"Dave" > wrote in message
oups.com...
>
> Dutch wrote:
>> "Dave" > wrote
>> > Dutch wrote:
>>
>> [..]
>>
>> >> > Why is this distinction more relevant than the distinction between
>> >> > collateral and intentional animal deaths?
>> >>
>> >> Because harm to animals in agriculture is not increasing the long-term
>> >> risk
>> >> of cancer in mice, it is systematic and repeated decimation of their
>> >> populations.
>> >
>> > Difference in numbers involved is a difference of degree rather than
>> > kind. Many of the animal deaths that you accuse vegans of hypocrisy
>> > over are "statistical", rather than "intentional", just like the human
>> > deaths caused by global warming. Birds flying into electricity pylons,
>> > fish deaths due to water pollution, pesticide accumulation in the food
>> > chain, animals mangled by farm machinery are all examples of
>> > "statistical" deaths.
>>
>> Some of that is valid, but the majority of animal harm in agriculture is
>> much more immediate and large-scale. Pesticides and herbicides are lethal
>> to
>> small animals, and Davis concludes that running machinery through fields
>> is
>> also.
>>
>> >> > There is little doubt that
>> >> > human activity causes global warming and little doubt that global
>> >> > warming increases the number of natural disasters like droughts,
>> >> > floods, storms and heatwaves as well as increasing the incidence
>> >> > of tropical diseases. IOW people, who would otherwise live, die as
>> >> > a consequence of greenhouse gas emmissions.
>> >>
>> >> It's not the same at all, c'mon Dave use your head. To be analagous to
>> >> the
>> >> treatment of animals we would have to level whole occupied
>> >> subdivisions
>> >> with
>> >> giant machines, and spray them with deadly nerve gas.
>> >
>> > If you simply want to count numbers of deaths then the difference is
>> > entirely of degree.
>>
>> A difference in numbers counted in many orders of magnitude amounts to a
>> difference in kind.
>
> Yes and no. The alleged fallacy of objetcing to the 101st death applies
> to both situations.

That doesn't follow at all. The 1001st death principle refers to the vegan's
obsession with the death of the animal on the dinner plate and his relative
indifference to the 1000 other animals who die in support of a human
lifestyle. Pollution or other indirect long-term harmful practices are not
comparable in kind.

>> If you wish to make distinctions based on how
>> > "direct"
>> > ,for want of a better word, the deaths are then there is no reason to
>> > deny similar distinctions between shooting an animal in the head and
>> > undertaking activities that endanger their lives in some way.
>>
>> It's not a matter of directness, that wasn't my point. If using a field
>> for
>> agriculture negatively impacts *most* of the animals on the land,
>> killing,
>> poisoning, injuring or displacing them, then that is different than
>> acknowledging that once in a while an animal is caught in the thresher.
>> The
>> latter would be classed as a statistical anomaly and not a moral factor.
>>
>>
>> >>
>> >> >> >> We don't
>> >> >> >> continue with anything which involves the routine slaughter of
>> >> >> >> humans.
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> > Not on anything like the same scale as the slaughter of animals
>> >> >> > but
>> >> >> > it
>> >> >> > is still there.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> On a statisical scale, but except for incidents like nuclear
>> >> >> accidents,
>> >> >> not
>> >> >> on a comparable scale to the harm caused to animals.
>> >> >
>> >> > Granted.
>> >>
>> >> That's where the difference lies. Statistical probablilty of *some*
>> >> harm
>> >> always exists, in every situation, that does not form a case.
>> >
>> > That's precisely my problem with the collateral deaths argument, Etter
>> > style.
>>
>> It depends on how you figure the degree of harm. I assume that it is
>> massive, you may think it's statisically insignificant.
>
> No. I think you are exaggerating it but I don't claim it is
> statistically insignificant.
>
>> > By contrast I find the more modest formulation aka the "least
>> > harm principle" quite pertinent.
>>
>> He does not conclude that the harm done by threshing machines alone is
>> statistically insignificant, not even factoring in plowing or spraying.
>> He
>> finds that animal populations are seriously decimated.
>
> AFAICR he concludes very little. He cites too studies comparing
> populations per ha for a given species before and after but i
> unable to say how much of the discrepency is due to displacement
> and how much is due to mortality.
>
>> >> >> >> If we
>> >> >> >> are going to inevitably decide that harm to *some* animals is
>> >> >> >> acceptable,
>> >> >> >> then the theoretical concept of "animals rights" collapses
>> >> >> >> utterly
>> >> >> >> and
>> >> >> >> must
>> >> >> >> be discarded in favor of a more logical world-view.
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> > Alternatively we can take the view that incidental animal deaths
>> >> >> > that
>> >> >> > are
>> >> >> > an almost unavoidable consequence of modern human technological
>> >> >> > activity are acceptable but don't justify deliberate slaughter of
>> >> >> > yet
>> >> >> > more
>> >> >> > animals.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> It's not that they justify the slaughter of animals or not, they
>> >> >> place
>> >> >> it
>> >> >> into context. If it were the case that abstaining from animal
>> >> >> products
>> >> >> actually was a "cruelty-free" lifestyle as many vegans tend to
>> >> >> think,
>> >> >> then
>> >> >> that would be an entirely different reality. As it is, animals die
>> >> >> either
>> >> >> way,
>> >> >
>> >> > Yes but the numbers of animals that die are not equivalent, not that
>> >> > simple death counts are a sensible way of comparing different diets.
>> >>
>> >> The numbers of animals that are harmed or killed will vary with the
>> >> production of a particular food, depending on where, when and how it's
>> >> produced.
>> >
>> > Of course.
>>
>> Which is why it's a fallacy to simple compare vegetables and meat.
>
> Meat [...] production causes more harm than vegetable production
> is a fallacy if the [...] is "always" but not if the [...] is
> "generally".

Exactly, but veganism isn't ever presented assuming "general" validity,
that's one of my primary objections to it.

>> >> >> so it's just not justifiable to assume a right/wrong good/bad
>> >> >> dichotomy
>> >> >> between farming animals and not doing so,
>> >> >
>> >> > Indeed. It's more like relatively good, relatively bad, somewhere in
>> >> > between,...
>> >>
>> >> If you are placing a value on animals harmed, you have to consider
>> >> collateral deaths, which means that vegan foods can be trumped by
>> >> non-vegan
>> >> foods. This must be acknowledged and factored into the moral equation.
>> >
>> > Sure. The appeal of veganism is that it is a very simple and easy rule
>> > to follow whereas comparisons between difficult degrees of "harm" are
>> > rather harder to establish.
>>
>> It's simple to follow, if you place very little value on enjoyment of
>> food,
>
> A matter of individual taste how much more enjoyable an omnivore
> diet is compared with a vegan one.

Hardly. In fact I think a major factor why vegans proseltyse so vehemently
is their wish to have company in their suffering.