Leif Erikson wrote:

Glorfindel wrote:

>>Why do you claim I am not qualified to know?

> Because you never studied this the relevant disciplines in science.

I have.

>>>Prove it.
>>
>>I don't know that one can prove it, but the scientific
>>community agrees the evidence is overwhelming that it is
>>so.

> Prove that.

If you'd studied the relevant disciplines in science,
you'd know it is so.

<snip>

>>>>>>>I think one has to condemn all conditioning as a violation of the
>>>>>>>animal's freedom and personhood, or not condemn conditioning _per
>>>>>>>se_.

>>>>This, I think, is true.

>>>It's bullshit.

>>Why?

> Because animals don't have "personhood"

That is your opinion, but others disagree.

However, that does not address the relevant
question he how can one claim a practice
is wrong *because it involves conditioning*
while not condemning conditioning? That
makes no logical sense. Conditioning
is either wrong in itself, or not. There
is no other alternative.

You may condemn a practice for some other
reason, which appears to be the case here,
but you apparently do not condemn conditioning
in itself. Therefore, you cannot condemn
a practice *simply* because it involves conditioning.
I can, and do.

<snip>

>>>>> She was suggesting one's position on such
>>>>>conditioning must be all or nothing in relation to other ways we
>>>>>condition animals (zoos, farms, training dogs to sit-stay, etc.).

>>>>*IF* the issue is conditioning in itself. I, myself, do reject
>>>>conditioning in general as a violation of animal rights ethics,
>>>>and do not think the purpose of the conditioning is the sole
>>>>criterion.

<snip>
>>
>>>>>>To repeat- I think it is a perversion, and if it is contrary to an
>>>>>>animals'
>>>>>>instinct and requires conditioning or abuse, I _strongly_ condemn it.

>>>>I agree

>>>But if it doesn't require such conditioning, you and
>>>Pearl are strongly supportive of it.

>>No. One can condemn it on the grounds that it causes harm either to the
>>animal or to the human involved, or to both.

> But apparently *not* on the ground that it is immoral and a perversion.

If it causes harm, unless that harm is for the greater benefit
of the individual harmed (such as the pain of a medical
procedure to prevent the greater harm of the disease/injury ),
I believe it is immoral. I certainly believe there are things
which are, indeed, immoral.

<snip>

> Lesley, in any case, endorses it:

> *As long as the feelings are mutual*,
> and there's *no coercion or force involved,* why
> should you be concerned? Personally, I have no
> problem with people's personal choices *as long as
> they don't harm or cause distress to another*- be it
> human or animal. [emphasis in original]
> http://tinyurl.com/dwzj7

> That is your position as well.

Well, yes, it is. I don't think I have a right to
prevent people by force from doing things which cause
no harm to another, human or animal. There may be
things which religious groups regard as sin, but in
a non-theocratic state, religious groups only have the
authority to enforce their views on their own members.
There may be things I dislike or regard as wrong, but
unless they cause *harm* -- harm which can be objectively
observed -- I do not have the right to enforce my
opinion on others against their will.