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Rupert Rupert is offline
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Dutch wrote:
> "Rupert" > wrote
> >
> > Dutch wrote:

>
> [..]
> > I disagree.
> >>
> >> You're wrong.
> >>

> >
> > Well, that's as may be. But you've introduced an undefined and
> > unexplained notion - "essential ability to hold those characteristics"
> > - and twice asserted without the slightest argument that all humans
> > have this ability and no nonhumans do. With all respect, I don't think
> > you're doing a very good job of defending your position.

>
> That may be, I thought it obvious, but ok I'll connect the dots. It's simple
> observation.
> 1. Aside from expected rare exceptions, all humans hold these
> characteristics, but more importantly..
> 2. Without exception, no non-humans hold or have ever held the
> characteristics, therefore one can conclude that if any animal does, humans
> alone possess the "essential ability to hold those characteristics".
>
> To address an expected objection... You will say that the existence of some
> humans without those characteristics negates the proposition of a set of
> essential human characteristics. Referring to physical abilities, one might
> state the rule that humans, as a species, possess the "essential ability" to
> walk upright on two legs. This is true despite exceptions to the rule, such
> as Spina Bifida sufferers. Just as mosquitoes and chickens have an
> "essential set of characteristics". so do humans.
>


So you're saying an individual's moral status should be judged on the
basis of what's typical for his or her species. I want you to explain
why this should be, and to address the fact that it has
counter-intuitive consequences for a hypothetical thought-experiment
which I presented.

> >> >> even if they are impaired due to misfortune. No animals of any other
> >> >> species
> >> >> have the potential to have such abilities, ZERO.
> >> >>
> >> >
> >> > The reality is it is a continuum.
> >>
> >> No it's not a continuum, it's black and white.
> >>

> >
> > This flies in the face of the evolutionary facts. We know that our
> > cognitive capacities developed incrementally during evolutionary
> > history, and hence that they are matter of degree.

>
> We share a lot of similiarlities with bananas on a cellular level also, that
> does not make a relevant fact.
>


Irrelevant. You said there is a sharp dividing line between humans and
nonhumans. I was simply pointing out that all species are the product
of a continuous process of development. Given any two species, there
once existed a set of evolutionary intermediaries between them such
that the process of developing from one species into the other via the
intermediaries was gradual and incremental. You may say we can draw a
threshold which distinguishes all existing humans from all existing
nonhumans today. But the question is where do we draw the threshold,
and why? You'll have to answer this if you want to credibly claim that
"it's black and white". You've already admitted that you'd want to draw
the threshold so that a few nonhuman species fall above it.

> Perhaps you are
> > claiming that there is some non-arbitrary threshold we can stipulate
> > that will draw a clear line between humans and some nonhuman species
> > such as great apes and all the other species. Well, it's your job to
> > specify that threshold and argue that it's non-arbitrary.

>
> What do mean by "arbitrary"? We possess cognitive powers that no other
> species possesses, there is nothing arbitrary about it.
>


I thought you agreed that some nonhuman species should be allowed into
the protected circle. The way we divide up the animals of the world
into species today is just an artifact of the accidents of evolutionary
history. If all the evolutionary intermediaries had survived, any two
species would form one "ring species" - a group of individuals such
that two individuals within the group sufficiently like one another can
interbreed, two individuals not sufficiently like one another cannot,
and any two individuals in the group can be connected by a series such
that each adjacent pair is a pair that can interbreed.

> >> > Nonhumans share these characteristics
> >> > with us to varying degrees.
> >>
> >> No they don't.
> >>

> >
> > Ridiculous and in blatant contradiction of the evolutionary facts.

>
> Evolution is irrelevant, we evolved from plenaria, should they be granted
> human rights?
>


Straw man. You claimed that nonhumans do not share our cognitive
characteristics with us in the slightest degree. That is totally
untenable. And you contradicted it when you agreed that nonhuman great
apes should be granted basic rights.

> >You
> > agree below that some nonhumans do have enough of the characteristics
> > to have some basic moral rights, so you contradict yourself.

>
> I'm not contradicting myself, you are not grasping my position.
>


So, you maintain they should have the rights despite the fact that they
don't have the characteristics in the slightest degree? Why should they
have the rights, then?

> > Your
> > position is totally untenable anyway.

>
> ROTFL! That is hilarious coming from you. AR is completely untenable in the
> real world, the only place that it can exist is in the misanthropic human
> imagination.
>


There is nothing misanthropic or untenable about it.

> >
> >> > You can, if you want, pick a certain
> >> > threshold and say "most humans are above this threshold, all nonhumans
> >> > are below it." But you'll have to set the threshold pretty high.
> >>
> >> Nonsense
> >>
> >> > Consider the following individual:
> >> >
> >> > "She communicates in sign language, using a vocabulary of over 1000
> >> > words. She also understands spoken English, and often carries on
> >> > 'bilingual' conversations, responding in sign to questions asked in
> >> > English. She is learning the letters of the alphabet, and can read some
> >> > printed words, including her own name. She has achieved scored between
> >> > 85 and 95 on the Standford-Binet Intelligence Test. She demonstrates a
> >> > clear self-awareness by engaging in self-directed behaviours in front
> >> > of a mirror, such as making faces or examining her teeth, and by her
> >> > appropriate use of self-descriptive language. She lies to avoid the
> >> > consequences of her own misbehaviour, and anticipates others' resopnses
> >> > to her actions. She engages in imaginary play, both alone and with
> >> > others. She has produced paintings and drawings which are
> >> > representational. She remembers and can talk about past events in her
> >> > life. She understands and has used appropriately time-related words
> >> > like 'before', 'after', 'later' and 'yesterday'. She laughs at her own
> >> > jokes and those of others. She cries when hurt or left alone, screams
> >> > when frightened or angered. She talks about her feelings, using words
> >> > like 'happy', 'sad', 'afraid', 'enjoy', 'eager', 'frustrate', 'made'
> >> > and, quite frequently, 'love'. She grieves for those she has lost - a
> >> > favourite cat who has died, a friend who has gone away. She can talk
> >> > about what happens when one dies, but she becomes fidgety and
> >> > uncomfortable when asked to discuss her own death or the death of her
> >> > companions. She displays a wonderful gentleness with kittens and other
> >> > small animals. She has even expressed empathy for others seen only in
> >> > pictures."
> >> >
> >> > That's a description of a nonhuman. You can set the threshold higher
> >> > than that if you want, but many would like to see some kind of
> >> > justification for doing so.
> >>
> >> I am not at all convinced that a lot of what is reported there is not
> >> projection on the part of over-zealous handlers.

> >
> > It's hard to see how it could be. The report almost entirely concerns
> > itself with objective matters of fact which it would be hard to be
> > mistaken about.

>
> I have seen this gorilla "Jojo"


Koko.

> on several documentaries, one in particular
> took a skeptical approach and it was evident that the handlers saw what they
> wanted to see on many occasions. In any case I am not disputing the
> intelligence of apes, or even of dogs and cats.
>


I thought no nonhuman shared our cognitive characteristics in the
slightest degree. So how do we go about deciding which species have
moral status, then?

> [..]
>
> >> > Nonhumans do have similar capabilities to SOME humans.
> >>
> >> You're still approaching the question backwards.
> >>

> >
> > What's that supposed to mean?

>
> It means that the test of inherent capabilities does not hinge on a few
> impaired individuals. Humans have the inherent capability of speech, "humans
> can talk" is a true statement, even though a few people are born deaf-mute.
>


Yes, well you're assuming that an individual's moral status should be
judged on the basis of what's typical for his or her species, I want
you to defend that, and address my thought-experiment.

> > Do you have any argument with what I say
> > below? If not, you'll have to come to terms with the consequences.

>
> You say a number of things below, but I am confident that I have an argument
> with it. The person here having difficulty coming to terms with the
> consequences of his position is you.
> >
> >> > Whatever we
> >> > decide about these beings, they should be treated the same way. It's
> >> > not true that these humans have the "essential ability" or the
> >> > "potential" to have these characteristics you're so excited about. It's
> >> > irrational to treat beings on the basis of what is typical for their
> >> > species, rather than their individual characteristics.
> >>
> >> The regime of rights attempts with limited success to view the human
> >> species
> >> as a family or a tribe. It is not irrational to view one's family
> >> favorably.
> >>

> >
> > But most people would see a problem with exploiting people just because
> > they happen not to be members of your family.

>
> "Exploit" is a charged word, My employer exploits my talents, as do my
> personal computer clients. I exploit the great variety of entertainment
> options in my area. Maybe you could come up with something less prejudicial
> and more descriptive. Do you mean to "treat unfairly"? I say that to say we
> treat animals unfairly when we use them for food flies in the face of the
> very nature of life. You may as well call a rainstorm unjust.
>


How about "inflict serious harm in order to serve your own purposes"?

> > The analogy with
> > partiality based on family relationships doesn't justify the status
> > quo.

>
> I wasn't trying to "justify" it, I was attempting to create a context that
> would allow you to understand how I view it.
>
> >> >> Instead you are attempting to drag all humans down to the
> >> >> level of other animals by pointing to rare humans who's human
> >> >> abilities
> >> >> are
> >> >> impaired. That is not a logical approach, because impairment of
> >> >> abilities
> >> >> is
> >> >> ad hoc, arbitrary and meaningless, it can occur by injury, accident,
> >> >> disease
> >> >> or fluke of genetics, it does not exist by nature.
> >> >
> >> > I can't distinguish between the condition of being born a permanently
> >> > radically cognitively impaired human and being born a nonhuman. They
> >> > both seem to be "by nature" to me.
> >>
> >> I think you could if you tried, but you don't want to. The nature of
> >> humans
> >> is not to have single-digit IQs, it is to have IQs of 100.
> >>

> >
> > Not all humans. Ultimately all you can say to justify your conclusion
> > is "a being's moral status should be based on what's typical for his or
> > her species."

>
> Assuming that NO member of that species has EVER demonstrated significantly
> greater capabilities, like mosquitoes.
>


Then each individual should be granted the moral status appropriate for
his or her characteristics.

> > That's a statement standing in need of an argument.

>
> Since as I have shown, it is precisely how we all think, YOU need to present
> a counter-argument.
>


No, it's not how we all think. Most people haven't thought about it to
that extent. Moral philosophers have tried to come up with a way of
defending our intuitions about how we should treat other species
against the argument from marginal cases, and this is the best we have
come up with so far. It's a principle that's being invoked to justify a
set of intuitions. But when it comes to our intuitions about
principles, many people find it more plausible that individuals should
be judged on their own characteristics rather than what's typical for
their species. The fact that the latter approach yields results more in
harmony with our intuitions about particular cases is not enough. The
principle needs more defence. We need to have it explained why that
should be so. A moral theory needs to do more than just yield the
correct results, it needs to have explanatory power.

Furthermore I have presented a counter-argument, which you have not
addressed.


> > It
> > also has some counter-intuitive consequences, as discussed below.

>
> Probably based on a misunderstanding on your part..
>


Argue the point.

> >> >> The question is asked,
> >> >> "What if a race of beings came to the earth with powers equal to or
> >> >> greater
> >> >> than humans?" They would be accorded rights, just as any animal
> >> >> species
> >> >> would who demonstrated capacities equivalent to humans.
> >> >>
> >> >> > Very few defenders of animal
> >> >> > agriculture are actually prepared to come out and say that. If they
> >> >> > want to say it, fine, then the matter can be debated. But if they
> >> >> > hold
> >> >> > that it's permissible to do it to the nonhumans, but not the
> >> >> > relevantly
> >> >> > similar humans,
> >> >>
> >> >> There are no animals relevantly similar to humans.
> >> >>
> >> >> > then the characteristics we identified aren't what
> >> >> > count after all, but rather species membership.
> >> >>
> >> >> Species membership identifies all beings who either have, have the
> >> >> potential
> >> >> to have, or have in their essence human abilities, or humanness.
> >> >
> >> > Don't agree with "have in their essence". It's hand-waving.
> >>
> >> No it's not, it's descriptive. No monkey has in it's essence a poet,
> >> philosopher or musician.
> >>

> >
> > No radically cognitively impaired human has either.

>
> Idiot savant
>


That's not what I mean by "radically cognitively impaired human".

> > So what?

>
> So everything Rupert. The existence of a few people with no legs does not
> change the essential physical nature of the human race. But no snake can
> stand up and walk.
>


But the principle that an individual should be judged on the basis of
what's typical for his or her species needs defending. I've also
presented a counter-argument which you haven't addressed.


>
> >
> >> If the
> >> > permanently radically cognitively impaired humans have it in their
> >> > essence, why not the nonhumans too?
> >>
> >> Cognitively impaired humans are exceptional cases usually a result of
> >> accident or misfortune, exceptions to not make a rule.
> >>

> >
> > But why should the rule be based on what's typical for the species,
> > rather than on individual characteristics?

>
> Because it's impossible and implausible to look at it that way. Show me an
> example of ONE individual of any of the species we "exploit" or kill in
> agriculture that has ever demonstrated a cognitive functioning set
> approaching that of a human?


They do have cognitive functions similar to some humans whom we think
should have some moral status. We have to revise either our beliefs
about the livestock or about the humans.

> Are you going to administer an intelligence
> test every time you decide to swat a mosquito, or are you going to treat
> mosquitoes as a species?


I will treat each individual mosquito on the basis of what I reasonably
believe about his or her mental characteristics.

> Are we going to grant rights to cockroaches because
> there are humans in comas with no cognitive functions?


If a human has permanently lost all capacity for consciousness, then
the only things relevant are his or her past wishes and the wishes of
those close to him or her.

> Talk about an
> untenable position.
>
>
> >> > Suppose we encountered a chimpanzee who had the same level of
> >> > intelligence as a highly intelligent human adult. What would we say
> >> > about this chimpanzee? Would we say that "in essence" he has the same
> >> > characteristics as ordinary chimpanzees and should be treated
> >> > accordingly, or would we say that all the chimpanzees have his
> >> > characteristics "in essence" and should be raised to his level? It's
> >> > irrational to judge on the basis of what's typical for an individual's
> >> > species. The individual characteristics should be what count.
> >>
> >> You raise a valid question in theory but in reality there is no need for
> >> an
> >> answer, since no chimpanzee will ever be as intelligent as a functional
> >> human.

> >
> > The thought-experiment is meant to bring attention to the
> > counter-intuitive consequences of maintaining that beings should be
> > granted a moral status based on what's typical for their species. If
> > this is what you are maintaining, you need to indicate how you will
> > deal with the challenge posed by this thought-experiment.

>
> The "thought experiment" did not present a real challenge, therefore does
> not require a real solution. If ONE chimp ever demonstrated human abilities
> in my opinion all chimps should immediately be elevated in moral status,


Thank you. I finally got a response.

So now it's no longer that an individual should be judged on the basis
of what's typical for his or her species, but he or she should be
judged on the basis of the most cognitively sophisticated member of his
or her species. *Why?* The species boundaries that exist today are just
an arbitrary product of evolutionary history. If all the evolutionary
intermediaries existed there would be no sharply defined species
boundaries. You can't just say "This position is what everyone thinks".
It's a position you tailor-made to produce results in harmony with your
beliefs about other species and so as to give an acceptable answer to
my thought-experiment. It's hardly an intuitively obvious moral
principle. You need to justify it.

> but
> that's irrelevant for a number of reasons. 1. I already think chimps ought
> to enjoy elevated moral status, 2. If given human status, many chimps would
> immediately qualify as murderers, since in an AR world, that's what most
> chimps are, they kill young, assault and kill members of other troupes and
> hunt baby monkeys for food, and lastly, 3. No chimp will ever demonstrate
> such abilities, so the point is meaningless anyway. The real world does not
> have to react to hypothetical conundrums that have no chance of occurring.
>
> >> But the question is unnecessary, because chimpanzees are close enough
> >> cousins of humans that in my view they ought to be protected anyway.
> >>
> >> >> > Someone can advocate
> >> >> > that species membership is the crucial characteristic too, but then
> >> >> > they have to confront the arguments against speciesism in the
> >> >> > literature.
> >> >>
> >> >> There are no valid arguments against speciesism.
> >> >
> >> > There are no valid arguments *for* speciesism.
> >>
> >> There don't need to be,

> >
> > Yes, there do.

>
> No, there don't, period.
>
> > Treating cases differently when a morally relevant
> > difference is not apparent requires justification.

>
> Those are just words that have you all tied up in knots. We ALL treat animal
> species and humans differently in various ways,


Because there are relevant differences. But we should treat nonhumans
in the same way we would treat relevantly similar humans.

> according to a whole variety
> of largely subjective criteria. There is no other rational way to address
> the real world.
>
> >
> >> it is the way nature is. You give no thought
> >> whatsoever to other species until they appear all furry tails and big
> >> eyes
> >> on some quasi-political bandwagon.
> >>
> >> > Philosophers have been
> >> > trying to find one for a long time, and have failed. We should treat
> >> > individuals on the basis of their individual characteristics, not what
> >> > is typical for their species. If you are uncomfortable with treating
> >> > permanently radically cognitively impaired humans in a certain way, you
> >> > shouldn't treat nonhumans in that way, either.
> >>
> >> That's your silly quasi-political bandwagon. Nobody treats non-humans as
> >> they treat humans,

> >
> > Nobody is suggesting they should.

>
> You are. We already treat them differently, you claim that is wrong because
> it is "speciesist", that implies you think they should not be judged based
> on species.
>


I claim a moral theory which implies it is morally permissible to
inflict a certain harm on a nonhuman for a certain purpose, but not on
a relevantly similar human for the same purpose, cannot be acceptable.

> > What is being advocated is equal
> > consideration. Some people advocate equal consideration and practice
> > what they preach.

>
> High-sounding words that mean nothing. Instead of mouthing vague
> catch-phrases propose something specific and consistent.


"Equal consideration" does mean something. It doesn't resolve every
question that can be raised about animal ethics. I'm not going to set
forth for you a complete theory that resolves every difficult question
that can be asked. You know what changes the animal movement wants. If
you want to argue against them, either argue that they are not required
by equal consideration, or come up with a decent argument against equal
consideration.