"Speciesism" - nothing wrong with it
On Apr 11, 8:37*pm, George Plimpton > wrote:
> On 4/11/2012 10:40 AM, Rupert wrote:
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> > On Apr 11, 8:51 am, George > *wrote:
> >> On 4/10/2012 10:50 PM, Rupert wrote:
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> >>> On Apr 11, 2:16 am, George > * *wrote:
> >>>> On 4/10/2012 3:54 PM, Rupert wrote:
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> >>>>> On Apr 10, 3:50 pm, George > * * *wrote:
> >>>>>> On 4/10/2012 12:35 AM, Rupert wrote:
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> >>>>>>> On Apr 9, 10:41 pm, George > * * * *wrote:
> >>>>>>>> On 4/9/2012 12:04 PM, Rupert wrote:
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> >>>>>>>>> On Apr 9, 6:42 pm, George > * * * * *wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>> On 4/9/2012 9:15 AM, Rupert wrote:
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> >>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 9, 4:31 pm, George > * * * * * *wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/8/2012 11:43 PM, Rupert wrote:
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> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 9, 6:44 am, George > * * * * * * *wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/8/2012 9:00 PM, Rupert wrote:
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> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 8, 7:06 pm, wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "Animal rights activists" - actually, most are "passivists", doing
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> nothing more than talk - commonly invoke "speciesism" to try to explain
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> why human use of animals is wrong. *This is meaningless. *First of all,
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> all species are "speciesist": *the members of all species pursue their
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> interests, as individual entities and as members of their species, with
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> no regard for the interests of other species.
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> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Some nonhuman animals do show concern for the interests of members of
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> other species, and in any case there is no good reason why we should
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> use the behaviour of nonhuman animals as a moral guide.
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> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> No other species show *moral* concern for interests of other species'
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> members.
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> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> The point of the post is that those who decry "speciesism" are relying
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> on it to say that humans should not engage in it.
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> >>>>>>>>>>>>> No, they are not.
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> >>>>>>>>>>>> Yes, they are. *You are requiring humans to behave a particular way due
> >>>>>>>>>>>> to their species. *That's "speciesism" (an ugly, contrived word, in fact
> >>>>>>>>>>>> not even a real word at all, as every spell-checker in existence
> >>>>>>>>>>>> demonstrates by flagging it as not a word.)
>
> >>>>>>>>>>> No, they're not requiring that humans behave a particular way due to
> >>>>>>>>>>> their species. Saying that only moral agents have moral obligations is
> >>>>>>>>>>> not speciesism.
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> >>>>>>>>>> That's not what you're doing.
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> >>>>>>>>> Why not?
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> >>>>>>>> You tell us what your motive is.
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> >>>>>>> I don't understand this.
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> >>>> Yes, you do.
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> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The "ar" passivists
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> cannot give a coherent explanation of why "speciesism" is wrong, except
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by invoking it themselves. *Only humans are capable of conceiving of the
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> interests of members of other species. *To say that we /must/ is itself
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "speciesist."
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> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It's not.
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> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is.
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> >>>>>>>>>>>>> You obviously don't understand what speciesism is.
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> >>>>>>>>>>>> I do understand full well what it is. *In fact, it's sophistry.
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> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Secondly, the only way the passivists attempt to show that it's wrong is
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by comparison with other "isms" that they claim, without explanation,
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are inherently and "obviously" wrong: *racism, sexism, "heterosexism",
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> etc. *This comparison is cynical and dishonest. *First, a discussion of
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *why* racism and sexism are (or might be) wrong quickly reveals that
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> they comprise negative thoughts and actions against people of the same
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> species who share the same morally relevant characteristics as those who
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are doing the discriminating. *A person's race or sex has no bearing on
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> his ability to participate in the moral community of humanity.
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> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> There are plenty of intellectually disabled humans who cannot
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> participate in the moral comunnity of humanity to
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> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> "marginal cases" doesn't work. *It's useless.
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> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Why not?
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> >>>>>>>>>>>> I've explained that to you before, too. *The argument from species
> >>>>>>>>>>>> normality defeats it, among other things.
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> >>>>>>>>>>> The argument from species normality is flawed.
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> >>>>>>>>>> No, it isn't. *It fully defeats the fake argument from marginal cases.
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> >>>>>>>>> Wrong.
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> >>>>>>>> Nope; right.
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> >>>>>>> What exactly are the premises of the argument from species normality?
>
> >>>>>> Above you wrote, "The argument from species normality is flawed." *Do
> >>>>>> you mean to say you wrote that without knowing what the premises are?
> >>>>>> That seems very reckless and irresponsible.
>
> >>>>> I believe that one of the premises of the argument from species
> >>>>> normality is that the moral consideration an individual should get is
> >>>>> determined by what characteristics are typical for that individual's
> >>>>> species, and I believe that it is possible to construct thought-
> >>>>> experiments which show this premise to be problematic.
>
> >>>> Have a go at it.
>
> >>> Do you know the thought-experiment of the chimpanzee who can
> >>> understand advanced mathematics?
>
> >> Yes, of course. *It's the case of freak intelligence. *It fails, because
> >> it is not symmetric with a marginal human case. *The actuality of the
> >> chimp with freak intelligence entails the potentiality of moral
> >> considerability, but the non-actuality of normal human cognition in the
> >> marginal human does *not* entail the non-potentiality of being a moral
> >> agent. *We see this clearly with humans who are only temporarily
> >> incapacitated, or with children who mostly will develop to be moral agents.
>
> > What do you mean by "potentiality"?
>
> Because humans are the unique class who are moral agents, then without
> knowing anything else about a human being, you know at least that he has
> the potential to be or to become a moral actor. *Furthermore, even when
> the actuality is that a human is not a moral actor, that doesn't mean he
> isn't potentially one. *This is obviously true of normal human infants,
> people in a reversible coma, people under anesthesia, people who are
> asleep, and others.
>
Again: what do you *mean* by "potential"?
> It is not membership /per se/ in the class of beings who as a matter of
> species normality have the morally relevant trait that leads us to
> include marginal humans and exclude all other animals; it is the
> *meaning* of it, which is the potentiality to exercising those faculties.
>
> There's another reason why the two marginal cases - freak-intelligent
> chimp, comatose human - are not symmetric: *we observe plenty of
> marginal humans, most of whom develop or recover their faculty for moral
> agency, but we have never observed a chimpanzee who can do mathematics
> at a level that he ought to earn university admission, nor does anyone
> reasonably expect we ever will.
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