On 3/7/2012 9:01 AM, Derek wrote:
> On Wed, 07 Mar 2012 08:42:45 -0800, George > wrote:
>
>> On 3/7/2012 6:03 AM, Derek wrote:
>>> On Tue, 06 Mar 2012 13:45:21 -0800, George > wrote:
>>>> On 3/6/2012 1:09 PM, Derek wrote:
>>>>> On Tue, 06 Mar 2012 11:04:01 -0800, George > wrote:
>>>>>> On 3/6/2012 10:25 AM, Derek wrote:
>>>>>>> On Tue, 06 Mar 2012 12:35:28 +0000, > wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 06/03/2012 03:35, George Plimpton wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> They are? So, if you admit that *some* of your vegetables cause animal
>>>>>>>>> death - and they do - then you're a murderer, right?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> No. If I personally killed them or paid a food producer to kill them
>>>>>>>> on my behalf then yes I would be a murderer like you. I or rather
>>>>>>>> Derek explained this to you last time I was here.
>>>>>>>> __________________________________________________ ____
>>>>>>>> Meat eaters who fail to justify the deaths accrued during the
>>>>>>>> production of their food often try to head off any criticism from
>>>>>>>> vegans by demanding that they too must accept liability for the deaths
>>>>>>>> accrued during the production of their food. Farmers, they say, who
>>>>>>>> kill animals collaterally while producing vegetables, are under the
>>>>>>>> employ of vegetarians, just as farmers who kill animals to produce
>>>>>>>> meat are under the employ of meat eaters. The liability for these
>>>>>>>> animal deaths in both food groups is identical, they say, and the
>>>>>>>> vegan therefore has no grounds for criticising the meat eater. But
>>>>>>>> this is a dishonest argument which relies on ignoring the relationship
>>>>>>>> between the consumer (employer) and the farmer (employee). Unlike the
>>>>>>>> servant or agent who acts directly under his employer's dictates, the
>>>>>>>> farmer is an independent contractor who carries out his job according
>>>>>>>> to his own method. From Wiki;
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> [Historical tests centered around finding control between a supposed
>>>>>>>> employer and an employee, in a form of master and servant
>>>>>>>> relationship. The roots for such a test can be found in Yewens v
>>>>>>>> Noakes, where Bramwell LJ stated that:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> "...a servant is a person who is subject to the command of his
>>>>>>>> master as to the manner in which he shall do his work."
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The control test effectively imposed liability where an employer
>>>>>>>> dictated both what work was to be done, and how it was to be done.
>>>>>>>> This is aptly suited for situations where precise instructions are
>>>>>>>> given by an employer; it can clearly be seen that the employer is the
>>>>>>>> causal link for any harm which follows. If on the other hand an
>>>>>>>> employer does not determine how an act should be carried out, then the
>>>>>>>> relationship would instead be one of employer and independent
>>>>>>>> contractor. This distinction was explained by Slesser LJ:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> "It is well established as a general rule of English law that an
>>>>>>>> employer is not liable for the acts of his independent contractor in
>>>>>>>> the same way as he is for the acts of his servants or agents, even
>>>>>>>> though these acts are done in carrying out the work for his benefit
>>>>>>>> under the contract. The determination whether the actual wrongdoer is
>>>>>>>> a servant or agent on the one hand or an independent contractor on the
>>>>>>>> other depends on whether or not the employer not only determines what
>>>>>>>> is to be done, but retains the control of the actual performance, in
>>>>>>>> which case the doer is a servant or agent; but if the employer, while
>>>>>>>> prescribing the work to be done, leaves the manner of doing it to the
>>>>>>>> control of the doer, the latter is an independent contractor."]
>>>>>>>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vicario...in_English_law
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Unlike the meat eater who demands the death of animals for his food,
>>>>>>>> vegans do not command their employers to kill animals during the
>>>>>>>> production of their vegetables. The farmers they employ are not their
>>>>>>>> agents or servants subject to their commands as to the manner in which
>>>>>>>> they shall do their work. The relationship between the farmer and the
>>>>>>>> consumer is merely one of employer and independent contractor. Unlike
>>>>>>>> the vegan, meat eaters cannot escape criticism for the deaths accrued
>>>>>>>> during the production of their food, and trying to foist liability for
>>>>>>>> collateral deaths accrued during vegetable production onto vegans to
>>>>>>>> head off that criticism is a dishonest tactic long made plain by me
>>>>>>>> many years ago here on these animal-related forums.
>>>>>>>> __________________________________________________ ___
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Exactly right, Glen. There's no reason to believe every morsel of
>>>>>>> food you eat has a history of animal death behind it,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Vegetables generally have that history.
>>>>>
>>>>> No, I don't believe that.
>>
>> It's true all the same.
>
> No, I don't believe it is. If you want to support your claim you're
> going to have to provide irrefutable evidence, not guesswork.
>
>>>>>>> and there's
>>>>>>> absolutely no reason to believe you can be held morally responsible
>>>>>>> for the deaths that may occur,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Absolutely wrong, Derek.
>>>>>
>>>>> I'm sorry, but I'm going to go along with the well-established
>>>>> rule of English law that dictates,
>>>>>
>>>>> "It is well established as a general rule of English law that an
>>>>> employer is not liable for the acts of his independent contractor in
>>>>> the same way as he is for the acts of his servants or agents, even
>>>>> though these acts are done in carrying out the work for his benefit
>>>>> under the contract...."
>>>>
>>>> As noted when you first tried that gambit, that addresses a narrower
>>>> *legal* liability; we're talking about moral responsibility.
>>>
>>> No, it addresses both.
>>
>> It doesn't.
>
> It does.

It doesn't.


>> Legal liability is narrower than moral liability. It is
>> based on it, but it doesn't exhaust it.
>>
>>
>>> [Assigning vicarious responsibility
>>>
>>> How to Cite
>>>
>>> Shultz, T. R., Jaggi, C. and Schleifer, M. (1987), Assigning vicarious
>>> responsibility. European Journal of Social Psychology, 17: 377–380.
>>> doi: 10.1002/ejsp.2420170314
>>>
>>> Abstract
>>>
>>> An experiment tested three hypotheses about the conditions under which
>>> someone can be held vicariously responsible [snip remaining blabber]
>
> No, it's not blabber.

It's blabber.


>> So, you believe that consumers are under no obligation not to buy goods
>> made by slave labor or by workers suffering other severe human rights
>> abuses in countries like China.
>
> No, I do not. I have the latest iPad and many other items bought
> from China. I also have diamonds which most likely help fund
> atrocities in Africa. Do you own any of these items?

No.


>> You also just got all omnivores off the hook for their meat consumption,
>> because they bear *exactly* the same relationship to the meat producers
>> that vegetable consumers bear to the crop farmers. Thanks!
>
> No, I did not. If you go over what you snipped away you'll find
> that I covered all that.

No, you didn't. It is not in dispute that omnivores' relationship to
meat producers is identical in terms of degree of control and degree of
"superiority", whatever that's supposed to mean, as "vegans'"
relationship with crop producers.