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Rupert Rupert is offline
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Default The myth of food production "efficiency" in the "ar" debate

On Apr 26, 5:59*am, George Plimpton > wrote:
> On 7/26/2007 5:02 AM, Rupert wrote:
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> > On Jul 26, 6:06 pm, > *wrote:
> >> Rupert wrote:
> >>> On Jul 6, 5:41 pm, > *wrote:
> >>>>> That's not the meaning of "discrimination" we're talking about here..
> >>>>> We're saying that, if you make different moral judgements about two
> >>>>> different cases, you're under an obligation to specify a morally
> >>>>> relevant difference between them.
> >>>> How many times do I have to repeat this? The chief morally relevant
> >>>> differences between humans and non-humans, in fact among all organisms, are
> >>>> intelligence and sentience.

>
> >>> But this doesn't distinguish *all* humans from *all* nonhumans. How
> >>> many times do I have to repeat *that*?

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> >> You never even have to think it again, it has been dispelled by an
> >> alternative way of approaching the whole subject of moral beings.
> >> "THE MORAL STATUS OF BEINGS WHO ARE NOT PERSONS;
> >> A CASUISTIC ARGUMENT "

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> > Yes, I know you're impressed by that essay. I'm not impressed by that
> > part of it, as it stands. I don't find the explanation of the crucial
> > notion of "capacity" to be anything approaching adequate.

>
> Why not? *Just because it doesn't fit with what you want to believe?
>
> You /could/ learn what it is, but you're too lazy and self-absorbed for
> it. *Here's a start:
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> * * * "Thus, asked whether she can multiply two digit numbers, a child
> * * * who at present can only multiply one-digit numbers may say that
> * * * she cannot do so at present (ability), but that she is sure she
> * * * could learn to do so if properly instructed (capability)."
>


Where's this from? Is this from Jon Wetlesen's essay?

> >> The class of beings called "moral persons" satisfies this objection. No
> >> non-human possesses the inherent capacity to be a moral agent or to
> >> display the other markers for advanced intelligence and sentience. You
> >> have tried to hang your hat on a supposed lack of clarity of the word
> >> "capacity",

>
> > Pretty much no attempt has been made to explain this crucial concept.

>
> Bullshit. *You're just too ****ing lazy to go find it. *I found it, and
> I don't pretend to be a specialist.
>


In order for Wetlesen's argument to be a successful rebuttal of the
AMC, he has to argue that there is at least a possibility that a
permanently severely retarded human being possesses the capability for
moral agency. What you have said so far doesn't explain what the
meaning of this is. Nor is the explanation to be found anywhere in
Wetlesen's essay.

> > He's saying there's some property that all humans have and no
> > nonhumans have.

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> No, he isn't. *He isn't saying what all humans have at all.
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> > Fine, then it's his burden to state what it is.

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> Except that he's not saying it.
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> > He hasn't even begun to embark on this task.

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> Nor will he - he doesn't need to do so.
>


He acknowledges that in order to rebut the AMC he needs to identify
some property that marginal humans have and nonhumans lack, and that
it is his burden to identify this property. My remark was correct.

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> >> but that objection is weak and has not been put forth. In
> >> fact capacity is a transparent concept, an acorn possesses the capacity
> >> to become an oak tree, a fertile egg possesses the capacity to be a
> >> chicken, a baby human and a person in a coma possess the capacity to
> >> become a moral agent.

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> > That sounds like by "capacity" you mean "potential ability", which he
> > explicitly disavows.

>
> No, he doesn't. *Stop lying about what he wrote.
>


I'm not.

"However, a subject may have the capabilities of moral agency without
having the operative abilities. In that case the subject is a moral
person without being a moral agent, since moral personhood is grounded
on the actual capability and not on the potential ability." From
Wetlesen's essay, in the section "A rebuttal of the argument from
marginal cases".

Please don't accuse other people of lying when you have no rational
foundation for this accusation.

> > And "potential ability" won't cover the cases
> > where the human is permanently impaired.

>
> He addresses that separately.


No, his claim is that even a permanently impaired human may have the
capability for moral agency. This is crucial to his attempted rebuttal
of the AMC.

Have you read the essay?