Dutch wrote:
> "Rupert" > wrote in message
> ups.com...
> >
> > Dutch wrote:
> >> "Rupert" > wrote
> >> >
> >> > Dutch wrote:
> >>
> >> [..]
> >> >> The morally relevant difference lies in the essential difference
> >> >> between
> >> >> humans and the animal species we use as food, or kill in crop fields,
> >> >> or
> >> >> what-have-you.
> >> >>
> >> >
> >> > You can identify some differences which hold between most humans and
> >> > most nonhumans and claim that they are morally relevant, but there will
> >> > always be some humans who don't have these differences from nonhuman
> >> > animals.
> >>
> >> I have explained this before. Human rights are designed to protect humans
> >> because of what we are by nature, and those rights cover all humans,
> >> including those whose nature is not yet developed or diminished by age or
> >> injury. We always hold by default to the hope that our human potential
> >> will
> >> be realized.
> >>
> >> >> > I really had a tough
> >> >> > time getting an answer out of you on this one, but at one point you
> >> >> > seemed to say it would be permissible to do the same thing to
> >> >> > humans.
> >> >>
> >> >> There's no reason to say that because we accept the killing and/or use
> >> >> of
> >> >> animals in agriculture that we must implicitly approve of the killing
> >> >> of
> >> >> humans. There are relevant differences between animal species, in
> >> >> their
> >> >> intelligence and level of awareness. The argument that a few humans
> >> >> have
> >> >> little intelligence (like ****wit) can be dismissed,
> >> >
> >> > It can't be dismissed. It has to be come to terms with.
> >>
> >> That is coming to terms with it, it is the rational conclusion.
> >>
> >> > If we hold that
> >> > it is permissible to do these things to nonhuman animals because they
> >> > lack certain characteristics, then we must also hold that it would be
> >> > permissible to do the same things to humans who lack the
> >> > characteristics.
> >>
> >> No, because it is the essential ability to hold these characteristics
> >> that
> >> is the deciding factor, not actual possession of the characteristics. All
> >> humans have the essential ability to hold the characteristics of
> >> humanness,
> >
> > I disagree.
>
> You're wrong.
>

Well, that's as may be. But you've introduced an undefined and
unexplained notion - "essential ability to hold those characteristics"
- and twice asserted without the slightest argument that all humans
have this ability and no nonhumans do. With all respect, I don't think
you're doing a very good job of defending your position.

> >> even if they are impaired due to misfortune. No animals of any other
> >> species
> >> have the potential to have such abilities, ZERO.
> >>
> >
> > The reality is it is a continuum.
>
> No it's not a continuum, it's black and white.
>

This flies in the face of the evolutionary facts. We know that our
cognitive capacities developed incrementally during evolutionary
history, and hence that they are matter of degree. Perhaps you are
claiming that there is some non-arbitrary threshold we can stipulate
that will draw a clear line between humans and some nonhuman species
such as great apes and all the other species. Well, it's your job to
specify that threshold and argue that it's non-arbitrary.

> > Nonhumans share these characteristics
> > with us to varying degrees.
>
> No they don't.
>

Ridiculous and in blatant contradiction of the evolutionary facts. You
agree below that some nonhumans do have enough of the characteristics
to have some basic moral rights, so you contradict yourself. Your
position is totally untenable anyway.

> > You can, if you want, pick a certain
> > threshold and say "most humans are above this threshold, all nonhumans
> > are below it." But you'll have to set the threshold pretty high.
>
> Nonsense
>
> > Consider the following individual:
> >
> > "She communicates in sign language, using a vocabulary of over 1000
> > words. She also understands spoken English, and often carries on
> > 'bilingual' conversations, responding in sign to questions asked in
> > English. She is learning the letters of the alphabet, and can read some
> > printed words, including her own name. She has achieved scored between
> > 85 and 95 on the Standford-Binet Intelligence Test. She demonstrates a
> > clear self-awareness by engaging in self-directed behaviours in front
> > of a mirror, such as making faces or examining her teeth, and by her
> > appropriate use of self-descriptive language. She lies to avoid the
> > consequences of her own misbehaviour, and anticipates others' resopnses
> > to her actions. She engages in imaginary play, both alone and with
> > others. She has produced paintings and drawings which are
> > representational. She remembers and can talk about past events in her
> > life. She understands and has used appropriately time-related words
> > like 'before', 'after', 'later' and 'yesterday'. She laughs at her own
> > jokes and those of others. She cries when hurt or left alone, screams
> > when frightened or angered. She talks about her feelings, using words
> > like 'happy', 'sad', 'afraid', 'enjoy', 'eager', 'frustrate', 'made'
> > and, quite frequently, 'love'. She grieves for those she has lost - a
> > favourite cat who has died, a friend who has gone away. She can talk
> > about what happens when one dies, but she becomes fidgety and
> > uncomfortable when asked to discuss her own death or the death of her
> > companions. She displays a wonderful gentleness with kittens and other
> > small animals. She has even expressed empathy for others seen only in
> > pictures."
> >
> > That's a description of a nonhuman. You can set the threshold higher
> > than that if you want, but many would like to see some kind of
> > justification for doing so.
>
> I am not at all convinced that a lot of what is reported there is not
> projection on the part of over-zealous handlers.

It's hard to see how it could be. The report almost entirely concerns
itself with objective matters of fact which it would be hard to be
mistaken about.

> Also I am not arguing that
> non-humans do not possess intelligence. Having said that, I believe that
> great apes possess sufficient human-like qualities that they could rightly
> be considered as deserving of basic rights.
> >
> > You may have no trouble drawing a sharp line between nonhuman great
> > apes and humans now. But this is just an accident of evolutionary
> > history. If all the evolutionary intermediaries were still living
> > today, you might have more trouble knowing exactly where to draw the
> > line.
>
> That's an unecessary hypothetical, I already have sufficient difficulty
> drawing a sharp line between nonhuman great apes and humans that I see no
> reason we should not err on the side of the apes.
>
> >> > Most people would find this counter-intuitive. The
> >> > position may be right, but someone who wants to advocate it should be
> >> > upfront about it, and say "I hold that it is permissible to do these
> >> > things to nonhuman animals because they lack these characteristics -
> >> > and I also hold that it would be permissible to do these things to
> >> > humans who lack the characteristics."
> >>
> >> You're approaching the problem backwards in order to artificially reach
> >> the
> >> conclusion you wish to reach. In order to raise other animal species to
> >> the
> >> level of humans, which is what you are trying to do, you must find at
> >> least
> >> one example of a member of a non-human species with capabilities equal or
> >> similar to humans.
> >
> > Nonhumans do have similar capabilities to SOME humans.
>
> You're still approaching the question backwards.
>

What's that supposed to mean? Do you have any argument with what I say
below? If not, you'll have to come to terms with the consequences.

> > Whatever we
> > decide about these beings, they should be treated the same way. It's
> > not true that these humans have the "essential ability" or the
> > "potential" to have these characteristics you're so excited about. It's
> > irrational to treat beings on the basis of what is typical for their
> > species, rather than their individual characteristics.
>
> The regime of rights attempts with limited success to view the human species
> as a family or a tribe. It is not irrational to view one's family favorably.
>

But most people would see a problem with exploiting people just because
they happen not to be members of your family. The analogy with
partiality based on family relationships doesn't justify the status
quo.

> >> Instead you are attempting to drag all humans down to the
> >> level of other animals by pointing to rare humans who's human abilities
> >> are
> >> impaired. That is not a logical approach, because impairment of abilities
> >> is
> >> ad hoc, arbitrary and meaningless, it can occur by injury, accident,
> >> disease
> >> or fluke of genetics, it does not exist by nature.
> >
> > I can't distinguish between the condition of being born a permanently
> > radically cognitively impaired human and being born a nonhuman. They
> > both seem to be "by nature" to me.
>
> I think you could if you tried, but you don't want to. The nature of humans
> is not to have single-digit IQs, it is to have IQs of 100.
>

Not all humans. Ultimately all you can say to justify your conclusion
is "a being's moral status should be based on what's typical for his or
her species." That's a statement standing in need of an argument. It
also has some counter-intuitive consequences, as discussed below.

> >> The question is asked,
> >> "What if a race of beings came to the earth with powers equal to or
> >> greater
> >> than humans?" They would be accorded rights, just as any animal species
> >> would who demonstrated capacities equivalent to humans.
> >>
> >> > Very few defenders of animal
> >> > agriculture are actually prepared to come out and say that. If they
> >> > want to say it, fine, then the matter can be debated. But if they hold
> >> > that it's permissible to do it to the nonhumans, but not the relevantly
> >> > similar humans,
> >>
> >> There are no animals relevantly similar to humans.
> >>
> >> > then the characteristics we identified aren't what
> >> > count after all, but rather species membership.
> >>
> >> Species membership identifies all beings who either have, have the
> >> potential
> >> to have, or have in their essence human abilities, or humaness.
> >
> > Don't agree with "have in their essence". It's hand-waving.
>
> No it's not, it's descriptive. No monkey has in it's essence a poet,
> philosopher or musician.
>

No radically cognitively impaired human has either. So what?

> If the
> > permanently radically cognitively impaired humans have it in their
> > essence, why not the nonhumans too?
>
> Cognitively impaired humans are exceptional cases usually a result of
> accident or misfortune, exceptions to not make a rule.
>

But why should the rule be based on what's typical for the species,
rather than on individual characteristics?

> > Suppose we encountered a chimpanzee who had the same level of
> > intelligence as a highly intelligent human adult. What would we say
> > about this chimpanzee? Would we say that "in essence" he has the same
> > characteristics as ordinary chimpanzees and should be treated
> > accordingly, or would we say that all the chimpanzees have his
> > characteristics "in essence" and should be raised to his level? It's
> > irrational to judge on the basis of what's typical for an individual's
> > species. The individual characteristics should be what count.
>
> You raise a valid question in theory but in reality there is no need for an
> answer, since no chimpanzee will ever be as intelligent as a functional
> human.

The thought-experiment is meant to bring attention to the
counter-intuitive consequences of maintaining that beings should be
granted a moral status based on what's typical for their species. If
this is what you are maintaining, you need to indicate how you will
deal with the challenge posed by this thought-experiment.

> But the question is unecessary, because chimpanzees are close enough
> cousins of humans that in my view they ought to be protected anyway.
>
> >> > Someone can advocate
> >> > that species membership is the crucial characteristic too, but then
> >> > they have to confront the arguments against speciesism in the
> >> > literature.
> >>
> >> There are no valid arguments against speciesism.
> >
> > There are no valid arguments *for* speciesism.
>
> There don't need to be,

Yes, there do. Treating cases differently when a morally relevant
difference is not apparent requires justification.

> it is the way nature is. You give no thought
> whatsoever to other species until they appear all furry tails and big eyes
> on some quasi-political bandwagon.
>
> > Philosophers have been
> > trying to find one for a long time, and have failed. We should treat
> > individuals on the basis of their individual characteristics, not what
> > is typical for their species. If you are uncomfortable with treating
> > permamently radically cognitively impaired humans in a certain way, you
> > shouldn't treat nonhumans in that way, either.
>
> That's your silly quasi-political bandwagon. Nobody treats non-humans as
> they treat humans,

Nobody is suggesting they should. What is being advocated is equal
consideration. Some people advocate equal consideration and practice
what they preach.

> unless they choose to in some selective way, nor should
> they. Humans are special, that's the way of the world, deal with it.
>
> >> The human species possesses
> >> special powers or the potential or inherent ability to have those powers,
> >> even if impaired, which humans by default value above all else, it is a
> >> fact
> >> of human culture, and of other species.