On Apr 20, 10:24*am, George Plimpton > wrote:
> It has degrees; it isn't absolute. *If I see my neighbor Smith's dog get
> loose and attack my neighbor Jones's cat, I'll try to stop the attack
> and save Jones's cat. *If I see Smith's dog attack a squirrel in the
> front yard, I probably won't try to save the squirrel; if I do try to
> stop the attack, it will be more out of consideration for Smith and how
> he wants his dog to behave. *If I see a coyote come down the street and
> attack the squirrel, for certain I won't do anything to try to save the
> squirrel.
>
> The squirrel simply doesn't enter into my imprecise calculus of moral
> consideration in the same way that Jones's cat does, and to the extent
> it enters into it at all, it's highly context-dependent. *No one gives
> equal moral consideration to the interests of all beings capable of
> suffering, nor should we be expected to do so. *We may not be able to
> say exactly where we draw lines, but that doesn't mean it's arbitrary.
> In any case, the "ar" radicals tell us that arbitrariness sometimes
> doesn't matter, or sometimes it does, so they are being arbitrary.
>
> For example, I am told that it is permissible for me to take my kinship
> with my child into account in deciding whether to rescue him or some
> other child from an impending catastrophe where I have time to rescue
> only one of them. *However, the same source would tell me that if
> neither of the two children were my known relatives, but if one were of
> my race and the other were of a different race, I would not be able to
> use race - also an indication of kinship, even if much more remotely so
> than family - in deciding which one to rescue.
>
> The sophists are trying somehow, any way they can, to find a means to
> salvage something they intuitively like. *There is no rigor to it at all.

If humans and other social animals have a propensity to be groupish,
dividing the world into an us vs them, then, would that justify making
moral choicees based upon this instinct such as helping one group but
not helping another group merely based upon a biological preference
for group identification? Is this impulse alone enough to justify
discrimination and favoritism or are there other reasons that need to
be added to justify your conclusion helping or promoting abuse?

....human nature appears to have been shaped by natural selection
working at multiple levels, including not just intra-group competition
but also inter-group competition. Haidt suggests that we have in our
minds what amounts to a “hive switch” that shuts down the self and
makes us feel, temporarily, that we are simply a part of a larger
whole (or hive). This uniquely human ability for self-transcendence is
crucial for understanding the origins of morality and religion...

http://newbooksinbrief.wordpress.com...onathan-haidt/
http://takimag.com/article/the_self_...e_sailer/print

(1) A group of bozos on a city street agree to join an social
experiment.

(2) Subjects (bozos) are divided into groups on basis of trivial
criteria like flipping a coin to deterimine if one is in Group X or
Group Y.

(3) Subjects do not interact, either within or between groups.

(4) Members of own group and other group remain anonymous.

(5) Subjects are then asked to allot money to two other subjects,
designated only by code number and group membership (X or Y). Subjects
own outcomes will not be affected by their allocation decisions.

(6) Despite minimal nature of these groups, subjects allocations
consistently favored other members of their own arbitrarily designated
groups, at the expense of members of the recently typed "outgroups".

[Tajfel] argues that the reason for this allocation strategy is to
create a differentiation between the groups which permits their group
membership to enhance their social identity.

------------------------------------------------
The Social Animal - Elliot Aronson - 8th Edition 1999
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0716733129/

Unreflected Ingroup Favoritism

One who reflects does not discriminate?: On the role of unreflected
cognitive processes for the occurrence of ingroup favoritism between
artificial groups; A categorization of individuals in two groups based
on completely trivial criteria like flipping a coin to determine which
group one is assigned (Group X or Group Y), can be sufficient to cause
mutual preferences for one's own group.

Social identity theory assumes a fundamental striving towards a
positive distinction of one's own group from other groups. The
tendency to a preference for one's own group is clearly reduced in a
situation involving intergroup judgments on negative comparison
dimensions or distribution decisions on negative stimuli (burdens,
aversive stimuli), in comparison to those in the positive realm.

These basic judgment processes may be the fundamental determining
factors of and conditions for social discrimination. Of some influence
may be the role which evaluations of oneself play for the positive
evaluation of minimal social groups. It is assumed that an unreflected
cognitive process is critical for this, in the course of which, as a
rule, the positive self-image is transferred to the new ingroup. Due
to the lesser degree of similarity to oneself, an outgroup cannot
benefit from such a generalization process.

Correspondingly, a positive distinctiveness of one's own group can
result solely from the self-ingroup relation, independent of an
ingroup-outgroup comparison. There is a generalized positive attitude
to the ingroup, and demonstrating the role of a low degree of
reflection for the occurrence of favoritism in minimal intergroup
situations and considerations of outgroups.

The randomly assigned individuals generally act as if those who share
their meaningless label are their good friends or close kin. Subjects
indicate that they like those who share their label. They rate others
who share their label as likely to have a more pleasant personality
and to have produced better output than outgroup members. Most
strikingly, subjects allocate more money and rewards to those who
share their labels.

In other related social experiments at political rallies it has been
noted that researchers faking injuries, were helped more or less
depending on whether their protest sign, and slogans supported or went
against those around them who could help.

The Social Animal - Elliot Aronson - 8th Edition 1999
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0716733129/