be unwilling to
take measures to prevent the lion from doing harm, which may involve
confining the lion (at least temporarily). If this it what you are
suggesting, I would be interested in seeing any citations you can
provide in support of this view. On the other hand, you may be
alluding to the fact that we are unwilling to intervene in predator-
prey relationships among nonhuman animals living free in the wild.
This is indeed an important point which will require some discussion.
It is mentioned by Carl Cohen, it is mentioned by Jonathan Ball
sometimes on this newsgroups, and it has received some discussion in
the literature. I will certainly do some discussion of that. On the
other hand, perhaps I am still confused about what your main point is
here. Maybe you could give some more specific real-world examples of
people being willing to confine a human who is a moral patient, but
not willing to confine a nonhuman animal who has the potential to do
harm, just to make clear which examples you had in mind.

You must realize the following:

(1) I am attempting to embark on this project without any
preconceptions about what conclusions I will arrive at
(2) It is indeed quite possible that I will come to the conclusion
that I have identified some serious deficiencies in certain views
widely accepted by those who identify themselves as animal rights
advocates. However, there is also some possibility that I will come to
a similar conclusion about those who identify themselves as
"welfarists". We will have to see.
(3) Dutch complains that DeGrazia's concept of "equal consideration"
is vague, and that no coherent definition of "speciesism" has been
offered except definitions which would imply that there is simply no
such thing as a non-speciesist ethical theory which anyone would find
acceptable. In response to this complaint I would like to attempt a
clearer statement of what a non-speciesist ethical theory is, and
investigate the question of whether it is possible to formulate a non-
speciesist ethical theory which anyone would find acceptable. If I
come to the conclusion that that is not possible, then it seems to me,
for reasons I'll elaborate on in my project, that this raises a puzzle
in the methodology of ethics which needs to be explored further, and I
will want to see if I can say anything about that.