Suppose a given act, A, turns out to be morally right
when assessed by preference utilitarianism's standards.
And suppose this moral verdict is rendered on the basis
of calculating the overall preference satisfaction score,
using preferences x, y, z. Given the evil outcomes
utilitarianism can sanction, are we to conclude that A is
right? And given the evil preferences it must count,
are we to say that the preferences x, y, z are all morally
above board?

The answer to both questions clearly is no. To show
that A is right, according to the utilitarian standard, is
no guarantee that A is right; and to count preferences
x, y and z in the utilitarian calculus is no guarantee that
there is nothing morally evil, nothing morally problematic,
about these preferences.

This much acknowledged, the general conclusion toward
which the earlier critique of utilitarianism has been leading
should be clear. Notwithstanding it's many merits, the
position emerges so seriously flawed that it fails to provide
a reliable standard by reference to which moral right and
wrong can be determined. Because it fails to provide such
a standard, utilitarian calculation, while it may be relevant
for some purposes, should play no role whatsoever when
the purpose is to decide what is fundamentally morally
right and wrong.

Rejection of utilitarianism has important consequences
for our moral thinking in general, our thinking about how
animals should be treated in particular. In the case of
animal agriculture, to continue with this example, a
careful, exhaustive analysis of overall consequences would
support one of three conclusions:

1) The current system of animal agriculture leads to
better overall consequences than any alternative.
2) The current system leads to worse overall
consequences than other alternatives.
3) The current system leads to overall consequences that
are equal to those that would flow from other alternatives.

If the first option were shown to be true, nothing would
follow regarding the moral acceptability of the current
system; if the second, nothing would follow concerning the
moral acceptability of the current system; and the same is
true of the third alternative. In short, what ever the overall
consequences happen to be, the central moral question,
"Is the current system morally acceptable?" will remain
unanswered.
The Animal Rights Debate. Page 187

Derek Nash, posing as "Ipse dixit" > wrote

> Suppose a given act, A, turns out to be morally right
> when assessed by preference utilitarianism's standards.

He blows it right there, utilitarian calculations are, by definition, for
the purpose of determining if an act is *useful*, not if it's morally right.

The rest of his circular sophistry now fails on that basis.

BTW, Derek, is it "useful" to you to attempt deceive people into thinking
you are someone else? Do we believe that makes it moral?

[..]

"Dutch" > wrote in message ...
> Derek Nash, posing as "Ipse dixit" > wrote
>
> > Suppose a given act, A, turns out to be morally right
> > when assessed by preference utilitarianism's standards.
>
> He blows it right there, utilitarian calculations are, by definition, for
> the purpose of determining if an act is *useful*, not if it's morally right.
>
> The rest of his circular sophistry now fails on that basis.
>
Now why didn't the co-author of that book, Professor Carl Cohen
think of that? You're a genius, Dutch!

"Ipse dixit" > wrote
>
> "Dutch" > wrote

> > Derek Nash, posing as "Ipse dixit" > wrote
> >
> > > Suppose a given act, A, turns out to be morally right
> > > when assessed by preference utilitarianism's standards.
> >
> > He blows it right there, utilitarian calculations are, by definition,
for
> > the purpose of determining if an act is *useful*, not if it's morally
right.
> >
> > The rest of his circular sophistry now fails on that basis.
> >
> Now why didn't the co-author of that book, Professor Carl Cohen
> think of that? You're a genius, Dutch!

Although I don't remember verbatim, I believe Cohen did make a similiar
point. Regan's argument is like saying 'suppose we weighed a fellow and
found him to be six feet tall'.

The proposition should say:

"Suppose a given act, A, turns out to produce a net good when assessed by
preference utilitarianism's standards."

He's engaging in sophistry. Utilitarian measurements are not *intended* to
determine morality, although there is considerable overlap between that
which results in net gain or good and that which we consider moral.

I agree with Regan that utilitarianism is not a satisfactory
basic position for defining ethics. In one sense, preference
utilitarianism is a gigantic _ad populem_ fallacy -- something
is right because a lot of those who are involved want it or
benefit from it. If you are in the minority, you're out of
luck.

Within a deontological system, I think there are good reasons for
considering utilitarian criteria. If two actions or goals
are both within ethical/moral guidelines, then it makes sense
to choose on the basis of which one you and others prefer, or
even (the foundation of democracy) which one the majority
prefer. And if neither of two actions is genuinely moral, it
may still be more ethical to choose the one which is less
harmful in a given situation -- for example, to choose
free-range chicken over confined veal or foie gras, literally
the lesser of two evils. This is my answer to the CD issue:
that it is less evil to buy vegetables than to buy meat and
other animal products which are produced by commercial breeding,
raising, and slaughter of animals, and within that system, it
is less evil to buy organic, locally-grown, lower-CD veggies
than to buy agribusiness veggies.

"There is no pure land." -- Andrew Linzey

Rat

Ipse dixit wrote:

> Suppose a given act, A, turns out to be morally right
> when assessed by preference utilitarianism's standards.
> And suppose this moral verdict is rendered on the basis
> of calculating the overall preference satisfaction score,
> using preferences x, y, z. Given the evil outcomes
> utilitarianism can sanction, are we to conclude that A is
> right? And given the evil preferences it must count,
> are we to say that the preferences x, y, z are all morally
> above board?
>
> The answer to both questions clearly is no. To show
> that A is right, according to the utilitarian standard, is
> no guarantee that A is right; and to count preferences
> x, y and z in the utilitarian calculus is no guarantee that
> there is nothing morally evil, nothing morally problematic,
> about these preferences.
>
> This much acknowledged, the general conclusion toward
> which the earlier critique of utilitarianism has been leading
> should be clear. Notwithstanding it's many merits, the
> position emerges so seriously flawed that it fails to provide
> a reliable standard by reference to which moral right and
> wrong can be determined. Because it fails to provide such
> a standard, utilitarian calculation, while it may be relevant
> for some purposes, should play no role whatsoever when
> the purpose is to decide what is fundamentally morally
> right and wrong.
>
> Rejection of utilitarianism has important consequences
> for our moral thinking in general, our thinking about how
> animals should be treated in particular. In the case of
> animal agriculture, to continue with this example, a
> careful, exhaustive analysis of overall consequences would
> support one of three conclusions:
>
> 1) The current system of animal agriculture leads to
> better overall consequences than any alternative.
> 2) The current system leads to worse overall
> consequences than other alternatives.
> 3) The current system leads to overall consequences that
> are equal to those that would flow from other alternatives.
>
> If the first option were shown to be true, nothing would
> follow regarding the moral acceptability of the current
> system; if the second, nothing would follow concerning the
> moral acceptability of the current system; and the same is
> true of the third alternative. In short, what ever the overall
> consequences happen to be, the central moral question,
> "Is the current system morally acceptable?" will remain
> unanswered.
> The Animal Rights Debate. Page 187
>
>

"Rat & Swan" > wrote
>
> I agree with Regan that utilitarianism is not a satisfactory
> basic position for defining ethics.

That's a strawman, nobody is saying that it is. Utilitarianism determines if
something, on balance, is beneficial within a given frame of reference.

> In one sense, preference
> utilitarianism is a gigantic _ad populem_ fallacy -- something
> is right because a lot of those who are involved want it or
> benefit from it.

If society operates on utilitarianism as Regan is implying, then why aren't
criminals, vagrants, and people carrying incurable diseases just
exterminated? That would benefit the healthy, productive, law-abiding
majority greatly.

> If you are in the minority, you're out of luck.

That's false, "minorites" are given huge considerations in the formation of
social policies.

> Within a deontological system, I think there are good reasons for
> considering utilitarian criteria. If two actions or goals
> are both within ethical/moral guidelines, then it makes sense
> to choose on the basis of which one you and others prefer, or
> even (the foundation of democracy) which one the majority
> prefer.

Which is exactly what happens. Of course if two actions are both moral, then
one chooses the better one.

> And if neither of two actions is genuinely moral, it
> may still be more ethical to choose the one which is less
> harmful in a given situation -- for example, to choose
> free-range chicken over confined veal or foie gras, literally
> the lesser of two evils. This is my answer to the CD issue:
> that it is less evil to buy vegetables than to buy meat and
> other animal products which are produced by commercial breeding,
> raising, and slaughter of animals, and within that system, it
> is less evil to buy organic, locally-grown, lower-CD veggies
> than to buy agribusiness veggies.

According to your assessment, commercial agribusiness which results in many
cds is one evil, and "freedom farming" is another, albeit for different
reasons. I contend that it's moral, given the conditions you present, to
choose the freedom farmed meat, as the lesser of two evils.

> "There is no pure land." -- Andrew Linzey

Indeed. I believe you have presented an excellent case for choosing humanely
farmed meat over agribusiness plant foods.

Utilitarianism can't define ethics, but it does provide a guide in acting
well under real world circumstances.

Dutch wrote:

> "Rat & Swan" > wrote

>>I agree with Regan that utilitarianism is not a satisfactory
>>basic position for defining ethics.

> That's a strawman, nobody is saying that it is. Utilitarianism determines if
> something, on balance, is beneficial within a given frame of reference.

You are wrong here -- utilitarian philosophers do indeed
say that the choice with the greatest utility is moral,
and ethics should be carried out on that basis.


>>In one sense, preference
>>utilitarianism is a gigantic _ad populum_ fallacy -- something
>>is right because a lot of those who are involved want it or
>>benefit from it.

> If society operates on utilitarianism as Regan is implying, then why aren't
> criminals, vagrants, and people carrying incurable diseases just
> exterminated? That would benefit the healthy, productive, law-abiding
> majority greatly.

Because Western society generally rejects pure utilitarianism
as a source of ethics, and because Western policy-makers
generally believe that humans ( but not animals) have rights.

>>If you are in the minority, you're out of luck.

> That's false, "minorites" are given huge considerations in the formation of
> social policies.

Not under pure utilitarianism.

>>Within a deontological system, I think there are good reasons for
>>considering utilitarian criteria. If two actions or goals
>>are both within ethical/moral guidelines, then it makes sense
>>to choose on the basis of which one you and others prefer, or
>>even (the foundation of democracy) which one the majority
>>prefer.

> Which is exactly what happens. Of course if two actions are both moral, then
> one chooses the better one.

One should, certainly, although the definition of "better" will
vary from one person to another.

>>And if neither of two actions is genuinely moral, it
>>may still be more ethical to choose the one which is less
>>harmful in a given situation -- for example, to choose
>>free-range chicken over confined veal or foie gras, literally
>>the lesser of two evils. This is my answer to the CD issue:
>>that it is less evil to buy vegetables than to buy meat and
>>other animal products which are produced by commercial breeding,
>>raising, and slaughter of animals, and within that system, it
>>is less evil to buy organic, locally-grown, lower-CD veggies
>>than to buy agribusiness veggies.

> According to your assessment, commercial agribusiness which results in many
> cds is one evil, and "freedom farming" is another, albeit for different
> reasons. I contend that it's moral, given the conditions you present, to
> choose the freedom farmed meat, as the lesser of two evils.

I understand your view, but I disagree because I believe the entire
system of breeding, raising, and slaughtering animals is so
deeply and inherently wrong on deontological grounds that CDs in
agribusiness (as wrong methods, not a wrong system in itself) are
less evil. OTOH, I believe that choosing locally produced, lower-CD
organic veggies is better on utilitarian grounds than choosing
agribusiness veggies. As I say, it is the difference between buying
a shirt sewn in a sweatshop vs buying a deliberately slaughtered slave.

>>"There is no pure land." -- Andrew Linzey

> Indeed. I believe you have presented an excellent case for choosing humanely
> farmed meat over agribusiness plant foods.

I disagree.

> Utilitarianism can't define ethics, but it does provide a guide in acting
> well under real world circumstances.

To some degree.

Rat

"Rat & Swan" > wrote in message ...
>
> I agree with Regan that utilitarianism is not a satisfactory
> basic position for defining ethics.

So do I, because looking at the hoped-for consequences
of an action to judge whether it's right or wrong to perform
it can allow all sorts of crimes and seems to be a back-to-
front way of looking at things. It relies on trusting to something,
such as luck or popular trends - which can always change.

> In one sense, preference
> utilitarianism is a gigantic _ad populem_ fallacy -- something
> is right because a lot of those who are involved want it or
> benefit from it. If you are in the minority, you're out of
> luck.
>
That's self marginalization for you. ;-)

> Within a deontological system, I think there are good reasons for
> considering utilitarian criteria.

I've never figured out how the two can exist together,
because if an action is judged good by examining its
consequences, how can we then say an action is judged
good because it was performed out of a respect for a
moral rule? The two will at some time conflict with each
other, so which is the right one to promote?

> If two actions or goals
> are both within ethical/moral guidelines, then it makes sense
> to choose on the basis of which one you and others prefer, or
> even (the foundation of democracy) which one the majority
> prefer. And if neither of two actions is genuinely moral, it
> may still be more ethical to choose the one which is less
> harmful in a given situation -- for example, to choose
> free-range chicken over confined veal or foie gras, literally
> the lesser of two evils.

Urgh, no! I hate it already, although I must admit I can't
explain exactly why.

> This is my answer to the CD issue:
> that it is less evil to buy vegetables than to buy meat and
> other animal products which are produced by commercial breeding,
> raising, and slaughter of animals, and within that system, it
> is less evil to buy organic, locally-grown, lower-CD veggies
> than to buy agribusiness veggies.
>
> "There is no pure land." -- Andrew Linzey
>
There bloody well is, Karen, but don't ask me where it
is. It seems to me we need a T.O.E for ethics as well as
physics. There's a need for something which combines
both utilitarianism and deontology in a single formula.

> Rat
>
> Ipse dixit wrote:
>
> > Suppose a given act, A, turns out to be morally right
> > when assessed by preference utilitarianism's standards.
> > And suppose this moral verdict is rendered on the basis
> > of calculating the overall preference satisfaction score,
> > using preferences x, y, z. Given the evil outcomes
> > utilitarianism can sanction, are we to conclude that A is
> > right? And given the evil preferences it must count,
> > are we to say that the preferences x, y, z are all morally
> > above board?
> >
> > The answer to both questions clearly is no. To show
> > that A is right, according to the utilitarian standard, is
> > no guarantee that A is right; and to count preferences
> > x, y and z in the utilitarian calculus is no guarantee that
> > there is nothing morally evil, nothing morally problematic,
> > about these preferences.
> >
> > This much acknowledged, the general conclusion toward
> > which the earlier critique of utilitarianism has been leading
> > should be clear. Notwithstanding it's many merits, the
> > position emerges so seriously flawed that it fails to provide
> > a reliable standard by reference to which moral right and
> > wrong can be determined. Because it fails to provide such
> > a standard, utilitarian calculation, while it may be relevant
> > for some purposes, should play no role whatsoever when
> > the purpose is to decide what is fundamentally morally
> > right and wrong.
> >
> > Rejection of utilitarianism has important consequences
> > for our moral thinking in general, our thinking about how
> > animals should be treated in particular. In the case of
> > animal agriculture, to continue with this example, a
> > careful, exhaustive analysis of overall consequences would
> > support one of three conclusions:
> >
> > 1) The current system of animal agriculture leads to
> > better overall consequences than any alternative.
> > 2) The current system leads to worse overall
> > consequences than other alternatives.
> > 3) The current system leads to overall consequences that
> > are equal to those that would flow from other alternatives.
> >
> > If the first option were shown to be true, nothing would
> > follow regarding the moral acceptability of the current
> > system; if the second, nothing would follow concerning the
> > moral acceptability of the current system; and the same is
> > true of the third alternative. In short, what ever the overall
> > consequences happen to be, the central moral question,
> > "Is the current system morally acceptable?" will remain
> > unanswered.
> > The Animal Rights Debate. Page 187
> >
> >
>

"Dutch" > wrote in message ...
> "Ipse dixit" > wrote
> > "Dutch" > wrote
> > > "Ipse dixit" > wrote
> > >
> > > > Suppose a given act, A, turns out to be morally
> > > > right when assessed by preference utilitarianism's
> > > > standards.
> > >
> > > He blows it right there, utilitarian calculations are,
> > > by definition, for the purpose of determining if an
> > > act is *useful*, not if it's morally right.
> > >
> > > The rest of his circular sophistry now fails on that
> > > basis.
> > >
> > Now why didn't the co-author of that book, Professor
> > Carl Cohen think of that? You're a genius, Dutch!
>
> Although I don't remember verbatim, I believe Cohen
> did make a similiar point.

No, he didn't. You haven't even read the book.

> Regan's argument is like saying 'suppose we weighed
> a fellow and found him to be six feet tall'.
>
Yes, you're dead right. That's exactly what he meant.

> The proposition should say:
>
[snip] No thanks, Dutch. I just can't bear it.

"Rat & Swan" > wrote
>
>
> Dutch wrote:
>
> > "Rat & Swan" > wrote
>
> >>I agree with Regan that utilitarianism is not a satisfactory
> >>basic position for defining ethics.
>
> > That's a strawman, nobody is saying that it is. Utilitarianism
determines if
> > something, on balance, is beneficial within a given frame of reference.
>
> You are wrong here -- utilitarian philosophers do indeed
> say that the choice with the greatest utility is moral,
> and ethics should be carried out on that basis.

Perhaps in some abstract philisophical discussion in some university lounge,
amongst wooly-headed academics, but in reality nobody, including those same
academics, make judgements according to strict utilitarianism. Judgements
always depend on a specific frame of reference. Strict utiltarianism
certainly has no application in this discussion.


> >>In one sense, preference
> >>utilitarianism is a gigantic _ad populum_ fallacy -- something
> >>is right because a lot of those who are involved want it or
> >>benefit from it.
>
> > If society operates on utilitarianism as Regan is implying, then why
aren't
> > criminals, vagrants, and people carrying incurable diseases just
> > exterminated? That would benefit the healthy, productive, law-abiding
> > majority greatly.
>
> Because Western society generally rejects pure utilitarianism
> as a source of ethics, and because Western policy-makers
> generally believe that humans ( but not animals) have rights.

Exactly, therefore utilitarianism is not your problem.

> >>If you are in the minority, you're out of luck.
>
> > That's false, "minorites" are given huge considerations in the formation
of
> > social policies.
>
> Not under pure utilitarianism.

Which doesn't exist.

> >>Within a deontological system, I think there are good reasons for
> >>considering utilitarian criteria. If two actions or goals
> >>are both within ethical/moral guidelines, then it makes sense
> >>to choose on the basis of which one you and others prefer, or
> >>even (the foundation of democracy) which one the majority
> >>prefer.
>
> > Which is exactly what happens. Of course if two actions are both moral,
then
> > one chooses the better one.
>
> One should, certainly, although the definition of "better" will
> vary from one person to another.

To some degree.

> >>And if neither of two actions is genuinely moral, it
> >>may still be more ethical to choose the one which is less
> >>harmful in a given situation -- for example, to choose
> >>free-range chicken over confined veal or foie gras, literally
> >>the lesser of two evils. This is my answer to the CD issue:
> >>that it is less evil to buy vegetables than to buy meat and
> >>other animal products which are produced by commercial breeding,
> >>raising, and slaughter of animals, and within that system, it
> >>is less evil to buy organic, locally-grown, lower-CD veggies
> >>than to buy agribusiness veggies.
>
> > According to your assessment, commercial agribusiness which results in
many
> > cds is one evil, and "freedom farming" is another, albeit for different
> > reasons. I contend that it's moral, given the conditions you present, to
> > choose the freedom farmed meat, as the lesser of two evils.
>
> I understand your view, but I disagree because I believe the entire
> system of breeding, raising, and slaughtering animals is so
> deeply and inherently wrong on deontological grounds that CDs in
> agribusiness (as wrong methods, not a wrong system in itself) are
> less evil.

Your judgment may satisfy deontological theorists, but if we could line up
the animals and somehow give them a vote (which you imply you are doing),
you can bet that the majority would vote for survival.

I'm also not talking about an "entire system", I may agree that is
corrupted. I am talking about the simple act of killing an animal for food.

> OTOH, I believe that choosing locally produced, lower-CD
> organic veggies is better on utilitarian grounds than choosing
> agribusiness veggies.

And killing one moose is better on utilitarian grounds than purchasing a ton
of agribusiness grains.

> As I say, it is the difference between buying
> a shirt sewn in a sweatshop vs buying a deliberately slaughtered slave.

A more apt analogy would be buying a shirt obtained in a robbery where
people were murdered vs murdering people and making a shirt from their skin.
In both cases people were killed, the primary differences being the
disposition of the bodies, AND one's aesthetic opinion about skin shirts.

> >>"There is no pure land." -- Andrew Linzey
>
> > Indeed. I believe you have presented an excellent case for choosing
humanely
> > farmed meat over agribusiness plant foods.
>
> I disagree.

You have stated that where two goods or two evils exist, it is appropriate
to use utilitarian grounds to determine the better course of action. That is
the cd argument almost to a tee. Where there are resultant deaths due to
man's pursuit of his own interests, it legitimate to choose the path which
appears to result in fewer.

Of course this presupposes that there is an absolute imperative to cause the
fewest animal deaths, which has not itself been established.

> > Utilitarianism can't define ethics, but it does provide a guide in
acting
> > well under real world circumstances.
>
> To some degree.
>
> Rat
>

"Ipse dixit" > wrote
> "Dutch" > wrote
> > "Ipse dixit" > wrote
> > > "Dutch" > wrote
> > > > "Ipse dixit" > wrote
> > > >
> > > > > Suppose a given act, A, turns out to be morally
> > > > > right when assessed by preference utilitarianism's
> > > > > standards.
> > > >
> > > > He blows it right there, utilitarian calculations are,
> > > > by definition, for the purpose of determining if an
> > > > act is *useful*, not if it's morally right.
> > > >
> > > > The rest of his circular sophistry now fails on that
> > > > basis.
> > > >
> > > Now why didn't the co-author of that book, Professor
> > > Carl Cohen think of that? You're a genius, Dutch!
> >
> > Although I don't remember verbatim, I believe Cohen
> > did make a similiar point.
>
> No, he didn't.

As I recall, he did, nonetheless, your objection is an Appeal to Authority
Fallacy, you haven't addressed my point at all.

> You haven't even read the book.

How would you know that? As it happens, I have read it.

> > Regan's argument is like saying 'suppose we weighed
> > a fellow and found him to be six feet tall'.
> >
> Yes, you're dead right. That's exactly what he meant.

And that makes sense on what level exactly?

> > The proposition should say:
> >
> [snip] No thanks, Dutch. I just can't bear it.

Oh, gosh, how interesting Derek. Your lack tolerance for the truth is well
established.

"Ipse dixit" > wrote in message >...
> Suppose a given act, A, turns out to be morally right
> when assessed by preference utilitarianism's standards.
> And suppose this moral verdict is rendered on the basis
> of calculating the overall preference satisfaction score,
> using preferences x, y, z. Given the evil outcomes
> utilitarianism can sanction, are we to conclude that A is
> right? And given the evil preferences it must count,
> are we to say that the preferences x, y, z are all morally
> above board?

I believe that in the above paragraph Tom Regan is guilty of
putting the cart before the horse. The moral status of an action
can not reasonably be determined without a logical framework to
provide the appropriate criteria. Utalitarianism is the basis
of such a framework. If you disagree that it is the best framework
to use, tell me one thing which has anything more than a trivial
importance beside the quality of emotional state experienced
by lifeforms capabale of such experiences.

As a thought experiment suppose the quality of an emotional state
could objectively be determined and expressed in units of "haps". In
my opinion
1 hap experienced by 100 sentient lifeforms is somewhat less
significant
than 100 haps experienced by 1 sentient lifeform. For sentient
lifeforms which are also moral agents I believe that one who
shows consideration to the emotional state of other's deserves
somewhat
more consideration than one who does not.

Subject to these two qualifications I fully endorse utalitatianism.
If an action complies with utalitarianism but not with your moral code
or vice versa then this does not mean there is anything wrong with
utalitarianism. It means there is something wrong with your moral
code.

"Purple" > wrote
> "Ipse dixit" > wrote

> > Suppose a given act, A, turns out to be morally right
> > when assessed by preference utilitarianism's standards.
> > And suppose this moral verdict is rendered on the basis
> > of calculating the overall preference satisfaction score,
> > using preferences x, y, z. Given the evil outcomes
> > utilitarianism can sanction, are we to conclude that A is
> > right? And given the evil preferences it must count,
> > are we to say that the preferences x, y, z are all morally
> > above board?
>
> I believe that in the above paragraph Tom Regan is guilty of
> putting the cart before the horse. The moral status of an action
> can not reasonably be determined without a logical framework to
> provide the appropriate criteria. Utalitarianism is the basis
> of such a framework. If you disagree that it is the best framework
> to use, tell me one thing which has anything more than a trivial
> importance beside the quality of emotional state experienced
> by lifeforms capabale of such experiences.

Survival of individuals, of species, of ecological systems, success of
species. Quality of emotional states seem to be quite a subjective and
trivial consideration.

> As a thought experiment suppose the quality of an emotional state
> could objectively be determined and expressed in units of "haps". In
> my opinion
> 1 hap experienced by 100 sentient lifeforms is somewhat less
> significant
> than 100 haps experienced by 1 sentient lifeform.

This is a hedonistic approach, measuring good according to the amount of
pleasure experienced.

> For sentient
> lifeforms which are also moral agents I believe that one who
> shows consideration to the emotional state of other's deserves
> somewhat more consideration than one who does not.

Most ethical systems preach that consideration for others be unconditional,
not doled out according to how well they fulfil some test.

> Subject to these two qualifications I fully endorse utalitatianism.

"utilitarianism" The root of the word is "utility" or usefulness.

> If an action complies with utalitarianism but not with your moral code
> or vice versa then this does not mean there is anything wrong with
> utalitarianism. It means there is something wrong with your moral
> code.

Only to a strict utilitarian. AR is a kind of unholy marriage of
utilitarianism and moralism.

"Purple" > wrote in message om...
> "Ipse dixit" > wrote in message >...
> >
> > Suppose a given act, A, turns out to be morally right
> > when assessed by preference utilitarianism's standards.
> > And suppose this moral verdict is rendered on the basis
> > of calculating the overall preference satisfaction score,
> > using preferences x, y, z. Given the evil outcomes
> > utilitarianism can sanction, are we to conclude that A is
> > right? And given the evil preferences it must count,
> > are we to say that the preferences x, y, z are all morally
> > above board?
>
> I believe that in the above paragraph Tom Regan is guilty of
> putting the cart before the horse.

Which means what, exactly, in this case? What
part in that paragraph are you referring to as the
cart, and which part the horse?

> The moral status of an action
> can not reasonably be determined without a logical framework to
> provide the appropriate criteria. Utalitarianism is the basis
> of such a framework.

Utilitarianism is one of at least two logical frameworks
to provide a criteria to judge the moral status of an
action. It cannot be used to judge the moral status of
all actions, since, as Regan points out, it can sanction
evil outcomes.

> If you disagree that it is the best framework
> to use, tell me one thing which has anything more than a trivial
> importance beside the quality of emotional state experienced
> by lifeforms capabale of such experiences.
>
1) The right to life;
If the gassing of innocent hostages along with their
kidnappers results in a greater happiness for the
greater number of citizens by ridding their society
of the terrorists who kidnapped them, then according
to utilitarianism, such a trade would judge that the
decision to gas them is a good one.

2) Freedom from torture;
If torturing prisoners of war for information brings
about a speedy conclusion to war, then according
to utilitarianism where doing what is expedient
rather than right is sanctioned.

3) The tragedy of the twin towers disaster;
If World peace results as a consequence of this
historic act of terrorism, as promised by Bush and
Blair, then according to the utilitarianism rule where
the consequences of an action judges the moral
status of that action, billions of utilitarian would be
forever in the debt of those terrorists.

4) Theft

5) Forced abortion.

6) etc.

> As a thought experiment suppose the quality of an
> emotional state could objectively be determined and
> expressed in units of "haps". In my opinion 1 hap
> experienced by 100 sentient lifeforms is somewhat
> less significant than 100 haps experienced by 1
> sentient lifeform.

Then according to that premise we must all enslave
ourselves to a single person's desires and happiness
rather than pursue any happiness for ourselves. Who
gets to decide the single beneficiary and the hundred
benefactors?

> For sentient lifeforms which are
> also moral agents I believe that one who shows
> consideration to the emotional state of other's
> deserves somewhat more consideration than one
> who does not.
>
This contradicts your first premise, for if it is right
to ensure a single person's happiness by prohibiting
the happiness of one the hundred benefactors, as
given in your example, then by definition that single
beneficiary cannot show any consideration for the
hundred others who must make themselves available
to him else he breaks his own rule.

> Subject to these two qualifications I fully endorse utalitatianism.

But those qualifications do contradict each other, so
to endorse utilitrarianism based on them makes no
sense at all.

> If an action complies with utalitarianism but not with your moral code
> or vice versa then this does not mean there is anything wrong with
> utalitarianism. It means there is something wrong with your moral
> code.

No. It simply means that using utilitarianism to judge
the moral status of all actions is the wrong logical
framework to use, since it can allow evil outcomes.
One the other hand, if we were to follow Kant's
categorical imperative we would find that a morally
good action is one that is done out of respect for a
moral law, and that any consequences following it
are totally immaterial when judging it's moral status.

"Dutch" > wrote in message ...
> "Ipse dixit" > wrote
> > "Dutch" > wrote
> > > "Ipse dixit" > wrote
> > > > "Dutch" > wrote
> > > > > "Ipse dixit" > wrote
> > > > >
> > > > > > Suppose a given act, A, turns out to be morally
> > > > > > right when assessed by preference utilitarianism's
> > > > > > standards.
> > > > >
> > > > > He blows it right there, utilitarian calculations are,
> > > > > by definition, for the purpose of determining if an
> > > > > act is *useful*, not if it's morally right.
> > > > >
> > > > > The rest of his circular sophistry now fails on that
> > > > > basis.
> > > > >
> > > > Now why didn't the co-author of that book, Professor
> > > > Carl Cohen think of that? You're a genius, Dutch!
> > >
> > > Although I don't remember verbatim, I believe Cohen
> > > did make a similiar point.
> >
> > No, he didn't.
>
> As I recall, he did,

Page number, please.

> nonetheless, your objection is an Appeal to Authority
> Fallacy, you haven't addressed my point at all.
>
How can a discussion over a book written by an
authority be seen as an appeal to authority when
the questions being put here are centered around
the authority in question in the first place?

> > You haven't even read the book.
>
> How would you know that?

Because I know you haven't the attention span required
to read a book.

> As it happens, I have read it.
>
No. You're lying, Dutch.

> > > Regan's argument is like saying 'suppose we weighed
> > > a fellow and found him to be six feet tall'.
> > >
> > Yes, you're dead right. That's exactly what he meant.
>
> And that makes sense on what level exactly?
>
I'm taking the **** out of you. Can't you see that? Of
course Regan's argument ISN'T "like saying 'suppose
we weighed a fellow and found him to be six feet tall'"
stupid.

> > > The proposition should say:
> > >
> > [snip] No thanks, Dutch. I just can't bear it.
>
> Oh, gosh, how interesting Derek. Your lack tolerance for the truth is well
> established.
>
It's my lack of any tolerance for your stupid, childish
analogies that I just can't bear, not a lack of tolerance
for the truth.

"Dutch" > wrote in message ...
> "Rat & Swan" > wrote
> > Dutch wrote:
> > > "Rat & Swan" > wrote
> >
> > > > I agree with Regan that utilitarianism is not a
> > > > satisfactory basic position for defining ethics.
> >
> > > That's a strawman, nobody is saying that it is.
> > > Utilitarianism determines if something, on balance,
> > > is beneficial within a given frame of reference.
> >
> > You are wrong here -- utilitarian philosophers do indeed
> > say that the choice with the greatest utility is moral,
> > and ethics should be carried out on that basis.
>
> Perhaps in some abstract philisophical discussion in some university lounge,
> amongst wooly-headed academics, but in reality nobody, including those same
> academics, make judgements according to strict utilitarianism. Judgements
> always depend on a specific frame of reference. Strict utiltarianism
> certainly has no application in this discussion.
>
When are you going to learn the basics of these
discussions, Dutch? Trying to discuss the issues
being raised here with you is like talking to a child.
Read a book on it or something and stop wasting
everyone's time and patience.

"Ipse dixit" > wrote
> "Dutch" > wrote
> > "Ipse dixit" > wrote
> > > "Dutch" > wrote
> > > > "Ipse dixit" > wrote
> > > > > "Dutch" > wrote
> > > > > > "Ipse dixit" > wrote
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > Suppose a given act, A, turns out to be morally
> > > > > > > right when assessed by preference utilitarianism's
> > > > > > > standards.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > He blows it right there, utilitarian calculations are,
> > > > > > by definition, for the purpose of determining if an
> > > > > > act is *useful*, not if it's morally right.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > The rest of his circular sophistry now fails on that
> > > > > > basis.
> > > > > >
> > > > > Now why didn't the co-author of that book, Professor
> > > > > Carl Cohen think of that? You're a genius, Dutch!
> > > >
> > > > Although I don't remember verbatim, I believe Cohen
> > > > did make a similiar point.
> > >
> > > No, he didn't.
> >
> > As I recall, he did,
>
> Page number, please.

I had the book out from the library, and I'm not going to get it to provide
a page reference for a dipshit who can't even admit when he switches nyms.
Take it as MY observation if you prefer.

> > nonetheless, your objection is an Appeal to Authority
> > Fallacy, you haven't addressed my point at all.
> >
> How can a discussion over a book written by an
> authority be seen as an appeal to authority when
> the questions being put here are centered around
> the authority in question in the first place?

The Appeal to Authority Fallacy occurs when one argues that since some
authority says its true then it must be true. Your argument against the
validity of my comment on Regan's words is based on your recollection that
Cohen never said it in his refutation. The implication is that since (you
think) Cohen didn't make the point, it is therefore an invalid point. It's
an Appeal to Authority Fallacy, (albeit in reverse), you don't address my
actual argument at all, in fact you probably don't understand it.

> > > You haven't even read the book.
> >
> > How would you know that?
>
> Because I know you haven't the attention span required
> to read a book.

You know no such hing.

> > As it happens, I have read it.
> >
> No. You're lying, Dutch.

You're wrong, as usual.

> > > > Regan's argument is like saying 'suppose we weighed
> > > > a fellow and found him to be six feet tall'.
> > > >
> > > Yes, you're dead right. That's exactly what he meant.
> >
> > And that makes sense on what level exactly?
> >
> I'm taking the **** out of you. Can't you see that?

How could I possibly know when you are being serious and when you aren't?
You are massively inconsistent in every respect.

Of
> course Regan's argument ISN'T "like saying 'suppose
> we weighed a fellow and found him to be six feet tall'"
> stupid.

Actually it is, if you had followed the rest of my argument you would have
seen why.

The proposition should say:

"Suppose a given act, A, turns out to produce a net good when assessed by
preference utilitarianism's standards."

He's engaging in sophistry. Utilitarian measurements are not *intended* to
determine morality, although there is considerable overlap between that
which results in net gain or good and that which we consider moral.

> > > > The proposition should say:
> > > >
> > > [snip] No thanks, Dutch. I just can't bear it.
> >
> > Oh, gosh, how interesting Derek. Your lack tolerance for the truth is
well
> > established.
> >
> It's my lack of any tolerance for your stupid, childish
> analogies that I just can't bear, not a lack of tolerance
> for the truth.

Every time the going gets tough you bail out with one of these churlish
waves of your hand.

You CAN'T HANDLE the truth!!!

"Ipse dixit" > wrote in message
...
>
> "Dutch" > wrote in message
...
> > "Rat & Swan" > wrote
> > > Dutch wrote:
> > > > "Rat & Swan" > wrote
> > >
> > > > > I agree with Regan that utilitarianism is not a
> > > > > satisfactory basic position for defining ethics.
> > >
> > > > That's a strawman, nobody is saying that it is.
> > > > Utilitarianism determines if something, on balance,
> > > > is beneficial within a given frame of reference.
> > >
> > > You are wrong here -- utilitarian philosophers do indeed
> > > say that the choice with the greatest utility is moral,
> > > and ethics should be carried out on that basis.
> >
> > Perhaps in some abstract philisophical discussion in some university
lounge,
> > amongst wooly-headed academics, but in reality nobody, including those
same
> > academics, make judgements according to strict utilitarianism.
Judgements
> > always depend on a specific frame of reference. Strict utiltarianism
> > certainly has no application in this discussion.
> >
> When are you going to learn the basics of these
> discussions, Dutch? Trying to discuss the issues
> being raised here with you is like talking to a child.
> Read a book on it or something and stop wasting
> everyone's time and patience.

Stuff it Derek. Come back when you have something intelligent to say.

"Ipse dixit" > wrote in message
...
> On Mon, 10 Nov 2003 12:35:59 -0800, "Dutch" > wrote:
>
> >"Ipse dixit" > wrote
> >> "Dutch" > wrote
> >> > "Ipse dixit" > wrote
> >> > > "Dutch" > wrote
> >> > > > "Ipse dixit" > wrote
> >> > > > > "Dutch" > wrote
> >> > > > > > "Ipse dixit" > wrote
> >> > > > > >
> >> > > > > > > Suppose a given act, A, turns out to be morally
> >> > > > > > > right when assessed by preference utilitarianism's
> >> > > > > > > standards.
> >> > > > > >
> >> > > > > > He blows it right there, utilitarian calculations are,
> >> > > > > > by definition, for the purpose of determining if an
> >> > > > > > act is *useful*, not if it's morally right.
> >> > > > > >
> >> > > > > > The rest of his circular sophistry now fails on that
> >> > > > > > basis.
> >> > > > > >
> >> > > > > Now why didn't the co-author of that book, Professor
> >> > > > > Carl Cohen think of that? You're a genius, Dutch!
> >> > > >
> >> > > > Although I don't remember verbatim, I believe Cohen
> >> > > > did make a similiar point.
> >> > >
> >> > > No, he didn't.
> >> >
> >> > As I recall, he did,
> >>
> >> Page number, please.
> >
> >I had the book out from the library
>
> Hah! Yeah right.

Yep. Do YOU own it? If so, read what Cohen says about morality and
utilitarianism.

>
> > and I'm not going to get it to provide
> >a page reference for a dipshit
>
> Of course not; the dirt-floored hut you call a library in your
> shit hole of a town doesn't stock it.

That's Cerkowski, we have a modern library.

> >Take it as MY observation if you prefer.
> >
> No chance. You're a self-confessed delusional liar.

What a waste of time you are.

> [bullshit]
> >
> >You CAN'T HANDLE the truth!!!
> >
> Change the record.

Hah! The broken record is one of *your* pet techniques.

You're at least smart enough to avoid a genuine debate, you know it always
leads to you with egg on your face.

The Appeal to Authority Fallacy occurs when one argues that since some
authority says its true then it must be true. Your argument against the
validity of my comment on Regan's words is based on your recollection that
Cohen never said it in his refutation. The implication is that since (you
think) Cohen didn't make the point, it is therefore an invalid point. It's
an Appeal to Authority Fallacy, (albeit in reverse), you don't address my
actual argument at all, in fact you probably don't understand it.

"Ipse dixit" > wrote
> "Purple" > wrote

[..]

> > If an action complies with utalitarianism but not with your moral code
> > or vice versa then this does not mean there is anything wrong with
> > utalitarianism. It means there is something wrong with your moral
> > code.
>
> No. It simply means that using utilitarianism to judge
> the moral status of all actions is the wrong logical
> framework to use, since it can allow evil outcomes.

That's does not make it wrong, it's because utilitarianism offers a
framework for judging outcomes.

> One the other hand, if we were to follow Kant's
> categorical imperative we would find that a morally
> good action is one that is done out of respect for a
> moral law, and that any consequences following it
> are totally immaterial when judging it's moral status.

They aren't really immaterial, morality based thinking just lacks the
framework to assess them. Morality based decisions result in "evil" (i.e.
bad) outcomes. An example would be the deaths of millions of innocent people
resulting from a moral decision to refrain from torturing prisoners.

Proper thinking seamlessly integrates morality and utilitarian based
paradigms.

"Dutch" > wrote in message >...
> "Purple" > wrote
> > "Ipse dixit" > wrote
>
> > > Suppose a given act, A, turns out to be morally right
> > > when assessed by preference utilitarianism's standards.
> > > And suppose this moral verdict is rendered on the basis
> > > of calculating the overall preference satisfaction score,
> > > using preferences x, y, z. Given the evil outcomes
> > > utilitarianism can sanction, are we to conclude that A is
> > > right? And given the evil preferences it must count,
> > > are we to say that the preferences x, y, z are all morally
> > > above board?
> >
> > I believe that in the above paragraph Tom Regan is guilty of
> > putting the cart before the horse. The moral status of an action
> > can not reasonably be determined without a logical framework to
> > provide the appropriate criteria. Utalitarianism is the basis
> > of such a framework. If you disagree that it is the best framework
> > to use, tell me one thing which has anything more than a trivial
> > importance beside the quality of emotional state experienced
> > by lifeforms capabale of such experiences.
>
> Survival of individuals,

In many cases this is important to the quality of emotional states
experienced by the individual's friend's. Even when this is not so
the survival of an individual is likely to be very important to itself.
Given the choice most individual's would not sacrifice their
future positive experiences to be rid of the negative. However there
are some individuals who suffer from terminal incurable illnesses or
intolerable and incurable depression. Their death would be a net gain
because it is the survival of positive emotional states that is important.
Survival of individuals is merely a manifestation of it.

> of species,

Only important if and when they are an important part of an ecosystem or
their survival means something to somebody. Again it isn't something
which is important in its own right.

> of ecological systems,

Becuase they sustain life.

> success of species.

The important thing is the way the success of a speices affects members of
that species and those of other species.

> Quality of emotional states seem to be quite a subjective

I believe you know the difference between a pleasant experience and
an unpleasant one.

> and trivial consideration.

There is nothing trivial about the difference between being happy and being
sad.

> > As a thought experiment suppose the quality of an emotional state
> > could objectively be determined and expressed in units of "haps". In
> > my opinion
> > 1 hap experienced by 100 sentient lifeforms is somewhat less
> > significant
> > than 100 haps experienced by 1 sentient lifeform.
>
> This is a hedonistic approach, measuring good according to the amount of
> pleasure experienced.

Do you think "Hedonist" would describe me better than "utalitarianism?"

> > For sentient
> > lifeforms which are also moral agents I believe that one who
> > shows consideration to the emotional state of other's deserves
> > somewhat more consideration than one who does not.
>
> Most ethical systems preach that consideration for others be unconditional,
> not doled out according to how well they fulfil some test.

Indeed I can not justify incorporating a concept of justice into my belief
system. It is a personal choice, not a philosophical truth. What about your
ethical system. Do you treat consideration of others as unconditional?

> > Subject to these two qualifications I fully endorse utalitatianism.
>
> "utilitarianism" The root of the word is "utility" or usefulness.
>
> > If an action complies with utalitarianism but not with your moral code
> > or vice versa then this does not mean there is anything wrong with
> > utalitarianism. It means there is something wrong with your moral
> > code.
>
> Only to a strict utilitarian. AR is a kind of unholy marriage of
> utilitarianism and moralism.

"Ipse dixit" > wrote in message >...
> "Purple" > wrote in message om...
> > "Ipse dixit" > wrote in message >...
> > >
> > > Suppose a given act, A, turns out to be morally right
> > > when assessed by preference utilitarianism's standards.
> > > And suppose this moral verdict is rendered on the basis
> > > of calculating the overall preference satisfaction score,
> > > using preferences x, y, z. Given the evil outcomes
> > > utilitarianism can sanction, are we to conclude that A is
> > > right? And given the evil preferences it must count,
> > > are we to say that the preferences x, y, z are all morally
> > > above board?
> >
> > I believe that in the above paragraph Tom Regan is guilty of
> > putting the cart before the horse.
>
> Which means what, exactly, in this case? What
> part in that paragraph are you referring to as the
> cart, and which part the horse?

The decision that an outcome is evil is the cart. The means for
determining whether this outcome is evil is the horse.
>
> > The moral status of an action
> > can not reasonably be determined without a logical framework to
> > provide the appropriate criteria. Utalitarianism is the basis
> > of such a framework.
>
> Utilitarianism is one of at least two logical frameworks
> to provide a criteria to judge the moral status of an
> action.

I'm not saying it is the only logical framework though I have
yet to be convinced that any others make sense. What system
do you use?

> It cannot be used to judge the moral status of
> all actions, since, as Regan points out, it can sanction
> evil outcomes.

Depends how you define evil. The way I use the term if I were
to define an action as "justified by utalitarianism" and "evil"
then I would be contradicting myself.

> > If you disagree that it is the best framework
> > to use, tell me one thing which has anything more than a trivial
> > importance beside the quality of emotional state experienced
> > by lifeforms capabale of such experiences.
> >
> 1) The right to life;
> If the gassing of innocent hostages along with their
> kidnappers results in a greater happiness for the
> greater number of citizens by ridding their society
> of the terrorists who kidnapped them, then according
> to utilitarianism, such a trade would judge that the
> decision to gas them is a good one.

Indeed. A tough decision for anyone to have to make but they
are no more responsible for the hostages they gas than they would
be for the future victims of the terrorists they let loose.
Desperate situations call for damage limitation, not absolutist
reasoning.

> 2) Freedom from torture;
> If torturing prisoners of war for information brings
> about a speedy conclusion to war, then according
> to utilitarianism where doing what is expedient
> rather than right is sanctioned.

Utalitarian grounds can easily be applied against the use of
torture as a tactic. Indeed it could even be argued that although
torture may sometimes be beneficial, sanctioning it may lead to
an over-reliance and an acceptance of more general usage and
that sociey would therefore be better off pretending that
torture can never be justified.

> 3) The tragedy of the twin towers disaster;
> If World peace results as a consequence of this
> historic act of terrorism, as promised by Bush and
> Blair, then according to the utilitarianism rule where
> the consequences of an action judges the moral
> status of that action, billions of utilitarian would be
> forever in the debt of those terrorists.

No. Lucky coincidence doesn't justify evil intent.
>
> 4) Theft

In most cases theft leads to a net loss of utility.
In circumstances like shoplifting this may well not
be the case but if such behaviour became endemic our
society would collapse and we would all be much worse
off as a result. Since I have no more reason to shoplift
than the next guy I also have no right to do so.

> 5) Forced abortion.

In must circumstances this will lead to a net loss of utility.
However overpopulation is a growing problem....

> 6) etc.
>
> > As a thought experiment suppose the quality of an
> > emotional state could objectively be determined and
> > expressed in units of "haps". In my opinion 1 hap
> > experienced by 100 sentient lifeforms is somewhat
> > less significant than 100 haps experienced by 1
> > sentient lifeform.
>
> Then according to that premise we must all enslave
> ourselves to a single person's desires and happiness
> rather than pursue any happiness for ourselves. Who
> gets to decide the single beneficiary and the hundred
> benefactors?

It is arguable whether this is true but I think I need to
think this part of my philosophy through more carefully.
Back to the drawing board....

> > For sentient lifeforms which are
> > also moral agents I believe that one who shows
> > consideration to the emotional state of other's
> > deserves somewhat more consideration than one
> > who does not.
> >
> This contradicts your first premise,

Not quite but it does go some way towards undermining my first
premise. At the moment I am finding it hard to defend
my first premise so I have retracted it instead.

for if it is right
> to ensure a single person's happiness by prohibiting
> the happiness of one the hundred benefactors, as
> given in your example, then by definition that single
> beneficiary cannot show any consideration for the
> hundred others who must make themselves available
> to him else he breaks his own rule.

> > Subject to these two qualifications I fully endorse utalitatianism.
>
> But those qualifications do contradict each other, so
> to endorse utilitrarianism based on them makes no
> sense at all.
>
> > If an action complies with utalitarianism but not with your moral code
> > or vice versa then this does not mean there is anything wrong with
> > utalitarianism. It means there is something wrong with your moral
> > code.
>
> No. It simply means that using utilitarianism to judge
> the moral status of all actions is the wrong logical
> framework to use, since it can allow evil outcomes.

Inaccurate utalitarian calculus can lead to evil outcomes.
Accurate utalitarian calculus can not. Unfortunately the
latter is way outside the scope of the human mind.

> One the other hand, if we were to follow Kant's
> categorical imperative we would find that a morally
> good action is one that is done out of respect for a
> moral law, and that any consequences following it
> are totally immaterial when judging it's moral status.

To use a technical philosophical term the categorical
imperative is "a load of rubbish". However since the
utalitarian principle is susceptible to human error,
it may sometimes be pragmatic to pretend that it the
categorical imperative is a valid concept.

"Purple" > wrote
> "Dutch" > wrote
> > "Purple" > wrote
> > > "Ipse dixit" > wrote
> >
> > > > Suppose a given act, A, turns out to be morally right
> > > > when assessed by preference utilitarianism's standards.
> > > > And suppose this moral verdict is rendered on the basis
> > > > of calculating the overall preference satisfaction score,
> > > > using preferences x, y, z. Given the evil outcomes
> > > > utilitarianism can sanction, are we to conclude that A is
> > > > right? And given the evil preferences it must count,
> > > > are we to say that the preferences x, y, z are all morally
> > > > above board?
> > >
> > > I believe that in the above paragraph Tom Regan is guilty of
> > > putting the cart before the horse. The moral status of an action
> > > can not reasonably be determined without a logical framework to
> > > provide the appropriate criteria. Utalitarianism is the basis
> > > of such a framework. If you disagree that it is the best framework
> > > to use, tell me one thing which has anything more than a trivial
> > > importance beside the quality of emotional state experienced
> > > by lifeforms capabale of such experiences.
> >
> > Survival of individuals,
>
> In many cases this is important to the quality of emotional states
> experienced by the individual's friend's.

That sentence makes no sense.

> Even when this is not so
> the survival of an individual is likely to be very important to itself.

That's what I said, survival is more important than emotional state.

> Given the choice most individual's would not sacrifice their
> future positive experiences to be rid of the negative.

I agree.

> However there
> are some individuals who suffer from terminal incurable illnesses or
> intolerable and incurable depression. Their death would be a net gain

To whom?

> because it is the survival of positive emotional states that is important.
> Survival of individuals is merely a manifestation of it.

That's ridiculous, people can live productive, creative lives without ever
being perceived by others as "happy". Some great writers, artists and
musicians were well-known for being morose individuals. People become
accustomed to the emotional states that evolve in their lives.

> > of species,
>
> Only important if and when they are an important part of an ecosystem or
> their survival means something to somebody. Again it isn't something
> which is important in its own right.

Every species is an important part of an ecosystem.

>
> > of ecological systems,
>
> Becuase they sustain life.

duh

> > success of species.
>
> The important thing is the way the success of a speices affects members of
> that species and those of other species.

duh

> > Quality of emotional states seem to be quite a subjective
>
> I believe you know the difference between a pleasant experience and
> an unpleasant one.

So? Some people enjoy the feeling of pain, others enjoy inflicting pain.

> > and trivial consideration.
>
> There is nothing trivial about the difference between being happy and
being
> sad.

Yes there is, it's just a matter of how one is subjectively experiencing
life.

> > > As a thought experiment suppose the quality of an emotional state
> > > could objectively be determined and expressed in units of "haps". In
> > > my opinion
> > > 1 hap experienced by 100 sentient lifeforms is somewhat less
> > > significant
> > > than 100 haps experienced by 1 sentient lifeform.
> >
> > This is a hedonistic approach, measuring good according to the amount of
> > pleasure experienced.
>
> Do you think "Hedonist" would describe me better than "utalitarianism?"

Absolutely, it's easier to spell too.

> > > For sentient
> > > lifeforms which are also moral agents I believe that one who
> > > shows consideration to the emotional state of other's deserves
> > > somewhat more consideration than one who does not.
> >
> > Most ethical systems preach that consideration for others be
unconditional,
> > not doled out according to how well they fulfil some test.
>
> Indeed I can not justify incorporating a concept of justice into my belief
> system.

It's the only thing that really belongs in a system of moral values.

> It is a personal choice, not a philosophical truth.

I disagree, a concept of justice is what forms the foundation for most of
our laws and social structures.

> What about your
> ethical system. Do you treat consideration of others as unconditional?

No, but I'm no paragon of virtue. If I lived in accordance with pure ethical
behaviour as I see it I believe I would treat everyone the same, regardless
of their past history. If I know someone is a hurtful person, and I treat
them accordingly, what have I accomplished? Will they thereby be moved to
become more kind? Justice is mine, sayeth the Lord, or something like that.

> > > Subject to these two qualifications I fully endorse utalitatianism.
> >
> > "utilitarianism" The root of the word is "utility" or usefulness.
> >
> > > If an action complies with utalitarianism but not with your moral code
> > > or vice versa then this does not mean there is anything wrong with
> > > utalitarianism. It means there is something wrong with your moral
> > > code.
> >
> > Only to a strict utilitarian. AR is a kind of unholy marriage of
> > utilitarianism and moralism.

On Mon, 10 Nov 2003 12:42:27 -0800, "Dutch" > wrote:

>"Ipse dixit" > wrote in message
. ..

[snip]

>> When are you going to learn the basics of these
>> discussions, Dutch? Trying to discuss the issues
>> being raised here with you is like talking to a child.
>> Read a book on it or something and stop wasting
>> everyone's time and patience.

Derek, that's gotta be one of the most hypcritical complaints I've
ever read on usenet, and I've been reading much longer than you. In my
3 on-off-again years of tpa participation you haven't seriously
addressed a challenge or changed your argument one iota. You type but
don't read, listen, or comprehend, hence no discussion, which leads to
responses like...

>Stuff it Derek. Come back when you have something intelligent to say.

That's a death sentence, Dutch. One of his other personalities will no
doubt jump to his defense. It's about the only time he doesn't dodge,
c&p irrelevant material, or quote out of context.

Non causa, pro causa my...

-- swamp

"Ipse dixit" > wrote in message
...
> On Tue, 11 Nov 2003 07:23:53 GMT, swamp > wrote:
>
> >On Mon, 10 Nov 2003 12:42:27 -0800, "Dutch" > wrote:
> >
> >>"Ipse dixit" > wrote in message
...
> >
> >[snip]
> >
> >>> When are you going to learn the basics of these
> >>> discussions, Dutch? Trying to discuss the issues
> >>> being raised here with you is like talking to a child.
> >>> Read a book on it or something and stop wasting
> >>> everyone's time and patience.
> >
> >Derek, that's gotta be one of the most hypcritical complaints I've
> >ever read on usenet, and I've been reading much longer than you. In my
> >3 on-off-again years of tpa participation you haven't seriously
> >addressed a challenge
>
> I've addressed every challenge put to me. Test me now.

That's a lie, you snipped my arguments two messages up without responding or
noting and inserted the ad homimen. You do something similiar every time you
start to feel cornered.

> >or changed your argument one iota.
>
> Excuuuuuse me for being consistent.

Dogmatism and belligerence is not an admirable consistency.

"Ipse dixit" > wrote

> I favour a philosophy where an action ought to follow
> from moral reasoning and for its own sake rather than
> for the sake of some hoped for or probable outcome.
> In my view, these moral oughts for doing things can be
> looked upon as categorical rules which can only be
> trumped by more imperative oughts. Let's say you hold
> a view that a categorical imperative exists to always
> tell the truth? You ought to tell the truth whether you
> like it or not, but if the Gestapo were to ask you for
> the whereabouts of your Jewish pals, you might then
> find that your categorical imperative to "always tell
> the truth" has been trumped by another categorical
> imperative to "always tell lies to your enemies." At no
> time has your reasoning rested on the sake of some
> hoped for or probable outcome, but instead, out of a
> respect for a moral law you hold dear.

Bullshit, you're diverting from the moral rule to never lie because it may
have an unwanted outcome. You're doing what everyone does, use moral rules
as general guidelines then adjusting them using utilitarian considerations
according to the situation.

If a girl asks you if she looks slimmer or if her hair looks nice you always
say yes, whether or not she looks like a hippo or her hair is a haystack.
Her feelings are more important *in that situation* than your strict
adherence to a moral rule.

> Utilitarianism, on the other hand, insists that the moral
> status of an action rests on the net amount of happiness
> it will bring as a consequence of it, and I don't think that
> that is a satisfactory way of dealing with moral issues
> since it allows certain actions, such as vivisection,
> infanticide and rights violations to occur. It puts what
> is expedient above what is right, and following that to
> its logical end would mean that it is expedient for us to
> randomly kill infants for their youthful organs, which isn't
> right.

The way it works is moral guidelines are set out and generally adhered to
unless there is an overriding reason to violate them.

You should never kill another person, but if they are about to kill you or
some other innocent person, that is an intolerable outcome, so you change
the rule.

> >> It cannot be used to judge the moral status of
> >> all actions, since, as Regan points out, it can sanction
> >> evil outcomes.
> >
> >Depends how you define evil. The way I use the term if I were
> >to define an action as "justified by utalitarianism" and "evil"
> >then I would be contradicting myself.
> >
> I agree; you would be, because certain evils can
> be sanctioned when using utilitarian principles, so
> to follow them necessarily means condoning evil.

Following moral principles dogmatically can result in evil outcomes also.

>
> >> > If you disagree that it is the best framework
> >> > to use, tell me one thing which has anything more than a trivial
> >> > importance beside the quality of emotional state experienced
> >> > by lifeforms capabale of such experiences.
> >> >
> >> 1) The right to life;
> >> If the gassing of innocent hostages along with their
> >> kidnappers results in a greater happiness for the
> >> greater number of citizens by ridding their society
> >> of the terrorists who kidnapped them, then according
> >> to utilitarianism, such a trade would judge that the
> >> decision to gas them is a good one.
> >
> >Indeed. A tough decision for anyone to have to make but they
> >are no more responsible for the hostages they gas than they would
> >be for the future victims of the terrorists they let loose.
> >Desperate situations call for damage limitation, not absolutist
> >reasoning.
> >
> Nevertheless, it is an example where utilitarian principles
> will judge that the gassing of innocent hostages is morally
> acceptable, and you did ask me to find "one thing which
> has anything more than a trivial importance beside the
> quality of emotional state" if I disagreed that utilitarianism
> "is the best framework to use."
>
> >> 2) Freedom from torture;
> >> If torturing prisoners of war for information brings
> >> about a speedy conclusion to war, then according
> >> to utilitarianism where doing what is expedient
> >> rather than right is sanctioned.
> >
> >Utalitarian grounds can easily be applied against the use of
> >torture as a tactic.
>
> I don't think it can, but I'm willing to see some examples.
> Utilitarianism would demand torture if it brought about a
> greater net of happiness to others.
>
> >Indeed it could even be argued that although
> >torture may sometimes be beneficial, sanctioning it may lead to
> >an over-reliance and an acceptance of more general usage and
> >that sociey would therefore be better off pretending that
> >torture can never be justified.
> >
> I'm not sure I get what you mean here.

Torture is considered unacceptable because if it's use ever leaked into
civilian use it could end up being a tool commonly used by police to gain
confessions from suspects, who may be innocent. At the same time, it is
known by everyone that it's used in wartime, but it's use is never publicly
condoned.

> >> 3) The tragedy of the twin towers disaster;
> >> If World peace results as a consequence of this
> >> historic act of terrorism, as promised by Bush and
> >> Blair, then according to the utilitarianism rule where
> >> the consequences of an action judges the moral
> >> status of that action, billions of utilitarian would be
> >> forever in the debt of those terrorists.
> >
> >No. Lucky coincidence doesn't justify evil intent.
>
> Again, I'm not sure what you mean here. Where does
> "lucky coincidence" come into it? If World peace is
> established from what sparked off our country's war
> on Global terrorism, then the good consequences
> following from 9/11 tragedy that did all the sparking
> must necessarily judge the moral status of that act
> as a good one.

Just because an act may eventually lead to a good result does not make it
moral. A rape may result in the birth of a great leader, that doesn't change
the nature of the act of rape.

> >> 4) Theft
> >
> >In most cases theft leads to a net loss of utility.
>
> But if we were to thieve Richard Branson's money
> and use it to benefit millions of others, then those
> good consequences will judge the moral status of
> that theft as necessary and good.
>
> >In circumstances like shoplifting this may well not
> >be the case but if such behaviour became endemic our
> >society would collapse and we would all be much worse
> >off as a result. Since I have no more reason to shoplift
> >than the next guy I also have no right to do so.
> >
> >> 5) Forced abortion.
> >
> >In must circumstances this will lead to a net loss of utility.
> >However overpopulation is a growing problem....
> >
> But the question is, "is it *right* to force a woman into
> having an abortion so that others may benefit?" I'm
> thinking of China's "family planning laws" here.

"Is it right" to allow a country to become so overpopulated that disease,
deprivation, and starvation become the norm? Morality and utilitarianism are
inextricably linked.


[..]
> >> No. It simply means that using utilitarianism to judge
> >> the moral status of all actions is the wrong logical
> >> framework to use, since it can allow evil outcomes.
> >
> >Inaccurate utalitarian calculus can lead to evil outcomes.
> >Accurate utalitarian calculus can not.
>
> I disagree, since if an accurate moral calculus were
> to find that the sacrificial slaughter of one man would
> save the souls of every man on Earth, then Pontius
> Pilate unwittingly did the right thing.

In christian mythology, he is still a reviled as a turncoat, even though his
act of betrayal was instrumental in the salvation of man.

> >Unfortunately the
> >latter is way outside the scope of the human mind.
> >
> >> One the other hand, if we were to follow Kant's
> >> categorical imperative we would find that a morally
> >> good action is one that is done out of respect for a
> >> moral law, and that any consequences following it
> >> are totally immaterial when judging it's moral status.
> >
> >To use a technical philosophical term the categorical
> >imperative is "a load of rubbish".
>
> Oh, I'm sorry.
>
> >However since the
> >utalitarian principle is susceptible to human error,
> >it may sometimes be pragmatic to pretend that it the
> >categorical imperative is a valid concept.
>
> OK.

On Tue, 11 Nov 2003 14:35:56 GMT, Ipse dixit > wrote:

>On Tue, 11 Nov 2003 07:23:53 GMT, swamp > wrote:
>
>>On Mon, 10 Nov 2003 12:42:27 -0800, "Dutch" > wrote:
>>
>>>"Ipse dixit" > wrote in message ...
>>
>>[snip]
>>
>>>> When are you going to learn the basics of these
>>>> discussions, Dutch? Trying to discuss the issues
>>>> being raised here with you is like talking to a child.
>>>> Read a book on it or something and stop wasting
>>>> everyone's time and patience.
>>
>>Derek, that's gotta be one of the most hypcritical complaints I've
>>ever read on usenet, and I've been reading much longer than you. In my
>>3 on-off-again years of tpa participation you haven't seriously
>>addressed a challenge
>
>I've addressed every challenge put to me. Test me now.

ok, begin by defending your (mis)application of *non causa pro causa*
to justify your supermarket purcahses of goods you know derive from
practices you oppose. Then, explain why knowingly buying stolen goods
from a fence isn't analogous.

>>or changed your argument one iota.
>
>Excuuuuuse me for being consistent.

Consistency is admirable until it's valued above truth, and then it
becomes a handicap.

-- swamp

"Who, me officer? What's a ferut? These guys?? No, they're Polish cats."

"Dutch" > wrote in message >...
> "Purple" > wrote
> > "Dutch" > wrote
> > > "Purple" > wrote
> > > > "Ipse dixit" > wrote
>
> > > > > Suppose a given act, A, turns out to be morally right
> > > > > when assessed by preference utilitarianism's standards.
> > > > > And suppose this moral verdict is rendered on the basis
> > > > > of calculating the overall preference satisfaction score,
> > > > > using preferences x, y, z. Given the evil outcomes
> > > > > utilitarianism can sanction, are we to conclude that A is
> > > > > right? And given the evil preferences it must count,
> > > > > are we to say that the preferences x, y, z are all morally
> > > > > above board?
> > > >
> > > > I believe that in the above paragraph Tom Regan is guilty of
> > > > putting the cart before the horse. The moral status of an action
> > > > can not reasonably be determined without a logical framework to
> > > > provide the appropriate criteria. Utalitarianism is the basis
> > > > of such a framework. If you disagree that it is the best framework
> > > > to use, tell me one thing which has anything more than a trivial
> > > > importance beside the quality of emotional state experienced
> > > > by lifeforms capabale of such experiences.
> > >
> > > Survival of individuals,
> >
> > In many cases this is important to the quality of emotional states
> > experienced by the individual's friend's.
>
> That sentence makes no sense.

The importance of the survival of individual's may be derived directly
from consideration of emotional states since their death is liable
to make their friends unhappy.

> > Even when this is not so
> > the survival of an individual is likely to be very important to itself.
>
> That's what I said, survival is more important than emotional state.

Survival is the continuation of emotional states. It may be a good or
a bad thing depending on the individual's emotional states. In most cases
it is an extremely good thing.

> > Given the choice most individual's would not sacrifice their
> > future positive experiences to be rid of the negative.
>
> I agree.

So the importance of survival is derived from a consideration of emotional
states.
>
> > However there
> > are some individuals who suffer from terminal incurable illnesses or
> > intolerable and incurable depression. Their death would be a net gain
>
> To whom?

To them.
>
> > because it is the survival of positive emotional states that is important.
> > Survival of individuals is merely a manifestation of it.
>
> That's ridiculous, people can live productive, creative lives without ever
> being perceived by others as "happy".

What concerns me is whether they are percieved by themselves as happy.
If they have no desire to commit suicide the importance of their
continued survival is a manifestation of the importance of emotional
states.

>Some great writers, artists and
> musicians were well-known for being morose individuals. People become
> accustomed to the emotional states that evolve in their lives.
>
> > > of species,
> >
> > Only important if and when they are an important part of an ecosystem or
> > their survival means something to somebody. Again it isn't something
> > which is important in its own right.
>
> Every species is an important part of an ecosystem.
>
> >
> > > of ecological systems,
> >
> > Becuase they sustain life.
>
> duh

IOW they are important for their impact on emotional states, not in their
own right.
>
> > > success of species.
> >
> > The important thing is the way the success of a speices affects members of
> > that species and those of other species.
>
> duh

IOW it is important because of its impact on emotional states, not important
in its own right.

> > > Quality of emotional states seem to be quite a subjective
> >
> > I believe you know the difference between a pleasant experience and
> > an unpleasant one.
>
> So? Some people enjoy the feeling of pain, others enjoy inflicting pain.

Indeed and inflicting pain on someone who enjoys it should be considered
a positive.

> > > and trivial consideration.
> >
> > There is nothing trivial about the difference between being happy and
> being
> > sad.
>
> Yes there is, it's just a matter of how one is subjectively experiencing
> life.

I don't know about you but I prefer my subjective experience of life to
be enjoyable.

> > > > As a thought experiment suppose the quality of an emotional state
> > > > could objectively be determined and expressed in units of "haps". In
> > > > my opinion
> > > > 1 hap experienced by 100 sentient lifeforms is somewhat less
> > > > significant
> > > > than 100 haps experienced by 1 sentient lifeform.
> > >
> > > This is a hedonistic approach, measuring good according to the amount of
> > > pleasure experienced.
> >
> > Do you think "Hedonist" would describe me better than "utalitarianism?"
>
> Absolutely, it's easier to spell too.

:-)

> > > > For sentient
> > > > lifeforms which are also moral agents I believe that one who
> > > > shows consideration to the emotional state of other's deserves
> > > > somewhat more consideration than one who does not.
> > >
> > > Most ethical systems preach that consideration for others be
> unconditional,
> > > not doled out according to how well they fulfil some test.
> >
> > Indeed I can not justify incorporating a concept of justice into my belief
> > system.
>
> It's the only thing that really belongs in a system of moral values.

I think there has been a misunderstanding. The way I used the term was
to imply that evil people deserve less consideration than good people.
You have already implied this concept doesn't belong in most ethical
systems.

> > It is a personal choice, not a philosophical truth.
>
> I disagree, a concept of justice is what forms the foundation for most of
> our laws and social structures.

What do you mean by "justice"?
>
> > What about your
> > ethical system. Do you treat consideration of others as unconditional?
>
> No, but I'm no paragon of virtue. If I lived in accordance with pure ethical
> behaviour as I see it I believe I would treat everyone the same, regardless
> of their past history. If I know someone is a hurtful person, and I treat
> them accordingly, what have I accomplished? Will they thereby be moved to
> become more kind?

Can't really argue with that but I somehow feel uncomfortable with
the idea that bad people should be allowed to lead more enjoyable
lives than good people.

> Justice is mine, sayeth the Lord, or something like that.
>
> > > > Subject to these two qualifications I fully endorse utalitatianism.
> > >
> > > "utilitarianism" The root of the word is "utility" or usefulness.
> > >
> > > > If an action complies with utalitarianism but not with your moral code
> > > > or vice versa then this does not mean there is anything wrong with
> > > > utalitarianism. It means there is something wrong with your moral
> > > > code.
> > >
> > > Only to a strict utilitarian. AR is a kind of unholy marriage of
> > > utilitarianism and moralism.

Ipse dixit, I can not find any record of your reply to me
and am only aware of it becuase Dutch has replied. If he
snipped anything, please reinsert it.

"Dutch" > wrote in message >...
> "Ipse dixit" > wrote
>
> > I favour a philosophy where an action ought to follow
> > from moral reasoning and for its own sake rather than
> > for the sake of some hoped for or probable outcome.
> > In my view, these moral oughts for doing things can be
> > looked upon as categorical rules which can only be
> > trumped by more imperative oughts. Let's say you hold
> > a view that a categorical imperative exists to always
> > tell the truth? You ought to tell the truth whether you
> > like it or not, but if the Gestapo were to ask you for
> > the whereabouts of your Jewish pals, you might then
> > find that your categorical imperative to "always tell
> > the truth" has been trumped by another categorical
> > imperative to "always tell lies to your enemies." At no
> > time has your reasoning rested on the sake of some
> > hoped for or probable outcome, but instead, out of a
> > respect for a moral law you hold dear.

But by what process of moral reasoning do you derive your
categorical imperatives? Why should you always to the truth?
Why should you always lie to your enemies?

> > Utilitarianism, on the other hand, insists that the moral
> > status of an action rests on the net amount of happiness
> > it will bring as a consequence of it, and I don't think that
> > that is a satisfactory way of dealing with moral issues
> > since it allows certain actions, such as vivisection,
> > infanticide and rights violations to occur.

By what process of moral reasoning did you arrive at the conclusion
that vivisection, infanticide and rights violations are wrong.

> > It puts what
> > is expedient above what is right, and following that to
> > its logical end would mean that it is expedient for us to
> > randomly kill infants for their youthful organs, which isn't
> > right.

How would you justify randomly killing infants for their youthful
organs within an utilitarian framework?

> > >> It cannot be used to judge the moral status of
> > >> all actions, since, as Regan points out, it can sanction
> > >> evil outcomes.
> > >
> > >Depends how you define evil. The way I use the term if I were
> > >to define an action as "justified by utalitarianism" and "evil"
> > >then I would be contradicting myself.
> > >
> > I agree; you would be, because certain evils can
> > be sanctioned when using utilitarian principles, so
> > to follow them necessarily means condoning evil.
> >
> > >> > If you disagree that it is the best framework
> > >> > to use, tell me one thing which has anything more than a trivial
> > >> > importance beside the quality of emotional state experienced
> > >> > by lifeforms capabale of such experiences.
> > >> >
> > >> 1) The right to life;
> > >> If the gassing of innocent hostages along with their
> > >> kidnappers results in a greater happiness for the
> > >> greater number of citizens by ridding their society
> > >> of the terrorists who kidnapped them, then according
> > >> to utilitarianism, such a trade would judge that the
> > >> decision to gas them is a good one.
> > >
> > >Indeed. A tough decision for anyone to have to make but they
> > >are no more responsible for the hostages they gas than they would
> > >be for the future victims of the terrorists they let loose.
> > >Desperate situations call for damage limitation, not absolutist
> > >reasoning.
> > >
> > Nevertheless, it is an example where utilitarian principles
> > will judge that the gassing of innocent hostages is morally
> > acceptable,

Indeed.

> > and you did ask me to find "one thing which
> > has anything more than a trivial importance beside the
> > quality of emotional state" if I disagreed that utilitarianism
> > "is the best framework to use."

OK but why do you think killing a few innocent hostages is a lesser
evil than allowing devastating terrorism?

> > >> 2) Freedom from torture;
> > >> If torturing prisoners of war for information brings
> > >> about a speedy conclusion to war, then according
> > >> to utilitarianism where doing what is expedient
> > >> rather than right is sanctioned.
> > >
> > >Utalitarian grounds can easily be applied against the use of
> > >torture as a tactic.
> >
> > I don't think it can, but I'm willing to see some examples.

Consider the massive amount of suffering endured by the prisoner
under torture, the chance that he might not know anything useful
or may not crack or may give misleading information leading you
down the wrong path. Is it really so far fetched to suggest
the net utility resulting from the decision to torture is negative?

> > Utilitarianism would demand torture if it brought about a
> > greater net of happiness to others.

Indeed.

> > >Indeed it could even be argued that although
> > >torture may sometimes be beneficial, sanctioning it may lead to
> > >an over-reliance and an acceptance of more general usage and
> > >that sociey would therefore be better off pretending that
> > >torture can never be justified.
> > >
> > I'm not sure I get what you mean here.

I don't know enough about the issue to make a really informed but the
following argument seems plausible: occasionally torture may lead to
a net benefit but where the tactic is sanctioned it is invariably
overused leading to overall harm. Therefore it is better not to permit it.
Is that any clearer?

> > >> 3) The tragedy of the twin towers disaster;
> > >> If World peace results as a consequence of this
> > >> historic act of terrorism, as promised by Bush and
> > >> Blair, then according to the utilitarianism rule where
> > >> the consequences of an action judges the moral
> > >> status of that action, billions of utilitarian would be
> > >> forever in the debt of those terrorists.
> > >
> > >No. Lucky coincidence doesn't justify evil intent.
> >
> > Again, I'm not sure what you mean here. Where does
> > "lucky coincidence" come into it? If World peace is
> > established from what sparked off our country's war
> > on Global terrorism, then the good consequences
> > following from 9/11 tragedy that did all the sparking
> > must necessarily judge the moral status of that act
> > as a good one.
>
> Just because an act may eventually lead to a good result does not make it
> moral. A rape may result in the birth of a great leader, that doesn't change
> the nature of the act of rape.

Yes. That will do for me too.
>
> > >> 4) Theft
> > >
> > >In most cases theft leads to a net loss of utility.
> >
> > But if we were to thieve Richard Branson's money
> > and use it to benefit millions of others, then those
> > good consequences will judge the moral status of
> > that theft as necessary and good.

Not necessarily if you look at the bigger picture. Consider
how good a lawless society would be to live in. Consider the
reduced incentive to make good products or services for
society if one doesn't get to keep some of what they earn.
Of course there is a form of legalised theft called taxation
and the moral status of this is indeed good.

> > >In circumstances like shoplifting this may well not
> > >be the case but if such behaviour became endemic our
> > >society would collapse and we would all be much worse
> > >off as a result. Since I have no more reason to shoplift
> > >than the next guy I also have no right to do so.
> > >
> > >> 5) Forced abortion.
> > >
> > >In must circumstances this will lead to a net loss of utility.
> > >However overpopulation is a growing problem....
> > >
> > But the question is, "is it *right* to force a woman into
> > having an abortion so that others may benefit?" I'm
> > thinking of China's "family planning laws" here.
>
> "Is it right" to allow a country to become so overpopulated that disease,
> deprivation, and starvation become the norm? Morality and utilitarianism are
> inextricably linked.

That will do for me too.

> > >> No. It simply means that using utilitarianism to judge
> > >> the moral status of all actions is the wrong logical
> > >> framework to use, since it can allow evil outcomes.
> > >
> > >Inaccurate utalitarian calculus can lead to evil outcomes.
> > >Accurate utalitarian calculus can not.
> >
> > I disagree, since if an accurate moral calculus were
> > to find that the sacrificial slaughter of one man would
> > save the souls of every man on Earth, then Pontius
> > Pilate unwittingly did the right thing.

If all our souls could be saved by the sacrificial slaughter of
one man (preferably a mass murderer) than that would indeed be
a very good thing.

"Purple" > wrote in message om...
> Ipse dixit, I can not find any record of your reply to me
> and am only aware of it becuase Dutch has replied. If he
> snipped anything, please reinsert it.

It may have been because I posted it using a news rerader
which ex-archives my posts, so I'll send through Outlook
Express as well. Here's the whole post.

[start]
>"Ipse dixit" > wrote in message >...
>> "Purple" > wrote in message om...
>> > "Ipse dixit" > wrote in message >...
>> > >
>> > > Suppose a given act, A, turns out to be morally right
>> > > when assessed by preference utilitarianism's standards.
>> > > And suppose this moral verdict is rendered on the basis
>> > > of calculating the overall preference satisfaction score,
>> > > using preferences x, y, z. Given the evil outcomes
>> > > utilitarianism can sanction, are we to conclude that A is
>> > > right? And given the evil preferences it must count,
>> > > are we to say that the preferences x, y, z are all morally
>> > > above board?
>> >
>> > I believe that in the above paragraph Tom Regan is guilty of
>> > putting the cart before the horse.
>>
>> Which means what, exactly, in this case? What
>> part in that paragraph are you referring to as the
>> cart, and which part the horse?
>
>The decision that an outcome is evil is the cart. The means for
>determining whether this outcome is evil is the horse.

So, according to you, Regan is guilty of putting "the decision
that an outcome is evil" before "the means for determining
whether an outcome is evil"?
>>
>> > The moral status of an action
>> > can not reasonably be determined without a logical framework to
>> > provide the appropriate criteria. Utalitarianism is the basis
>> > of such a framework.
>>
>> Utilitarianism is one of at least two logical frameworks
>> to provide a criteria to judge the moral status of an
>> action.
>
>I'm not saying it is the only logical framework though I have
>yet to be convinced that any others make sense.

It seemed to me you were, but then it must be said
I am sometimes prone to jump the gun a bit. In fact,
quite prone actually, and more than just a bit if I'm to
be perfectly honest. In my defence though, it still
looks to me that you were laying down a challenge
and defying me to give you examples where only
utilitarianism principles can be used to judge the
moral status of an action - so there. ;-)

> What system do you use?
>
I favour a philosophy where an action ought to follow
from moral reasoning and for its own sake rather than
for the sake of some hoped for or probable outcome.
In my view, these moral oughts for doing things can be
looked upon as categorical rules which can only be
trumped by more imperative oughts. Let's say you hold
a view that a categorical imperative exists to always
tell the truth? You ought to tell the truth whether you
like it or not, but if the Gestapo were to ask you for
the whereabouts of your Jewish pals, you might then
find that your categorical imperative to "always tell
the truth" has been trumped by another categorical
imperative to "always tell lies to your enemies." At no
time has your reasoning rested on the sake of some
hoped for or probable outcome, but instead, out of a
respect for a moral law you hold dear.

Utilitarianism, on the other hand, insists that the moral
status of an action rests on the net amount of happiness
it will bring as a consequence of it, and I don't think that
that is a satisfactory way of dealing with moral issues
since it allows certain actions, such as vivisection,
infanticide and rights violations to occur. It puts what
is expedient above what is right, and following that to
its logical end would mean that it is expedient for us to
randomly kill infants for their youthful organs, which isn't
right.

>> It cannot be used to judge the moral status of
>> all actions, since, as Regan points out, it can sanction
>> evil outcomes.
>
>Depends how you define evil. The way I use the term if I were
>to define an action as "justified by utalitarianism" and "evil"
>then I would be contradicting myself.
>
I agree; you would be, because certain evils can
be sanctioned when using utilitarian principles, so
to follow them necessarily means condoning evil.

>> > If you disagree that it is the best framework
>> > to use, tell me one thing which has anything more than a trivial
>> > importance beside the quality of emotional state experienced
>> > by lifeforms capabale of such experiences.
>> >
>> 1) The right to life;
>> If the gassing of innocent hostages along with their
>> kidnappers results in a greater happiness for the
>> greater number of citizens by ridding their society
>> of the terrorists who kidnapped them, then according
>> to utilitarianism, such a trade would judge that the
>> decision to gas them is a good one.
>
>Indeed. A tough decision for anyone to have to make but they
>are no more responsible for the hostages they gas than they would
>be for the future victims of the terrorists they let loose.
>Desperate situations call for damage limitation, not absolutist
>reasoning.
>
Nevertheless, it is an example where utilitarian principles
will judge that the gassing of innocent hostages is morally
acceptable, and you did ask me to find "one thing which
has anything more than a trivial importance beside the
quality of emotional state" if I disagreed that utilitarianism
"is the best framework to use."

>> 2) Freedom from torture;
>> If torturing prisoners of war for information brings
>> about a speedy conclusion to war, then according
>> to utilitarianism where doing what is expedient
>> rather than right is sanctioned.
>
>Utalitarian grounds can easily be applied against the use of
>torture as a tactic.

I don't think it can, but I'm willing to see some examples.
Utilitarianism would demand torture if it brought about a
greater net of happiness to others.

>Indeed it could even be argued that although
>torture may sometimes be beneficial, sanctioning it may lead to
>an over-reliance and an acceptance of more general usage and
>that sociey would therefore be better off pretending that
>torture can never be justified.
>
I'm not sure I get what you mean here.

>> 3) The tragedy of the twin towers disaster;
>> If World peace results as a consequence of this
>> historic act of terrorism, as promised by Bush and
>> Blair, then according to the utilitarianism rule where
>> the consequences of an action judges the moral
>> status of that action, billions of utilitarian would be
>> forever in the debt of those terrorists.
>
>No. Lucky coincidence doesn't justify evil intent.

Again, I'm not sure what you mean here. Where does
"lucky coincidence" come into it? If World peace is
established from what sparked off our country's war
on Global terrorism, then the good consequences
following from 9/11 tragedy that did all the sparking
must necessarily judge the moral status of that act
as a good one.
>>
>> 4) Theft
>
>In most cases theft leads to a net loss of utility.

But if we were to thieve Richard Branson's money
and use it to benefit millions of others, then those
good consequences will judge the moral status of
that theft as necessary and good.

>In circumstances like shoplifting this may well not
>be the case but if such behaviour became endemic our
>society would collapse and we would all be much worse
>off as a result. Since I have no more reason to shoplift
>than the next guy I also have no right to do so.
>
>> 5) Forced abortion.
>
>In must circumstances this will lead to a net loss of utility.
>However overpopulation is a growing problem....
>
But the question is, "is it *right* to force a woman into
having an abortion so that others may benefit?" I'm
thinking of China's "family planning laws" here.

>> 6) etc.

That one got you stumped.
>>
>> > As a thought experiment suppose the quality of an
>> > emotional state could objectively be determined and
>> > expressed in units of "haps". In my opinion 1 hap
>> > experienced by 100 sentient lifeforms is somewhat
>> > less significant than 100 haps experienced by 1
>> > sentient lifeform.
>>
>> Then according to that premise we must all enslave
>> ourselves to a single person's desires and happiness
>> rather than pursue any happiness for ourselves. Who
>> gets to decide the single beneficiary and the hundred
>> benefactors?
>
>It is arguable whether this is true but I think I need to
>think this part of my philosophy through more carefully.
>Back to the drawing board....
>
;-)

>> > For sentient lifeforms which are
>> > also moral agents I believe that one who shows
>> > consideration to the emotional state of other's
>> > deserves somewhat more consideration than one
>> > who does not.
>> >
>> This contradicts your first premise,
>
>Not quite but it does go some way towards undermining my first
>premise. At the moment I am finding it hard to defend
>my first premise so I have retracted it instead.
>
I see.

> for if it is right
>> to ensure a single person's happiness by prohibiting
>> the happiness of one the hundred benefactors, as
>> given in your example, then by definition that single
>> beneficiary cannot show any consideration for the
>> hundred others who must make themselves available
>> to him else he breaks his own rule.
>
>> > Subject to these two qualifications I fully endorse utalitatianism.
>>
>> But those qualifications do contradict each other, so
>> to endorse utilitrarianism based on them makes no
>> sense at all.
>>
>> > If an action complies with utalitarianism but not with your moral code
>> > or vice versa then this does not mean there is anything wrong with
>> > utalitarianism. It means there is something wrong with your moral
>> > code.
>>
>> No. It simply means that using utilitarianism to judge
>> the moral status of all actions is the wrong logical
>> framework to use, since it can allow evil outcomes.
>
>Inaccurate utalitarian calculus can lead to evil outcomes.
>Accurate utalitarian calculus can not.

I disagree, since if an accurate moral calculus were
to find that the sacrificial slaughter of one man would
save the souls of every man on Earth, then Pontius
Pilate unwittingly did the right thing.

>Unfortunately the
>latter is way outside the scope of the human mind.
>
>> One the other hand, if we were to follow Kant's
>> categorical imperative we would find that a morally
>> good action is one that is done out of respect for a
>> moral law, and that any consequences following it
>> are totally immaterial when judging it's moral status.
>
>To use a technical philosophical term the categorical
>imperative is "a load of rubbish".

Oh, I'm sorry.

>However since the
>utalitarian principle is susceptible to human error,
>it may sometimes be pragmatic to pretend that it the
>categorical imperative is a valid concept.

OK.
[end]

"Ipse dixit" > wrote in message
...
> On Tue, 11 Nov 2003 09:57:38 -0800, "Dutch" > wrote:
>
> >"Ipse dixit" > wrote in message
...
> >> On Tue, 11 Nov 2003 07:23:53 GMT, swamp >
wrote:
> >> >On Mon, 10 Nov 2003 12:42:27 -0800, "Dutch" > wrote:
> >> >>"Ipse dixit" > wrote in message
...
> >> >
> >> >[snip]
> >> >
> >> >>> When are you going to learn the basics of these
> >> >>> discussions, Dutch? Trying to discuss the issues
> >> >>> being raised here with you is like talking to a child.
> >> >>> Read a book on it or something and stop wasting
> >> >>> everyone's time and patience.
> >> >
> >> >Derek, that's gotta be one of the most hypcritical complaints I've
> >> >ever read on usenet, and I've been reading much longer than you. In my
> >> >3 on-off-again years of tpa participation you haven't seriously
> >> >addressed a challenge
> >>
> >> I've addressed every challenge put to me. Test me now.
> >
> >That's a lie, you snipped my arguments two messages up without responding
or
> >noting and inserted the ad homimen. You do something similiar every time
you
> >start to feel cornered.
> >
> If I ever do ignore the crap you post, it's because it isn't
> a valid challenge to my position, argument or stance on
> animal rights and veganism. It's mostly just childish,
> unworkable analogies that I can't be bothered to waste
> my time on.

BULLSHIT! If I made invalid arguments or analogies you would jump all over
them. Your problem is they are valid arguments and revealing analogies for
which you have no satisfactory answer.. In this case I was having a
discussion *with Rat* and made a whole series of reasonable points. You
intervened with your usual idiotic wave of the hand dismissal. Derek, if
anyone doesn't grasp the basics here it's YOU.


>
> >> >or changed your argument one iota.
> >>
> >> Excuuuuuse me for being consistent.
> >
> >Dogmatism and belligerence is not an admirable consistency.
> >
>
>

"Ipse dixit" > wrote in message
...
> On Wed, 12 Nov 2003 09:01:57 -0800, "Dutch" > wrote:
>
> >"Ipse dixit" > wrote in message
...
> >> On Tue, 11 Nov 2003 09:57:38 -0800, "Dutch" > wrote:
> >> >"Ipse dixit" > wrote in message
...
> >> >> On Tue, 11 Nov 2003 07:23:53 GMT, swamp
>wrote:
> >> >> >On Mon, 10 Nov 2003 12:42:27 -0800, "Dutch" > wrote:
> >> >> >>"Ipse dixit" > wrote in message
...
> >> >> >
> >> >> >[snip]
> >> >> >
> >> >> >>> When are you going to learn the basics of these
> >> >> >>> discussions, Dutch? Trying to discuss the issues
> >> >> >>> being raised here with you is like talking to a child.
> >> >> >>> Read a book on it or something and stop wasting
> >> >> >>> everyone's time and patience.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >Derek, that's gotta be one of the most hypcritical complaints I've
> >> >> >ever read on usenet, and I've been reading much longer than you. In
my
> >> >> >3 on-off-again years of tpa participation you haven't seriously
> >> >> >addressed a challenge
> >> >>
> >> >> I've addressed every challenge put to me. Test me now.
> >> >
> >> >That's a lie, you snipped my arguments two messages up
> >> >without responding or noting and inserted the ad homimen.
> >> >You do something similiar every time you start to feel cornered.
> >> >
> >> If I ever do ignore the crap you post, it's because it isn't
> >> a valid challenge to my position, argument or stance on
> >> animal rights and veganism. It's mostly just childish,
> >> unworkable analogies that I can't be bothered to waste
> >> my time on.
> >
> >BULLSHIT!
>
> Look at your last effort of an analogy between Regan's
> argument and the weight of a man measuring six feet;

Quit snipping without noting, you unethical hyprocrite.

> "Regan's argument is like saying 'suppose we weighed
> a fellow and found him to be six feet tall."
> Dutch 2003-11-09
>
> It's pathetic, and I've no time or inclination to even bother
> with it, so Lord knows why you think I would feel cornered
> by it.

You feel cornered not by that single analogy, but by the weight of the
reason that I bring to the whole argument. My point in the analogy you quote
is that Regan is saying that it's wrong to measure the morality of something
by utilitarian means. I'm saying that's a strawman, we all use utilitarian
considerations in concert with moral guidelines, not instead of them.

You repeatedly demonstrate an utter lack of understanding of even your own
arguments that you copy from websites.

"Ipse dixit" > wrote
> On Tue, 11 Nov 2003 10:29:35 -0800, "Dutch" > wrote:
>
> >"Ipse dixit" > wrote
> >
> >> I favour a philosophy where an action ought to follow
> >> from moral reasoning and for its own sake rather than
> >> for the sake of some hoped for or probable outcome.
> >> In my view, these moral oughts for doing things can be
> >> looked upon as categorical rules which can only be
> >> trumped by more imperative oughts. Let's say you hold
> >> a view that a categorical imperative exists to always
> >> tell the truth? You ought to tell the truth whether you
> >> like it or not, but if the Gestapo were to ask you for
> >> the whereabouts of your Jewish pals, you might then
> >> find that your categorical imperative to "always tell
> >> the truth" has been trumped by another categorical
> >> imperative to "always tell lies to your enemies." At no
> >> time has your reasoning rested on the sake of some
> >> hoped for or probable outcome, but instead, out of a
> >> respect for a moral law you hold dear.
> >
> >Bullshit, you're diverting from the moral rule to never lie because it
may
> >have an unwanted outcome.
>
> Rather than diverting from one rule, as you put it, When
> faced with an enemy instead of a friend, a different
> categorical imperative trumps the previous one and
> forces you to lie to your enemies. Karen's son can only
> disobey a direct order if it has been trumped by another's
> where a higher duty lies, such as one from a higher
> ranking officer than before.
>
> >You're doing what everyone does, use moral rules
> >as general guidelines then adjusting them
>
> That's right.
>
> >using utilitarian considerations
> >according to the situation.
> >
> No. Either action is performed out of a respect for a
> moral law rather than from any thoughts for the following
> consequences.

Wrong, the reason you create an exception to the rule is because it will
have an unwanted consequence in that instance. There is no moral law to
always lie to your enemies, in fact a soldier is instructed to give his
correct name, rank, and serial number.

> >If a girl asks you if she looks slimmer or if her hair looks nice you
always
> >say yes, whether or not she looks like a hippo or her hair is a haystack.
>
> Speak for yourself, Dutch, but I would rather just reply,
> "No" than be rude by telling her she looks like a hippo.
>
> >Her feelings are more important *in that situation* than your strict
> >adherence to a moral rule.
> >
> To tell a lie to a friend is wrong, and that would hurt her
> feelings even more, so my rule still remains.

You're taking the wrong approach again, it's most often the best course to
lie to avoid hurting a person's feelings.

> >> Utilitarianism, on the other hand, insists that the moral
> >> status of an action rests on the net amount of happiness
> >> it will bring as a consequence of it, and I don't think that
> >> that is a satisfactory way of dealing with moral issues
> >> since it allows certain actions, such as vivisection,
> >> infanticide and rights violations to occur. It puts what
> >> is expedient above what is right, and following that to
> >> its logical end would mean that it is expedient for us to
> >> randomly kill infants for their youthful organs, which isn't
> >> right.
> >
> >The way it works is moral guidelines are set out and generally adhered to
> >unless there is an overriding reason to violate them.
> >
> >You should never kill another person, but if they are about to kill you
or
> >some other innocent person, that is an intolerable outcome, so you change
> >the rule.
> >
> Then you are agreeing with me. A higher duty to a higher
> moral imperative demands that it trumps the previous one;
> "not to kill."

No, you are making an exception to the rule because following it in the
specific case will have an intolerable outcome. If it weren't for the fear
of the negative outcome you would follow the rule. It's utilitarian.

> >> >> It cannot be used to judge the moral status of
> >> >> all actions, since, as Regan points out, it can sanction
> >> >> evil outcomes.
> >> >
> >> >Depends how you define evil. The way I use the term if I were
> >> >to define an action as "justified by utalitarianism" and "evil"
> >> >then I would be contradicting myself.
> >> >
> >> I agree; you would be, because certain evils can
> >> be sanctioned when using utilitarian principles, so
> >> to follow them necessarily means condoning evil.
> >
> >Following moral principles dogmatically can result in evil outcomes also.
> >
> Some examples would be nice.

Always telling the truth would hurt people's feelings unecessarily all the
time, and make you a social pariah.
Never killing another person (passivity) would permit the most horrible of
worst case scenarios to happen.
Never employing torture in wartime could lead to many thousands more deaths.

[..]

> >Torture is considered unacceptable because if it's use ever leaked into
> >civilian use it could end up being a tool commonly used by police to gain
> >confessions from suspects, who may be innocent. At the same time, it is
> >known by everyone that it's used in wartime, but it's use is never
publicly
> >condoned.
> >
> It's not considered unacceptable purely on those grounds.
> It's unacceptable because it is morally wrong to violate the
> rights of the victim being tortured; again an action or inaction
> performed out of a respect for a moral law rather than from
> looking towards any hoped-for beneficial consequences.

But, as in the case of killing another human being or lying, we make
exceptions to moral rules in extraordinary circumstances. Especially in
war, where mass exceptions to the rule of killing people are made. In the
case of torture specifically, the exception remains mute.

> >> >> 3) The tragedy of the twin towers disaster;
> >> >> If World peace results as a consequence of this
> >> >> historic act of terrorism, as promised by Bush and
> >> >> Blair, then according to the utilitarianism rule where
> >> >> the consequences of an action judges the moral
> >> >> status of that action, billions of utilitarian would be
> >> >> forever in the debt of those terrorists.
> >> >
> >> >No. Lucky coincidence doesn't justify evil intent.
> >>
> >> Again, I'm not sure what you mean here. Where does
> >> "lucky coincidence" come into it? If World peace is
> >> established from what sparked off our country's war
> >> on Global terrorism, then the good consequences
> >> following from 9/11 tragedy that did all the sparking
> >> must necessarily judge the moral status of that act
> >> as a good one.
> >
> >Just because an act may eventually lead to a good result does not make it
> >moral.
>
> PERFECT !!

You just agreed that your statement above was incorrect.

It's also true that just because an act contradicts a moral guideline, or
leads to a negative result, that it's necessarily immoral.

> >A rape may result in the birth of a great leader, that doesn't change
> >the nature of the act of rape.
> >
> A good example.

Thank you.

> >> >> 4) Theft
> >> >
> >> >In most cases theft leads to a net loss of utility.
> >>
> >> But if we were to thieve Richard Branson's money
> >> and use it to benefit millions of others, then those
> >> good consequences will judge the moral status of
> >> that theft as necessary and good.
> >>
> >> >In circumstances like shoplifting this may well not
> >> >be the case but if such behaviour became endemic our
> >> >society would collapse and we would all be much worse
> >> >off as a result. Since I have no more reason to shoplift
> >> >than the next guy I also have no right to do so.
> >> >
> >> >> 5) Forced abortion.
> >> >
> >> >In must circumstances this will lead to a net loss of utility.
> >> >However overpopulation is a growing problem....
> >> >
> >> But the question is, "is it *right* to force a woman into
> >> having an abortion so that others may benefit?" I'm
> >> thinking of China's "family planning laws" here.
> >
> >"Is it right" to allow a country to become so overpopulated that disease,
> >deprivation, and starvation become the norm? Morality and utilitarianism
are
> >inextricably linked.

Please take note.


[..]

"Ipse dixit" > wrote in message
...
> On Wed, 12 Nov 2003 01:18:50 GMT, swamp > wrote:
[..]
> >ok, begin by defending your (mis)application of *non causa pro causa*
>
> Non causa pro causa
[..]
> http://gncurtis.home.texas.net/index.html

Quoting the definition doesn't mean you are applying it correctly.

>to justify your supermarket purcahses of goods you know derive from
> >practices you oppose.
>
> Who ever said "I know" that the goods I buy derive from practices
> I oppose? I've always maintained that I buy my goods in good faith.

Presuming against all odds that a situation exists favorably to you is not
good faith.

> > Then, explain why knowingly buying stolen goods
> >from a fence isn't analogous.
[..]
> But the analogy between (A) and (B) is weak because
> customers buying from farmers have no choice but to
> buy from them, while there are two markets open for
> cars; the black market or retail shops.

False, the consumers of agribusiness food products have other options, they
just happen to be more difficult and inconvenient. Vegans are only
interested in easy, convenient options, that's why they're hypocrites in
their judgmental attitudes.

> The potential car buyer has the choice NOT to buy
> from the crook thereby avoiding responsibility for
> car theft personally and generally, but the customer
> buying food doesn't have this privilege because all
> food is provided by a single market; the farmer.

Not only is there NOT only *one farmer*, you (vegans in general) do NOT have
to let others provide their food for them, that's a choice based on ease and
convenience.

Vegans can also choose to see their dietary choices realistically as
reasonable half-measures, but that would not provide the rush associated
with sanctimony.

> One side of the analogy is very dissimilar from the
> other and I see that as a weak analogy.

The sides are equal, in both cases a consumer is making a choice based
primarily on self-interest rather than according to a moral law.

"Ipse dixit" > wrote in message
...
> On Wed, 12 Nov 2003 11:12:36 -0800, "Dutch" > wrote:
>
> >"Ipse dixit" > wrote in message
> .. .
> >> On Wed, 12 Nov 2003 09:01:57 -0800, "Dutch" > wrote:
>
> >> >> >> I've addressed every challenge put to me. Test me now.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >That's a lie, you snipped my arguments two messages up
> >> >> >without responding or noting and inserted the ad homimen.
> >> >> >You do something similiar every time you start to feel cornered.
> >> >> >
> >> >> If I ever do ignore the crap you post, it's because it isn't
> >> >> a valid challenge to my position, argument or stance on
> >> >> animal rights and veganism. It's mostly just childish,
> >> >> unworkable analogies that I can't be bothered to waste
> >> >> my time on.
> >> >
> >> >BULLSHIT!
> >>
> >> Look at your last effort of an analogy between Regan's
> >> argument and the weight of a man measuring six feet;
> >
> >Quit snipping without noting, you unethical hyprocrite.
>
> I'll do exactly what I like.

Then you'll continue to be an unethical hypocrite.

> If I ever do snip anything, it is
> because it's just more of the same nonsense I snipped
> earlier.

BULLSHIT! You snip new information ALL THE TIME, without noting.

You have one (very low) standard for yourself and a very different one for
everyone else.

> >> "Regan's argument is like saying 'suppose we weighed
> >> a fellow and found him to be six feet tall."
> >> Dutch 2003-11-09
> >>
> >> It's pathetic, and I've no time or inclination to even bother
> >> with it, so Lord knows why you think I would feel cornered
> >> by it.
> >
> >You feel cornered not by that single analogy
>
> Yeah right. It's a killer.

**** off you useless sack of shit.

"Ipse dixit" > wrote
> On Wed, 12 Nov 2003 14:13:26 -0800, "Dutch" > wrote:
>
> >"Ipse dixit" > wrote in message
> .. .
> >> On Wed, 12 Nov 2003 11:12:36 -0800, "Dutch" > wrote:
> >>
> >> >"Ipse dixit" > wrote in message
> >> .. .
> >> >> On Wed, 12 Nov 2003 09:01:57 -0800, "Dutch" > wrote:
> >>
> >> >> >> >> I've addressed every challenge put to me. Test me now.
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >That's a lie, you snipped my arguments two messages up
> >> >> >> >without responding or noting and inserted the ad homimen.
> >> >> >> >You do something similiar every time you start to feel cornered.
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> If I ever do ignore the crap you post, it's because it isn't
> >> >> >> a valid challenge to my position, argument or stance on
> >> >> >> animal rights and veganism. It's mostly just childish,
> >> >> >> unworkable analogies that I can't be bothered to waste
> >> >> >> my time on.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >BULLSHIT!
> >> >>
> >> >> Look at your last effort of an analogy between Regan's
> >> >> argument and the weight of a man measuring six feet;
> >> >
> >> >Quit snipping without noting, you unethical hyprocrite.
> >>
> >> I'll do exactly what I like.
> >
> >Then you'll continue to be an unethical hypocrite.
> >
> >> If I ever do snip anything, it is
> >> because it's just more of the same nonsense I snipped
> >> earlier.
> >
> >BULLSHIT!
>
> Are you trying to emulate "Usual Suspect" as well as
> Jon now, Dutch?

Does he call bullshit on you too? That's not surprising.

> >> >> "Regan's argument is like saying 'suppose we weighed
> >> >> a fellow and found him to be six feet tall."
> >> >> Dutch 2003-11-09
> >> >>
> >> >> It's pathetic, and I've no time or inclination to even bother
> >> >> with it, so Lord knows why you think I would feel cornered
> >> >> by it.
> >> >
> >> >You feel cornered not by that single analogy
> >>
> >> Yeah right. It's a killer.

You didn't read what I said.

> >**** off you useless sack of shit.
> >
> Try making me.

I already did. I made a rational argument and forced you to snip and hide
behind lame non sequitors.

On Wed, 12 Nov 2003 07:22:11 GMT, Ipse dixit > wrote:

>On Wed, 12 Nov 2003 01:18:50 GMT, swamp > wrote:
>
>>On Tue, 11 Nov 2003 14:35:56 GMT, Ipse dixit > wrote:
>>
>>>On Tue, 11 Nov 2003 07:23:53 GMT, swamp > wrote:
>>>
>>>>On Mon, 10 Nov 2003 12:42:27 -0800, "Dutch" > wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>"Ipse dixit" > wrote in message ...
>>>>
>>>>[snip]
>>>>
>>>>>> When are you going to learn the basics of these
>>>>>> discussions, Dutch? Trying to discuss the issues
>>>>>> being raised here with you is like talking to a child.
>>>>>> Read a book on it or something and stop wasting
>>>>>> everyone's time and patience.
>>>>
>>>>Derek, that's gotta be one of the most hypcritical complaints I've
>>>>ever read on usenet, and I've been reading much longer than you. In my
>>>>3 on-off-again years of tpa participation you haven't seriously
>>>>addressed a challenge
>>>
>>>I've addressed every challenge put to me. Test me now.
>>
>>ok, begin by defending your (mis)application of *non causa pro causa*
>
>Non causa pro causa
>
>1.. Type-Level: A causal law has the form:
>
>Events of type C cause events of type E.

No, event type A (buying veggies at the supermarket) leads to event B
(the farmer using competitive methods). Otherwise, he's off the
shelves and out of business because events like you (type C) don't
really care enough to keep event A from happening.

>Here, we are not talking about a causal relation
>holding between two particular events...

Oh, yes we are.

>... but the
>general causal relation holding between instances
>of two types of event. For example, when we
>say that smoking cigarettes causes lung cancer,
>we are not talking about an individual act of
>smoking causing a particular case of lung cancer.
>Rather, we mean that smoking is a type of event
>which causes another type of event, namely,
>cancer.

Ah, so it's the cigarette manufacturer who's to blame, not the smoker?
You guys kill me faster than you can kill yourselves. I suppose you'll
go after gun manufacturers next?

>Mistakes about type-level causation are the
>result of confusing correlation with causation.

Mistakes in logic are far more common.

>Two types of event may occur simultaneously,
>or one type always following the other type,
>without there being a causal relation between
>them. One common source of non-causal
>correlations between two event-types is when
>both are effects of a third type of event.
>http://gncurtis.home.texas.net/index.html

Your "mistake" isn't among one of the above, however. You, like the
smokers, knowingly endorse the causal relationship the shift the
blame.

>>to justify your supermarket purcahses of goods you know derive from
>>practices you oppose.
>
>Who ever said "I know" that the goods I buy derive from practices
>I oppose? I've always maintained that I buy my goods in good faith

Maintain all you want. You buy anyway.

>> Then, explain why knowingly buying stolen goods
>>from a fence isn't analogous.

[snip]

>The potential car buyer has the choice NOT to buy
>from the crook....

....as you have the choice to not buy from the farmers you hold
responsible.

>thereby avoiding responsibility for
>car theft personally and generally, but the customer
>buying food doesn't have this privilege because all
>food is provided by a single market; the farmer.

Uh-huh. Except that you can buy a car that isn't stolen just as you
can buy organic veggies or grow them yourself. It'll cost you more, of
course. It all comes down to money w/ ar/ev types, doesn't it?

>One side of the analogy is very dissimilar from the
>other and I see that as a weak analogy.

You have to. Your argument dissolves elsewise.

-- swamp

"Ipse dixit" > wrote in message
...
> On Wed, 12 Nov 2003 17:41:25 -0800, "Dutch" > wrote:
> >"Ipse dixit" > wrote
> >> On Wed, 12 Nov 2003 14:13:26 -0800, "Dutch" > wrote:
> >> >"Ipse dixit" > wrote in message
...
> >> >> On Wed, 12 Nov 2003 11:12:36 -0800, "Dutch" > wrote:
> >> >> >"Ipse dixit" > wrote in message
...
> >> >> >> On Wed, 12 Nov 2003 09:01:57 -0800, "Dutch" > wrote:
> >> >>
> >> >> >> >> >> I've addressed every challenge put to me. Test me now.
> >> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >> >That's a lie, you snipped my arguments two messages up
> >> >> >> >> >without responding or noting and inserted the ad homimen.
> >> >> >> >> >You do something similiar every time you start to feel
cornered.
> >> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >> If I ever do ignore the crap you post, it's because it isn't
> >> >> >> >> a valid challenge to my position, argument or stance on
> >> >> >> >> animal rights and veganism. It's mostly just childish,
> >> >> >> >> unworkable analogies that I can't be bothered to waste
> >> >> >> >> my time on.
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >BULLSHIT!
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> Look at your last effort of an analogy between Regan's
> >> >> >> argument and the weight of a man measuring six feet;
> >> >> >
> >> >> >Quit snipping without noting, you unethical hyprocrite.
> >> >>
> >> >> I'll do exactly what I like.
> >> >
> >> >Then you'll continue to be an unethical hypocrite.
> >> >
> >> >> If I ever do snip anything, it is
> >> >> because it's just more of the same nonsense I snipped
> >> >> earlier.
> >> >
> >> >BULLSHIT!
> >>
> >> Are you trying to emulate "Usual Suspect" as well as
> >> Jon now, Dutch?
> >
> >Does he call bullshit on you too?
>
> He starts off most of his objections in that way, and being
> that you haven't a mind of your own and lack any real
> personality it's obvious you're trying to emulate him in the
> same way you've tried emulating Ball these last few years.
> I thought it better I ought to tell you rather than let you
> continue to make an arse of yourself.

You seem to be deluded by the notion that a constant stream of ad hominem
fallacies makes up for a lack of validity in your arguments, it doesn't.

> >> >> >> "Regan's argument is like saying 'suppose we weighed
> >> >> >> a fellow and found him to be six feet tall."
> >> >> >> Dutch 2003-11-09
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> It's pathetic, and I've no time or inclination to even bother
> >> >> >> with it, so Lord knows why you think I would feel cornered
> >> >> >> by it.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >You feel cornered not by that single analogy
> >> >>
> >> >> Yeah right. It's a killer.
> >
> >You didn't read what I said.
> >
> Yes, I did, and it was the same kind of scruffy, sloppy
> rubbish you always write, so I didn't bother with it and
> snipped it away rather waste my time tidying it all up just
> to make a small reply. Increase your line width like
> everyone keeps asking you or use the "Enter" key to
> drop a line, slob.

You seem to be deluded by the notion that a constant stream of ad hominem
fallacies makes up for a lack of validity in your arguments, it doesn't.

> >> >**** off you useless sack of shit.
> >> >
> >> Try making me.
> >
> >I already did.
>
> No, you obviously haven't. You're delusional.

Yes, I obviously have, or else you wouldn't be using ad hominem fallacies in
place of arguments.

"Ipse dixit" > wrote in message >...
> "Purple" > wrote in message om...
> > Ipse dixit, I can not find any record of your reply to me
> > and am only aware of it becuase Dutch has replied. If he
> > snipped anything, please reinsert it.
>
> It may have been because I posted it using a news rerader
> which ex-archives my posts, so I'll send through Outlook
> Express as well. Here's the whole post.

Thanks. I read the newsgroup via google and seem to have recently
stopped seeing your posts. I shall reply to the parts I missed.
If you would like to continue the conversation you could try replying
to my email address. It is valid but does have an automatic spam filter
so I'm not sure if it will work.

> >> > > Suppose a given act, A, turns out to be morally right
> >> > > when assessed by preference utilitarianism's standards.
> >> > > And suppose this moral verdict is rendered on the basis
> >> > > of calculating the overall preference satisfaction score,
> >> > > using preferences x, y, z. Given the evil outcomes
> >> > > utilitarianism can sanction, are we to conclude that A is
> >> > > right? And given the evil preferences it must count,
> >> > > are we to say that the preferences x, y, z are all morally
> >> > > above board?
> >> >
> >> > I believe that in the above paragraph Tom Regan is guilty of
> >> > putting the cart before the horse.
> >>
> >> Which means what, exactly, in this case? What
> >> part in that paragraph are you referring to as the
> >> cart, and which part the horse?
> >
> >The decision that an outcome is evil is the cart. The means for
> >determining whether this outcome is evil is the horse.
>
> So, according to you, Regan is guilty of putting "the decision
> that an outcome is evil" before "the means for determining
> whether an outcome is evil"?

Basically yes. He is determining an outcome to be evil without
sound reasoning and then concluding that utilitarianism is
wrong because it doesn't always back up his judgement.
> >>
> >> > The moral status of an action
> >> > can not reasonably be determined without a logical framework to
> >> > provide the appropriate criteria. Utalitarianism is the basis
> >> > of such a framework.
> >>
> >> Utilitarianism is one of at least two logical frameworks
> >> to provide a criteria to judge the moral status of an
> >> action.
> >
> >I'm not saying it is the only logical framework though I have
> >yet to be convinced that any others make sense.
>
> It seemed to me you were, but then it must be said
> I am sometimes prone to jump the gun a bit.

Perhaps I was claiming it was the only valid system but
then went into denial because I normally pride myself on
a lack of dogmatism.

> In fact,
> quite prone actually, and more than just a bit if I'm to
> be perfectly honest. In my defence though, it still
> looks to me that you were laying down a challenge
> and defying me to give you examples where only
> utilitarianism principles can be used to judge the
> moral status of an action - so there. ;-)

Indeed I was laying down that challenge and still am to
some extent. I have of course conceeded that the
categorical imperative can be useful in certain
circumstances but only because it is impossible to use
utilitarianism with 100% accuracy.

Rest of the post already responded to.

On Thu, 13 Nov 2003 13:04:47 GMT, Ipse dixit > wrote:

>On Thu, 13 Nov 2003 06:52:41 GMT, swamp > wrote:
>
>>On Wed, 12 Nov 2003 07:22:11 GMT, Ipse dixit > wrote:
>>
>>>On Wed, 12 Nov 2003 01:18:50 GMT, swamp > wrote:
>>>
>>>>On Tue, 11 Nov 2003 14:35:56 GMT, Ipse dixit > wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>On Tue, 11 Nov 2003 07:23:53 GMT, swamp > wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>On Mon, 10 Nov 2003 12:42:27 -0800, "Dutch" > wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>"Ipse dixit" > wrote in message ...

>Why didn't you stick with the original algebraic terms "C" and "E"?
>But anyway, if you were to read the full explanation of why your
>argument invokes the non causa pro causa fallacy, instead of
>jumping in after the first sentence invoking the same fallacy again,
>then you might actually learn something.

I'm not interested in learning sloppy logic.

>The fallacy of Non Causa Pro Causa occurs when something is
>identified as the cause of an event, but it has not actually been
>shown to be the cause.
>http://www.infidels.org/news/atheism....html#noncausa
>
>You have not shown that (buying veggies at the supermarket)
>is identified as the cause for farmers causing their collateral
>deaths.

I really shouldn't have to, as it's a very simple formula, but I'll
indulge you. The "organic" farmer can't compete w/ the farmer who uses
pesticides, fertilizer, heavy machinery, and all those other things
that lead to CDs. His yield is lower, and his produce is less
attractive to the average buyer. Unless you ar/evs step up and support
him he goes out of business. Thus, he is forced to adopt the practices
you decry *because* you demand cheap veggies.

I don't know about jolly old England, but there are produce marts here
which cater to those who are willing to pay a premium for "organic"
foods. Costs almost twice as much, tho, and the lettuce leaves have
holes in them, and it's common to find insects chomping away. Are you
willing to make that sacrifice?

>>Otherwise, he's off the
>>shelves and out of business because events like you (type C) don't
>>really care enough to keep event A from happening.
>>
>And now you're invoking yet another fallacy but asserting that
>should one event occur (an adoption of different method to
>reduce collateral deaths), the so will other harmful events (he'll
>go out of business).
>
>Slippery Slope Argument;
>This argument states that should one event occur, so will other
>harmful events. There is no proof made that the harmful events
>are caused by the first event.
>http://www.infidels.org/news/atheism/logic.html#slope
>
>Wake up and read what you're writing

There's no slippery slope here, and the "harmful event" is only damage
to your pocketbook. That and it takes more acreage to grow the same
amount, so more native animals will be displaced. A small issue, I
pre-concede.

>>>Here, we are not talking about a causal relation
>>>holding between two particular events...
>>
>>Oh, yes we are.
>>
>Oh, no I'm not.

Yes, you are. You're simply denying your deliberate contribution.

>>>... but the
>>>general causal relation holding between instances
>>>of two types of event. For example, when we
>>>say that smoking cigarettes causes lung cancer,
>>>we are not talking about an individual act of
>>>smoking causing a particular case of lung cancer.
>>>Rather, we mean that smoking is a type of event
>>>which causes another type of event, namely,
>>>cancer.
>>
>>Ah, so it's the cigarette manufacturer who's to blame, not the smoker?
>
>No. You've misread it.

You've missed the point.

>>You guys kill me faster than you can kill yourselves. I suppose you'll
>>go after gun manufacturers next?
>>
>No. That would be absurd.

Now you're getting it. Think farmer = gun manufacturer.

>>>Mistakes about type-level causation are the
>>>result of confusing correlation with causation.
>>
>>Mistakes in logic are far more common.
>>
>As far as you're concerned; yes that's true.

Possibly, At least I attempt to correct them.

>>>Two types of event may occur simultaneously,
>>>or one type always following the other type,
>>>without there being a causal relation between
>>>them. One common source of non-causal
>>>correlations between two event-types is when
>>>both are effects of a third type of event.
>>>http://gncurtis.home.texas.net/index.html
>>
>>Your "mistake" isn't among one of the above, however.
>
>The refutation I use to stop you insisting I have a
>causal relationship to the farmer's collateral deaths
>is exactly as that given above. If you want to insist
>it isn't despite my telling you it is, then we are at an
>impasse where the only way forward is for you to
>prove you can read my mind as well as Jonathan
>claims to.

You have *stated* that you play no role in CDs; no mind-reading is
necessary. I am attempting, tho I know the effort will be futile, to
demonstrate how your actions affect the practices of the farmer which
lead to CDs.

>>You, like the smokers, knowingly endorse the causal
>>relationship the shift the blame.
>>
>I, like most other smokers, take the blame for my own
>actions rather than blame fag companies for the
>damage I do to my health.

Good for you. People this side are getting rich blaming the fag
companies. Now apply that same thinking to the farmers and your
position becomes consistent.

>>>>to justify your supermarket purcahses of goods you know derive from
>>>>practices you oppose.
>>>
>>>Who ever said "I know" that the goods I buy derive from practices
>>>I oppose? I've always maintained that I buy my goods in good faith
>>
>>Maintain all you want.
>
>I will.

....and will continue to be foolishly consistent.

>>You buy anyway.
>>
>And, as I've pointed out many times before, I don't
>see any causal link between my trade with him and
>the method he uses to satisfy my demand.

Not seeing it doesn't mean it isn't there.

>It doesn't instruct him to farm one way or the other.

But it absolutely does. The purchase implies satisfaction w/ the
product. This isn't rocket science, Derek.

>Those options...

They aren't options. How many times must this be repeated to you? The
cheap, attractive, leafy veggies you demand require the farmer to use
the methods you condemn.

>...are his, and he, being completely autonomous is fully
>responsible for his actions. I blame him on the basis
>that he is a morally responsible agent carrying
>obligations to endure the consequences of his actions.
>Physical evidence tells you who is culpable for them,
>so for you to then claim that the responsibility for them
>segues from him to me through thin air is merely a
>belief on your part and doesn't

Your argument fails at "options." Furthermore, he's hired by you every
time you buy from him. $$ and ££s aren't "thin air."

>>>> Then, explain why knowingly buying stolen goods
>>>>from a fence isn't analogous.
>>
>>[snip]
>>
>So, first of all you screech and wail about some alleged
>failure on my part to ever address the issues raised here,
>and when I show you the evidence proving I have
>addressed them, you snip it all away. Hah! So in answer
>to your above question, again;
>
>It is a weak analogy in the form
>A is like B.
>B has property P.
>Therefore, A has property P.
>(Where the analogy between A and B is weak.)
>
>(A) buying from a farmer causing collateral deaths
>is like
>(B) buying from a crook stealing cars.
>(B) has the property (P), a responsibility for car theft.
>Therefore, (A) buying from a farmer causing collateral
>deaths has the property (P), a responsibility for
>collateral deaths.
>
>But the analogy between (A) and (B) is weak because
>customers buying from farmers have no choice but to
>buy from them, while there are two markets open for
>cars; the black market or retail shops.

More psuedo-formulaic denial. There's no A, B, C, E or P. There's you
purchasing the cheapest, most CD laden veggies on the market. No need
for algebra. Cheap, convenient veggies = CDs. Period.

>>>The potential car buyer has the choice NOT to buy
>>>from the crook....
>>
>>...as you have the choice to not buy from the farmers you hold
>>responsible.
>
>No.

Yes. You have chosen to buy from those you accuse of killing and are
therefore complicit in said killing.

>Whoever produces the food we buy will be a farmer,
>and according to your argument they all cause collateral
>deaths, but in the case of a potential car buyer, he has
>the choice to buy one from a retailer as well as the black
>market, so the analogy between the potential car buyer
>and a consumer buying goods from farmers is invalid
>because they don't both carry the same property (P).

You and the car buyer both have options. You have chosen the less
expensive, more convenient, animals be damned one. Welcome to the real
world.

>>>thereby avoiding responsibility for
>>>car theft personally and generally, but the customer
>>>buying food doesn't have this privilege because all
>>>food is provided by a single market; the farmer.
>>
>>Uh-huh. Except that you can buy a car that isn't stolen
>>just as you can buy organic veggies or grow them yourself.
>
>Which would mean dismissing the farmer altogether,
>proving even more that the analogy between him and
>the car market is invalid. Thanks.

Actually, it dismisses the car dealer. You need to eat but you don't
need to drive a car.

>> It'll cost you more, of
>>course. It all comes down to money w/ ar/ev types, doesn't it?
>>
>No.

Partly true. It comes down to money w/ all of us, only you deny it.

>>>One side of the analogy is very dissimilar from the
>>>other and I see that as a weak analogy.
>>
>>You have to. Your argument dissolves elsewise.
>>
>So, getting back to your initial claim, how can you
>honestly say that in your 3-year participation here
>you've never seen me seriously addressed a single
>challenge?

In those 3 years you haven't managed nor seriously addressed the CD
obstacle. Blaming the farmers you patronize rings hollow.

And on that note, I rest my case,

-- swamp