On 4/12/2012 8:52 AM, Rupert wrote:
> On Apr 12, 5:53 am, George > wrote:
>> On 4/11/2012 8:46 PM, Rupert wrote:
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>>> On Apr 11, 8:37 pm, George > wrote:
>>>> On 4/11/2012 10:40 AM, Rupert wrote:
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>>>>> On Apr 11, 8:51 am, George > wrote:
>>>>>> On 4/10/2012 10:50 PM, Rupert wrote:
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>>>>>>> On Apr 11, 2:16 am, George > wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 4/10/2012 3:54 PM, Rupert wrote:
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>>>>>>>>> On Apr 10, 3:50 pm, George > wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 4/10/2012 12:35 AM, Rupert wrote:
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>>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 9, 10:41 pm, George > wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/9/2012 12:04 PM, Rupert wrote:
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>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 9, 6:42 pm, George > wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/9/2012 9:15 AM, Rupert wrote:
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>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 9, 4:31 pm, George > wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/8/2012 11:43 PM, Rupert wrote:
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>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 9, 6:44 am, George > wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/8/2012 9:00 PM, Rupert wrote:
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 8, 7:06 pm, wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "Animal rights activists" - actually, most are "passivists", doing
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> nothing more than talk - commonly invoke "speciesism" to try to explain
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> why human use of animals is wrong. This is meaningless. First of all,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> all species are "speciesist": the members of all species pursue their
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> interests, as individual entities and as members of their species, with
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> no regard for the interests of other species.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Some nonhuman animals do show concern for the interests of members of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> other species, and in any case there is no good reason why we should
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> use the behaviour of nonhuman animals as a moral guide.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> No other species show *moral* concern for interests of other species'
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> members.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The point of the post is that those who decry "speciesism" are relying
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on it to say that humans should not engage in it.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> No, they are not.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Yes, they are. You are requiring humans to behave a particular way due
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to their species. That's "speciesism" (an ugly, contrived word, in fact
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not even a real word at all, as every spell-checker in existence
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> demonstrates by flagging it as not a word.)
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> No, they're not requiring that humans behave a particular way due to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> their species. Saying that only moral agents have moral obligations is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not speciesism.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That's not what you're doing.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Why not?
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> You tell us what your motive is.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>> I don't understand this.
>>
>>>>>>>> Yes, you do.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The "ar" passivists
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> cannot give a coherent explanation of why "speciesism" is wrong, except
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by invoking it themselves. Only humans are capable of conceiving of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> interests of members of other species. To say that we /must/ is itself
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "speciesist."
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It's not.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You obviously don't understand what speciesism is.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I do understand full well what it is. In fact, it's sophistry.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Secondly, the only way the passivists attempt to show that it's wrong is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by comparison with other "isms" that they claim, without explanation,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are inherently and "obviously" wrong: racism, sexism, "heterosexism",
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> etc. This comparison is cynical and dishonest. First, a discussion of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *why* racism and sexism are (or might be) wrong quickly reveals that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> they comprise negative thoughts and actions against people of the same
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> species who share the same morally relevant characteristics as those who
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are doing the discriminating. A person's race or sex has no bearing on
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> his ability to participate in the moral community of humanity.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> There are plenty of intellectually disabled humans who cannot
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> participate in the moral comunnity of humanity to
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "marginal cases" doesn't work. It's useless.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Why not?
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I've explained that to you before, too. The argument from species
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> normality defeats it, among other things.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The argument from species normality is flawed.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> No, it isn't. It fully defeats the fake argument from marginal cases.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Wrong.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Nope; right.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>> What exactly are the premises of the argument from species normality?
>>
>>>>>>>>>> Above you wrote, "The argument from species normality is flawed." Do
>>>>>>>>>> you mean to say you wrote that without knowing what the premises are?
>>>>>>>>>> That seems very reckless and irresponsible.
>>
>>>>>>>>> I believe that one of the premises of the argument from species
>>>>>>>>> normality is that the moral consideration an individual should get is
>>>>>>>>> determined by what characteristics are typical for that individual's
>>>>>>>>> species, and I believe that it is possible to construct thought-
>>>>>>>>> experiments which show this premise to be problematic.
>>
>>>>>>>> Have a go at it.
>>
>>>>>>> Do you know the thought-experiment of the chimpanzee who can
>>>>>>> understand advanced mathematics?
>>
>>>>>> Yes, of course. It's the case of freak intelligence. It fails, because
>>>>>> it is not symmetric with a marginal human case. The actuality of the
>>>>>> chimp with freak intelligence entails the potentiality of moral
>>>>>> considerability, but the non-actuality of normal human cognition in the
>>>>>> marginal human does *not* entail the non-potentiality of being a moral
>>>>>> agent. We see this clearly with humans who are only temporarily
>>>>>> incapacitated, or with children who mostly will develop to be moral agents.
>>
>>>>> What do you mean by "potentiality"?
>>
>>>> Because humans are the unique class who are moral agents, then without
>>>> knowing anything else about a human being, you know at least that he has
>>>> the potential to be or to become a moral actor. Furthermore, even when
>>>> the actuality is that a human is not a moral actor, that doesn't mean he
>>>> isn't potentially one. This is obviously true of normal human infants,
>>>> people in a reversible coma, people under anesthesia, people who are
>>>> asleep, and others.
>>
>>> Again: what do you *mean* by "potential"?
>>
>> Stop wasting time. It's not a difficult word, and English is your
>> native language.
>>
>
> It is not plausible that all humans have the potential to be moral
> agents.

/ex ante/, all humans do have that potential. /ex post/ we see that the
actuality is some humans have diminished capacity that prevents them
from attaining the normal human potential.