On 4/11/2012 10:40 AM, Rupert wrote:
> On Apr 11, 8:51 am, George > wrote:
>> On 4/10/2012 10:50 PM, Rupert wrote:
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>>> On Apr 11, 2:16 am, George > wrote:
>>>> On 4/10/2012 3:54 PM, Rupert wrote:
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>>>>> On Apr 10, 3:50 pm, George > wrote:
>>>>>> On 4/10/2012 12:35 AM, Rupert wrote:
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>>>>>>> On Apr 9, 10:41 pm, George > wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 4/9/2012 12:04 PM, Rupert wrote:
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>>>>>>>>> On Apr 9, 6:42 pm, George > wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 4/9/2012 9:15 AM, Rupert wrote:
>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 9, 4:31 pm, George > wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/8/2012 11:43 PM, Rupert wrote:
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>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 9, 6:44 am, George > wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/8/2012 9:00 PM, Rupert wrote:
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 8, 7:06 pm, wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "Animal rights activists" - actually, most are "passivists", doing
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> nothing more than talk - commonly invoke "speciesism" to try to explain
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> why human use of animals is wrong. This is meaningless. First of all,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> all species are "speciesist": the members of all species pursue their
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> interests, as individual entities and as members of their species, with
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> no regard for the interests of other species.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Some nonhuman animals do show concern for the interests of members of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> other species, and in any case there is no good reason why we should
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> use the behaviour of nonhuman animals as a moral guide.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> No other species show *moral* concern for interests of other species'
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> members.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The point of the post is that those who decry "speciesism" are relying
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on it to say that humans should not engage in it.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> No, they are not.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Yes, they are. You are requiring humans to behave a particular way due
>>>>>>>>>>>> to their species. That's "speciesism" (an ugly, contrived word, in fact
>>>>>>>>>>>> not even a real word at all, as every spell-checker in existence
>>>>>>>>>>>> demonstrates by flagging it as not a word.)
>>
>>>>>>>>>>> No, they're not requiring that humans behave a particular way due to
>>>>>>>>>>> their species. Saying that only moral agents have moral obligations is
>>>>>>>>>>> not speciesism.
>>
>>>>>>>>>> That's not what you're doing.
>>
>>>>>>>>> Why not?
>>
>>>>>>>> You tell us what your motive is.
>>
>>>>>>> I don't understand this.
>>
>>>> Yes, you do.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The "ar" passivists
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> cannot give a coherent explanation of why "speciesism" is wrong, except
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by invoking it themselves. Only humans are capable of conceiving of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> interests of members of other species. To say that we /must/ is itself
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "speciesist."
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It's not.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> You obviously don't understand what speciesism is.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> I do understand full well what it is. In fact, it's sophistry.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Secondly, the only way the passivists attempt to show that it's wrong is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by comparison with other "isms" that they claim, without explanation,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are inherently and "obviously" wrong: racism, sexism, "heterosexism",
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> etc. This comparison is cynical and dishonest. First, a discussion of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *why* racism and sexism are (or might be) wrong quickly reveals that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> they comprise negative thoughts and actions against people of the same
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> species who share the same morally relevant characteristics as those who
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are doing the discriminating. A person's race or sex has no bearing on
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> his ability to participate in the moral community of humanity.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> There are plenty of intellectually disabled humans who cannot
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> participate in the moral comunnity of humanity to
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "marginal cases" doesn't work. It's useless.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Why not?
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> I've explained that to you before, too. The argument from species
>>>>>>>>>>>> normality defeats it, among other things.
>>
>>>>>>>>>>> The argument from species normality is flawed.
>>
>>>>>>>>>> No, it isn't. It fully defeats the fake argument from marginal cases.
>>
>>>>>>>>> Wrong.
>>
>>>>>>>> Nope; right.
>>
>>>>>>> What exactly are the premises of the argument from species normality?
>>
>>>>>> Above you wrote, "The argument from species normality is flawed." Do
>>>>>> you mean to say you wrote that without knowing what the premises are?
>>>>>> That seems very reckless and irresponsible.
>>
>>>>> I believe that one of the premises of the argument from species
>>>>> normality is that the moral consideration an individual should get is
>>>>> determined by what characteristics are typical for that individual's
>>>>> species, and I believe that it is possible to construct thought-
>>>>> experiments which show this premise to be problematic.
>>
>>>> Have a go at it.
>>
>>> Do you know the thought-experiment of the chimpanzee who can
>>> understand advanced mathematics?
>>
>> Yes, of course. It's the case of freak intelligence. It fails, because
>> it is not symmetric with a marginal human case. The actuality of the
>> chimp with freak intelligence entails the potentiality of moral
>> considerability, but the non-actuality of normal human cognition in the
>> marginal human does *not* entail the non-potentiality of being a moral
>> agent. We see this clearly with humans who are only temporarily
>> incapacitated, or with children who mostly will develop to be moral agents.
>>
>
> What do you mean by "potentiality"?

Because humans are the unique class who are moral agents, then without
knowing anything else about a human being, you know at least that he has
the potential to be or to become a moral actor. Furthermore, even when
the actuality is that a human is not a moral actor, that doesn't mean he
isn't potentially one. This is obviously true of normal human infants,
people in a reversible coma, people under anesthesia, people who are
asleep, and others.

It is not membership /per se/ in the class of beings who as a matter of
species normality have the morally relevant trait that leads us to
include marginal humans and exclude all other animals; it is the
*meaning* of it, which is the potentiality to exercising those faculties.

There's another reason why the two marginal cases - freak-intelligent
chimp, comatose human - are not symmetric: we observe plenty of
marginal humans, most of whom develop or recover their faculty for moral
agency, but we have never observed a chimpanzee who can do mathematics
at a level that he ought to earn university admission, nor does anyone
reasonably expect we ever will.