On Apr 20, 11:24*am, George Plimpton > wrote:
> It has degrees; it isn't absolute. *If I see my neighbor Smith's dog get
> loose and attack my neighbor Jones's cat, I'll try to stop the attack
> and save Jones's cat. *If I see Smith's dog attack a squirrel in the
> front yard, I probably won't try to save the squirrel; if I do try to
> stop the attack, it will be more out of consideration for Smith and how
> he wants his dog to behave. *If I see a coyote come down the street and
> attack the squirrel, for certain I won't do anything to try to save the
> squirrel.
>
> The squirrel simply doesn't enter into my imprecise calculus of moral
> consideration in the same way that Jones's cat does, and to the extent
> it enters into it at all, it's highly context-dependent. *No one gives
> equal moral consideration to the interests of all beings capable of
> suffering, nor should we be expected to do so. *We may not be able to
> say exactly where we draw lines, but that doesn't mean it's arbitrary.
> In any case, the "ar" radicals tell us that arbitrariness sometimes
> doesn't matter, or sometimes it does, so they are being arbitrary.
>
> For example, I am told that it is permissible for me to take my kinship
> with my child into account in deciding whether to rescue him or some
> other child from an impending catastrophe where I have time to rescue
> only one of them. *However, the same source would tell me that if
> neither of the two children were my known relatives, but if one were of
> my race and the other were of a different race, I would not be able to
> use race - also an indication of kinship, even if much more remotely so
> than family - in deciding which one to rescue.
>
> The sophists are trying somehow, any way they can, to find a means to
> salvage something they intuitively like. *There is no rigor to it at all.


If Smith's dog attacks you Gooberdoodle what if anything do you think
Jones's cat should do about it?