"Speciesism" - nothing wrong with it
On 4/11/2012 8:46 PM, Rupert wrote:
> On Apr 11, 8:37 pm, George Plimpton > wrote:
>> On 4/11/2012 10:40 AM, Rupert wrote:
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>>> On Apr 11, 8:51 am, George > wrote:
>>>> On 4/10/2012 10:50 PM, Rupert wrote:
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>>>>> On Apr 11, 2:16 am, George > wrote:
>>>>>> On 4/10/2012 3:54 PM, Rupert wrote:
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>>>>>>> On Apr 10, 3:50 pm, George > wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 4/10/2012 12:35 AM, Rupert wrote:
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>>>>>>>>> On Apr 9, 10:41 pm, George > wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 4/9/2012 12:04 PM, Rupert wrote:
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>>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 9, 6:42 pm, George > wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/9/2012 9:15 AM, Rupert wrote:
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>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 9, 4:31 pm, George > wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/8/2012 11:43 PM, Rupert wrote:
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>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 9, 6:44 am, George > wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/8/2012 9:00 PM, Rupert wrote:
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>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 8, 7:06 pm, wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "Animal rights activists" - actually, most are "passivists", doing
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> nothing more than talk - commonly invoke "speciesism" to try to explain
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> why human use of animals is wrong. This is meaningless. First of all,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> all species are "speciesist": the members of all species pursue their
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> interests, as individual entities and as members of their species, with
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> no regard for the interests of other species.
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>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Some nonhuman animals do show concern for the interests of members of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> other species, and in any case there is no good reason why we should
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> use the behaviour of nonhuman animals as a moral guide.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> No other species show *moral* concern for interests of other species'
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> members.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The point of the post is that those who decry "speciesism" are relying
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on it to say that humans should not engage in it.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> No, they are not.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Yes, they are. You are requiring humans to behave a particular way due
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to their species. That's "speciesism" (an ugly, contrived word, in fact
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not even a real word at all, as every spell-checker in existence
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> demonstrates by flagging it as not a word.)
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> No, they're not requiring that humans behave a particular way due to
>>>>>>>>>>>>> their species. Saying that only moral agents have moral obligations is
>>>>>>>>>>>>> not speciesism.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> That's not what you're doing.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Why not?
>>
>>>>>>>>>> You tell us what your motive is.
>>
>>>>>>>>> I don't understand this.
>>
>>>>>> Yes, you do.
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>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The "ar" passivists
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> cannot give a coherent explanation of why "speciesism" is wrong, except
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by invoking it themselves. Only humans are capable of conceiving of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> interests of members of other species. To say that we /must/ is itself
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "speciesist."
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It's not.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You obviously don't understand what speciesism is.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I do understand full well what it is. In fact, it's sophistry.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Secondly, the only way the passivists attempt to show that it's wrong is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by comparison with other "isms" that they claim, without explanation,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are inherently and "obviously" wrong: racism, sexism, "heterosexism",
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> etc. This comparison is cynical and dishonest. First, a discussion of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *why* racism and sexism are (or might be) wrong quickly reveals that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> they comprise negative thoughts and actions against people of the same
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> species who share the same morally relevant characteristics as those who
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are doing the discriminating. A person's race or sex has no bearing on
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> his ability to participate in the moral community of humanity.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> There are plenty of intellectually disabled humans who cannot
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> participate in the moral comunnity of humanity to
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "marginal cases" doesn't work. It's useless.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Why not?
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I've explained that to you before, too. The argument from species
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> normality defeats it, among other things.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> The argument from species normality is flawed.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> No, it isn't. It fully defeats the fake argument from marginal cases.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Wrong.
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>>>>>>>>>> Nope; right.
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>>>>>>>>> What exactly are the premises of the argument from species normality?
>>
>>>>>>>> Above you wrote, "The argument from species normality is flawed." Do
>>>>>>>> you mean to say you wrote that without knowing what the premises are?
>>>>>>>> That seems very reckless and irresponsible.
>>
>>>>>>> I believe that one of the premises of the argument from species
>>>>>>> normality is that the moral consideration an individual should get is
>>>>>>> determined by what characteristics are typical for that individual's
>>>>>>> species, and I believe that it is possible to construct thought-
>>>>>>> experiments which show this premise to be problematic.
>>
>>>>>> Have a go at it.
>>
>>>>> Do you know the thought-experiment of the chimpanzee who can
>>>>> understand advanced mathematics?
>>
>>>> Yes, of course. It's the case of freak intelligence. It fails, because
>>>> it is not symmetric with a marginal human case. The actuality of the
>>>> chimp with freak intelligence entails the potentiality of moral
>>>> considerability, but the non-actuality of normal human cognition in the
>>>> marginal human does *not* entail the non-potentiality of being a moral
>>>> agent. We see this clearly with humans who are only temporarily
>>>> incapacitated, or with children who mostly will develop to be moral agents.
>>
>>> What do you mean by "potentiality"?
>>
>> Because humans are the unique class who are moral agents, then without
>> knowing anything else about a human being, you know at least that he has
>> the potential to be or to become a moral actor. Furthermore, even when
>> the actuality is that a human is not a moral actor, that doesn't mean he
>> isn't potentially one. This is obviously true of normal human infants,
>> people in a reversible coma, people under anesthesia, people who are
>> asleep, and others.
>>
>
> Again: what do you *mean* by "potential"?
Cut the shit, Woopert. You know what is meant by it.
>> It is not membership /per se/ in the class of beings who as a matter of
>> species normality have the morally relevant trait that leads us to
>> include marginal humans and exclude all other animals; it is the
>> *meaning* of it, which is the potentiality to exercising those faculties.
>>
>> There's another reason why the two marginal cases - freak-intelligent
>> chimp, comatose human - are not symmetric: we observe plenty of
>> marginal humans, most of whom develop or recover their faculty for moral
>> agency, but we have never observed a chimpanzee who can do mathematics
>> at a level that he ought to earn university admission, nor does anyone
>> reasonably expect we ever will.
>
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