On Apr 21, 12:04*pm, George Plimpton > wrote:
> On 4/21/2012 10:35 AM, Immortalist wrote:
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> > On Apr 20, 10:24 am, George > *wrote:
> >> It has degrees; it isn't absolute. *If I see my neighbor Smith's dog get
> >> loose and attack my neighbor Jones's cat, I'll try to stop the attack
> >> and save Jones's cat. *If I see Smith's dog attack a squirrel in the
> >> front yard, I probably won't try to save the squirrel; if I do try to
> >> stop the attack, it will be more out of consideration for Smith and how
> >> he wants his dog to behave. *If I see a coyote come down the street and
> >> attack the squirrel, for certain I won't do anything to try to save the
> >> squirrel.
>
> >> The squirrel simply doesn't enter into my imprecise calculus of moral
> >> consideration in the same way that Jones's cat does, and to the extent
> >> it enters into it at all, it's highly context-dependent. *No one gives
> >> equal moral consideration to the interests of all beings capable of
> >> suffering, nor should we be expected to do so. *We may not be able to
> >> say exactly where we draw lines, but that doesn't mean it's arbitrary.
> >> In any case, the "ar" radicals tell us that arbitrariness sometimes
> >> doesn't matter, or sometimes it does, so they are being arbitrary.
>
> >> For example, I am told that it is permissible for me to take my kinship
> >> with my child into account in deciding whether to rescue him or some
> >> other child from an impending catastrophe where I have time to rescue
> >> only one of them. *However, the same source would tell me that if
> >> neither of the two children were my known relatives, but if one were of
> >> my race and the other were of a different race, I would not be able to
> >> use race - also an indication of kinship, even if much more remotely so
> >> than family - in deciding which one to rescue.
>
> >> The sophists are trying somehow, any way they can, to find a means to
> >> salvage something they intuitively like. *There is no rigor to it at all.
>
> > If humans and other social animals have a propensity to be groupish,
> > dividing the world into an us vs them, then, would that justify making
> > moral choicees based upon this instinct such as helping one group but
> > not helping another group merely based upon a biological preference
> > for group identification?
>
> If it's a natural human tendency, then why would it need moral
> justification?

In court cases involving pathological groupishness like racial
discrimination and numerous other nasty and beastly human behaviors?