On 7/26/2007 5:02 AM, Rupert wrote:
> On Jul 26, 6:06 pm, > wrote:
>> Rupert wrote:
>>> On Jul 6, 5:41 pm, > wrote:
>>>>> That's not the meaning of "discrimination" we're talking about here.
>>>>> We're saying that, if you make different moral judgements about two
>>>>> different cases, you're under an obligation to specify a morally
>>>>> relevant difference between them.
>>>> How many times do I have to repeat this? The chief morally relevant
>>>> differences between humans and non-humans, in fact among all organisms, are
>>>> intelligence and sentience.
>>
>>> But this doesn't distinguish *all* humans from *all* nonhumans. How
>>> many times do I have to repeat *that*?
>>
>> You never even have to think it again, it has been dispelled by an
>> alternative way of approaching the whole subject of moral beings.
>> "THE MORAL STATUS OF BEINGS WHO ARE NOT PERSONS;
>> A CASUISTIC ARGUMENT "
>>
>
> Yes, I know you're impressed by that essay. I'm not impressed by that
> part of it, as it stands. I don't find the explanation of the crucial
> notion of "capacity" to be anything approaching adequate.

Why not? Just because it doesn't fit with what you want to believe?

You /could/ learn what it is, but you're too lazy and self-absorbed for
it. Here's a start:

"Thus, asked whether she can multiply two digit numbers, a child
who at present can only multiply one-digit numbers may say that
she cannot do so at present (ability), but that she is sure she
could learn to do so if properly instructed (capability)."


>> The class of beings called "moral persons" satisfies this objection. No
>> non-human possesses the inherent capacity to be a moral agent or to
>> display the other markers for advanced intelligence and sentience. You
>> have tried to hang your hat on a supposed lack of clarity of the word
>> "capacity",
>
> Pretty much no attempt has been made to explain this crucial concept.

Bullshit. You're just too ****ing lazy to go find it. I found it, and
I don't pretend to be a specialist.


> He's saying there's some property that all humans have and no
> nonhumans have.

No, he isn't. He isn't saying what all humans have at all.


> Fine, then it's his burden to state what it is.

Except that he's not saying it.


> He hasn't even begun to embark on this task.

Nor will he - he doesn't need to do so.


>
>> but that objection is weak and has not been put forth. In
>> fact capacity is a transparent concept, an acorn possesses the capacity
>> to become an oak tree, a fertile egg possesses the capacity to be a
>> chicken, a baby human and a person in a coma possess the capacity to
>> become a moral agent.
>>
>
> That sounds like by "capacity" you mean "potential ability", which he
> explicitly disavows.

No, he doesn't. Stop lying about what he wrote.


> And "potential ability" won't cover the cases
> where the human is permanently impaired.

He addresses that separately.