On Jun 18, 3:51 pm, Rudy Canoza > wrote:
> Rupert wrote:
> > On Jun 17, 3:17 pm, Rudy Canoza > wrote:
> >> Rupert wrote:
> >>> On Jun 7, 1:53 am, Rudy Canoza > wrote:
> >>>> Rupert wrote:
> >>>>> On Jun 6, 2:57 pm, Rudy Canoza > wrote:
> >>>>>> Rupert wrote:
> >>>>>>> On Jun 6, 3:27 am, Rudy Canoza >
wrote:
> >>>>>>>> Don wrote:
> >>>>>>>>> "Kadaitcha Man" > wrote in message
> ix.com...
> >>>>>>>>>> Dutch > Thou issue of a mangy dog. Thou
damnable fellow. Ye
> >>>>>>>>>> afforded:
> >>>>>>>>>>> Diet is not normally considered to be a major
> >>>>>>>>>>> moral issue except by vegans, so a non-vegan who decides
they want to
> >>>>>>>>>>> explore the health benefits of a vegan diet is unlikely
to feel a
> >>>>>>>>>>> moral barrier to making such a change, that would not
even come up as
> >>>>>>>>>>> an issue. However, a vegan who is used to thinking of
their diet as a
> >>>>>>>>>>> statement of moral commitment, which is most of them, is
very likely
> >>>>>>>>>>> to have psychological barriers or hangups preventing them
from
> >>>>>>>>>>> starting to eat meat.
> >>>>>>>>>> Suppose, for one moment, that all vegans suddenly discover
that their
> >>>>>>>>>> bodies
> >>>>>>>>>> are lacking in a certain mineral or enzyme (et al) and
that they will die
> >>>>>>>>>> horrible deaths over the space of a month due to the
supposed lack. Also
> >>>>>>>>>> suppose that they must do what the man below did or die
horribly because
> >>>>>>>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>>> life-saving ingredient cannot be obtained any other way:
>
>>>>>>>>>>http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20070605/...uk_china_frogs
> >>>>>>>>>> How many vegans do you suppose will succumb to their
innate will to live
> >>>>>>>>>> thereby ****ing off their alleged "moral commitment"?
> >>>>>>>>>> I say damn near every one of them would. So then, what
value is the "moral
> >>>>>>>>>> commitment"?
> >>>>>>>>> This so called *moral code* is largely a figment of the
posters imagination.
> >>>>>>>> No. What is imaginary is your belief that you are
> >>>>>>>> morally superior by virtue of not consuming animal
> >>>>>>>> parts. That such a false moral belief underlies
> >>>>>>>> "veganism" is not in rational dispute.
> >>>>>>> Why is it false,
> >>>>>> Not consuming the parts doesn't mean one doesn't harm
> >>>>>> animals, killer.
> >>>>> Yes, I know.
> >>>> Then, you know why the moral belief is false, too.
> >>> Here we go again. Just because vegans also financially support
> >>> processes which harm animals
> >> No, cocksucker - not "[merely] financially support",
> >> you shitbag.
>
> > "Financial support" is
>
> ...is a lie.

Nonsense.

> It is not "[merely] financial support",
> and that is the incorrect description.

It is very obviously a correct description, and there's nothing wrong
with it.

> That is a
> sleazy, deliberately deceptive attempt to minimize what
> it is they do,

It's not.

> and it has FAILED, rupie.

There was never any attempt to begin with.

Anyway, if you are so obviously right, then why are you making it
more
hard for my replies to be seen by restricting the follow-up to
"alt.usenet.kooks"? Seems to me like an unethical attempt to block me
from
replying.

On Jun 18, 5:19 pm, "Dutch" > wrote:
> "Rupert" > wrote> On Jun 18, 6:30 am, "Dutch" > wrote:
>
> [..]
>
>
>
>
>
> >> >> > Preference utilitarianism is the view that we ought to perform that
> >> >> > action which will lead to the greatest expected amount of overall
> >> >> > preference-satisfaction, for all sentient beings over all future
> >> >> > time,
> >> >> > of the actions available to us.
>
> >> >> Which doesn't even attempt to say why the preferences
> >> >> of non-human entities ought be given any weight as all.
>
> >> > Why shouldn't they?
>
> >> Because those preferences conflict with ours.
>
> > Well, I might as well say, "Why should I give anyone else's
> > preferences any consideration, when they conflict with mine?" What
> > justification is there for drawing the distinction on the basis of
> > species? Why not on the basis of race, or on whether someone was born
> > in a leap year?
>
> Because species signifies differences in sentience, sometime vast
> differences. Year of birth doesn't signify anything.
>

Species membership is *correlated* with differences in cognitive
capacity. You could maintain that cognitive capacity makes a
difference. But that's not the position under attack. Ball maintains
that *all* sentient humans have rights, regardless of cognitive
capacity, and no nonhumans do. That's a position which discriminates
on the basis of species alone, not on the basis of cognitive capacity.
And that *is* analogous to a position which discriminates on the basis
of race or year of birth. Species in itself is no more significant
than race or year of birth, the cognitive capacities correlated with
it may be.


>
>
> >> > What grounds are there for giving no weight to
> >> > preferences of nonhuman beings, any more than there are grounds for
> >> > giving no weight to the preferences of humans with dark skin?
>
> >> There are relevant bases for differentiation between species, there are
> >> none
> >> between races of humans.
>
> > Well, we've been through this many many times. There are differences
> > between typical humans and typical nonhumans, but if you're going to
> > make those the basis of differentiation then some humans will fall
> > outside the protected circle.
>
> Ability vs "capability", read the essay.
>
> > Incidentally, there are measurable differences between the average IQ
> > scores of different races.
>
> What do average IQs have to do with anything?
>

Well, your average IQ score is correlated with the extent to which you
have some of the cognitive capacities which you seem to regard as so
important.

> >> > If you're taking the viewpoint that preference-satisfaction is what
> >> > matters, then if anyone is going to say that the preferences of some
> >> > beings don't count, the burden is on them to explain why.
>
> >> It's not even that they don't count, it's that they are overruled.
> >> Organisms
> >> always place priority on their own preferences.
>
> > Well, preference utilitarians say we should consider all interests of
> > all parties affected equally.
>
> Nobody does that.
>

What of it?

> > You may not agree with it, that's fine,
> > I'm just expounding for you what the theory says, as an example of a
> > theory that is consistent with equal consideration.
>
> Nothing is consistent with "equal consideration", nobody knows what it
> means, and an equally inscrutable catch-phrase will not pass as a lucid
> definition. Consideration is always specific.
>

Sigh. All right, well, I tried.

>
>
>
>
> >> >> As soon as they attempt it, they get circular.
>
> >> >> ****ing bullshit from start to finish. Among other
> >> >> things, it can - and has - led to some half-witted
> >> >> self-styled "philosopher" trying to show that the
> >> >> (il)logic of the larder is *correct*: that we "ought"
> >> >> to want to cause livestock to exist, because the amount
> >> >> of utility they experience up to the point we kill them
> >> >> exceeds the disutility they experience from being killed.
>
> >> >> You ****ing ****, rupie - you're trying to help that
> >> >> goddamned ****ing pervert ****wit David Harrison.
>
> >> > I'm not advocating preference utilitarianism, I'm explaining what it
> >> > is for the purpose of explaining to Dutch what theories are consistent
> >> > with equal consideration.
>
> >> You have never explained it, you just assert it.
>
> > I'm explaining what it says. I'm not asserting that it is the correct
> > theory.
>
> You're repeating catch-phrases, you're not explaining anything.

Like I said, I gave it another go. It proved just as fruitless as last
time. If you're not going to listen and take some trouble to
understand, of course I can't explain anything to you.

On Jun 18, 7:46 pm, "Dutch" > wrote:
> "Rupert" > wrote
>
> [..]
>
> > If I point out that existing institutions are based on discrimination
> > that lacks justification,
>
> The charge has to be plausible. It isn't sufficient that a small group of
> wild-eyed fanatics "point something out". I could point out that women
> routinely choose men as husbands, discriminating against many good dogs.
> That is not a plausible argument, and no justification is needed except to
> inform you that dogs are the wrong species.
>

That's a matter of personal preference, it doesn't need justification.
Inflicting harm on sentient beings does need justification.

> > then the burden of proof is on those who
> > would seek to justify those institutions.
>
> No, the burden remains on you to establish that your charge is plausible,
> you haven't, in fact everything you say in support of your charge only
> undermines it by it's sheer brutal circularity and lack of coherence.
>

Well, I don't agree. In my talk, I point out that species
discrimination exists and challenge those who would support it to come
up with a justification. That's a reasonable request.

> >If I lived in the nineteenth
> > century and wanted to challenge the institution of enslaving black
> > people, it would have been sufficient for me to point out that it was
> > based on arbitrary discrimination and ask for a justification for that
> > discrimination. How else could I have argued that the institution was
> > wrong?
>
> By arguing that skin colour was not a morally relevant criterion to
> discriminate on, it's immaterial. Species is morally relevant because it
> signals that an animal either has or lacks the ability and/or capability to
> exhibit higher cognitive functions like advanced self-awareness, knowledge
> of living in time and mortality. So far only humans have demonstrated this
> cap/ability.

In that case its the cognitive capacities which are morally relevant,
not species in itself. And that's fine as long as people are prepared
to be consistent and follow through with the implications of that, but
nobody is.

On Jun 18, 5:26 pm, "Dutch" > wrote:
> "Rupert" > wrote.
>
> > If I were in the nineteenth
> > century and I were arguing that the interests of black people should
> > be given equal weight to those of white people, it would not be my job
> > to make a positive case. It would be sufficient simply to challenge my
> > opponents to give good grounds on which to discriminate against black
> > people.
>
> You can't base your position on the assumption that racism provides a valid
> example. It doesn't, it's an absurd argument. The differences between negro
> men and white men are insignificant compared to the differences between a
> chicken and a human being.

That's an attempt to meet the burden of proof, which is basically
conceding my point. My analogy is valid regarding the issue of where
the burden of proof lies.

On Jun 18, 6:53 pm, "Dutch" > wrote:
> "Rupert" > wrote in message
>
> oups.com...
>
> > On Jun 18, 7:18 am, "Dutch" > wrote:
> >> "Rupert" > wrote
>
> >> > On Jun 17, 4:57 pm, "Dutch" > wrote:
>
> >> [..]
>
> >> >> > Preference utilitarianism is the view that we ought to perform that
> >> >> > action which will lead to the greatest expected amount of overall
> >> >> > preference-satisfaction, for all sentient beings over all future
> >> >> > time,
> >> >> > of the actions available to us.
>
> >> >> What if what leads to the most satisfaction to me leads to death for
> >> >> another
> >> >> sentient being, like a chicken?
>
> >> > Then you weigh up the interests of all those affected.
>
> >> The interest of the chicken in survival is discounted because it is not
> >> sufficiently sentient to be aware of its existence across time. My
> >> interest
> >> in consuming chicken wins.
>
> > Well, Peter Singer would not be in unqualified agreement with you. He
> > has a discussion of this in Chapter 5 of "Practical Ethics". Please
> > don't whinge about my referring to books. We are discussing Peter
> > Singer's views here, not my own. If you want to understand what those
> > views are, you should read what he wrote.
>
> I don't, I asked YOU.
>

I don't think you're justified in killing a chicken just because you
feel hungry, when other nutritious food is available.

> >> >> > A theory is consistent with equal
> >> >> > consideration if the means it advocates by which to resolve moral
> >> >> > decisions give equal weight to the relevantly similar interests of
> >> >> > all
> >> >> > sentient beings, regardless of species.
>
> >> >> What does "relevantly similar" mean? Relevant to me or the chicken?
>
> >> > It means similar in all morally relevant respects.
>
> >> It's invalid to use the same words in the explanation that are used in
> >> the
> >> phrase being defined.
>
> > See my reply to Ball.
>
> No, give me a real definition.
>

The notion of moral relevance is fundamental, it hasn't got a
definition. You yourself used it when you said that race and year of
birth were not morally relevant but the cognitive capacities
correlated with species were.

> >> > The issue is who
> >> > has the most at stake.
>
> >> If you actually use "equal consideration" in the literal sense then the
> >> animal *always* has more at stake in the immediate equation. Therefore
> >> the
> >> consideration is not really equal, it's weighted. Show how its weighted.
>
> > What Peter Singer advocates is equal consideration.
>
> No it isn't.
>

Sigh. You admit that you don't understand the concept. So maybe you
should pay attention to my attempts to explain it to you, rather than
decide for yourself whether it applies.

> >> >> > Preference utilitarianism is
> >> >> > consistent with equal consideration because it weighs the relevantly
> >> >> > similar interests of any two sentient beings equally, regardless of
> >> >> > species.
>
> >> >> Chickens want to live, I want to eat chicken. Who wins?
>
> >> > It depends on who has more at stake.
>
> >> Who wins, me or the chicken? I want your opinion.
>
> > I'm not a preference utilitarian. If I were, I wouldn't think it would
> > be right for you to kill a chicken who happened to be passing by just
> > because you felt hungry, no.
>
> Why not? Isn't the hunger of a highly sentient being more important than the
> life of a marginally sentient one?
>

Not really, not when you can easily assuage your hunger in other ways.

> > When the chicken was brought into
> > existence because of your desire to eat it, the issue is more complex.
>
> Do tell.
>

According to Peter Singer, anyway. He thinks that you may be justified
in bringing a being who does not have a concept of itself as a subject
existing over time and then killing it painlessly, assuming you
couldn't bring it into existence without prematurely killing it.
However in "Practical Ethics" he suggests it may be best to have a
general rule of thumb not to kill animals for food, because the
temptation to ignore their important interests when we use them for
economic purposes would be too great.

> [..]
>
>
>
> >> > Yeah, you're right, complex issues are raised in actually applying
> >> > preference utilitarianism, and it may not be absolutely clear what it
> >> > actually entails about our situation. You want to argue about this,
> >> > maybe you should thrash it out with Peter Singer. I'm just presenting
> >> > it to you as an example.
>
> >> You're the one who claimed that preference utilitarianism is consistent
> >> wih
> >> equal consideration. How did you arrive at that conclusion?
>
> > It gives equal weight to the relevantly similar interests of all
> > sentient beings.
>
> You don't have the slightest idea do you? You just type catch-phrases and
> expect people to stand in awe of your intellect.
>

No, I don't. I don't think this concept is particularly hard to
understand, and I think I'm giving a good explanation of it. If the
explanation I give is not clear, then we can illustrate it by
considering specifical ethical frameworks, which is what I've been
trying to do. But you haven't been very good at listening.

> [..]
>
>
>
> >> Sure, but the fundamental issue is the use of animals as a food source,
> >> and
> >> he doesn't challenge that.
>
> > Well, actually, he does in "Practical Ethics", but he may have
> > softened his views somewhat since then.
>
> Maybe he flops around as the situation warrants, ARAs tend to do that.
>
> >> >> >> > It's set forth
> >> >> >> > in "Practical Ethics". He only thinks it's acceptable provided it
> >> >> >> > is
> >> >> >> > reasonable to assume that the animals do not have a concept of
> >> >> >> > themselves as an entity existing over time.
>
> >> >> >> That is essentially why everyone feels justified in the way we
> >> >> >> treat
> >> >> >> animals. It captures one major component of the difference between
> >> >> >> humans
> >> >> >> and other species, seeing oneself as mortal.
>
> >> >> > Well, maybe you would find Singer's philosophy congenial then. I
> >> >> > work
> >> >> > with an organization called "Animal Liberation" which was founded
> >> >> > shortly after the publication of Singer's book of the same title,
> >> >> > and
> >> >> > regards itself as having goals that are based on Singer's
> >> >> > philosophy.
> >> >> > At the same time a lot of people who work with the organization are
> >> >> > strongly critical of Singer's philosophy and regard themselves as
> >> >> > animal rights advocates. I am inclined to think there are some
> >> >> > constraints on how we should promote the good, so to that extent I
> >> >> > disagree with Singer, but Singer has had a lot of influence on me.
>
> >> >> Everyone thinks there are constraints on how we should promote the
> >> >> good,
> >> >> such as not experimenting on humans against their will to advance
> >> >> medical
> >> >> science. That's normal.
>
> >> > Singer only thinks constraints apply when following them leads to
> >> > better consequences.
>
> >> What do YOU think?
>
> > I don't agree with him.
>
> Not Singer, you.
>

I just told you what I think.

> >> >> >> > And he also thinks there
> >> >> >> > are dangers in having a policy which allows us to kill animals
> >> >> >> > for
> >> >> >> > food, since that will encourage us to think of them as resources
> >> >> >> > to
> >> >> >> > exploited and may tempt us to slide down the slippery slope to
> >> >> >> > abuse.
>
> >> >> >> That exact danger exists in all instances when we exploit other
> >> >> >> beings
> >> >> >> for
> >> >> >> our own purposes, including human-human, organization-human,
> >> >> >> employer-worker, etc.. That's why we have laws.
>
> >> >> > Quite.
>
> >> >> >> > In "Practical Ethics" he suggested it may be best to have a
> >> >> >> > general
> >> >> >> > policy of not killing animals for food. He may have changed his
> >> >> >> > view
> >> >> >> > somewhat since then.
>
> >> >> >> I disagree with him. We should stop everything then.
>
> >> >> > Well, I really don't see how that follows. He advocated such a
> >> >> > policy
> >> >> > in "Practical Ethics" because he thought it would lead to the best
> >> >> > consequences. To argue that it generalizes to "everything", whatever
> >> >> > exactly you mean by that, you'd have to argue that that would have
> >> >> > the
> >> >> > best consequences overall as well.
>
> >> >> The best overall consequences [for the most beings] would be for man
> >> >> to
> >> >> disappear from this planet.
>
> >> > Well, you could argue that. Singer, I belive, would think that the
> >> > consequences are better overall if we stick around.
>
> >> What do YOU think?
>
> > I think this contention of Singer's is fairly plausible.
>
> Not Singer, you.
>

I just told you what I think.

> >> >> >> >>I know you won't give me a direct answer, but I'll ask again
> >> >> >> >> anyway, by what stretch of the imagination can this be construed
> >> >> >> >> as
> >> >> >> >> "equal
> >> >> >> >> consideration"? Equal to what? No slogans please.
>
> >> >> >> > Preference utilitarianism is consistent with equal consideration
> >> >> >> > because it weighs all relevantly similar interests equally in
> >> >> >> > evaluating outcomes. The idea is that if a being does not have a
> >> >> >> > conception of itself as an entity existing over time, then it
> >> >> >> > does
> >> >> >> > not
> >> >> >> > have an interest in continuing to live in the way that you or I
> >> >> >> > do.
> >> >> >> > So
> >> >> >> > no wrong is done if we bring the being into existence, provide it
> >> >> >> > with
> >> >> >> > a pleasant life, and then kill it prematurely (assuming that
> >> >> >> > killing
> >> >> >> > it prematurely was inevitable if we were to bring the being into
> >> >> >> > existence at all).
>
> >> >> >> And this differs exactly how with the typical good-welfare-based
> >> >> >> way
> >> >> >> of
> >> >> >> looking at human-animal relations?
>
> >> >> > Some people call it a form of new welfarism. It's generally thought
> >> >> > to
> >> >> > be more radical than standard welfarism. Have you read "Animal
> >> >> > Liberation"? Do you agree with all the recommendations he makes
> >> >> > there?
>
> >> >> I don't want to get into referring to books at every turn. My view is
> >> >> that
> >> >> human beings, due to their unique nature and abilities, are granted
> >> >> the
> >> >> most
> >> >> fundamental of rights.
>
> >> >> >> > He also regards infanticide as sometimes acceptable
> >> >> >> > on similar grounds.
>
> >> >> >> I see no significant difference between infanticide and abortion,
> >> >> >> but
> >> >> >> that's
> >> >> >> another issue entirely.
>
> >> >> >> [..]
>
> >> >> >> >> >> > Well, I don't agree. Maybe you have a different notion of
> >> >> >> >> >> > "sentience"
> >> >> >> >> >> > to me.
>
> >> >> >> >> >> It means the ability to experience sensations, like pain.
>
> >> >> >> >> > Yes, I agree. But I don't agree with you that every being has
> >> >> >> >> > some
> >> >> >> >> > degree of sentience. Only members of the animal kingdom are
> >> >> >> >> > sentient,
> >> >> >> >> > for example.
>
> >> >> >> >> Plants are not "beings".
>
> >> >> >> > Why not? What's a "being"?
>
> >> >> >> A living creature,
>
> >> >> > A plant is a living creature.
>
> >> >> I already conceded the point, I don't care if you want to call plants
> >> >> beings. It's semantics.
>
> >> >> >> an animal. Nonetheless, I don't mind if you choose to
> >> >> >> include plants as beings, we agree that there is a leap from plant
> >> >> >> "beings"
> >> >> >> to animal "beings", and I contend that the difference is that
> >> >> >> animals
> >> >> >> have a
> >> >> >> far more evolved ability to experience sensations than plants, and
> >> >> >> that's
> >> >> >> what I call basic sentience.
>
> >> >> > Well, I would agree with you, quite a lot of animals are sentient,
> >> >> > possibly almost all of them, whereas no organisms that are not
> >> >> > members
> >> >> > of the animal kingdom are.
>
> >> >> Probably not, but that rests on the definition of a word, which may
> >> >> vary.
> >> >> Plants certainly sense light and heat.
>
> >> > I don't think a plant's sensations have any subjective character. It
> >> > is not like anything to be a plant.
>
> >> I would add to that, being a chicken or a cow is nothing like being a
> >> person. The difference in the subjective experience is huge. Animals,
> >> except
> >> perhaps higher apes, simply exist in the moment, which explains many of
> >> their amazing abilities, and our fascination with them.
>
> >> [..]
>
> >> >> I believe that since animals can suffer as we can therefore we are
> >> >> morally
> >> >> obliged towards ones in our care to make every effort to ensure that
> >> >> they
> >> >> do
> >> >> not. That's not a radical point of view, it's one shared by most
> >> >> thoughtful
> >> >> people.
>
> >> > If it were put into practice fairly radical changes would be required.
> >> > So why aren't most thoughtful people campaigning for radical changes
> >> > in the way we treat animals?
>
> >> The same reason they aren't campaigning to change a thousand other
> >> examples
> >> of injustice in the world, like genocide in Darfur or slave trade in
> >> Russia,
> >> people are busy living their lives. It's not because they don't think
> >> it's
> >> wrong.
>
> > Okay, fine. So most thoughtful people basically agree with me about
> > animals and support the work I do.
>
> Telemarketing? No they don't.
>
> > Apparently they choose not to
> > change their diets, but never mind.
>
> What do you recommend, veganism? What a surprise.
>
> > So why do I get so much flak here?
>
> Because you're a colossal idiot, beyond anything that I ever imagined
> possible. You ramble on and never say anything and when people call you on
> it you cry like a baby. You think you're imparting great profound thoughts
> but you just talk in circles.
>
> [..]
>
>
>
> >> >> I
> >> > really don't see what's wrong with offering to attempt to educate
> >> > someone.
>
> >> That's amazing.
>
> >> [..]
>
> >> >> > I'm sorry that that's the way it appears to you. To understand the
> >> >> > notion of "equal consideration" it helps to have some familiarity
> >> >> > with
> >> >> > the different frameworks that have been considered in moral
> >> >> > philosophy.
>
> >> >> If it can't be expressed in plain English then as far as I am
> >> >> concerned
> >> >> it's
> >> >> useless.
>
> >> > It can be expressed in English, but a little time and effort is
> >> > required to understand.
>
> >> You haven't tried to express it in plain English so I haven't had the
> >> opportunity.
>
> > Yes, I have.
>
> OK, maybe you've tried, but you have not succeeded. I accept the possibility
> that you don't know how.
>
> [..]
>
> >> >> > It's nonsense that all humans except those in persistent vegetative
> >> >> > states have the highest level of sentience in the animal kingdom.
>
> >> >> You sure about that? That might depend on exactly what we decide to
> >> >> measure.
>
> >> > Well, elaborate.
>
> >> The ability to have a higher subjective experience is uniquely human. We
> >> don't know to what extent people with limited abilities retain this
> >> ability,
> >> so we err on the side of caution.
>
> > Then we should err on the side of caution in the case of nonhuman
> > animals as well.
>
> Why? There has never been any evidence whatsoever that the animals we use
> for food possess any higher cognitive abilities.

Same amount of evidence as there is with cognitively impaired humans.

> On the other hand, it is
> very plausible that even impaired humans still do possess such abilities,
> even in some hidden form.

The conjecture is equally plausible in both cases.

> That's why we err on the side of caution with
> humans. Besides it remains a completely implausible idea that the human race
> could function while "erring on the side of caution" when dealing with
> animals. We couldn't do it if we wanted to.

"Rupert" > wrote in
> On Jun 18, 7:31 pm, "Dutch" > wrote:

>> > Why? Is the burden of proof on you to show that the interests of black
>> > people shouldn't be ignored? How do you propose to meet that burden of
>> > proof?
>>
>> I'm sure negros are impressed that you are comparing their human rights
>> with
>> chickens.
>
> Well, you tell me where the analogy breaks down.

There is no plausible similarity between chickens and humans that would
compel us to treat them similarly. The only similarity is that morally
significant is that chickens can also experience suffering, therefore we
ought to alleviate that suffering. But that is a characteristic of chickens,
the relation to human sensitivity to pain is really immaterial.

> Sure you can say,
> negroes have similar cognitive capacities to typical Caucasian humans

Not similar, equal, identical.

> and chickens don't, but that's basically conceding my point, inasmuch
> as you're making an effort to meet the burden of proof.

My attempts to explain why your analogy is invalid in no way relieve you of
the burden to show that it is valid.

"Rupert" > wrote
> On Jun 18, 5:19 pm, "Dutch" > wrote:

[..]

>> >> >> > Preference utilitarianism is the view that we ought to perform
>> >> >> > that
>> >> >> > action which will lead to the greatest expected amount of overall
>> >> >> > preference-satisfaction, for all sentient beings over all future
>> >> >> > time,
>> >> >> > of the actions available to us.
>>
>> >> >> Which doesn't even attempt to say why the preferences
>> >> >> of non-human entities ought be given any weight as all.
>>
>> >> > Why shouldn't they?
>>
>> >> Because those preferences conflict with ours.
>>
>> > Well, I might as well say, "Why should I give anyone else's
>> > preferences any consideration, when they conflict with mine?" What
>> > justification is there for drawing the distinction on the basis of
>> > species? Why not on the basis of race, or on whether someone was born
>> > in a leap year?
>>
>> Because species signifies differences in sentience, sometime vast
>> differences. Year of birth doesn't signify anything.
>>
>
> Species membership is *correlated* with differences in cognitive
> capacity. You could maintain that cognitive capacity makes a
> difference. But that's not the position under attack. Ball maintains
> that *all* sentient humans have rights, regardless of cognitive
> capacity, and no nonhumans do. That's a position which discriminates
> on the basis of species alone, not on the basis of cognitive capacity.

That's the argument from marginal cases, its refuted in the essay. Since you
refuse to read it in its entirety here is the relevant section, although it
makes better sense if you read the 18 pages leading up to it.
<-------------->
A rebuttal of the argument from marginal cases
It may well be that Warren's proposal at this point is more adequate in
relation to common sense than the positions of Regan or Singer.
Nevertheless, it appears that all three of them have based their arguments
on the assumption that the concepts of a moral person and a moral agent are
synonymous or equivalent. This assumption can be contested, and if it is
rejected, it seems that their arguments will not work.
An alternative to their assumption has been developed by Jens Saugstad in
his doctoral thesis on The Moral Ontology of Human Fetuses; A Metaphysical
Investigation of Personhood (1994). On Saugstad's interpretation, Kant's
concept of a moral person is generic in relation to that of a moral agent.
This implies that the class of moral agents is a subclass of moral persons;
some moral persons are moral agents, others are not.
On the conceptual level Saugstad gets this result by distinguishing two
kinds of capacities: capabilities and abilities. In order to be a moral
agent, a person must be able to take a moral responsibility for his or her
actions, and to be answerable for them. This requires not only the
capabilities of free will, reason and a linguistic competence; but also the
operative ability of realising these capabilities in practice. However, a
subject may have the capabilities of moral agency without having the
operative abilities. In that case the subject is a moral person without
being a moral agent, since moral personhood is grounded on the actual
capability and not on the potential ability.
Two consequences follow from this solution. In the first place, it extends
moral status to sentient marginal humans. The sufficient and necessary
condition for this extension is the presence of the capability of moral
agency. If this is present, it is not necessary that the operative ability
is also present. On this ground equal inherent value and equal basic rights
can be ascribed to both marginal and normal human beings.
Admittedly, the assumption about the presence of this capability is not
equally verifiable in all cases. In some cases it is verifiable, such as in
normal youths, children, neonates, and foetuses in the later stages of
pregnancy. They do not have the actual ability of being moral agents, but
they have it potentially and it will be actualised in due time. Still they
may be assumed to have the capability as an actual internal property, and
this is the ground for considering them to be persons. It may be asked
whether this argument justifies the assumption about equal moral status
value. Would it not be possible to introduce grading on the basis of how far
the potentiality for moral agency has developed? This view has been
propounded in discussions about abortion. On the basis of the present
argument, however, it must be rejected, since moral status value is assumed
to be grounded on capabilities of agency, which are actual, and not on
potential abilities.
In other cases there are humans who have been moral agents, but have lost
the required abilities. This pertains to many cases of the severely brain
damaged and the severely senile. If we assume that they have retained their
capabilities of being moral agents, we still have a sufficient reason for
ascribing equal inherent value to them. Against this it may be objected that
they may have lost not only their ability of being moral agents, but also
their capability. There is room for much empirical doubt about these
borderline cases, and for that reason there is also room for giving them the
benefit of doubt. Admittedly, this is a somewhat ad hoc assumption. Even if
it is not a good scientific explanation, however, it may be a good moral
reason.
This kind of argument can also be applied to the most difficult cases of
marginal humans who have never had the ability of being moral agents and
will never get it, such as the severely mentally retarded. Theoretically, it
is not inconceivable that the capability is still there, and that this can
be used as a ground for ascribing an equal moral status value to them. If
this justification is not accepted, however, it does not necessarily follow
that they have no moral status value at all. They may have a gradual moral
status value, depending on the argument which we shall discuss below. As for
those who are borne without a brain, they do seem to be excluded.
According to the present argument, inherent value is ascribed equally to all
moral persons. Hence this position is universalistic and egalitarian. If
this way of understanding the relation between moral persons and moral
agents works, there will be no need to distinguish Agent's Rights and Human
Rights the way Warren does. They will be grounded in the same internal
property of moral persons, and there will be no need for a supplementary
justification based on an external relation such as membership in a human
society.
The second consequence which follows from this position is that there will
be a relevant difference between human and non-human beings, which can
justify a differential treatment with regard to the ascription of moral
status. Humans have a property which other animals lack, notably the
capability of being moral agents, and if this property is accepted to be a
necessary condition for the ascription of moral status, then its absence in
other animals will be a sufficient condition for denying moral status to
them. In this way Kant's anthropocentrism is vindicated, albeit with the
proviso mentioned earlier that this rests on the contingent fact that only
humans are moral persons. Theoretically, there might be other moral persons
also, but there seem to be none, excepting perhaps some of our closest
relatives among the primates.
<----------->

> And that *is* analogous to a position which discriminates on the basis
> of race or year of birth. Species in itself is no more significant
> than race or year of birth, the cognitive capacities correlated with
> it may be.

When one speaks of discrimination based on species it refers to the whole
package, not simply the genetic marker for human.

>> >> > What grounds are there for giving no weight to
>> >> > preferences of nonhuman beings, any more than there are grounds for
>> >> > giving no weight to the preferences of humans with dark skin?
>>
>> >> There are relevant bases for differentiation between species, there
>> >> are
>> >> none
>> >> between races of humans.
>>
>> > Well, we've been through this many many times. There are differences
>> > between typical humans and typical nonhumans, but if you're going to
>> > make those the basis of differentiation then some humans will fall
>> > outside the protected circle.
>>
>> Ability vs "capability", read the essay.
>>
>> > Incidentally, there are measurable differences between the average IQ
>> > scores of different races.
>>
>> What do average IQs have to do with anything?
>>
>
> Well, your average IQ score is correlated with the extent to which you
> have some of the cognitive capacities which you seem to regard as so
> important.

IQ tests are notoriously limited and biased. There are profoundly mentally
disabled humans with very low IQs but with remarkable abilities.

>> >> > If you're taking the viewpoint that preference-satisfaction is what
>> >> > matters, then if anyone is going to say that the preferences of some
>> >> > beings don't count, the burden is on them to explain why.
>>
>> >> It's not even that they don't count, it's that they are overruled.
>> >> Organisms
>> >> always place priority on their own preferences.
>>
>> > Well, preference utilitarians say we should consider all interests of
>> > all parties affected equally.
>>
>> Nobody does that.
>>
>
> What of it?

Something that has never been done and arguably cannot be done should be
viewed as a non-workable theory.

>> > You may not agree with it, that's fine,
>> > I'm just expounding for you what the theory says, as an example of a
>> > theory that is consistent with equal consideration.
>>
>> Nothing is consistent with "equal consideration", nobody knows what it
>> means, and an equally inscrutable catch-phrase will not pass as a lucid
>> definition. Consideration is always specific.
>>
>
> Sigh. All right, well, I tried.

That was a pathetic try, if it was one at all. You have no idea what you're
talking about. Repeating the fallacy of "the argument from marginal cases"
is not any kind of attempt at anything.


>> >> >> As soon as they attempt it, they get circular.
>>
>> >> >> ****ing bullshit from start to finish. Among other
>> >> >> things, it can - and has - led to some half-witted
>> >> >> self-styled "philosopher" trying to show that the
>> >> >> (il)logic of the larder is *correct*: that we "ought"
>> >> >> to want to cause livestock to exist, because the amount
>> >> >> of utility they experience up to the point we kill them
>> >> >> exceeds the disutility they experience from being killed.
>>
>> >> >> You ****ing ****, rupie - you're trying to help that
>> >> >> goddamned ****ing pervert ****wit David Harrison.
>>
>> >> > I'm not advocating preference utilitarianism, I'm explaining what it
>> >> > is for the purpose of explaining to Dutch what theories are
>> >> > consistent
>> >> > with equal consideration.
>>
>> >> You have never explained it, you just assert it.
>>
>> > I'm explaining what it says. I'm not asserting that it is the correct
>> > theory.
>>
>> You're repeating catch-phrases, you're not explaining anything.
>
> Like I said, I gave it another go. It proved just as fruitless as last
> time. If you're not going to listen and take some trouble to
> understand, of course I can't explain anything to you.

You can't explain it because a) it's nonsense, b) you are inarticulate, and
c) you're confused.

It's hardly any wonder you sound like a yammering parrot.

"Rupert" > wrote in message
oups.com...
> On Jun 18, 7:46 pm, "Dutch" > wrote:
>> "Rupert" > wrote
>>
>> [..]
>>
>> > If I point out that existing institutions are based on discrimination
>> > that lacks justification,
>>
>> The charge has to be plausible. It isn't sufficient that a small group of
>> wild-eyed fanatics "point something out". I could point out that women
>> routinely choose men as husbands, discriminating against many good dogs.
>> That is not a plausible argument, and no justification is needed except
>> to
>> inform you that dogs are the wrong species.
>>
>
> That's a matter of personal preference, it doesn't need justification.
> Inflicting harm on sentient beings does need justification.

The justification is self-evident, in the case of chickens it's to produce
food.

>> > then the burden of proof is on those who
>> > would seek to justify those institutions.
>>
>> No, the burden remains on you to establish that your charge is plausible,
>> you haven't, in fact everything you say in support of your charge only
>> undermines it by it's sheer brutal circularity and lack of coherence.
>>
>
> Well, I don't agree. In my talk, I point out that species
> discrimination exists and challenge those who would support it to come
> up with a justification. That's a reasonable request.

See above. The justification is self-evident, in the case of chickens its to
produce food.


>> >If I lived in the nineteenth
>> > century and wanted to challenge the institution of enslaving black
>> > people, it would have been sufficient for me to point out that it was
>> > based on arbitrary discrimination and ask for a justification for that
>> > discrimination. How else could I have argued that the institution was
>> > wrong?
>>
>> By arguing that skin colour was not a morally relevant criterion to
>> discriminate on, it's immaterial. Species is morally relevant because it
>> signals that an animal either has or lacks the ability and/or capability
>> to
>> exhibit higher cognitive functions like advanced self-awareness,
>> knowledge
>> of living in time and mortality. So far only humans have demonstrated
>> this
>> cap/ability.
>
> In that case its the cognitive capacities which are morally relevant,
> not species in itself. And that's fine as long as people are prepared
> to be consistent and follow through with the implications of that, but
> nobody is.

Yes they are. Every human possesses either the innate ability or capability
to manifest higher cognitive functions, no non-human ever has.

"Rupert" > wrote
> On Jun 18, 5:26 pm, "Dutch" > wrote:
>> "Rupert" > wrote.
>>
>> > If I were in the nineteenth
>> > century and I were arguing that the interests of black people should
>> > be given equal weight to those of white people, it would not be my job
>> > to make a positive case. It would be sufficient simply to challenge my
>> > opponents to give good grounds on which to discriminate against black
>> > people.
>>
>> You can't base your position on the assumption that racism provides a
>> valid
>> example. It doesn't, it's an absurd argument. The differences between
>> negro
>> men and white men are insignificant compared to the differences between a
>> chicken and a human being.
>
> That's an attempt to meet the burden of proof, which is basically
> conceding my point. My analogy is valid regarding the issue of where
> the burden of proof lies.

That's a sleazy and unconscionable evasion. My attempts to explain why your
analogy is invalid in no way relieve you of the burden to show that it is
valid.

"Rupert" > wrote
> On Jun 18, 6:53 pm, "Dutch" > wrote:
[..]
>>
>> >> >> > Preference utilitarianism is the view that we ought to perform
>> >> >> > that
>> >> >> > action which will lead to the greatest expected amount of overall
>> >> >> > preference-satisfaction, for all sentient beings over all future
>> >> >> > time,
>> >> >> > of the actions available to us.
>>
>> >> >> What if what leads to the most satisfaction to me leads to death
>> >> >> for
>> >> >> another
>> >> >> sentient being, like a chicken?
>>
>> >> > Then you weigh up the interests of all those affected.
>>
>> >> The interest of the chicken in survival is discounted because it is
>> >> not
>> >> sufficiently sentient to be aware of its existence across time. My
>> >> interest
>> >> in consuming chicken wins.
>>
>> > Well, Peter Singer would not be in unqualified agreement with you. He
>> > has a discussion of this in Chapter 5 of "Practical Ethics". Please
>> > don't whinge about my referring to books. We are discussing Peter
>> > Singer's views here, not my own. If you want to understand what those
>> > views are, you should read what he wrote.
>>
>> I don't, I asked YOU.
>>
>
> I don't think you're justified in killing a chicken just because you
> feel hungry, when other nutritious food is available.

I have some questions about that..

Why should I not choose the chicken if that is what satisfies me? Nobody,
including you, is choosing the path of least harm.

How is your particular compromise between animal suffering and personal
convenience imposable onto me?

How do you even know that the calories I would substitute for the chicken
would equate to less animal harm than the chicken?


>> >> >> > A theory is consistent with equal
>> >> >> > consideration if the means it advocates by which to resolve moral
>> >> >> > decisions give equal weight to the relevantly similar interests
>> >> >> > of
>> >> >> > all
>> >> >> > sentient beings, regardless of species.
>>
>> >> >> What does "relevantly similar" mean? Relevant to me or the chicken?
>>
>> >> > It means similar in all morally relevant respects.
>>
>> >> It's invalid to use the same words in the explanation that are used in
>> >> the
>> >> phrase being defined.
>>
>> > See my reply to Ball.
>>
>> No, give me a real definition.
>>
>
> The notion of moral relevance is fundamental, it hasn't got a
> definition. You yourself used it when you said that race and year of
> birth were not morally relevant but the cognitive capacities
> correlated with species were.

I didn't ask for a definition of moral relevance, I asked for a definition
of the phrase "relevantly similar". You use the phrase constantly, in fact
it seems fundamental to your argument, yet I have never heard of the term in
my life and can make no sense of it.

>
>> >> > The issue is who
>> >> > has the most at stake.
>>
>> >> If you actually use "equal consideration" in the literal sense then
>> >> the
>> >> animal *always* has more at stake in the immediate equation. Therefore
>> >> the
>> >> consideration is not really equal, it's weighted. Show how its
>> >> weighted.
>>
>> > What Peter Singer advocates is equal consideration.
>>
>> No it isn't.
>>
>
> Sigh. You admit that you don't understand the concept. So maybe you
> should pay attention to my attempts to explain it to you, rather than
> decide for yourself whether it applies.

You don't understand it either. You think that "it has a nice ring to it"
equals understanding. DeGrazia himself in the first chapter of his book
admits he doesn't really understand it. He spends the entire book trying to
show why others ought to be obliged to disprove a concept he created which
makes no sense.

>> >> >> > Preference utilitarianism is
>> >> >> > consistent with equal consideration because it weighs the
>> >> >> > relevantly
>> >> >> > similar interests of any two sentient beings equally, regardless
>> >> >> > of
>> >> >> > species.
>>
>> >> >> Chickens want to live, I want to eat chicken. Who wins?
>>
>> >> > It depends on who has more at stake.
>>
>> >> Who wins, me or the chicken? I want your opinion.
>>
>> > I'm not a preference utilitarian. If I were, I wouldn't think it would
>> > be right for you to kill a chicken who happened to be passing by just
>> > because you felt hungry, no.
>>
>> Why not? Isn't the hunger of a highly sentient being more important than
>> the
>> life of a marginally sentient one?
>>
>
> Not really, not when you can easily assuage your hunger in other ways.

Why must I opt for those other ways when I prefer this way?

>
>> > When the chicken was brought into
>> > existence because of your desire to eat it, the issue is more complex.
>>
>> Do tell.
>>
>
> According to Peter Singer, anyway. He thinks that you may be justified
> in bringing a being who does not have a concept of itself as a subject
> existing over time and then killing it painlessly, assuming you
> couldn't bring it into existence without prematurely killing it.
> However in "Practical Ethics" he suggests it may be best to have a
> general rule of thumb not to kill animals for food, because the
> temptation to ignore their important interests when we use them for
> economic purposes would be too great.

Good for him. Do you always let authors do your thinking for you? Something
happened to your mind in all those years of studying math theory.

[..]

>> >> > Yeah, you're right, complex issues are raised in actually applying
>> >> > preference utilitarianism, and it may not be absolutely clear what
>> >> > it
>> >> > actually entails about our situation. You want to argue about this,
>> >> > maybe you should thrash it out with Peter Singer. I'm just
>> >> > presenting
>> >> > it to you as an example.
>>
>> >> You're the one who claimed that preference utilitarianism is
>> >> consistent
>> >> wih
>> >> equal consideration. How did you arrive at that conclusion?
>>
>> > It gives equal weight to the relevantly similar interests of all
>> > sentient beings.
>>
>> You don't have the slightest idea do you? You just type catch-phrases and
>> expect people to stand in awe of your intellect.
>>
>
> No, I don't. I don't think this concept is particularly hard to
> understand, and I think I'm giving a good explanation of it. If the
> explanation I give is not clear, then we can illustrate it by
> considering specifical ethical frameworks, which is what I've been
> trying to do. But you haven't been very good at listening.

You're a fraud. You can't even explain what "relevantly similar" means.

>
>> [..]
>>
>>
>>
>> >> Sure, but the fundamental issue is the use of animals as a food
>> >> source,
>> >> and
>> >> he doesn't challenge that.
>>
>> > Well, actually, he does in "Practical Ethics", but he may have
>> > softened his views somewhat since then.
>>
>> Maybe he flops around as the situation warrants, ARAs tend to do that.
>>
>> >> >> >> > It's set forth
>> >> >> >> > in "Practical Ethics". He only thinks it's acceptable provided
>> >> >> >> > it
>> >> >> >> > is
>> >> >> >> > reasonable to assume that the animals do not have a concept of
>> >> >> >> > themselves as an entity existing over time.
>>
>> >> >> >> That is essentially why everyone feels justified in the way we
>> >> >> >> treat
>> >> >> >> animals. It captures one major component of the difference
>> >> >> >> between
>> >> >> >> humans
>> >> >> >> and other species, seeing oneself as mortal.
>>
>> >> >> > Well, maybe you would find Singer's philosophy congenial then. I
>> >> >> > work
>> >> >> > with an organization called "Animal Liberation" which was founded
>> >> >> > shortly after the publication of Singer's book of the same title,
>> >> >> > and
>> >> >> > regards itself as having goals that are based on Singer's
>> >> >> > philosophy.
>> >> >> > At the same time a lot of people who work with the organization
>> >> >> > are
>> >> >> > strongly critical of Singer's philosophy and regard themselves as
>> >> >> > animal rights advocates. I am inclined to think there are some
>> >> >> > constraints on how we should promote the good, so to that extent
>> >> >> > I
>> >> >> > disagree with Singer, but Singer has had a lot of influence on
>> >> >> > me.
>>
>> >> >> Everyone thinks there are constraints on how we should promote the
>> >> >> good,
>> >> >> such as not experimenting on humans against their will to advance
>> >> >> medical
>> >> >> science. That's normal.
>>
>> >> > Singer only thinks constraints apply when following them leads to
>> >> > better consequences.
>>
>> >> What do YOU think?
>>
>> > I don't agree with him.
>>
>> Not Singer, you.
>>
>
> I just told you what I think.

No, you told me some of Singer's supposed thoughts and said "nay", that
tells me nothing about you.

[..]

>> > Then we should err on the side of caution in the case of nonhuman
>> > animals as well.
>>
>> Why? There has never been any evidence whatsoever that the animals we use
>> for food possess any higher cognitive abilities.
>
> Same amount of evidence as there is with cognitively impaired humans.

False, there is every reason to believe that cognitively impaired humans
have rich inner lives.

>> On the other hand, it is
>> very plausible that even impaired humans still do possess such abilities,
>> even in some hidden form.
>
> The conjecture is equally plausible in both cases.

No, because no healthy non-human has ever demonstrated human-like cognitive
powers. It's not plausible to assume that they do.


>> That's why we err on the side of caution with
>> humans. Besides it remains a completely implausible idea that the human
>> race
>> could function while "erring on the side of caution" when dealing with
>> animals. We couldn't do it if we wanted to.
>
>

"Rupert" > wrote
> On Jun 18, 3:52 pm, Rudy Canoza > wrote:

[..]
>> >> The burden of proof is on you, and you fail to meet it
>> >> - always.
>>
>> > If I point out that existing institutions are based on
>> > discrimination that lacks justification
>>
>> Then the burden of proof is on YOU to demonstrate the
>> lack of justification. You fail.
>>
>> ****wit.
>
> That's utterly absurd. If someone maintains that there's a
> justification, it's clearly their job to provide it. You utterly
> incredible fool.

You have said that you are not morally compelled to do everything in your
power to stop supporting animal deaths. You have granted yourself the moral
right to determine when it is justifiable for you to support animal deaths,
yet at the same time you attempt to take that right away from others, and to
top it all off you accuse us of supporting unjustified discrimination. The
hypocrisy is beyond comprehension.

"Kickin' Goober's Faggot Ass" > wrote in message
oups.com...
> On Jun 18, 3:29 am, "Dutch" > wrote:
>> "Rupert" > wrote
>>
>> > On Jun 17, 3:17 pm, Rudy Canoza > wrote:
>>
>> [..]
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> >> we have shown, conclusively and irrefutably, that it is
>> >> anything *but* that, rupie, you filthy shit-faced yob.
>> >> Their participation has these qualities that make
>> >> them fully and undeniably morally culpable in animal
>> >> deaths:
>>
>> >> - active
>> >> - fully aware
>> >> - voluntary
>> >> - repeated
>> >> - unnecessary
>>
>> >> That is, rupie, you mealy-mouthed coward, they *CHOOSE*
>> >> to participate in animal-killing processes.
>>
>> > They choose to financially support them, yes.
>>
>> No different than if they went out to the farm and wrung their little
>> necks
>> with their bare hands.
>>
>> >> Stop writing "[merely] financially support", rupie, you
>> >> little smarmy thimbleful of shit.
>>
>> > No. Stop absurdly trying to order people around and acting like a fool.
>>
>> You tell him rupe, he's not the boss of you.
>
>
>
>
>
> Baby Goo

Ga ga goo goo to you too.

"Rupert" > wrote in message
oups.com...
> On Jun 18, 3:31 pm, Rudy Canoza > wrote:
>> Rupert wrote:
>> > On Jun 18, 7:28 am, Rudy Canoza > wrote:
>> >> Dutch wrote:
>> >>> "Rupert" > wrote
>> >>>> On Jun 17, 4:57 pm, "Dutch" > wrote:
>> >>> [..]
>> >>>>>> Preference utilitarianism is the view that we ought to perform
> that
>> >>>>>> action which will lead to the greatest expected amount of
> overall
>> >>>>>> preference-satisfaction, for all sentient beings over all
> future time,
>> >>>>>> of the actions available to us.
>> >>>>> What if what leads to the most satisfaction to me leads to
> death for
>> >>>>> another
>> >>>>> sentient being, like a chicken?
>> >>>> Then you weigh up the interests of all those affected.
>> >>> The interest of the chicken in survival is discounted because it
> is not
>> >>> sufficiently sentient to be aware of its existence across time.
> My
>> >>> interest in consuming chicken wins.
>> >> rupie the toweringly egotistical boy and other
>> >> ****witted utilitarians arbitrarily assign weights, on
>> >> the basis of polemics, such that the chicken "wins".
>> >> The exercise is bullshit sophistry from start to finish.
>>
>> > This is nonsense
>>
>> No. The exercise *is* bullshit sophistry, nothing more.
>>
>
> That's not an argument. You wouldn't know anything about what you're
> talking about anyway. If you want to criticize the existing
> literature,
> then engage with it.
>
>> >>>>>> A theory is consistent with equal
>> >>>>>> consideration if the means it advocates by which to resolve
> moral
>> >>>>>> decisions give equal weight to the relevantly similar
> interests of all
>> >>>>>> sentient beings, regardless of species.
>> >>>>> What does "relevantly similar" mean? Relevant to me or the
> chicken?
>> >>>> It means similar in all morally relevant respects.
>> >>> It's invalid to use the same words in the explanation that are
> used in
>> >>> the phrase being defined.
>> >> If we're talking about utilitarianism, "morality"
>> >> doesn't enter into it. rupie was just bullshitting.
>>
>> > Nonsense. Utilitarianism is a moral theory.
>>
>> No. There's no such thing as morality in
>> utilitarianism. You can't get to morality by
>> blabbering about entities' preferences.
>>
>
> Nonsense. Utilitarianism is just as much a moral theory as any other.
> As pointed out a few times now, your own political philosophy
> sometimes
> appeals to utilitarian considerations.
>
>
>> >>>> The issue is who
>> >>>> has the most at stake.
>> >>> If you actually use "equal consideration" in the literal sense
> then the
>> >>> animal *always* has more at stake in the immediate equation.
> Therefore
>> >>> the consideration is not really equal, it's weighted. Show how
> its
>> >>> weighted.
>> >> Arbitrarily, so that the bullshit sophist "A.L."
>> >> utilitarian "wins" his little rhetorical game.
>>
>> > Nonsense. It's not weighted.
>>
>> Bullshit. You just don't know what the ****ing hell
>> you're talking about. Of *course* there are weights,
>> you stupid ****. But you ****s just make them up.
>
> No, that's rubbish. You are the one who doesn't know what he's
> talking
> about. If you want to prove otherwise, make an argument. Preferably
> one
> which refers to the literature.

"The literature" BWAHAHAHAHAHA! What a poseur you are.

"Rupert" > wrote

> Your desperation
> to
> try to put other people down is truly pathetic.

He should take a few lessons in advanced condescension from Professor
Rupert.

Rupert wrote:
> On Jun 18, 3:31 pm, Rudy Canoza > wrote:
>> Rupert wrote:
>>> On Jun 18, 7:28 am, Rudy Canoza > wrote:
>>>> Dutch wrote:
>>>>> "Rupert" > wrote
>>>>>> On Jun 17, 4:57 pm, "Dutch" > wrote:
>>>>> [..]
>>>>>>>> Preference utilitarianism is the view that we ought to perform
> that
>>>>>>>> action which will lead to the greatest expected amount of
> overall
>>>>>>>> preference-satisfaction, for all sentient beings over all
> future time,
>>>>>>>> of the actions available to us.
>>>>>>> What if what leads to the most satisfaction to me leads to
> death for
>>>>>>> another
>>>>>>> sentient being, like a chicken?
>>>>>> Then you weigh up the interests of all those affected.
>>>>> The interest of the chicken in survival is discounted because it
> is not
>>>>> sufficiently sentient to be aware of its existence across time.
> My
>>>>> interest in consuming chicken wins.
>>>> rupie the toweringly egotistical boy and other
>>>> ****witted utilitarians arbitrarily assign weights, on
>>>> the basis of polemics, such that the chicken "wins".
>>>> The exercise is bullshit sophistry from start to finish.
>>> This is nonsense
>> No. The exercise *is* bullshit sophistry, nothing more.
>>
>
> That's not an argument.

It's a observation based in fact.


>>>>>>>> A theory is consistent with equal
>>>>>>>> consideration if the means it advocates by which to resolve
> moral
>>>>>>>> decisions give equal weight to the relevantly similar
> interests of all
>>>>>>>> sentient beings, regardless of species.
>>>>>>> What does "relevantly similar" mean? Relevant to me or the
> chicken?
>>>>>> It means similar in all morally relevant respects.
>>>>> It's invalid to use the same words in the explanation that are
> used in
>>>>> the phrase being defined.
>>>> If we're talking about utilitarianism, "morality"
>>>> doesn't enter into it. rupie was just bullshitting.
>>> Nonsense. Utilitarianism is a moral theory.
>> No. There's no such thing as morality in
>> utilitarianism. You can't get to morality by
>> blabbering about entities' preferences.
>>
>
> Nonsense.

Not an argument, and anyway false.


>>>>>> The issue is who
>>>>>> has the most at stake.
>>>>> If you actually use "equal consideration" in the literal sense
> then the
>>>>> animal *always* has more at stake in the immediate equation.
> Therefore
>>>>> the consideration is not really equal, it's weighted. Show how
> its
>>>>> weighted.
>>>> Arbitrarily, so that the bullshit sophist "A.L."
>>>> utilitarian "wins" his little rhetorical game.
>>> Nonsense. It's not weighted.
>> Bullshit. You just don't know what the ****ing hell
>> you're talking about. Of *course* there are weights,
>> you stupid ****. But you ****s just make them up.
>
> No,

Yes, there are weights, rupie - politically chosen weights.

Rupert wrote:
> On Jun 18, 3:38 pm, Rudy Canoza > wrote:
>> Rupert wrote:
>>> On Jun 14, 10:41 pm, Rudy Canoza > wrote:
>>>> On Jun 13, 10:08 pm, Rupert > wrote:
>>>>> On Jun 14, 2:16 pm, Rudy Canoza > wrote:
>>>>>> On Jun 13, 8:43 pm, Rupert > wrote:
>>>>>>> On Jun 14, 1:01 pm, Rudy Canoza > wrote:
>>>>>>>> On Jun 13, 7:53 pm, Rupert > wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On Jun 14, 11:42 am, Rudy Canoza > wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On Jun 13, 4:20 pm, Rupert > wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On Jun 14, 4:34 am, Rudy Canoza >
> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On Jun 12, 7:26 pm, Rupert >
> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Jun 13, 12:04 pm, Rudy Canoza >
> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Jun 12, 3:49 pm, Rupert >
> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Jun 13, 12:14 am, Rudy Canoza
> > wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Rupert wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Jun 12, 3:31 pm, Rudy Canoza
> > wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Rupert wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Jun 12, 1:44 pm, Rudy Canoza
> > wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That does not contradict what I said.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It does, rupie. You know it does. You see a
> moral
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dimension; K.M. denies it.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That has never been in dispute.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Yes, you are denying it, stupid ****. You are
> denying
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it when you say that K.M. sees it as morally
> justified.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> No, I'm not. K.M. clearly thinks that eating meat
> is morally
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> permitted.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> No. He thinks there is no moral issue underlying it
> at
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> all.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You are wrong; he does not see it as morally
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> justified. He sees it as not a moral issue at
> all, and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> therefore not requiring moral justification.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> He doesn't think there's a serious moral case
> against it.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> He thinks, correctly, that there's no moral issue to
> be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> examined at all.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> He does think it's morally permitted.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> No.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Yes, of course he does.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> No, ****witted rupie, he doesn't. You are engaging in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false bifurcation.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> He thinks, correctly, that there's no moral issue.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Which is quite consistent with what I said.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> No. What you said is a misstatement of what he said.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> He does not think it's morally permitted; he thinks
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> there's no moral dimension to it at all. To think
> it's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> morally permitted is implicitly believe there is a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> moral question about it that has been answered.
> That's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not what he thinks.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You're wrong, but in your towering youthful arrogance,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you can't admit it.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> By the way, the view that there is no serious moral
> issue raised by
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> modern farming is utterly idiotic.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It's also a sloppy straw man, rupie - no one has said
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that. What K.M. said is there's no moral dimension to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> eating meat.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You ****witted plodder.- Hide quoted text -
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> - Show quoted text -
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Anyway, no more word from you about my mathematical
> ability.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> None needed. You're a plodder. Your Ph.D. shows
> diligence, not
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> talent.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> You have absolutely no way of knowing whether I have
> mathematical
>>>>>>>>>>>>> talent or not.
>>>>>>>>>>>> I do know, rupie.
>>>>>>>>>>> As I say,
>>>>>>>>>> No, as *I* say, rupie, you fatuous ****. There are plenty
> of people
>>>>>>>>>> with Ph.D. degrees in math, and you do not stand out in any
> way.
>>>>>>>>> Make up your mind what you're claiming. First you said my
> Ph.D. was
>>>>>>>>> worthless and I was a waste of educational resources.
>>>>>>>> Not quite worthless, but not worth what was stolen from the
> taxpayers.
>>>>>>> Well, I suppose that depends on your views about the value of
>>>>>>> mathematical research.
>>>>>> No. If you're spending your "professional" time bothering
> people as a
>>>>>> <snicker> telemarketer, then your Ph.D. obviously was a waste
> for the
>>>>>> taxpayer.
>>>>> Incidentally, we are not bothering people.
>>>> You are. Telemarketing = bothering people.
>>> Most of the people I speak with are perfectly polite to me, and
> many
>>> are pleased to receive my call.
>> That's a ****ing lie.
>>
>
> No.

Yes, it's a ****ing lie. People hate telemarketers.


>>>>> Anyway, I'm afraid that doesn't follow at all. It just means
>>>>> this is the best job that I've managed to find within two months
> of
>>>>> job search.
>>>> With a Ph.D. in maths. Priceless!
>>> Well, I'm glad you find it entertaining
>> It's a ****ing laugh riot, rupie. What a ****!
>>
>
> I know a lot of people who've just finished a Ph.D. who are in the
> same situation:

Frantically trying to persuade the poor sap manual
laborer/taxpayer that he "invested" in something
worthwhile. It won't sell.


>>>>>>>>> Now you're
>>>>>>>>> saying I probably won't get a Fields Medal and I'm not
> substantially
>>>>>>>>> more talented than my fellow Ph.D. students.
>>>>>>>> And that's true.
>>>>>>> If it were
>>>>>> It is.
>>>>> You don't have a clue one way or the other
>>>> One way or ANother, you semi-literate slag.
>>> "One way or the other" is a perfectly legitimate construction
>> Wrong. It assumes there are only two ways, and that's
>> bullshit. "One way or ANother", you stupid blithering
>> ****.
>>
>
> No, there are only two ways.

False.


>>>> But I do have a clue - in fact, much more than that.
>>> On the basis of what?
>> Education, experience, innate ability.
>>
>
> None of which bears on the issue

Of course they do.


>>>>>>>>>> You
>>>>>>>>>> wouldn't be ****ing away precious research time here if you
> did.
>>>>>>>>> I'm actually writing these posts while I'm at work.
>>>>>>>> So, you're shirking and stealing from your employer. That
> figures.
>>>>>>>> You're unethical in the extreme.
>>>>>>> Not at all.
>>>>>> Completely.
>>>>> I am more ethical than you
>>>> You are wholly unethical, not least because you lie about your
> lack of
>>>> ethics.
>>> Okay
>> Yes, okay.
>>
>
> Silly fool.

Stupid psychotic ****.


>>>>>>>>> I'm working in a
>>>>>>>>> telemarketing centre, because I need the money.
>>>>>>>> So, I was right: your Ph.D. *is* worthless, so much so that
> you've
>>>>>>>> sunk to <scoff> telemarketing! Jumping ****ing jesus!
>>>>>>> I only handed it in a couple of months ago.
>>>>>> Might as well have been five years.
>>>>> As usual
>>>> !!!
>>> What are you making exclamation marks about here, you weirdo? Okay,
>>> so you think I'll be stuck in telemarketing for the next five
>>> years.
>> Ha ha ha ha ha! Goddamnit, rupie, I'm about to split
>> my sides!
>>
>
> Strange fellow.

Nope. But it is just ****ing hilarious that it is only
now dawning on you that you're a ****ing career
telemarketer with a Ph.D. in maths. Ha ha ha ha ha!


>>> I've just completed quite a good Ph.D. thesis in maths
>> As if anyone is going to take your [highly
>> self-interested] word for it, you ****.
>>
>
> They won't need to.

**** off.


>>>>>>>>> I spend almost all of my spare
>>>>>>>> !!!!!!!!!
>>>>>>>>> time engaged in study and research.
>>>>>>>> Isn't that special.
>>>>>>> You're such a joke. I'm a productive mathematician.
>>>>>> You're a worthless, dinner-interrupting telemarketer - i.e.,
> scum.
>>>>>> People hate your guts.
>>>>> No.
>>>> Yes.
>>> Sigh.
>> What the **** is wrong with you, *writing* out "sigh"?
>> You ****ing baboon.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> I know by virtue of what you tell me: all the time
>>>>>>>>>>>> you waste on this "animal ethics" bullshit, for example,
> something far
>>>>>>>>>>>> outside your expertise.
>>>>>>>>>>> It's not wasted time. It's serious academic study.
>>>>>>>>>> It's absolutely wasted time. You're a dilettante.
>>>>>>>>> This, too, is something you are not in a position to judge.
>>>>>>>> I am, and I am correct.
>>>>>>> 'Fraid not.
>>>>>> I am correct.
>>>>> You think you are
>>>> I am.
>>> It gets more convincing
>> Of course.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> I don't know what the maths equivalent of the John Bates
> Clark medal
>>>>>>>>>>>> is, but we'll never hear "rupert mccallum" mentioned as a
> candidate
>>>>>>>>>>>> for it, nor for any Nobel.
>>>>>>>>>>> There is no Nobel Prize in mathematics. The equivalent is
> the Fields
>>>>>>>>>>> Medal. It is only awarded to people under 40.
>>>>>>>>>>> The Fields Medal is the most coveted prize in all of
> mathematics,
>>>>>>>>>>> awarded only for the most outstanding achievements, and
> I've only got
>>>>>>>>>>> nine years left to get it. I grant you it's fairly unlikely
> that I'll
>>>>>>>>>>> get that one.
>>>>>>>>>> It's a certainly that you won't.
>>>>>>>>> You have absolutely no competence to comment on the matter.
>>>>>>>> It is a certainty you will not win the Field medal.
>>>>>>> The only piece of decent evidence you have regarding that
> matter is
>>>>>> The fact that you're here.
>>>>> That has no bearing on the matter at all.
>>>> It has all the bearing in the world. The fact that you spend a
> HUGE
>>>> amount of time here - you really are a wheezy windbag - instead of
>>>> doing research speaks volumes.
>>> Well, that's a very interesting view you have, but the bottom
>>> line is, I'm extremely well-read in many different areas of
>>> mathematics,
>> But not *doing* anything there. SO it was a waste of
>> the taxpayers' money.
>>
>
> No, it wasn't.

It was.


> I did some interesting research,

Of zero use to the poor taxpayer.


>>> It may well be that I'll never win the Fields Medal
>> That's a guarantee.
>
> That's a conjecture made in

....absolute rock-solid certainty.

Rupert wrote:
> On Jun 18, 3:52 pm, Rudy Canoza > wrote:
>> Rupert wrote:
>>> On Jun 18, 3:29 pm, Rudy Canoza > wrote:
>>>> Rupert wrote:
>>>>> On Jun 18, 4:38 am, Rudy Canoza > wrote:
>>>>>> Rupert wrote:
>>>>>>> On Jun 17, 5:03 pm, Rudy Canoza > wrote:
>>>>>>>> Dutch wrote:
>>>>>>>>> "Rupert" > wrote in message
>>>>>>>>> ups.com...
>>>>>>>>>> On Jun 17, 12:16 pm, "Dutch" > wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> "Rupert" > wrote in message
>>>>>>>>>>> ups.com...
>>>>>>>>>>>> On Jun 15, 1:59 pm, "Dutch" > wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> "Rupert" > wrote
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Jun 12, 5:55 pm, "Dutch" > wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> [..]
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Yes, I know all that about Singer. That's a
> completely >>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> different
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> issue.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It's not a completely different issue, the ideas are
> closely
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> linked.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> he
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> believes that consuming meat is acceptable, even
> laudable
>>>>>>>>>>> under >> >> >> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> right
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> circumstances, then he is obviously challenging the
> validity of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> equal
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> consideration.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> No, he's not. He invented the idea of equal
> consideration and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> he's a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strong advocate of it. This is what you don't get.
> Singer's
>>>>>>>>>>> views
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an example of a theory that's consistent with equal >>
>>>>>>>>>>> consideration.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So you consider raising livestock to be an example of
> equal
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> consideration?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> How bizarre.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Peter Singer's preference utilitarianism is one example
> of a theory
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> which is consistent with equal consideration. The last
> time I
>>>>>>>>>>> tried >> > to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> explain this to you you told me I was talking waffle.
> Perhaps you
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> should have made a greater effort to listen and
> understand.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> You utter a bunch or words but say nothing, exactly like
> you just
>>>>>>>>>>> did. >> I
>>>>>>>>>>>>> understand language and the world well enough, and
> nothing so far
>>>>>>>>>>> has >> led
>>>>>>>>>>>>> me
>>>>>>>>>>>>> to conclude that you have anything worthwhile to say that
> will >>
>>>>>>>>>>> enlighen
>>>>>>>>>>>>> me
>>>>>>>>>>>>> any further. If you did you probably would have done so
> by now.
>>>>>>>>>>>> Saying "Peter Singer's preference utilitarianism is one
> example of a
>>>>>>>>>>>> theory which is consistent with equal consideration" is
> not saying
>>>>>>>>>>>> nothing. It's saying something. I can understand someone
> who didn't
>>>>>>>>>>>> know very much about Peter Singer's preference
> utilitarianism not
>>>>>>>>>>>> finding it very informative. But it's rather bizarre for
> you to view
>>>>>>>>>>>> your ignorance about preference utilitarianism as a defect
> on my part.
>>>>>>>>>>>> I would have thought it would be more rational to say
> "Would you mind
>>>>>>>>>>>> telling me a bit more about what preference utilitarianism
> is?"
>>>>>>>>>>> Go ahead, and explain equal consideration in plain English
> while
>>>>>>>>>>> you're at
>>>>>>>>>>> it, then show how the two are consistent. Do all this in a
> way that any
>>>>>>>>>>> intlligent person could go, Oh yeah, I see what you mean.
> Then you
>>>>>>>>>>> will have
>>>>>>>>>>> said something.
>>>>>>>>>> Preference utilitarianism is the view that we ought to
> perform that
>>>>>>>>>> action which will lead to the greatest expected amount of
> overall
>>>>>>>>>> preference-satisfaction, for all sentient beings over all
> future time,
>>>>>>>>>> of the actions available to us.
>>>>>>>>> What if what leads to the most satisfaction to me leads to
> death for
>>>>>>>>> another sentient being, like a chicken?
>>>>>>>> The ****witted utilitarians have no valid or reliable
>>>>>>>> means of measuring satisfaction or utility, nor do they
>>>>>>>> have any valid or reliable means of weighting it across
>>>>>>>> individuals.
>>>>>>> That's a challenge that can be raised, yes.
>>>>>> And not met by the ****witted utilitarians in any way.
>>>>> As I pointed out in the part which you snipped, the challenge
> applies
>>>>> to many other people, including you. The utilitarians do at least
> as
>>>>> good a job of responding to it as anyone else.
>>>>>>>>>> A theory is consistent with equal
>>>>>>>>>> consideration if the means it advocates by which to resolve
> moral
>>>>>>>>>> decisions give equal weight to the relevantly similar
> interests of all
>>>>>>>>>> sentient beings, regardless of species.
>>>>>>>>> What does "relevantly similar" mean? Relevant to me or the
> chicken?
>>>>>>> Similar in all morally relevant respects.
>>>>>> Circular.
>>>>> No, because the preference utilitarian has a theory about what
>>>>> respects are morally relevant: what is morally relevant is how
> much is
>>>>> at stake for the affected parties.
>>>>>>>> The ****witted utilitarians have coherent explanation
>>>>>>>> for why equal consideration should be given to the
>>>>>>>> preferences of non-human beings.
>>>>>>> No-one's ever given any good reason why it shouldn't.
>>>>>> The burden of proof, which you consistently fail to
>>>>>> meet, is on you to show that it should.
>>>>> No.
>>>> Yes. You are the ones who want to change something,
>>>> based on assertions you make. You must support the
>>>> assertions, and you can't; weakly blabbering, "well,
>>>> why not?" is not support.
>>>> The burden of proof is on you, and you fail to meet it
>>>> - always.
>>> If I point out that existing institutions are based on
> discrimination
>>> that lacks justification
>> Then the burden of proof is on YOU to demonstrate the
>> lack of justification. You fail.
>>
>> ****wit.
>
> That's utterly absurd.

No. You are trying to overthrow the status quo. The
burden of proof is on you to justify your desire for
change.

Rupert wrote:
> On Jun 18, 3:51 pm, Rudy Canoza > wrote:
>> Rupert wrote:
>>> On Jun 17, 3:17 pm, Rudy Canoza > wrote:
>>>> Rupert wrote:
>>>>> On Jun 7, 1:53 am, Rudy Canoza > wrote:
>>>>>> Rupert wrote:
>>>>>>> On Jun 6, 2:57 pm, Rudy Canoza > wrote:
>>>>>>>> Rupert wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On Jun 6, 3:27 am, Rudy Canoza >
> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> Don wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> "Kadaitcha Man" > wrote in message
>>>>>>>>>>> ...
>>>>>>>>>>>> Dutch > Thou issue of a mangy dog. Thou
> damnable fellow. Ye
>>>>>>>>>>>> afforded:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Diet is not normally considered to be a major
>>>>>>>>>>>>> moral issue except by vegans, so a non-vegan who decides
> they want to
>>>>>>>>>>>>> explore the health benefits of a vegan diet is unlikely
> to feel a
>>>>>>>>>>>>> moral barrier to making such a change, that would not
> even come up as
>>>>>>>>>>>>> an issue. However, a vegan who is used to thinking of
> their diet as a
>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement of moral commitment, which is most of them, is
> very likely
>>>>>>>>>>>>> to have psychological barriers or hangups preventing them
> from
>>>>>>>>>>>>> starting to eat meat.
>>>>>>>>>>>> Suppose, for one moment, that all vegans suddenly discover
> that their
>>>>>>>>>>>> bodies
>>>>>>>>>>>> are lacking in a certain mineral or enzyme (et al) and
> that they will die
>>>>>>>>>>>> horrible deaths over the space of a month due to the
> supposed lack. Also
>>>>>>>>>>>> suppose that they must do what the man below did or die
> horribly because
>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>> life-saving ingredient cannot be obtained any other way:
>>>>>>>>>>> http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20070605/...uk_china_frogs
>>>>>>>>>>>> How many vegans do you suppose will succumb to their
> innate will to live
>>>>>>>>>>>> thereby ****ing off their alleged "moral commitment"?
>>>>>>>>>>>> I say damn near every one of them would. So then, what
> value is the "moral
>>>>>>>>>>>> commitment"?
>>>>>>>>>>> This so called *moral code* is largely a figment of the
> posters imagination.
>>>>>>>>>> No. What is imaginary is your belief that you are
>>>>>>>>>> morally superior by virtue of not consuming animal
>>>>>>>>>> parts. That such a false moral belief underlies
>>>>>>>>>> "veganism" is not in rational dispute.
>>>>>>>>> Why is it false,
>>>>>>>> Not consuming the parts doesn't mean one doesn't harm
>>>>>>>> animals, killer.
>>>>>>> Yes, I know.
>>>>>> Then, you know why the moral belief is false, too.
>>>>> Here we go again. Just because vegans also financially support
>>>>> processes which harm animals
>>>> No, cocksucker - not "[merely] financially support",
>>>> you shitbag.
>>> "Financial support" is
>> ...is a lie.
>
> Nonsense.

No. "[merely] financial support" is a lie. It is a
lie intended to minimize the moral culpability in
animal death.


>> It is not "[merely] financial support",
>> and that is the incorrect description.
>
> It is very obviously

an incorrect description.


>> That is a
>> sleazy, deliberately deceptive attempt to minimize what
>> it is they do,
>
> It's not.

It is, rupie. It's sleazy and dishonest. It's the
effort of a ****stain.


>> and it has FAILED, rupie.
>
> There was never any attempt to begin with.

That's a lie.

On Mon, 18 Jun 2007 17:46:58 -0700, Kickin' Goober's Faggot Ass > wrote:

>On Jun 18, 3:29 am, "Dutch" > wrote:
>> "Rupert" > wrote
>>
>> > On Jun 17, 3:17 pm, Rudy Canoza > wrote:
>>
>> [..]
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> >> we have shown, conclusively and irrefutably, that it is
>> >> anything *but* that, rupie, you filthy shit-faced yob.
>> >> Their participation has these qualities that make
>> >> them fully and undeniably morally culpable in animal
>> >> deaths:
>>
>> >> - active
>> >> - fully aware
>> >> - voluntary
>> >> - repeated
>> >> - unnecessary
>>
>> >> That is, rupie, you mealy-mouthed coward, they *CHOOSE*
>> >> to participate in animal-killing processes.
>>
>> > They choose to financially support them, yes.
>>
>> No different than if they went out to the farm and wrung their little necks
>> with their bare hands.
>>
>> >> Stop writing "[merely] financially support", rupie, you
>> >> little smarmy thimbleful of shit.
>>
>> > No. Stop absurdly trying to order people around and acting like a fool.
>>
>> You tell him rupe, he's not the boss of you.
>
>
>
>
>
>Baby Goo it is too late for you to help Pappy Goo.
>
>Flailing your tiny fists will avail him nothing.
>
>He's had his ass kicked here repeatedly.

Good point. In fact the Goober has even kicked
*his own* stupid ass all over the place repeatedly.

On Mon, 18 Jun 2007 09:17:27 GMT, "Dutch" > wrote:

><dh@.> wrote
>> On 31 May 2007 13:02:15 -0700, Rudy Canoza > wrote:
>>
>>>what you mean, ****wit, is that their lives "ought" to occur,
>>
>> Which particular their lives are you trying to refer to Goo,
>> and why do you think anything could suggest that "they"
>> "ought to occur"?
>
>
>If he's not correct, then what's selfish about advocating the elimination of
>livestock?

The selfishness is because it would ONLY benefit people
who are disturbed by the fact that humans kill animals for
food, but it would do nothing to help the animals.

<dh@.> wrote
> On Mon, 18 Jun 2007 09:17:27 GMT, "Dutch" > wrote:
>
>><dh@.> wrote
>>> On 31 May 2007 13:02:15 -0700, Rudy Canoza > wrote:
>>>
>>>>what you mean, ****wit, is that their lives "ought" to occur,
>>>
>>> Which particular their lives are you trying to refer to Goo,
>>> and why do you think anything could suggest that "they"
>>> "ought to occur"?
>>
>>
>>If he's not correct, then what's selfish about advocating the elimination
>>of
>>livestock?
>
> The selfishness is because it would ONLY benefit people
> who are disturbed by the fact that humans kill animals for
> food, but it would do nothing to help the animals.


You yourself advocate the elimination of battery hens. Doesn't that help the
animals?

****wit David Harrison, hopelessly overmatched ignorant
cracker, lied:
> On Mon, 18 Jun 2007 09:17:27 GMT, "Dutch" > wrote:
>
>> ****wit David Harrison, hopelessly overmatched ignorant cracker, lied:
>>> On 31 May 2007 13:02:15 -0700, Rudy Canoza > wrote:
>>>
>>>> what you mean, ****wit, is that their lives "ought" to occur,
>>> Which particular their lives are you trying to refer to Rudy,
>>> and why do you think anything could suggest that "they"
>>> "ought to occur"?

YOU are the one who thinks "their" lives "ought" to
occur, ****wit. They don't exist, yet somehow -
fantastically - you think "they" ought to come into
existence and "get to experience life", because you
believe - fantastically - that doing so would be a
"benefit" to "them".


>>
>> If he's not correct, then what's selfish about advocating the elimination of
>> livestock?
>
> The selfishness is because it would ONLY benefit people
> who are disturbed by the fact that humans kill animals for
> food, but it would do nothing to help the animals.

How can *anything* help non-existent imaginary animals,
****wit? Goddamn, you just talk worse and worse
foolishness.

Make no mistake, ****wit - you think "they", meaning
non-existent imaginary livestock, could somehow
"benefit" by coming into existence. That is absolute
horseshit.

On Tue, 19 Jun 2007 19:45:00 GMT, "Dutch" > wrote:

><dh@.> wrote
>> On Mon, 18 Jun 2007 09:17:27 GMT, "Dutch" > wrote:
>>
>>><dh@.> wrote
>>>> On 31 May 2007 13:02:15 -0700, Rudy Canoza > wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>what you mean, ****wit, is that their lives "ought" to occur,
>>>>
>>>> Which particular their lives are you trying to refer to Goo,
>>>> and why do you think anything could suggest that "they"
>>>> "ought to occur"?
>>>
>>>
>>>If he's not correct, then what's selfish about advocating the elimination
>>>of
>>>livestock?
>>
>> The selfishness is because it would ONLY benefit people
>> who are disturbed by the fact that humans kill animals for
>> food, but it would do nothing to help the animals.
>
>
>You yourself advocate the elimination of battery hens. Doesn't that help the
>animals?

Which animals? How?

On Tue, 19 Jun 2007, Goo wrote:

>you think "they", meaning non-existent imaginary
>livestock, could somehow "benefit" by coming into
>existence.

LOL. Your obsession with "non-existent imaginary
livestock" is amusing Goober, but it also completely
screws up whatever you use for a mind. Appreciating
the fact that some things benefit from lives of positive
value is in no way dependant on or restricted by your
supposed "non-existent imaginary livestock", Goo.
Try to understand--in spite of your obsession with the
idea--that it has nothing to do with "them".

****wit David Harrison, who claims to appreciate the life of a dead
chicken, lied:
> On Tue, 19 Jun 2007, Rudy Canoza wrote:
> >you think "they", meaning non-existent imaginary
> >livestock, could somehow "benefit" by coming into
> >existence.
>
> LOL. Your obsession with "non-existent imaginary
> livestock"

No - YOUR obsession with them, ****wit. You, ****wit, are the one who
"thinks" they are being "denied life" by "aras". That's absurd,
****wit, but you think it, and there is no dispute that you think it.
We have your own posts to see that you think it, ****wit:

That approach is illogical, since if it
is wrong to end the lives of animals, it is
*far worse* to keep those same animals from
getting to have any life at all.
****wit - 07/30/1999

You also know that "ARAs" want to deprive
future farm animals [of] living,
****wit - 01/08/2002

What gives you the right to want to deprive
them [unborn animals] of having what life they
could have?
****wit - 10/12/2001

The animals that will be raised for us to eat
are more than just "nothing", because they
*will* be born unless something stops their
lives from happening. Since that is the case,
if something stops their lives from happening,
whatever it is that stops it is truly "denying"
them of the life they otherwise would have had.
****wit - 12/09/1999

Yes, it is the unborn animals that will be
born if nothing prevents that from happening,
that would experience the loss if their lives
are prevented.
****wit - 08/01/2000

EVERYTHING you have written over eight miserable wasted years,
****wit, proves that you, and you alone, obsess over imaginary, non-
existent farm animals.

You're ****ed up, ****wit - just a mess.

On Jun 20, 12:51 pm, dh@. wrote:
> On Tue, 19 Jun 2007 19:45:00 GMT, "Dutch" > wrote:
> ><dh@.> wrote
> >> On Mon, 18 Jun 2007 09:17:27 GMT, "Dutch" > wrote:
>
> >>><dh@.> wrote
> >>>> On 31 May 2007 13:02:15 -0700, Rudy Canoza > wrote:
>
> >>>>>what you mean, ****wit, is that their lives "ought" to occur,
>
> >>>> Which particular their lives are you trying to refer to Goo,
> >>>> and why do you think anything could suggest that "they"
> >>>> "ought to occur"?
>
> >>>If he's not correct, then what's selfish about advocating the elimination
> >>>of
> >>>livestock?
>
> >> The selfishness is because it would ONLY benefit people
> >> who are disturbed by the fact that humans kill animals for
> >> food, but it would do nothing to help the animals.
>
> >You yourself advocate the elimination of battery hens. Doesn't that help the
> >animals?
>
> Which animals?

THESE animals, ****wit - the non-existent, imaginary ones you
irrationally obsess over:

That approach is illogical, since if it
is wrong to end the lives of animals, it is
*far worse* to keep those same animals from
getting to have any life at all.
****wit - 07/30/1999

You also know that "ARAs" want to deprive
future farm animals [of] living,
****wit - 01/08/2002

What gives you the right to want to deprive
them [unborn animals] of having what life they
could have?
****wit - 10/12/2001

The animals that will be raised for us to eat
are more than just "nothing", because they
*will* be born unless something stops their
lives from happening. Since that is the case,
if something stops their lives from happening,
whatever it is that stops it is truly "denying"
them of the life they otherwise would have had.
****wit - 12/09/1999

Yes, it is the unborn animals that will be
born if nothing prevents that from happening,
that would experience the loss if their lives
are prevented.
****wit - 08/01/2000

<dh@.> wrote in message news
> On Tue, 19 Jun 2007 19:45:00 GMT, "Dutch" > wrote:
>
>><dh@.> wrote
>>> On Mon, 18 Jun 2007 09:17:27 GMT, "Dutch" > wrote:
>>>
>>>><dh@.> wrote
>>>>> On 31 May 2007 13:02:15 -0700, Rudy Canoza >
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>what you mean, ****wit, is that their lives "ought" to occur,
>>>>>
>>>>> Which particular their lives are you trying to refer to Goo,
>>>>> and why do you think anything could suggest that "they"
>>>>> "ought to occur"?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>If he's not correct, then what's selfish about advocating the
>>>>elimination
>>>>of
>>>>livestock?
>>>
>>> The selfishness is because it would ONLY benefit people
>>> who are disturbed by the fact that humans kill animals for
>>> food, but it would do nothing to help the animals.
>>
>>
>>You yourself advocate the elimination of battery hens. Doesn't that help
>>the
>>animals?
>
> Which animals? How?

Answer the question. Why do you advocate the elimination of battery hens?
How does that help the animals? This is the same question you are posing to
vegans, if you expect them to answer it then you should be able to.

<dh@.> wrote in message ...
> On Tue, 19 Jun 2007, Goo wrote:
>
>>you think "they", meaning non-existent imaginary
>>livestock, could somehow "benefit" by coming into
>>existence.
>
> LOL. Your obsession with "non-existent imaginary
> livestock"


It's your obsession ****wit.

On Wed, 20 Jun 2007 23:26:11 GMT, "Dutch" > wrote:

><dh@.> wrote in message news
>> On Tue, 19 Jun 2007 19:45:00 GMT, "Dutch" > wrote:
>>
>>><dh@.> wrote
>>>> On Mon, 18 Jun 2007 09:17:27 GMT, "Dutch" > wrote:
>>>>
>>>>><dh@.> wrote
>>>>>> On 31 May 2007 13:02:15 -0700, Rudy Canoza >
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>what you mean, ****wit, is that their lives "ought" to occur,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Which particular their lives are you trying to refer to Goo,
>>>>>> and why do you think anything could suggest that "they"
>>>>>> "ought to occur"?
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>If he's not correct, then what's selfish about advocating the
>>>>>elimination
>>>>>of
>>>>>livestock?
>>>>
>>>> The selfishness is because it would ONLY benefit people
>>>> who are disturbed by the fact that humans kill animals for
>>>> food, but it would do nothing to help the animals.
>>>
>>>
>>>You yourself advocate the elimination of battery hens. Doesn't that help
>>>the
>>>animals?
>>
>> Which animals? How?
>
>Answer the question.

How could I answer the question when you can't even tell
me what you think you're trying to ask? "Doesn't that help"
WHICH? "the animals"?

>Why do you advocate the elimination of battery hens?

Because I consider battery cages to be overly restrictive AND
I believe that sort of environment encourages a LOT of brutality
and abuse resulting in the suffering of many more birds than
would occur if the birds were kept in open houses.

>How does that help the animals?

WHICH "the animals" do you think you're trying to talk about???

>This is the same question you are posing to
>vegans, if you expect them to answer it then you should be able to.

They aren't helping any animals at all, which is the point. So
far it appears that "the animals" you think you're trying to ask
me about are imaginary, which puts "them" in the same
category as "the animals" who benefit from the "help" "they"
get from vegans, meaning that this is yet another case of you
being bewildered and confused.

Cage free farming provides many hens with decent lives of
positive value, but it does nothing to "help" caged hens in any
way. Its value is in providing decent lives for *different* hens,
not in providing "help" for hens who are already in cages. Even
if a cage filled house is converted to cage free, the hens who
were in the cages would not benefit from it...*different* hens
would benefit. The farmers would wait until the caged hens
were ready to be replaced, and would make the conversion
when the house was empty after they had been sent off to
slaughter. The change to cage free would benefit many
thousands of different hens in the future, but not any hens
who had been raised in the cages.

On Wed, 20 Jun 2007 14:38:38 -0700, Goo wrote:

>****wit David Harrison, who claims to appreciate the life of a dead
>chicken, lied:
>> On Tue, 19 Jun 2007, Goo wrote:
>> >you think "they", meaning non-existent imaginary
>> >livestock, could somehow "benefit" by coming into
>> >existence.
>>
>> LOL. Your obsession with "non-existent imaginary
>>livestock" is amusing Goober, but it also completely
>>screws up whatever you use for a mind. Appreciating
>>the fact that some things benefit from lives of positive
>>value is in no way dependant on or restricted by your
>>supposed "non-existent imaginary livestock", Goo.
>
>No

Then Goober just explain HOW you think your
"non-existent imaginary livestock" prevent existing
animals from benefitting from their existence.

****wit David Harrison, stupid cracker who "thinks" he
can "appreciate" the life of a dead chicken [snicker],
lied:
> On Wed, 20 Jun 2007 23:26:11 GMT, "Dutch" > wrote:
>
>> ****wit David Harrison, stupid cracker who "thinks" he can "appreciate" the life of a dead chicken [snicker], lied:
>>>
>>>> ****wit David Harrison, stupid cracker who "thinks" he can "appreciate" the life of a dead chicken [snicker], lied:
>>>>> On Mon, 18 Jun 2007 09:17:27 GMT, "Dutch" > wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> ****wit David Harrison, stupid cracker who "thinks" he can "appreciate" the life of a dead chicken [snicker], lied:
>>>>>>> On 31 May 2007 13:02:15 -0700, Rudy Canoza >
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> what you mean, ****wit, is that their lives "ought" to occur,
>>>>>>> Which particular their lives are you trying to refer to Goo,
>>>>>>> and why do you think anything could suggest that "they"
>>>>>>> "ought to occur"?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> If he's not correct, then what's selfish about advocating the
>>>>>> elimination
>>>>>> of
>>>>>> livestock?
>>>>> The selfishness is because it would ONLY benefit people
>>>>> who are disturbed by the fact that humans kill animals for
>>>>> food, but it would do nothing to help the animals.
>>>>
>>>> You yourself advocate the elimination of battery hens. Doesn't that help
>>>> the
>>>> animals?
>>> Which animals? How?
>> Answer the question.
>
> How could I answer the question

You're trying to be cute, ****wit, and as with
everything else you try, you fail. Answer the
question, ****wit.


>
>> Why do you advocate the elimination of battery hens?
>
> Because I consider battery cages to be overly restrictive AND
> I believe that sort of environment encourages a LOT of brutality
> and abuse resulting in the suffering of many more birds than
> would occur if the birds were kept in open houses.

No more than your belief that fighting cocks and
fighting dogs "benefit" by coming into existence, ****wit.


>> How does that help the animals?
>
> WHICH "the animals" do you think you're trying to talk about???

ANY animals, ****wit: *you* believe that coming into
existence is a "benefit" per se, and so by advocating
that certain animals not be bred, you are advocating
the withholding of this imaginary "benefit", based
entirely on *your* tastes.

<dh@.> wrote
> On Wed, 20 Jun 2007 23:26:11 GMT, "Dutch" > wrote:

[..]

>
>>Why do you advocate the elimination of battery hens?
>
> Because I consider battery cages to be overly restrictive AND
> I believe that sort of environment encourages a LOT of brutality
> and abuse resulting in the suffering of many more birds than
> would occur if the birds were kept in open houses.

But as you have said yourself, those are a whole different group of animals.
You still advocate the elimination of battery hens for precisely the same
reason that ARAs advocate the elimination of other forms of livestock,
because they believe that the conditions are overly-restrictive and the
suffering, in their opinion, is excessive.

>>How does that help the animals?
>
> WHICH "the animals" do you think you're trying to talk about???
>
>>This is the same question you are posing to
>>vegans, if you expect them to answer it then you should be able to.
>
> They aren't helping any animals at all, which is the point.

THEY are employing exactly the same kind of thinking as you, except that
they draw the line in a different place. The fact that they are not
recommending replacing the livestock they want to see eliminated with other
forms of livestock is completely irrelevant. There is no moral imperative
for anyone to cause livestock to exist. Your accusation that they are
somehow doing something inconsiderate or fundamentally different than you do
when you advocate the elimination of battery hens is absurd.

<snip diversion>

****wit David Harrison, stupid cracker who "thinks" he
can "appreciate" the life of a dead chicken [snicker],
lied:
> On Wed, 20 Jun 2007 14:38:38 -0700, Rudy Canoza wrote:
>
>> ****wit David Harrison, who claims to appreciate the life of a dead
>> chicken, lied:
>>> On Tue, 19 Jun 2007, Rudy Canoza wrote:
>>>> you think "they", meaning non-existent imaginary
>>>> livestock, could somehow "benefit" by coming into
>>>> existence.
>>> LOL. Your obsession with "non-existent imaginary
>>> livestock" is amusing Goober, but it also completely
>>> screws up whatever you use for a mind. Appreciating
>>> the fact that some things benefit from lives of positive
>>> value is in no way dependant on or restricted by your
>>> supposed "non-existent imaginary livestock", Goo.
>> No - YOUR obsession with them, ****wit. You, ****wit, are the one who
>> "thinks" they are being "denied life" by "aras". That's absurd,
>> ****wit, but you think it, and there is no dispute that you think it.
>> We have your own posts to see that you think it, ****wit:
>>
>> That approach is illogical, since if it
>> is wrong to end the lives of animals, it is
>> *far worse* to keep those same animals from
>> getting to have any life at all.
>> ****wit - 07/30/1999
>>
>> You also know that "ARAs" want to deprive
>> future farm animals [of] living,
>> ****wit - 01/08/2002
>>
>> What gives you the right to want to deprive
>> them [unborn animals] of having what life they
>> could have?
>> ****wit - 10/12/2001
>>
>> The animals that will be raised for us to eat
>> are more than just "nothing", because they
>> *will* be born unless something stops their
>> lives from happening. Since that is the case,
>> if something stops their lives from happening,
>> whatever it is that stops it is truly "denying"
>> them of the life they otherwise would have had.
>> ****wit - 12/09/1999
>>
>> Yes, it is the unborn animals that will be
>> born if nothing prevents that from happening,
>> that would experience the loss if their lives
>> are prevented.
>> ****wit - 08/01/2000
>>
>> EVERYTHING you have written over eight miserable wasted years,
>> ****wit, proves that you, and you alone, obsess over imaginary, non-
>> existent farm animals.
>>
>> You're ****ed up, ****wit - just a mess.
>
> Then Rudy just explain

NO, ****wit. There's nothing I need to explain. YOU
need to explain just how it is you "think" you know
that animals "benefit" by passing from your imaginary
state of "pre-existence" into existence. They do not,
because no such "passage" takes place for "them", but
*YOU* think it does, so you need to explain yourself.
Of course, you haven't be able to do so - can't even
get started - in over EIGHT miserable wasted ****ing years.

On Thu, 21 Jun 2007 18:38:49 GMT, "Dutch" > wrote:

><dh@.> wrote
>> On Wed, 20 Jun 2007 23:26:11 GMT, "Dutch" > wrote:
>
>[..]
>
>>
>>>Why do you advocate the elimination of battery hens?
>>
>> Because I consider battery cages to be overly restrictive AND
>> I believe that sort of environment encourages a LOT of brutality
>> and abuse resulting in the suffering of many more birds than
>> would occur if the birds were kept in open houses.
>
>But as you have said yourself, those are a whole different group of animals.

Yes, one which I would rather see not exist, along with dogs
and bulls used for fighting.

>You still advocate the elimination of battery hens for precisely the same
>reason that ARAs advocate the elimination of other forms of livestock,
>because they believe that the conditions are overly-restrictive and the
>suffering, in their opinion, is excessive.

You agree with them completely. I believe some of their lives
are of positive value, and some are not.

> >>How does that help the animals?
>>
>> WHICH "the animals" do you think you're trying to talk about???
>>
>>>This is the same question you are posing to
>>>vegans, if you expect them to answer it then you should be able to.
>>
>> They aren't helping any animals at all, which is the point.
>
>THEY are employing exactly the same kind of thinking as you, except that
>they draw the line in a different place.

You draw it at the same place they do, insisting as they do
that no livestock animals' lives should be given positive consideration.

>The fact that they are not
>recommending replacing the livestock they want to see eliminated with other
>forms of livestock is completely irrelevant.

No it's not, it's just that none of you can explain WHICH wildlife
you would supposedly provide life for instead of livestock, much
less WHY anyone would agree to do it, as we have gone over
dozens of times by now.

>There is no moral imperative
>for anyone to cause livestock to exist. Your accusation that they are
>somehow doing something inconsiderate or fundamentally different than you do
>when you advocate the elimination of battery hens is absurd.

That's a lie. In complete contrast to your lie, and unlike you
advocates of the misnomer, I can say which animals I believe
should replace others, and also why I feel that way.

<dh@.> wrote

> On Thu, 21 Jun 2007 18:38:49 GMT, "Dutch" > wrote:
>
>><dh@.> wrote
>>> On Wed, 20 Jun 2007 23:26:11 GMT, "Dutch" > wrote:
>>
>>[..]
>>
>>>
>>>>Why do you advocate the elimination of battery hens?
>>>
>>> Because I consider battery cages to be overly restrictive AND
>>> I believe that sort of environment encourages a LOT of brutality
>>> and abuse resulting in the suffering of many more birds than
>>> would occur if the birds were kept in open houses.
>>
>>But as you have said yourself, those are a whole different group of
>>animals.
>
> Yes, one which I would rather see not exist, along with dogs
> and bulls used for fighting.

Fine, I agree. Animals that are going to be subjected to inhumane treatment
should never be brought into existence. That is the same way vegans think,
except they think that all commercial farming is inhumane. I don't happen to
agree with them, neither do you. Where you and I disagree is that you argue
that vegans can be criticized for "denying life" to animals, a logical
absurdity.

>>You still advocate the elimination of battery hens for precisely the same
>>reason that ARAs advocate the elimination of other forms of livestock,
>>because they believe that the conditions are overly-restrictive and the
>>suffering, in their opinion, is excessive.
>
> You agree with them completely.

Um, no, I obviously don't. If I did I would be a vegan, I'm not, I am a meat
eater. I just returned from shopping, among other things I bought an organic
chicken breast, some free range organic ground beef for meatloaf and some
wild sockeye salmon steaks.

> I believe some of their lives
> are of positive value, and some are not.

That's not unreasonable, but only meaningful inasmuchas you prove it *and*
take precautions to consume only the products from the former group. As a
general statement it's empty rhetoric.


>
>> >>How does that help the animals?
>>>
>>> WHICH "the animals" do you think you're trying to talk about???
>>>
>>>>This is the same question you are posing to
>>>>vegans, if you expect them to answer it then you should be able to.
>>>
>>> They aren't helping any animals at all, which is the point.
>>
>>THEY are employing exactly the same kind of thinking as you, except that
>>they draw the line in a different place.
>
> You draw it at the same place they do, insisting as they do
> that no livestock animals' lives should be given positive consideration.

There's that weasel-phrase again. "Positive consideration" to you implies
some kind of vague, generalized argument against veganism and for meat
consumption. It's neither. Ethical consumers do not take credit for the
lives of the animals used to produce their products, not vegetarians, not
meat-eaters.

>>The fact that they are not
>>recommending replacing the livestock they want to see eliminated with
>>other
>>forms of livestock is completely irrelevant.
>
> No it's not,

Yes it is.

> it's just that none of you can explain WHICH wildlife
> you would supposedly provide life for instead of livestock, much
> less WHY anyone would agree to do it, as we have gone over
> dozens of times by now.

What makes you think that humans are required to <blech> "provide life" for
wildlife? The only reason we "provide life" for livestock is to produce
products. If we stopped and left the land and resources to wildlife they
would "provide" their own lives.

>>There is no moral imperative
>>for anyone to cause livestock to exist. Your accusation that they are
>>somehow doing something inconsiderate or fundamentally different than you
>>do
>>when you advocate the elimination of battery hens is absurd.
>
> That's a lie.

It's the truth.

> In complete contrast to your lie, and unlike you
> advocates of the misnomer, I can say which animals I believe
> should replace others, and also why I feel that way.

There is no reason to control which animals replace livestock, or to think
that it's any better for there to be free range hens and broilers than wild
grouse and pheasants simply because we <blech> "provide life" for the hens.
On the contrary, the earth would most likely be better off if wild grouse
and pheasants replaced free range hens and broilers, because they are part
of a natural ecosystem. I'm not advocating it, I am merely pointing out that
you can't argue that you serve any greater good by <blech> "providing life"
for domestic hens.

One of these days I hope you wake up and realize that this so-called
argument of yours makes no sense.

On Sun, 24 Jun 2007 20:29:57 GMT, "Dutch" > wrote:

><dh@.> wrote
>
>> On Thu, 21 Jun 2007 18:38:49 GMT, "Dutch" > wrote:
>>
>>><dh@.> wrote
>>>> On Wed, 20 Jun 2007 23:26:11 GMT, "Dutch" > wrote:
>>>
>>>[..]
>>>
>>>>
>>>>>Why do you advocate the elimination of battery hens?
>>>>
>>>> Because I consider battery cages to be overly restrictive AND
>>>> I believe that sort of environment encourages a LOT of brutality
>>>> and abuse resulting in the suffering of many more birds than
>>>> would occur if the birds were kept in open houses.
>>>
>>>But as you have said yourself, those are a whole different group of
>>>animals.
>>
>> Yes, one which I would rather see not exist, along with dogs
>> and bulls used for fighting.
>
>Fine, I agree. Animals that are going to be subjected to inhumane treatment
>should never be brought into existence. That is the same way vegans think,
>except they think that all commercial farming is inhumane. I don't happen to
>agree with them, neither do you. Where you and I disagree is that you argue
>that vegans can be criticized for "denying life" to animals,

No I don't. Whenever you say that it immediately brings to mind
2 questions:

1. Why do you lie about it?
2. After all this time, do you have idea what my argument really is?

>a logical
>absurdity.
>
>>>You still advocate the elimination of battery hens for precisely the same
>>>reason that ARAs advocate the elimination of other forms of livestock,
>>>because they believe that the conditions are overly-restrictive and the
>>>suffering, in their opinion, is excessive.
>>
>> You agree with them completely.
>
>Um, no, I obviously don't. If I did I would be a vegan, I'm not, I am a meat
>eater.

It doesn't matter whether you are or not, since you still insist exactly
as "they" do that consumers must never consider--much MUCH!!! less
have any respect for--the lives of the animals they consume.

>I just returned from shopping, among other things I bought an organic
>chicken breast, some free range organic ground beef for meatloaf and some
>wild sockeye salmon steaks.
>
>> I believe some of their lives
>> are of positive value, and some are not.
>
>That's not unreasonable, but only meaningful inasmuchas you prove it *and*
>take precautions to consume only the products from the former group. As a
>general statement it's empty rhetoric.

As a general statement it points out a very significant aspect of human
influence on animals, but one which advocates of the misnomer necessarily
do NOT want to see taken into consideration.

>>> >>How does that help the animals?
>>>>
>>>> WHICH "the animals" do you think you're trying to talk about???
>>>>
>>>>>This is the same question you are posing to
>>>>>vegans, if you expect them to answer it then you should be able to.
>>>>
>>>> They aren't helping any animals at all, which is the point.
>>>
>>>THEY are employing exactly the same kind of thinking as you, except that
>>>they draw the line in a different place.
>>
>> You draw it at the same place they do, insisting as they do
>> that no livestock animals' lives should be given positive consideration.
>
>There's that weasel-phrase again. "Positive consideration" to you implies

You don't have any idea what it means to me, as you prove
consistently.
.. . .
>> none of you can explain WHICH wildlife
>> you would supposedly provide life for instead of livestock, much
>> less WHY anyone would agree to do it, as we have gone over
>> dozens of times by now.
>
>What makes you think that humans are required to <blech> "provide life" for
>wildlife?

If you can't tell us which wildlife you suggest we provide life for
instead of livestock, and WHY we should do so, then you have
absolutely nothing at all to offer or even to consider. The fact is
that you can't, so the fact is you can provide nothing to even
consider.

>The only reason we "provide life" for livestock is to produce
>products. If we stopped and left the land and resources to wildlife they
>would "provide" their own lives.
>
>>>There is no moral imperative
>>>for anyone to cause livestock to exist. Your accusation that they are
>>>somehow doing something inconsiderate or fundamentally different than you
>>>do
>>>when you advocate the elimination of battery hens is absurd.
>>
>> That's a lie.
>
>It's the truth.
>
>> In complete contrast to your lie, and unlike you
>> advocates of the misnomer, I can say which animals I believe
>> should replace others, and also why I feel that way.
>
>There is no reason to control which animals replace livestock,

LOL!!! You are displaying your cluelessness as clearly as
it's possible to display it!

"Every consumer choice promotes animals to experience
life." - Dutch

>or to think

I couldn't help but notice you don't like trying to do that.

>that it's any better for there to be free range hens and broilers than wild
>grouse

"Wild animals on average suffer more than farm animals, I think that's
obvious." - Dutch

>and pheasants

From what I've been led to believe wild pheasant populations
can not exist on their own. New birds need to be raised in
captivity and then released in order to maintain the wild populations.
Without human assistance they would die out. That means without
having any idea, and without being able to understand at all, you
have finally accidentally given an example of what I've been asking
you to provide for years, but you wouldn't even know that if I hadn't
just pointed it out for you.
.. . .
>One of these days I hope you wake up and realize that this so-called
>argument of yours makes no sense.

You are so clueless about all this nothing really makes sense to
you, you just think some parts of it do. The fact that the things you
think you "know" change completely from time to time, should be
enough to let even you know that you're nowhere near figuring it
out. That being the case I suppose there is some hope of you
eventually developing a partial understanding of what I'm saying
since you change your beliefs 180 degrees sometimes, but even
then you would have to try to understand instead of trying to get me
to believe what you want me to believe, and lying about what I do
believe. After all this time you still have yet to even acknowledge
what I'm actually saying, and--incredibly--I guess it's possible that
you're not deliberately lying but truly STILL do not know. As you
insist, I suppose you may honestly be THAT stupid.

<dh@.> wrote in message ...
> On Sun, 24 Jun 2007 20:29:57 GMT, "Dutch" > wrote:
>
>><dh@.> wrote
>>
>>> On Thu, 21 Jun 2007 18:38:49 GMT, "Dutch" > wrote:
>>>
>>>><dh@.> wrote
>>>>> On Wed, 20 Jun 2007 23:26:11 GMT, "Dutch" > wrote:
>>>>
>>>>[..]
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>Why do you advocate the elimination of battery hens?
>>>>>
>>>>> Because I consider battery cages to be overly restrictive AND
>>>>> I believe that sort of environment encourages a LOT of brutality
>>>>> and abuse resulting in the suffering of many more birds than
>>>>> would occur if the birds were kept in open houses.
>>>>
>>>>But as you have said yourself, those are a whole different group of
>>>>animals.
>>>
>>> Yes, one which I would rather see not exist, along with dogs
>>> and bulls used for fighting.
>>
>>Fine, I agree. Animals that are going to be subjected to inhumane
>>treatment
>>should never be brought into existence. That is the same way vegans think,
>>except they think that all commercial farming is inhumane. I don't happen
>>to
>>agree with them, neither do you. Where you and I disagree is that you
>>argue
>>that vegans can be criticized for "denying life" to animals,
>
> No I don't.

Yes you do. You have stated it explicitly at least a dozen times, often
enough to know that your denials are lies.

Whenever you say that it immediately brings to mind
> 2 questions:
>
> 1. Why do you lie about it?
> 2. After all this time, do you have idea what my argument really is?

Your argument has devolved into a series of equivocations which don't
disguise the real meaning, which is that you believe that consumers of
animal products should take solace in the fact that the chicken they are
eating "experienced life" compared to a vegan who selfishly refuses to
sponsor the lives of livestock animals. You equivocate that your opponents
are being "inconsiderate" when we refuse to "consider" that sponsoring the
life a livestock animal has moral significance. It's a flagrant
equivocation.

>
>>a logical
>>absurdity.
>>
>>>>You still advocate the elimination of battery hens for precisely the
>>>>same
>>>>reason that ARAs advocate the elimination of other forms of livestock,
>>>>because they believe that the conditions are overly-restrictive and the
>>>>suffering, in their opinion, is excessive.
>>>
>>> You agree with them completely.
>>
>>Um, no, I obviously don't. If I did I would be a vegan, I'm not, I am a
>>meat
>>eater.
>
> It doesn't matter whether you are or not, since you still insist
> exactly
> as "they" do that consumers must never consider--much MUCH!!! less
> have any respect for--the lives of the animals they consume.

False, based on an equivocation.

>>I just returned from shopping, among other things I bought an organic
>>chicken breast, some free range organic ground beef for meatloaf and some
>>wild sockeye salmon steaks.

You probably just buy piggly-wiggly factory farmed meat. Where is your
"consideration"?

>>
>>> I believe some of their lives
>>> are of positive value, and some are not.
>>
>>That's not unreasonable, but only meaningful inasmuchas you prove it *and*
>>take precautions to consume only the products from the former group. As a
>>general statement it's empty rhetoric.
>
> As a general statement it points out a very significant aspect of human
> influence on animals, but one which advocates of the misnomer necessarily
> do NOT want to see taken into consideration.

As a general statement is empty rhetoric and a fallacy. It points out
nothing of any significance.

>
>>>> >>How does that help the animals?
>>>>>
>>>>> WHICH "the animals" do you think you're trying to talk about???
>>>>>
>>>>>>This is the same question you are posing to
>>>>>>vegans, if you expect them to answer it then you should be able to.
>>>>>
>>>>> They aren't helping any animals at all, which is the point.
>>>>
>>>>THEY are employing exactly the same kind of thinking as you, except that
>>>>they draw the line in a different place.
>>>
>>> You draw it at the same place they do, insisting as they do
>>> that no livestock animals' lives should be given positive consideration.
>>
>>There's that weasel-phrase again. "Positive consideration" to you implies
>
> You don't have any idea what it means to me, as you prove
> consistently.

I can only infer, since you refuse to explain it, except with circularity.

> . . .
>>> none of you can explain WHICH wildlife
>>> you would supposedly provide life for instead of livestock, much
>>> less WHY anyone would agree to do it, as we have gone over
>>> dozens of times by now.
>>
>>What makes you think that humans are required to <blech> "provide life"
>>for
>>wildlife?
>
> If you can't tell us which wildlife you suggest we provide life for
> instead of livestock, and WHY we should do so, then you have
> absolutely nothing at all to offer or even to consider. The fact is
> that you can't, so the fact is you can provide nothing to even
> consider.

What makes you think that humans are required to <blech> "provide life" for
wildlife?


>>The only reason we "provide life" for livestock is to produce
>>products. If we stopped and left the land and resources to wildlife they
>>would "provide" their own lives.
>>
>>>>There is no moral imperative
>>>>for anyone to cause livestock to exist. Your accusation that they are
>>>>somehow doing something inconsiderate or fundamentally different than
>>>>you
>>>>do
>>>>when you advocate the elimination of battery hens is absurd.
>>>
>>> That's a lie.
>>
>>It's the truth.
>>
>>> In complete contrast to your lie, and unlike you
>>> advocates of the misnomer, I can say which animals I believe
>>> should replace others, and also why I feel that way.
>>
>>There is no reason to control which animals replace livestock,
>
> LOL!!! You are displaying your cluelessness as clearly as
> it's possible to display it!

What makes you think that humans are required to <blech> "provide life" for
wildlife?

> "Every consumer choice promotes animals to experience
> life." - Dutch

That's not <blech> "providing life" for wildlife.

>>or to think
>
> I couldn't help but notice you don't like trying to do that.
>
>>that it's any better for there to be free range hens and broilers than
>>wild
>>grouse
>
> "Wild animals on average suffer more than farm animals, I think that's
> obvious." - Dutch

So what? The suffering of wild animals is not our problem unless we cause
it.

>>and pheasants
>
> From what I've been led to believe wild pheasant populations
> can not exist on their own. New birds need to be raised in
> captivity and then released in order to maintain the wild populations.
> Without human assistance they would die out. That means without
> having any idea, and without being able to understand at all, you
> have finally accidentally given an example of what I've been asking
> you to provide for years, but you wouldn't even know that if I hadn't
> just pointed it out for you.

What you believe is irrelevant.

> . . .
>>One of these days I hope you wake up and realize that this so-called
>>argument of yours makes no sense.
>
> You are so clueless about all this nothing really makes sense to
> you, you just think some parts of it do. The fact that the things you
> think you "know" change completely from time to time, should be
> enough to let even you know that you're nowhere near figuring it
> out. That being the case I suppose there is some hope of you
> eventually developing a partial understanding of what I'm saying
> since you change your beliefs 180 degrees sometimes, but even
> then you would have to try to understand instead of trying to get me
> to believe what you want me to believe, and lying about what I do
> believe. After all this time you still have yet to even acknowledge
> what I'm actually saying, and--incredibly--I guess it's possible that
> you're not deliberately lying but truly STILL do not know. As you
> insist, I suppose you may honestly be THAT stupid.

The more you ramble on the more confusion you demonstrate.

On Jun 20, 3:38 pm, Rudy Canoza > wrote:
> ****wit David Harrison, who claims to appreciate the life of a dead
> chicken, lied:
>
> > On Tue, 19 Jun 2007, Rudy Canoza wrote:
> > >you think "they", meaning non-existent imaginary
> > >livestock, could somehow "benefit" by coming into
> > >existence.
>
> > LOL. Your obsession with "non-existent imaginary
> > livestock"
>
> No - YOUR obsession with them, ****wit. You, ****wit, are the one who
> "thinks" they are being "denied life" by "aras". That's absurd,
> ****wit, but you think it, and there is no dispute that you think it.
> We have your own posts to see that you think it, ****wit:
>
> That approach is illogical, since if it
> is wrong to end the lives of animals, it is
> *far worse* to keep those same animals from
> getting to have any life at all.
> ****wit - 07/30/1999
>
> You also know that "ARAs" want to deprive
> future farm animals [of] living,
> ****wit - 01/08/2002
>
> What gives you the right to want to deprive
> them [unborn animals] of having what life they
> could have?
> ****wit - 10/12/2001
>
> The animals that will be raised for us to eat
> are more than just "nothing", because they
> *will* be born unless something stops their
> lives from happening. Since that is the case,
> if something stops their lives from happening,
> whatever it is that stops it is truly "denying"
> them of the life they otherwise would have had.
> ****wit - 12/09/1999
>
> Yes, it is the unborn animals that will be
> born if nothing prevents that from happening,
> that would experience the loss if their lives
> are prevented.
> ****wit - 08/01/2000
>
> EVERYTHING you have written over eight miserable wasted years,
> ****wit, proves that you, and you alone, obsess over imaginary, non-
> existent farm animals.
>
> You're ****ed up, ****wit - just a mess.


Goo there is NO BIGGER mess on newsgroups than
yourself...................and you are doing a great job at training
Neo-natal Goo to succeed you.

On Jun 19, 2:36 pm, "Dutch" > wrote:
> "Rupert" > wrote
>
> > On Jun 18, 3:52 pm, Rudy Canoza > wrote:
>
> [..]
>
> >> >> The burden of proof is on you, and you fail to meet it
> >> >> - always.
>
> >> > If I point out that existing institutions are based on
> >> > discrimination that lacks justification
>
> >> Then the burden of proof is on YOU to demonstrate the
> >> lack of justification. You fail.
>
> >> ****wit.
>
> > That's utterly absurd. If someone maintains that there's a
> > justification, it's clearly their job to provide it. You utterly
> > incredible fool.
>
> You have said that you are not morally compelled to do everything in your
> power to stop supporting animal deaths. You have granted yourself the moral
> right to determine when it is justifiable for you to support animal deaths,
> yet at the same time you attempt to take that right away from others, and to
> top it all off you accuse us of supporting unjustified discrimination. The
> hypocrisy is beyond comprehension.

I believe that there are some limits on when it is morally permissible
to buy products which are produced by processes that cause harm. On
the other hand, there are some instances where people buy products
which are produced by processes that cause harm, and yet I am not yet
convinced that this is morally impermissible. Obviously I do not
believe that I or anyone else has the unconditional right to buy
whatever products they personally feel they are justified in buying.
The reality, however, is that I and each other person can only make a
good faith effort to determine which products they are justified in
buying and act accordingly. If I ever become convinced that what I am
doing is morally wrong, I shall acknowledge that fact, and hopefully I
will change my behaviour. In all of these respects, I am just like
you. I am not even aware of any differences between our positions
about exactly which products it is permissible to justify, except that
you apparently think yourself justified in occasionally buying factory-
farmed meat, I probably wouldn't agree with that. There are no more
grounds for calling me hypocritical than you. You too, buy some
products which were produced in harmful ways, and morally condemn
other people for producing other products that were produced in
harmful ways. You may want to argue that the place you've chosen to
drawn the boundary is better, but there are no grounds for an
accusation of hypocrisy. You've acknowledged that it's reasonable to
assert that there are some limits on the extent to which we may
support unnecessary suffering and that encouraging veganism is one
reasonable strategy for getting people to reduce their contribution to
suffering. I really don't see what your problem is. Your constant
accusations of hypocrisy are really incredible effrontery. There are
no grounds for calling me hypocritical which do not apply equally well
to you.

On Jun 19, 12:51 pm, "Dutch" > wrote:
> "Rupert" > wrote in
>
> > On Jun 18, 7:31 pm, "Dutch" > wrote:
> >> > Why? Is the burden of proof on you to show that the interests of black
> >> > people shouldn't be ignored? How do you propose to meet that burden of
> >> > proof?
>
> >> I'm sure negros are impressed that you are comparing their human rights
> >> with
> >> chickens.
>
> > Well, you tell me where the analogy breaks down.
>
> There is no plausible similarity between chickens and humans that would
> compel us to treat them similarly.

You're missing the point. I am not advocating that humans and chickens
be treated similarly - I am not advocating that we try to teach
chickens mathematics, for example, or give them the right to vote.
Equal consideration of their interests with that which we would give
the relevantly similar interests of a human does not entail that we
treat them similarly to typical humans. When you say "There are
distinctions between typical humans and chickens, therefore we are
justified in treating them differently" you're basically conceding my
point: discrimination requires justification by means of a morally
relevant difference. There are distinctions between typical humans and
chickens which do justify us in treating them differently, but the
point that we should give equal consideration to their interests with
that which we would give to the relevantly similar interests of a
human remains, and in *this* respect the situation is analogous with
the requirement to give equal consideration to the relevantly similar
interests of people with fair skin and people with dark skin. If
people with dark skin were on average significantly less intelligent
than us, as used to be widely believed, that would entail some
differences in how we treat them - there would be certain forms of
advanced education which would be appropriate for them less often, for
example, and certain forms of employment which would be appropriate
for them less often. The general point that their relevantly similar
interests should be given equal consideration would still remain, even
if this claim were correct. Getting people to change their beliefs
that people with dark skin were less intelligent no doubt provided
some welcome help to the cause of getting them better treatment, but
strictly speaking the case for giving them equal consideration was
unaffected by this factual issue. In this respect, the situations are
analogous. You have not undermined this analogy.


> The only similarity is that morally
> significant is that chickens can also experience suffering, therefore we
> ought to alleviate that suffering. But that is a characteristic of chickens,
> the relation to human sensitivity to pain is really immaterial.
>
> > Sure you can say,
> > negroes have similar cognitive capacities to typical Caucasian humans
>
> Not similar, equal, identical.
>
> > and chickens don't, but that's basically conceding my point, inasmuch
> > as you're making an effort to meet the burden of proof.
>
> My attempts to explain why your analogy is invalid in no way relieve you of
> the burden to show that it is valid.

Your attempts to undermine the analogy miss the point, that is what I
am trying to explain to you.