Meadowlark wrote:
> wrote:
>
> It's tempting to respond as Takver. 
>
> > Meadowlark wrote:
> <snip>
>
> >>Is there any scientific evidence to support Sapontzis's claim
> >>that some animals are moral agents?
>
> > Well excuse my ignorance about Sapontzis, but if we can't agree on what
> > a set of morals is, then we aren't going to agree on the scientific
> > evidence for or against. And people have been arguing about that
> > forever.
>
> For the most part, people have been arguing about how moral
> principles are to be applied, or carried out in specific
> situations. Basic moral principles are much the same throughout
> human cultures. For example, there is no human culture that I
> know of which considers cowardice or cruelty a virtue, but
> different cultures, and individuals within cultures, differ on
> how cruelty is defined, as we see here on TPA.
>
> People in the Kantian tradition tend to say that actions are only
> moral if they are supported by moral reasoning -- that is, if the
> person acting can say why his action is moral, or why it follows
> some moral principle ("acting for the right reason"). Regan is in
> this tradition. What Sapontzis says is that if a being acts by
> intent, and acts in a way generally considered moral, he is acting
> morally. So Regan does not consider children or non-human animals
> moral agents. He calls them moral patients, that is, beings toward
> whom we have moral obligations, but who have no moral obligations in
> return toward us.
Thanks for the abstract. In that case, I disagree with Regan - at
least somewhat. More reasonable to me would be that any being can in
some sense be a moral agent (acts by intent in a manner considered
moral by someone), and also a moral patient (deserving of moral
obligations). Don't you agree?
>
> Sapontzis:
>
> "Furthermore, not all moral actions of animals can be plausibly
> accounted for as products of instinct and conditioning. ...
> there is at least no more reason to think that a pet dog
> pulling a drowning child from a swimming pool is acting
> instinctively or reflexively than to think that a human being
> doing the same thing is acting instinctively or reflexively.
> ...even if animals are incapable of demonstrating the morality
> of their actions, their intentional and straightforward kind,
> corageous, and otherwise virtuous acts can be moral actions,
> for they accord with accepted moral norms and, consequently, do
> not require justification to be moral."
Sounds reasonable to me.
>
> > If you agree that a human is a "moral agent", whatever that may mean,
> > and that a human is an animal (no arguments here I hope), then no
> > scientific evidence is necessary as only fundamental logic is needed.
>
> True. However, that does not apply to non-human animals.
>
I would say it does, provided we agree that the animals share behavior
motivations and stimuli with humans.
> >>Does this, in fact, undercut Regan's argument, and is it
> >>fatal to Regan's basic thesis?
>
> > How would it? I just read some decent pieces by Regan, though I don't
> > always agree with his language, I don't see the conflict.
>
> I don't think it is fatal to Regan's argument, but I think if we
> accept Sapontzis's view above, we might need to reconsider
> Regan's definition of non-humans as moral patients. Not difficult,
> if we say Regan defines as moral agents only those who can defend their
> actions by abstract reason. This would be related to his 18th-century
> approach to the definition of rights, IMO.
I'm OK with Regans "moral patients" ideas, as long as he doesn't make
it an either-or, patient or actor. Even adults are sometimes forced to
rely on the morals of others.
>
> >>You would think that last would matter to the anti-AR crowd,
> >>since they want to attack Regan.
>
> >>Those are real questions, but they require real knowledge
> >>of AR, and real ability to wrestle with theory. None of those
> >>on either side appears to have any ability to address them.
>
> > Either side of what? Beware the false dichotomy.
>
> Well, I think one either accepts that (some) non-humans have rights,
> or one doesn't. How rights are defined and applied is definitely
> open to varied interpretation.
>
You have found the problem there. Whether or not humans (or
non-humans) have "intrinsic rights", and what that might mean in
practice, is certainly hotly debated all over the usenet and the world.
> <snip>
>
> > Because the other is sacred of course. Without faith in your listener,
> > your reader - you are completely lost.
>
> Ah, very true. My faith has been severely shaken by the internet.
And stirred I hope.
Cheers-